A-10s over Kosovo (illustrations removed)

“Moonbeam, attacking this target will not cause collateral damage. Say reason for needing target approval.”

“Chili 11, we know the CAOC will insist on the information. We know we’ll get the approval faster if we have it ready.”

“Moonbeam, go ahead.”

“Chili 11, say distance and direction to nearest civilian buildings.”

“Moonbeam, the nearest civilian building is 400 meters to the west.”

“Chili 11, describe the building.”

“Moonbeam, the building is a farm building about 20-meters square.”

“Chili 11, Moonbeam, say type and location of the nearest civilian vehicle.”

(I paused to find one somewhere.)

“Moonbeam, the nearest civilian vehicle is a single car parked in the outskirts of Prizren, at least two kilometers from the target.”

“Moonbeam copies, stand by.”

We productively used the next several minutes (and gas) to locate some mortar pits farther to the south.

“Chili 11, Moonbeam.”

“Moonbeam, Chili 11, go ahead.”

“Chili 11, the CAOC wants to know if you can attack that target without causing collateral damage to the farm building 400 meters away.”

“I can’t believe this!” I transmitted privately to Colonel Thompson on the FM radio.

“Moonbeam, Chili 11, inform the CAOC that I can attack this target without causing collateral damage to a building 400 meters away.”

“Moonbeam copies, stand by.”

We finally got our attack clearance and proceeded to destroy all six of the big artillery pieces, using all the ordnance that was carried by another A-10 flight, a GR-7 flight, and us.

We began to accuse the CAOC folks of trying to FAC from their desks in Vicenza. This time, however, we took a different approach. We submitted a paper to the CAOC on ways to simplify the ROEs and reduce risk to the pilots, while maintaining the zero-collateral-damage safeguards. Col Stu Johnson, the CAOC chief of operations, sympathized with our request but reasoned that the alliance had about all it could take of changing ROEs. He said we’d have to do the best we could under the circumstances and promised to try to accelerate the approval process.

That he did. In the last week or so of the campaign, as the KLA stepped up its pressure on the Serbs, the delay in receiving our target-attack approval was significantly reduced. As noted earlier, this close control by the CAOC violated a basic tenet of air and space power, which calls for centralized control and decentralized execution. Just as centralized planning and control is critical to the proper application of airpower, our Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) reminds us that so is the concept of decentralized execution—“delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders is essential to achieve effective span of control and to foster initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility”(23). We experienced centralized control and execution. Consequently, our situational responsiveness and tactical flexibility suffered.

I want to emphasize that our discussion of ROEs, their application in OAF, and the influence that they had on our combat effectiveness is not intended to air gripes or to disparage the fine professionals who worked in the extremely difficult circumstances at the CAOC. When we complain about problems with “the CAOC,” we do not fix blame but merely identify the CAOC as our immediate contact in the command and control conduit. General Short, Colonel Johnson, and all the battlestaff directors who sat in “the chair” during the nonstop combat operations probably saved our unit from immeasurable pain on numerous occasions—and we never knew it. We did know that we had their support throughout OAF, and we gratefully and sincerely applauded their leadership after the NATO victory.

Nevertheless, we hope that we will never again fight a war with similar ROEs. We had no knowledge of the agendas of, or the interaction and dynamics between nations, heads of state, and our leaders (SECDEF, SACEUR, AFSOUTH, CFACC, and the CAOC). Therefore, we are unable to comment on what the ROEs could or should have been. We did understand that any targeting mistakes that took the lives of innocents could easily have unraveled the international support for the campaign. However, it is our conviction that the war was unnecessarily lengthened and that innocent Kosovar lives were lost because we did not have streamlined ROEs which supported decentralized execution. Our recommendations for the future:

• Push responsibility and authority to the lowest possible level—trust those who are well trained to do their jobs.

• Develop unambiguous target-identification procedures that allow for decentralized decision making at the AFAC level.

• Consider calling a “time out” for a day or two to gather the experts and decide on a best way to go forward when the ROEs adversely affect combat operations.

• Ensure that all war fighters fully understand the ROEs.

When Things Work Out Maj Pete “Bro” Brotherton