Just as Russia’s human rights agenda is focused on the idea of fascism, so too does the issue of fascism color Russia’s information warfare and its views of history. Certainly, the struggle against Nazi forces during the Second World War left an indelible imprint on the Soviet and Russian psyche. In the war against the fascists, some 20 to 30 million Soviet citizens of various nationalities died—more deaths than any single country suffered. Since the 2000s, however, the Russian government has increasingly turned the idea of fascism into a political tool and Russian historians are increasingly promoting this Kremlin line.112
Indeed, fascism has served the Kremlin as a useful label to pin on its opponents—whether the Baltic States, the West in general, or since 2014 the Ukrainian government. This process of manufacturing enemies out of foreign states and peoples via the media has been demonstrated in the case of Latvia by American-Latvian political scientist and Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks, but a similar process can be seen vis-à-vis other states as well.113 These efforts to manufacture “self” versus “other” also serve to unify Russian society with ideological conceptions which are centered on three pillars of Russian national identity: Christian Orthodoxy, victory against fascism in the Second World War, and anti-Americanism.114Two possible motives drive Russia’s efforts in the historical sphere. First, Putin’s regime has been consciously rehabilitating Soviet-era leaders as symbols as well as returning to a Soviet interpretation of history.115
Second, Moscow’s historical revisionism seeks to counter the efforts of Central and Eastern Europe to study Soviet persecutions and deportations against both the Russian people and other nations. In the EU, there has been a movement to recognize Soviet historical crimes equally with those of the Nazis. In April 2009, with the support of Baltic and Polish members, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the European conscience and totalitarianism that came just short of equating Soviet and Nazi crimes.116 Likewise, the EU has created Black Ribbon Day or the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, and an educational project, the Platform of European Memory and Conscience. However, the regime of Vladimir Putin relies on disinformation and historical reinterpretations not to reassess the past but instead to push forward its foreign policy agenda in the present—particularly when it comes to “protecting” its so-called compatriots and claiming people and territories that are perceived as historically Russian.STAGE 6: PROTECTION
The previous five stages of the reimperialization trajectory would traditionally represent softer forms of a state’s influence. In the case of Russia, however, these soft instruments have been highly securitized, reflecting “soft coercion” rather than traditional soft power. The sixth stage, that of “protecting” Russian compatriots, marks a concrete departure from softer methods toward hard power. This is the stage where military campaigns could commence, though hybrid warfare is possibly more likely to play a role than conventional warfare.
The implicit notion of protecting Russian compatriots is present at nearly all of the five previous stages of the trajectory. Humanitarian policies deal specifically with seeking to ensure and protect the rights of the Russian compatriots. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Russia’s laws, policies, and strategies on compatriot issues enshrine, institutionalize, and legalize this protection even when such a practice is unusual in international law. An offer of a passport is in its very essence an offer of state protection—both inside and outside Russia’s borders. Finally, information warfare often focuses on the alleged violations of Russian human rights, threats of fascism, and even preposterous accusations of genocide of the Russian diaspora, as voiced by the main federal investigative authority, the Russian Investigative Committee, during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in late 2014.117
Thus, Moscow-led protection of compatriots becomes the natural extension of earlier Russian policies.