(Cambridge Concise Histories) Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki - A Concise History of Poland-Cambridge University Press (2006)

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monarchy and that only the existing Sejm had the authority to elect a new king. While the radicals wanted a ‘people’s war’ against Russia, the moderate leadership hoped that a successful military campaign would force Nicholas and the Great Powers to revise the clauses of the Vienna treaties relating to Poland. Secretly, Cz.ar-toryski was even willing to retain a loose dynastic link with Russia. He was anxious to reassure the governments of Europe, especially Austria and Prussia, that the Polish revolution was national, that its aim was the Kingdom’s independence, and that it was in no way socially subversive. Yet the force of events extended Polish war aims. The spread of the insurrection to the western guhernii of Russia compelled the Sejm, in another act of defiance against the treaty of Vienna, to pass a bill in May 1831 incorporating that vast area into the Polish state. Nicholas in the meantime had resolved that he would reduce the Kingdom’s autonomy, while to surrender to the full territorial demands of the Poles would be tantamount to relegating Russia from the ranks of the Great Powers. The Poles were now left with no alternative but to fight and win a war with Russia.

The well-trained Polish army, which reached 80,000 effectives, gave a good account of itself. On 25 February Chlopicki halted the Russian advance on Warsaw at Grochow, the largest land battle fought in Europe between Waterloo and the Crimean War. A string of subsequent Polish successes in the spring alarmed St Petersburg, but the defeat of the indecisive General Skrzynecki at Ostrolęka on 26 May turned the scales of the war against the Poles. Commanded by the experienced campaigner Paskevich, the Russian army was able to cross the Vistula near the Prussian border and approached Warsaw from the west. The prospect of defeat led to vicious street unrest in Warsaw in mid-August and to recriminations within the National Government. Czartoryski’s suggestion that the Poles should seek Austrian protection infuriated Lelewel and the radicals who now pressed for the creation of an egalitarian republic. The government resigned and full power was finally conferred on one man, General Jan Krukowiecki, who restored order. But by then it was all too late. Conscious of the ignominious behaviour of the Targowica Confederacy in 1792, the Polish civilian and military leadership refused to capitulate to the tsar and went into exile.

The glaring differences in resources between Russia and the landlocked Congress Kingdom were bound to tell eventually on the war’s outcome, yet there were specific failings on the Polish side. The Poles lacked political unity during the early stages of the insurrection. Some of their leaders were doubtful about their chances of success, while the 200-man Sejm retained effective control of the war effort and deprived the National Government of real power. On balance, the Polish high command showed less initiative than Marshal Paskevich. The rising also lacked wide social support. No imaginative attempt was made to win over the peasant masses; even a modest government bill to enable peasants on crown lands to purchase their own freeholds was rejected by the Sejm in April. And for all its respect for the social order, the Polish leadership failed to win any effective international support. The enthusiasm for the Polish cause among the public of Britain, Germany, and especially France was widespread. Casimir Dela-vigne’s impassioned song ’La Varsovienne’ was sung in Paris in March 183 t to the stirring music by d’Auber, and rapidly acquired in translation a prominent place in the repertoire of Polish patriotic songs. Across much of Germany resounded songs (the so-called Polenlieder) in praise of the valiant Poles. Yet nothing could sway the governments into action. The cabinets of Berlin and Vienna remained neutral but essentially hostile, while the British and the French were preoccupied with acute domestic problems and were at loggerheads over the Belgian Question.

The cost of defeat for the Poles was disastrous; not only did the mirage of a large independent Poland dissolve into thin air but most of the limited gains of 1815 were also lost. Nicholas I formally respected the Vienna treaties by retaining the Kingdom as a separate administrative and legal unit, but he abolished the constitution, the Sejm and the Polish army. The university of Warsaw was closed down. Excluded from a general amnesty were the original conspirators, all members of the Sejm and of the National Government, and all exiles. Paskevich, now created ‘prince of Warsaw’, remained an all-powerful viceroy with a permanent army of occupation. In 1833 martial law was introduced, and a vast citadel-prison was built to overawe the restive city.

The end of the Kingdom’s statehood encouraged Prussia and

Austria to rescind some of their concessions to the Polish nationality. In 1833-4 three partitioning powers mutually guaranteed their respective Polish possessions and committed themselves to the suppression of all revolutionary activity. The 'Holy Alliance’ was back in business. Even the papacy, committed to the preservation of the international order, condemned the insurrection. In the western gubernii the local insurgents had to endure hard labour, servitude in the tsarist army, and the loss of their property. The closure of the university of Wilno (except for the medical and theological faculties) and of the entire network of Polish schools was a tragic blow to Polish culture, yet only the beginning of the region’s further russification.

With the collapse of the insurrection in 183 1, about 10,000 Polish exiles, including much of the Kingdom’s political, military and cultural elite, headed west, mostly to Prance. They promoted among their hosts an idealized vision of Poland as a heroic victim of tsarist tyranny and did much to promote russophobia among western liberals and radicals. In the west the exiles were also free to assess the causes of their failure and to discuss and prepare various plans for their country’s future salvation. Indeed, the next decade and a half witnessed among the ‘Great Emigration’ an extraordinary flowering of Romantic literary creativity and of political and social thought which was to exert a deep impact on Polish national consciousness. Of the exiled bards the greatest was Mickiewicz. In his Books of the Polish nation and Polish pilgrimage (1832.) he called on the exiles (‘the soul of the Polish nation’) to prepare for ‘a universal war for the freedom of peoples’, and gave expression to his messianic vision of Poland as the ‘Christ of Nations’ whose resurrection would bring about the religious regeneration of mankind. In his lectures at the College de France between 1840 and Г844 Mickiewicz was to develop his subversive attacks on the existing European order, drawing on himself inevitably the opprobrium of the French authorities. The poet Juliusz Slowacki considered nations as spiritual categories that should be led by revolutionary spiritual elites. While endorsing the ideal of national self-determination, the conservative Zygmunt Krasinski was disturbed by the notions of popular sovereignty advocated by Mickiewicz and Slowacki, and in his Undivine comedy (1835) presented an apocalyptic vision of the destruction of the old social order by ‘the hungry and the poor’. Mickiewicz’s revolutionary eschatology was also attacked by Cyprian Norwid, the last of the great philosophizing poets of the Romantic period, who was to warn against raising patriotism into an ‘unjustified religion’.

What emotionally united all the poets and all the exiles was the music of Frederic Chopin: from the powerful ‘Revolutionary’ etude (op. 10 no. 12. in С minor), in which the composer was believed to express his anguish on hearing of Warsaw’s fall in September 1831, to his preludes, mazurkas and krakowiaks which conveyed sentiments of yearning for the distant homeland. More than the written word, it is Chopin’s music that remains the purest and the most universally accessible expression of Polish Romantic feeling. It is extraordinary how this frail and sickly man, who never lifted a sword or gun in the national cause, is revered to the present day as a sacred national icon.

The political and ideological disputes that had raged in Warsaw during the insurrection acquired even greater intensity in exile in a climate of mutual recrimination. Within the wide spectrum of emigre political groupings, the most prestigious was that led from Paris by Prince Czartoryski, whose support for a modern constitutional monarchy based on a propertied and educated electorate attracted moderate conservatives and liberals. As a statesman of international renown, Czartoryski cultivated unofficial links with the governments of Britain and France and established across Europe an extensive network of agents. At first he concentrated on defending Poland’s limited rights as defined by the treaties of 1815, a legalistic position tactically justified to win international support but condemned by many of his less restrained fellow exiles. Two conditions, Czartoryski sensibly argued, had to be met for a Polish national uprising to succeed: it had to coincide with a major European war between Russia and the Western Powers, and it had to enjoy wide peasant support, which could only be gained if the nobility voluntarily endowed the peasants with their own landholdings. The vital lessons of 183 т had clearly been learnt, not that they brought independence any nearer. In 1840 Czartoryski adopted a more independent policy by using his agents to weaken Russian influence in the Balkans and to promote the cause of nationality in general. He also persuaded the papacy to modify its originally negative stance towards Polish nationalism.

Despite his relentless defence of the Polish cause, the majority of the exiles turned their backs on the aristocratic Czartoryski and sought more radical if equally fruitless solutions. While Czartoryski considered the traditions of the szlachta as the essential ingredient of Polish national values, Lelewel found theoretical inspiration for his collectivist brand of democracy in his romanticized pseudo-historic accounts of primitive Slavonic communes in pre-Christian Poland. With his associates from the Patriotic Society Lelewel put his hopes in the early overthrow of the continental autocracies by the carbonari; he joined ‘Young Europe’, the international revolutionary republican brotherhood led by Giuseppe Mazzini. The efforts of Lelewel’s emissaries to rekindle the flames of insurrection in Russian Poland not only failed but also provoked the tsarist authorities to weaken even further Polish and Catholic influence in the western gubernii. In 1839 the Greek Catholic Church with its 2 million mostly Belarusian-speaking adherents was formally absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1840 the Lithuanian legal code, the last functioning institutional link with the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was replaced by Russian law, and in the south-western (Ukrainian) gubernii Governor-General Bibikov zealously implemented the policy of reducing the legal status of the petty szlachta to that of ‘one-dwelling peasants’.

As the conspiratorial work of Lelewel’s Young Poland fizzled out in the late 1830s, it was replaced as the main left-wing rival to Czartoryski by the more realistic and larger Polish Democratic Society, founded in Paris in 1832. The Democratic Society called for the removal of all social privileges, and for the inclusion of all social groups within a modern democratic nation of equal citizens. After bitter internal wrangles most of the democrats acknowledged that the participation of the szlachta, with its tradition of political and personal liberty, was essential for the recovery of independence; at the same time they insisted that the peasants had to acquire full property rights to their holdings without the payment of any indemnity. After 1840 the Polish Democratic Society was run from Versailles by a five-man directorate; its most outstanding strategist was Wiktor Heltman, who had already been involved in student conspiracies in 1817. The Democratic Society’s critical but ultimately conciliatory approach to the nobility and its acceptance of private property as the basis of society was not shared by one of its splinter groups, the Commune of the Polish People formed in Portsmouth by exiled non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Drawing eclectically on all schools of French socialist and democratic thought, and inspired by Lelewel’s theories of primitive Slav communalism, the Commune called for the overthrow of the nobility, the introduction of collective landownership, and the rejection of western industrialization. Isolated from the majority of the exiles and weakened by internal feuds, the populists were soon to learn how poorly the cause of agrarian socialism was to fare in Poland.

It was clear by the 1840s that all active emigre groups in various degrees accepted the involvement of the peasantry in the national struggle as a precondition of a successful insurrection. It was an urgent matter since it was feared that the partitioning governments would improve the peasants’ lot and thereby rob the peasants of the material incentive to join the national cause. At the same time it needs to be borne in mind that the Polish radicals and democrats saw in the Lithuanian-, Belarusian- and Ukrainian-speaking serfs of the western gubernii future equal citizens of a democratic Polish nation embracing all the lands that had constituted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772. In that sense they identified Polish territorial claims in the east with the universal cause of liberty. Whether this generous vision had any mileage within the complex and increasingly confrontational ethnic, religious and social realities of that region remained to be seen.

It is worth noting at this juncture that not all men of talent who found themselves outside Poland in this period remained in Europe or were always directly involved in politics. Ignacy Domeyko, a geologist and railway builder, contributed much to the economic and educational life of Colombia and Chile, while Paul Edmund Strzelecki was a pioneering explorer in Australia and named that country’s highest peak after Košciuszko. For those educated Poles who did not have to choose exile, and who eschewed political agitation or revolutionary conspiracy, there remained some scope

for legal economic and cultural activity within the limits set by the governments of the partitioning states. It was in Poznania that political and material conditions were most favourable in the 1840s for all such work of social improvement, which became known in Polish as ‘organic work’ (praca organiczna). Prussian rule mellowed under the liberal-minded Frederick William IV, and it was possible for the philanthropist Karol Marcinkowski to launch a variety of practical initiatives in the fields of education, commerce and the crafts. A conceptual framework for this activity was provided by the eminent FFegelian philosopher August Cieszkowski, who endorsed modern scientific and bourgeois civilization. Modern agricultural methods also raised the productivity of noble-owned estates and peasant farms in Poznania. The increased cultivation of the potato, in western and then central Poland, added a much welcomed nutritional boost to the peasants’ staple diet of brown bread and vegetables, especially the ubiquitous cabbage. Industry and commerce continued to make impressive inroads in the Congress Kingdom in the 1830s and 1840s, especially in textiles and railway building; the Warsaw-Vienna railway, financed by private investors, was completed in 1848. Many of the Kingdom’s substantial landowners accepted the necessity of modernizing the retarded rural economy; the case was growing for commuting peasant labour dues into money rents, and even for introducing a land reform on the Prussian model. It is noteworthy that it was in Russian-occupied Wilno in the early and mid-1840s that Stanislaw Moniuszko, the creator of the Polish national opera, wrote and produced some of his earliest works. In Galicia, however, backward social conditions and the absence of committed activists militated against ‘organic work’.

Against this background of gradual economic improvement, wealth creation and political realism, the scheming exiles and revolutionaries seemed at times to be a peripheral element in the daily lives and concerns of their fellow countrymen. For all their zeal the different Polish movements for national and social liberation had clearly failed by 1840 to overthrow the foreign yoke: there was no great F.uropean war nor was there a great rising of the peoples of Europe. Yet this did not deter further attempts to challenge the political and social order in Poland; Czartoryski continued with his propaganda and the exiled Polish Democratic Society set about restoring an underground network across Poland in the early j 840s. While the programme of the Democratic Society was potentially relevant in the more advanced Poznania, the ground in Russian and Austrian Poland was less fertile for modern democratic ideas. Yet it was there that a new generation of impatient radicals set to work. Henryk Kamienski and his nephew Edward Dembowski, two ‘penitent’ noblemen, espoused the cause of a peasant revolution and of a ‘people’s war’ as the only solution to Poland’s national and social predicament. Dressed as a peasant, Dembowski wandered through the villages of Galicia preaching his revolutionary gospel, only to realise that his listeners were more interested in property rights than in rural socialism. He duly felt obliged to modify his message, but his call for action found a response among the leadership of the Democratic Society which was also encouraged by the existence in 1844 of a populist conspiracy led by Piotr Sciegienny, a revolutionary parish priest in Lublin province.

The continuing rumbles of discontent in the villages of Galicia and of the Kingdom were interpreted by the democrats as evidence of an imminent revolutionary outburst that had to be channelled in the national cause. There was no time to waste. The directory of the Democratic Society in Versailles coordinated plans for a national insurrection throughout Poland for 1846. The forces of the partitioning states were to be destroyed piecemeal by a mass peasant army at the head of which was to stand the 32-vear-old emigre I.udwik Mieroslawski, in whom the democrats recognized a rare but so far unproved strategic genius. Even Czartoryski, unable to halt the revolutionary movement yet desperate to prevent an internecine class war, urged the nobility to participate. But the agitation of the democrats and populists among the peasantry was nothing less than playing with fire; their failure to appreciate the deep social and cultural divisions in large areas of the Polish countryside was soon to be borne out in a horrifying and tragic fashion.

Mieroslawski and his associates were betrayed to the Prussian police before any action could begin in Poznania; the Russians too quickly foiled the conspiracy in the Kingdom. Conditions were more favourable in the Republic of Krakow, where the free and propertied peasants rallied in support of the democratic revolutionary government established in February 1846, which Prince Czartoryski recognized out of patriotic solidarity. In the western half of Galicia, however, the gulf between the patriotic and democratic ideology of the insurgents and the class antagonism of the semiserfs ended in catastrophe. The Polish-speaking Catholic peasants turned against the rebels and their liberal gentry sympathizers in an orgy of killing and destruction. Dembowski, who joined the Krakow revolution, was killed by the Austrians while leading an unarmed religious procession from the city on 27 February in a desperate bid to win over the Galician peasants. Having manipulated the peasants’ fury in suppressing the insurrection, the Austrian government then forced them back to their villages, and to their feudal duties. The Republic of Krakow, the last island of Polish freedom, was annexed by Austria, with Russian and Prussian consent and despite British and French protests. The mirage of national and social solidarity burst in the aftermath of the Galician jacquerie. While the authorities mopped up what was left of the revolutionary network, many landowners came to the conclusion that they would have to seek government protection of their economic and social interests. At the same time Tsar Nicholas moved briskly in 1 846 and 1848 to reduce the danger of a peasant explosion in his Polish lands and to lessen the influence of the Polish nobility there; in the Kingdom he granted security of tenure to the peasants, and in the western gubernii he placed firm limits on the seigneurial exploitation of the serfs.

Just as the events of 1846 exposed the gross unreality of a ‘people’s war’, so too did the ideal of the brotherhood of nations founder on the rocks of conflicting nationalisms during the revolutions that gripped much of continental Europe in 1848 and 1 849. Russian Poland remained sullenly quiet in 1848-9 as Nicholas I tightened his repressive controls. Elsewhere, however, in exile and at home many Polish patriots were galvanized into action by the revolutionary wave that seemed to herald the collapse of absolutism in Prussia and Austria, and of the international order that sanctioned the subjugation of their country. Mickiewicz threw himself body and soul behind the cause of revolutionary internationalism in Italy and France; Mieroslawski was released from prison in Berlin and set to work to organize a Polish army and administration in Poznania, where the poet Slowacki also arrived to lend encouragement. Alluring prospects of an alliance between the new Liberal government of Prussia and the Poles, supported by the French Republic, against Russia proved short-lived. In the end Berlin was not willing to go beyond the division of Poznania into two ethnic areas and when this was rejected by the Poles the Prussian army restored full control in April and May 1848. The initial support, in March, of the German Pre-Parliament in Frankfurt for Polish independence evaporated in July in acrimonious arguments over Germany’s future eastern border; only a handful of radicals remained true to German solidarity with Polish national aspirations. In Paris, on 1 5 May, thousands of workers, to the cry of ‘Vive la Pologne!', invaded the National Assembly. Lamartine spoke movingly in Poland’s favour, but the French Republic dared not risk waging a major war for Poland’s liberation.

Memories of the tragedy of 1846 were all too recent in Galicia and the response of the local Poles to the Viennese revolution in March 1848 was initially cautious and limited to a petition for autonomy for the province. In a separate attempt to win over the peasants to the national cause, the Polish national committees in Krakow (reinforced here by members of the Democratic Society) and in Lwow invited the landed nobility voluntarily to abolish labour dues on Easter Sunday. They were outmanoeuvred by the Austrian governor Stadion, who pre-empted the Polish leaders by first announcing the end of the corvee in the Emperor’s name on Easter Saturday, and then bombarding Krakow into submission on 26 April. Continuing revolutionary ferment in Vienna in May 1848 and the spread of nationalist uprisings in Italy and Hungary encouraged the Poles to rally again. This time a 20,000-strong national guard was created; there was even talk of Galicia becoming a kind of Piedmont, an independent Polish centre front which would proceed the liberation of the rest of Poland.

By now, however, Polish aspirations clashed in the east of Galicia with those of the young Ukrainian national movement, focused around the Uniate Church, which demanded imperial protection against the Poles and the division of Galicia along ethnic lines. In the summer and autumn of 1848 the imperial authorities showed considerable powers of recuperation: they exploited all inter-ethnic conflicts, and found that many peasants, now emancipated and free from the corvee, showed limited support for national movements led by the gentry and the intelligentsia. Province after province fell to the imperial forces, which eventually in November restored full control over Galicia. About four thousand Polish fighters managed to escape across the Carpathian mountains to join the Hungarians, who still defied the Habsburgs. The Polish generals Jozef Bern and Henryk Dembinski, veterans of the 1831 war against Russia, were given high commands; Bern was eventually appointed overall commander of the Hungarian army. At this juncture the Habsburgs turned to St Petersburg for help. Implacably hostile to the national awakening in central Europe and to any developments that might raise the hopes of his ungrateful Polish subjects, Tsar Nicholas willingly obliged and in May 1849 dispatched a Russian expeditionary force under Field-Marshal Paskevich, the conqueror of Warsaw in 1831. Within three months the Hungarians were crushed and thousands of exiles, including the Poles, had to flee into Ottoman territory.

The Polish contribution to the revolutions and wars of liberation in Italy, western Germany and Hungary in 1848-9 did more than justice to the Polish patriots’ internationalist slogan of ‘For Your Freedom and Ours’, but the national rivalries in Poland and elsewhere also revealed that the Romantic belief in the brotherhood of Europe’s nations was mostly wishful thinking. In the long run the events of 1848-9 did contribute to the strengthening of Polish national consciousness. The brief revolutionary period witnessed the blossoming of unfettered journalism and public debate in both Prussian and Austrian Poland. The willingness of the emancipated peasants of Poznania to rally to the national cause was profoundly telling, and helped in due course to shape the sturdy Polish nationalism of that region. And even in Silesia the social upheavals of 1848-9 reawakened among the Polish-speaking peasantry an attachment to their mother tongue. By the same token, the end of serfdom in Galicia was to begin the lengthy process of integrating the Polish-speaking peasants there into a wider Polish community. In the eastern part of that province Ukrainian national feeling was to prevail.

On the other hand, the contrasting experiences in the separate parts of Poland in 1848-9 only accentuated the already pronounced regional differences between them. The partition frontiers appeared as firmly drawn as ever. Inevitably, the influence of the emigres plummeted; many educated Poles in Poland now resented the claims of the exiles to guide the nation’s destiny. In the years that followed, the advocates of non-revolutionary methods gained the upper hand in the Prussian and Austrian parts. Conservative Polish deputies attended the Prussian parliament, established in 1851, while the appointment in 1850 of a Polish viceroy in Galicia, Count Agenor Goluchowski, encouraged the loyalism of the Galician aristocracy to the Habsburgs.

The outbreak in 1854 of the Crimean War, in which Britain, France and Turkey challenged Russian ambitions in the Balkans, appeared at first to be Providence’s answer to the lengthy prayers of the dejected Polish exiles, who promptly raised a variety of armed formations to fight against Russia. Mickiewiez, the embodiment of Polish Romantic defiance, himself arrived in Constantinople to help the military effort, only to be struck down by cholera. However, by agreeing to sue for peace in 1855, the new tsar Alexander II successfully deflected the British and French threat to widen the conflict to embrace the Polish Question, which was excluded from the agenda of the Paris peace conference of 1856.

At the same time the era of reforms that Alexander II launched after the debacle of the Crimean War could not ignore Russia’s Polish lands. An amnesty for political prisoners, the suspension of military recruiting, the opening of a medical academy in Warsaw, and the appointment of the conciliatory Prince Gorchakov as viceroy in the Congress Kingdom all heralded a much-welcomed political thaw, which also coincided with a period of vigorous economic growth. Police controls were eased and restrictions on public activity lifted. In .1858 Count Andrzej Zamoyski, the largest landowner in the Kingdom, was permitted to launch an Agricultural Society which attracted the old established landed nobility as well as landowners of recent bourgeois, including Jewish, origin. While initially concerned with the urgent issue of agrarian reform, the Agricultural Society became in effect the national forum for moderate opinion in the Kingdom, a kind of substitute Sejm. The cause of peaceful modern progress was also promoted by Leopold Kronenberg, Warsaw’s most influential banker and industrialist, and a Jewish convert to Calvinism, who associated himself closely with Zamoyski.

Among Warsaw’s intelligentsia, voices could also be heard calling for the introduction of accountable local government and for wider social reform, including Jewish emancipation and the abolition of peasant labour dues. iMore alarming for the tsarist authorities was the growing receptivity of the younger generation to radical ideas and to Polish Romantic literature, which became more accessible in the new freer climate. The anticipation of change was encouraged by the authorized debate on peasant emancipation in Russia, and by the achievement of Italian and Romanian unification between 1859 and 186 r. From his exile the indefatigable yet reckless iVlieroslawski resumed his urgent call for an early national insurrection which would pre-empt the tsar by offering a generous land settlement to the peasants in the Kingdom and especially to the serfs of the western gubernii.

The Russian authorities, faced with the growing ferment in the Kingdom in 1859-60, found themselves in an awkward situation characteristic of authoritarian imperial regimes that embark on liberal reform; repression would only inflame Polish patriotic feelings while concessions would only encourage the Poles to ask for more. Demonstrations became increasingly frequent in Warsaw. In October i860 stink bombs were let off in the Great Theatre at a performance attended by Tsar Alexander, Emperor Franz Josef of Austria and the prince regent of Prussia. The singing of patriotic songs in churches and in the streets heightened popular feelings. In early 1861 events took an alarming turn. In response to the tsar’s February decree emancipating the serfs of the Russian Empire, the Agricultural Society in Warsaw formally called on 26 February for the granting of full property rights to the Kingdom’s peasant leaseholders. A series of demonstrations was violently dispersed and in one instance Russian troops fired on the crowd, killing five people. The tsar, with one eye on improving relations with Napoleon III, offered to introduce limited cultural and administrative concessions in the Kingdom, but also resolved to crush all unrest and to curtail all independent political initiatives.

On 27 March Marquis Aleksander Wielopolski was appointed head of a revived department of religious and educational affairs in Warsaw. Wielopolski was a conservative patriot who had participated in the anti-Russian uprising of 1831 but who, under the impact of the horrors of the Galician jacquerie of 1846, had accepted the necessity of collaboration with Russia. Now in 1861 he saw himself as a man of Providence who believed he could restore to the Kingdom a measure of its lost autonomy while at the same time keeping at bay all the restless and subversive elements in Polish society. Unfortunately, his strategy also entailed the dissolution on 6 April of the Agricultural Society and of the City Delegation, two institutions which enjoyed considerable moral authority in the city. The crowds that gathered in Castle Square on 8 April to protest against the authorities’ actions displayed patriotic and religious emotions of an unparalleled intensity; many of those present continued to pray on their knees as Russian troops fired into the crowd killing over 100 people. Public opinion was enraged, collaboration with the tsarist authorities was discredited, and a state of national mourning was declared; the women of Warsaw, of all social ranks, wore black for the next two years. Many of the city’s Jews, encouraged by the chief rabbi Beer Meisels, also joined the protest movement. In towns across the Kingdom and even in the western guhernii, vast congregations attended patriotic religious services. Significantly enough, much of the countryside remained aloof from the outburst of patriotic grief, preferring to agitate against labour dues, which Alexander finally replaced with cash payments in October.

The stick-and-carrot policy was not abandoned. The promised local authority elections, in which only 25,000 persons qualified to vote, took place in the autumn of 1861. But the new viceroy Lambert introduced martial law and banned all public gatherings, some of which had been highly symbolic and provocative, such as the celebration of the anniversary of Poland’s union with Lithuania or the quasi-royal funeral of the popular archbishop of Warsaw Fijalkowski. On it November, the anniversary of Košciuszko’s death, crowds again poured into Warsaw’s churches. This time Russian soldiers entered the churches and proceeded to arrest thousands of worshippers. In a dramatic gesture against this

28 The closure of the churches, painted by Artur Grottger (1837-67) in t 861. All places of worship were closed in Warsaw as a protest against Russian soldiers arresting worshippers cm 1 т November 186 1. Patriotism and religion made a powerful combination in Russian Poland in the run-up to the insurrection of 1863. Like many Polish artists of his generation, Grottger focused on patriotic themes, making the insurrection his major subject tn a series of symbolic paintings. He had studied at the Vienna Academy before returning to Krakow. The painting is kept today in the Muzeum Narodowe (National Museum) in Wroclaw.

profanation, the ecclesiastical authorities of all faiths ordered the closure of all the city’s Catholic and Protestant churches and of all its synagogues. Wielopolski resigned and left for St Petersburg.

All this played into the hands of conspiratorial radical groups, now styled the ‘Reds’, who embarked on preparations for an uprising. Links were established with radical officers in the tsarist army while Mieroslawski's followers, trained in Italy with Garibaldi’s blessing, slipped into the Kingdom. Zamoyski, Kronen-berg and other moderate ‘White’ leaders remained bitterly hostile to such adventurism, and concentrated on mobilizing Polish and foreign opinion in favour of the peaceful extension of Polish national rights. In mid-1862 events seemed to favour their cause. The government’s relations with the Catholic Church were eased by the appointment of a new archbishop of Warsaw, while Wielopolski’s dignified and sensible arguments finally persuaded Alexander II to restore to the Kingdom much of its lost self-rule. The tsar’s liberal-minded brother Constantine was appointed viceroy, and all non-military matters in the Kingdom were placed in the hands of a civilian government led by Wielopolski, who immediately proceeded with some badly needed social and educational reforms. The compulsory commutation of labour dues into rents was a step forward, although it did not satisfy peasant demands for land and did not bridge the gulf between the nobility and the peasantry. The Jewish population finally obtained equal legal rights. The university of Warsaw and a network of Polish schools were restored.

There was, however, no extension of political liberties, and Wielopolski’s unpopularity did little to enhance the objective attractiveness of the reform package. If anything, the youthful Reds, led by Jaroslaw Dqbrowski, stepped up their revolutionary preparations: the rudimentary structures of an underground state were put into place under the direction of a Central National Committee, a secret paramilitary force was raised, and plots were hatched to assassinate the viceroy and Wielopolski. Many young Catholic clerics found themselves drawn to radical beliefs akin to modern liberation theology. The position of the Whites, unwilling to alienate public opinion by co-operating with Wielopolski yet not wishing to give the Reds any advantages in the patriotic stakes, was becoming increasingly difficult. In September 1862, in an attempt to seize the patriotic high ground and to marginalize the Reds, Zamoyski proposed to Grand Duke Constantine that the western gubernii should be reunited with the Kingdom and that the 1815 constitution should be restored in its entirety, with the Sejm and a separate army. The tsar exiled Zamoyski for his audacity, but thereby weakened the influence of those Poles who wished to avoid an uprising. The middle ground in Polish politics was fast disintegrating.

The conspirators, led by the 22-year-old Stefan Bobrowski and the 28-year-old Zygmunt Padlewski, were planning to strike in the spring of 1863. However, their hand was forced when Wielopolski ordered, on 14 January 1863, the round-up and conscription into the tsarist army of 12,000 urban youths known to the police for their radicalism. With one surgical cut Wielopolski hoped to destroy the Reds in the middle of the winter when conditions were least favourable for an insurrection. To the consternation of many of their fellow conspirators in the provinces, the Red leadership decided to act. On 22 January 1863 the Central National Committee proclaimed itself the ‘Provisional National Government’, and declared war on Russia for the liberation of all of Russia’s Polish lands within the limits of 1772. The insurgents initially had at their disposal merely 6,000 poorly armed men, mostly urban workers, artisans and impoverished nobles, against a Russian army of 100,000 in the Kingdom and a further equal number in the western gnbernii. Most men of property looked aghast at the sheer irresponsibility of the young Reds.

The self-styled National Government hoped to lessen the disparity between the forces by winning over the mass of the peasantry to the struggle. To this end it issued a decree granting the peasants full property rights to all their holdings, and promising rewards in the form of land to all landless peasants who joined the insurrection. I11 mid-February Mieroslawski, aspiring to become the Polish Garibaldi, was back in Poland as ‘dictator’. The initial peasant response to the uprising was generally favourable but muted. The insurrection turned into a guerrilla war in which no more than 30,000 insurgents at any one time pitted themselves with little more than shotguns and scythes against the largest army in Europe. Yet despite their enormous military superiority and their early victories over Mieroslawski’s units, the Russians were unable to stamp out the insurgents whose hit-and-run tactics proved highly effective in the forests of Poland and Lithuania. Wide expressions of public sympathy in the West, and official British and French diplomatic protests to St Petersburg, only encouraged the insurgents in their illusions that foreign intervention would save their cause; as a result, support for the rising spread within Poland to groups hitherto opposed to the armed struggle. The Whites could not stomach Mieroslawski and some were unhappy about the anonymous character of the National Government, but they were persuaded to join the insurrection when command was assumed by the moderates Marian Langiewicz and later Karol Majewski. The insurrection engulfed much of Lithuania and western Belarus but not the Ukraine, while numerous volunteers crossed the border from Poznania and Galicia.

In April 1863 the tsar’s offer of an amnesty was rejected and the rising entered a more bitter phase. Alexander II dismissed Wielopolski, and replaced Grand Duke Constantine as viceroy with Field Marshal Berg, whose harsh methods emulated those of Mikhail Muraviev, the governor-general of Vilna, whose pitiless repression in the east earned him lasting notoriety in Polish patriotic tradition as ‘the hangman’. The Reds took the reins of the National Government and responded with their brand of terror, deploying a security corps of so-called ‘stiletto-men’ against Russian officials and their Polish collaborators. Desperate to prolong the struggle until the spring of 1864, in the hope that France might yet intervene, the insurgents elected a new leader in October 1863: Romuald Traugutt, an experienced professional officer from the tsarist army who had resigned his commission in 1862 and who had proved his mettle as a guerrilla commander in the woods and marshes of Polesie. Traugutt’s political sympathies lay with the Whites, but he infused the underground state with a renewed determination to survive; the insurrectionary army was reorganized and a unified military and civilian command created.

But the tide of events was turning against the insurgents. They were unable to establish effective control over any sizeable region of Russian Poland and were thus unable to implement systematically their land reform. The tensions between the Whites and the Reds weakened Traugutt’s authority. The vocal support for the Polish cause of the Russian radicals Herzen and Bakunin, and of the Russian revolutionary organization ‘Tand and Will’ produced limited practical benefits. Indeed, most of Russian public opinion, including many liberals and Slavophiles, rallied against the Poles in a powerful outburst of indignant patriotism. And once again the international situation, so vital a factor in the Poles’ calculations and hopes, proved unfavourable. Austria and Prussia, in league at the time over the Danish problem, both adopted a hostile attitude to the Polish insurrection; Bismarck even offered to help the Russians against the rebels. Cut off from the rest of Europe, the Polish insurgents soon learnt that all the expressions of support and sympathy from Paris, London and elsewhere were a cruel deception. There was to be no European Congress to discuss the Polish issue, let alone any military intervention on their behalf.

In early March 1864 the tsarist authorities made a bold stroke to outmanoeuvre the National Gcwernment in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the peasants. The liberal Russian reformer N. N. Miliutin had finally persuaded the tsar that to offer the peasants the same property rights as those promised by the revolutionary government would do more than anything else to restore Russian control in the Kingdom. Indeed, following Tsar Alexander’s generous decree of 2 March on land reform, support for the insurrection in the Polish countryside began to slacken as the peasants turned to securing their new rights. Traugutt and his associates were arrested in April and executed on 5 August 1864, by which time the remaining flames of insurrection had been largely snuffed out. The last insurgent unit, led by the radical priest Stanislaw Brzoska, held out in Podlasie until 1865.

For those thousands of insurgents who were spared the gallows, there awaited the long march to penal servitude in Siberia. Landowners who had sympathized with or supported the uprising faced fines or the confiscation of their property. Yet another Polish generation paid the price for a heroic but ultimately doomed attempt to challenge the Partitions. However, it was a remarkable feat that the uprising managed to last for eighteen months against such overwhelming military odds. The insurgents proved to be an elusive and tenacious foe. From its hideouts in Warsaw the National Government was able to function under the very noses of the tsarist police, and in the countryside its secret agencies played hide-and-seek with the Russian army. In many areas landowners and peasants paid a ‘national tax’ and offered supplies to the insurgents who, although often surrounded and defeated, would quickly reform and resurface with fresh volunteers. The secret underground state that operated over much of Russian Poland in 1863-4 was an extraordinary phenomenon in the history of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe. In the words of Viceroy Berg, it had been ‘a truly devilish conspiracy’. But it could not hold out indefinitely against an army of nearly 400,000 men (half of the entire Russian land forces) which flooded the tsar’s Polish lands, and especially with the demoralizing absence of any foreign intervention. Increasingly harsh reprisals and finally the tsar’s gesture to the peasants also took their toll. Yet through its endorsement of the peasant cause, the insurrection had prompted the tsarist authorities to offer to the Kingdom’s peasantry a far more generous deal than that contemplated by Wielopolski or indeed offered by the tsar to the peasants in Russia proper.

It now remained to be seen whether the peasants of Russian Poland would become the grateful and loyal subjects of their imperial master in St Petersburg, or whether, with their immediate economic demands satisfied, they would find a common national identity with their fellow countrymen. The international order that emerged after 1864 also represented a watershed in the history of the Polish struggles for independence. With the rise of Bismarckian Germany as the major power on the continent of Europe, and the consequent eclipse of France, all Polish illusions of western help died. The era of Romantic insurrections had come to an end. Nevertheless, the memory of the heroism and sacrifice of 1 863-4 and the sense that a great injustice had been done were to leave a bitter and potent legacy.

5

An era of transformation, 1864-1914

The crushing of the insurrection of 1863-4 dealt what seemed to be a final and fatal body blow to the cause of Polish independence. A new wave of exiles, as defiant but not as illustrious as their predecessors of 1831, sought sanctuary in the west. Militant radicals amongst them joined the cause of international socialism, and many went to fight, and perish, on the barricades of the Paris Commune. The moderates set about devising no less unrealistic plans to preserve the national cause. Some of their ideas and activities were to germinate in the long run into vigorous socialist and nationalist movements within Poland, but at the moment, with every year that passed, the Polish Question as an international issue faded more and more into the distant background. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 and the resulting Eastern Crisis raised a few desultory hopes, only to dash them. Indeed, the 1870s and 1 880s witnessed a reinvigorated campaign by both the Russian and Prussian authorities to weaken still further the Polish character of their respective shares of old Poland. It was ironically in Austria, which had been least well disposed to Polish national aspirations in the early decades of the century, that Polish fortunes were to improve.

The distinct administrative status of the Congress Kingdom was much reduced, and Russian was imposed as the language of administration and of the courts. In 1874 that ill-fated creation of the Congress of Vienna was even formally renamed ‘the Vistula Land’ (Privislansky Kray), and the office of viceroy was abolished.

Censorship and strict police controls became the order of the day, and steps were taken to weaken the influence of the nobility among the Kingdom’s peasantry. In the western gubernii the purchase of land by individuals of Polish or Catholic origin and the public use of the Polish language were forbidden. The Poles’ sense of political impotence was further reinforced when two important liberal reforms, introduced in the 1860s in the rest of the Russian Empire by Tsar Alexander II, were not extended to any of the ex-Polish lands. These were the zemstva, elected district councils with extensive responsibilities for health, education and the economic infrastructure; and secondly, the jury system in the law courts. On the credit side, however, Polish conscripts into the tsarist army were at least able to benefit from Miliutin’s humane army reforms which ended the system of twenty-year military servitude.

The active involvement of the Roman Catholic clergy in the recent uprising brought upon the Church increased restrictions, in both the Kingdom and the western gubernii. Most monasteries were closed, and surviving ones were forbidden to admit new members. A fifth of all Roman Catholic parishes in Lithuania and Belarus were dissolved. Protesting bishops were deported, with the result that by 1870 all but one of the Kingdom’s dioceses were unoccupied. The surviving Creek Catholic diocese of Chehn in the south-east of the Kingdom was compelled to return to Orthodoxy in 1875; troops were used to whip the reluctant villagers into submission. An agreement between St Petersburg and the papacy in 1882 brought only limited respite to the Church in Russian Poland.

The Kingdom’s educational system was not spared either. In the mid-i86os Russian became the obligatory language of instruction in all secondary schools, followed by all elementary schools in 1885. In 1869 a Russian-language university was opened in Warsaw to replace the closed ‘Main School’. The humiliation experienced in 1878 by the young Maria Sklodowska (later Curie), and her fellow pupils, when instructed by a government school inspector to recite the Lord’s Prayer in Russian and then to enumerate from memory all members of the imperial family, was a characteristic feature of those years.

The distinct status of Prussia’s ex-Polish provinces was also eroded. Poznania and Danzig Pomerania (West Prussia), which had not been included in the German Confederation of 1815, were now fully integrated within the new Germany after 1871. German was finally established as the exclusive language of local administration, the courts and, by 1887, of all schools, with the notable exception of religious instruction. Nothing was now left of earlier Polish hopes for the creation of a Polish university in Poznan. Bismarck was not a modern-style German nationalist, and initially considered Polish-speaking peasants capable of loyal service to the Prussian state. But he was adamant that Polish aspirations to statehood were fundamentally incompatible with Prussian and German state interests, and that Polish nationalism, represented primarily by the nobility and the clergy, was on a par with Catholicism as a centrifugal force hostile to the new Reich. Bismarck’s attempt in the 1870s to subordinate the Roman Catholic Church to the German state and to limit its influence in society, the so-called Kulturkampf, acquired in the east a distinctly anti-Polish character. In the Poznan-Gniezno archdiocese most remaining monasteries and convents were dissolved, and between 1873 ^and 1877 30 per cent of the parishes were deprived of their priests by police arrests. The ultramontane Archbishop Ledochowski was imprisoned for two years and was then obliged to leave for Rome. Yet the unintended outcome of the Kulturkampf in the east was the strengthening of the links between religion and nationality, most unexpectedly in Upper Silesia. In response to growing nationalist demands within the Reich to strengthen even more the German character of the Prussian east, Bismarck created in 1886 a special fund to buy out Polish-owned estates with the aim of distributing the land among German settlers. Except for a short conciliatory period towards the Poles under Chancellor Caprivi between 1890 and 1894, when the government needed the support of the Polish deputies in the Reichstag, the resulting struggle over land added yet another dimension to the persistent nationality conflict in the east.

The policies of the Austrian government towards its Polish subjects in the latter part of the nineteenth century provided a sharp contrast to developments in Russia and Prussia. Major defeats at the hands of France and Prussia, in 1859 and 1866 respectively, weakened the Austrian Empire and obliged Vienna to make constitutional concessions. The creation of a partly representative

Council of State and of regional parliaments in the early 1860s led in 1867 to the more thorough transformation of the empire into the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Inhibited by still vivid memories of the jacquerie of 1846 and apprehensive about the Ukrainian national revival, the predominantly conservative Polish leadership in Galicia contented itself with a limited degree of autonomy within the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.

In return for loyalty to Austria, control of Galicia’s internal affairs was gradually transferred to the local Polish elite. Until 1918 the posts of viceroy and of the minister for Galicia in the Viennese cabinet were both held by Poles. A narrow class-based franchise ensured a landed and middle-class domination of the provincial Sejm in Lwow, and of the Galician representation to the central Austrian parliament. Between 1877 and 1889 there were no peasant representatives in the provincial Diet, and only a handful of Ukrainians. A number of Polish aristocrats held high office in Vienna: Count Alfred Potocki and Count Kazimierz Badeni served as Austria’s prime ministers in 1870-1 and 1895-7, respectively; Count Agenor Goluchowski (the elder) was interior minister and minister of state from 1859 to i860, while his son served as foreign minister between 1895 and 1906. Polish national culture was allowed to flourish; after 1870 the Polish language was restored in the administration, the courts, the schools and in the two universities of Krakow and Lwow. The hitherto passive Catholic hierarchy in Galicia acquired a more pronounced national character and greater freedom of action: in 1879 the patriotic Albin Dunajewski was nominated archbishop of Krakow, and in 1890 was elevated to the cardinalate. Krakow emerged as the centre of the Polish world of art, to be dominated for three decades by Jan Matejko, whose vast historical canvases portrayed a glorified and dramatic vision of Poland’s past. Compared to what had existed before, and to what was happening in Russian and Prussian Poland, these were substantial political and cultural benefits; yet they did not quickly bring commensurate economic and social progress to what remained for decades a backward province of the Austrian Empire.

The new realities within Poland and across Europe as a whole compelled many educated Poles to reassess critically their nation’s predicament and its prospects for the future. The first and most vigorous intellectual and historical condemnation of the futility of political Romanticism and of the tradition of armed insurrections came in 1869 from a group of erstwhile freedom fighters, now prominent intellectuals in Krakow: the historian Jan Szujski and the literary historian Stanislaw Tarnowski. In Szujski’s memorable phrase, liberum conspiro (the freedom to conspire) was an anarchic and destructive principle on a par with the old liberum veto. To this was added, in the late 1870s, a scathing critique of Poland’s past by the influential historian Michat Bobrzynski. Known in Poland as the ‘Stanczyks’, with reference to Stanczyk, a sixteenth-century court jester, they endeavoured to influence Polish public opinion in the spirit of political realism, hard work and social conservatism. The essential unity of Polish culture had to be promoted, ran their message, but politically the Poles had little alternative but to accept ‘tri-loyalism’, or co-existence with their three respective governments. It was a position easier to adopt under the Habsburgs’ tolerant rule in Galicia than under the strict tsarist regime in Warsaw; nevertheless, to many conservative men of property across Poland tri-loyalism offered a prudent way of coming to terms with difficult political realities.

The futile heroism of the insurrectionary tradition was also condemned in the 1870s by the Positivists of Warsaw. Drawing heavily on the values of western rationalism and empirical philosophy, and on the tradition of ‘organic work’, they called on the Poles to focus on strengthening the economic, social and cultural sinews of the nation. Modern European civilization had to be the way of the future, not impractical dreams. The leading Positivists, such as the journalist and publicist Aleksander Swiytochowski, the novelists Boleslaw Prus and Eliza Qrzeszkowa, or the poet Adam Asnyk, offered in their work a realistic and anti-obscurantist approach to social problems which did much to promote the cause of progress in their country. One of the main achievements of the Positivists was a clandestine ‘flying university’, founded in 1886, offering rigorous academic courses in Polish. By the 1880s, however, it was becoming clear that industrialization and urbanization, especially in Russian Poland, were creating social divisions and tensions rather than the social harmony and national unity of which they dreamt.

The latter objectives were most successfully promoted in Poznania where Polish landowners, artisans, peasants and priests found common ground in the defence of their faith, their land and their nationality against German nationalist pressure. Economic co-operatives and self-help educational societies, many led by priests, flourished. Over a thousand Polish libraries, mostly of a religious and moralistic character, operated in Poznania and Silesia. The Polish-owned Peasant Bank, founded in 1872, had 125,000 members by 1910. In 1888 the Poles of Prussia even founded a Land Bank to counteract Berlin's policy of buying out Polish landowners. The strong sense of nationality of the Poznanian peasants was not only a reaction to the Kulturkampf but also a reflection of the advanced level of civilization in Prussia’s Polish lands. The emergence in Prussian Poland of a modern, highly productive system of agriculture owed much to the early Prussian land reform which had favoured the creation of economically viable large and medium-sized farms. It was also encouraged by the demand for food in Germany’s expanding industrial cities, by the German government’s protectionist tariffs on agricultural products, and by the construction of a dense railway network throughout Prussia.

The pace of economic development and social change during the last four decades of the nineteenth century was markedly different in each of the regions of partitioned Poland. In the former Congress Kingdom the tsarist land reform of 1864 had created an uneven patchwork of reduced landed estates and numerous small and fragmented peasant holdings. Agricultural productivity here was much lower than in Poznania. Indeed, the entire rural sector was badly hit by the agricultural slump of the 1880s. In contrast to the wealthier aristocracy, many landowners among the lesser gentry did not survive the crisis and drifted into the urban professions and into the growing ranks of the intelligentsia, which retained many of the gentry’s cultural values and genteel habits. Among the peasants, too, the more robust coped, but many had to sell their uneconomic holdings (most were under 15 hectares in size) and seek new jobs or join the armies of seasonal labourers that criss-crossed this part of Europe at harvest time. On the other hand, there was a striking

growth of industry, of towns and of railway construction, even if modest by English or German standards. The population of Warsaw, now an important metallurgical centre, doubled between 1864 and 1890 to nearly half a million and reached over 760,000 in 1910; that of Eodz, which attracted much German capital and which directed much of its vast textile production to Russia and the Far East, increased spectacularly from z8,ooo in i860 to 410,000 in 1910. Coal-mining expanded in the Dąbrowa basin near the Silesian border. The proportion of the urban population of the Kingdom grew from just over a fifth of the total in 1872 to about a third in 1909, by which time the value of industrial production exceeded the agricultural. In economic terms, the former Kingdom had become the most advanced region of the Russian Empire.

Much less developed was Galicia with its dense patchwork of small and frequently subdivided peasant holdings, its abject rural poverty and its socially conservative elite. Until 1890 the province remained in debt to the central government in Vienna and was burdened by indemnity payments to landowners following the peasant emancipation of 1848. It trailed far behind industrialized Teschen Silesia as well as other western regions of Austria. At the beginning of the twentieth century, out of a population of 7.3 million, Galicia had no more than 60,000 industrial workers. Its only significant industrial activity was the extraction of oil (over 5 per cent of world production in 1909) around Boryslaw and Drohobycz in the south-east. Economic expansion did accelerate after 1890, and the cities of Lwow and Krakow reached a respectable size by 1910, with 207,000 and 174,000 inhabitants respectively.

The last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed substantial demographic growth across Poland, with the resulting mass exodus of poor peasants to the industrial areas of Westphalia and subsequently overseas, mainly to the United States and Brazil; about 2.5 million peasants are estimated to have left the ethnic Polish lands between 1870 and 1914- By 19.14 the number of Poles in the United States stood at about four million; they had their own schools and churches, and represented at that stage the largest immigrant community from central Europe. The Polish character of large parts of Chicago in the first half of the twentieth century

30 Marie Curie-Sklodowska: a Nobel prize-winner, photographed in 19T3 in Birmingham. After training herself in chemical analysis in the laboratories of the Museum of Industry and Agriculture in Warsaw, she left to study in Paris where she graduated in physics and mathematics. In 1895 ^she married the physicist Pierre Curie. In Г898 she discovered two highly radioactive new elements, polonium and radium. She w'as twice awarded the Nobel Prize: in 1903 (together with her husband and Antoine Henri Becquerel) for physics, and in 19ГТ, alone, for chemistry. She always maintained close contact with her native country, and was instrumental in the establishment of the Radium Institute in Warsaw in 1932..

owed much to this early wave of job-seeking emigrants. In the absence of adequate cultural and educational institutions, especially in Russian Poland, many talented Poles of gentry or middle-class background also left to make careers abroad. Joseph Conrad (Korzeniowski), Ignacy Paderewski and Maria Curie-Sklodowska (see opposite) provide three most eminent examples. To these one could also add the names of two future presidents of Poland: Gabriel Narutowicz, an expert on hydroelectricity, and the chemist Ignacy Mošcicki, both of whom acquired their professional reputations in Switzerland. By the same token, numerous Polish engineers made their fortunes in the Russian interior and Siberia where their Polish origins were not a liability. Nor did his national background prevent Waclaw Nižynski (better known as Vaslav Nijinsky) from making a glittering career as a star of Russian ballet. And even among Poles sentenced to exile in Siberia and the Russian Far East there were scholars who contributed to the scientific knowledge of those distant lands: Benedykt Dvbowski classified the fauna of Lake Baykal, while Bronislaw Pilsudskį (Jozef’s brother) conducted anthropological studies on Sakhalin.

The western gubernii of the Russian Empire retained a predominantly rural character, although the coming of the railways did stimulate economic activity. Nevertheless, rural over-population took its toll here too; nearly a quarter of the ethnic Lithuanian population emigrated, mostly to the United States, between 1864 and 1914. Belarus, with its poor soil and extensive forests, remained most backward; among the isolated and self-sufficient marshland communities in Polesie primitive conditions continued well into the twentieth century. In the Ukraine west of the river Dnieper, substantial Polish landed fortunes managed to survive; their owners, such as the Potockis or the Branickis, had the scope and resources to modernize their estates and to develop ancillary food industries, especially the highly profitable refining of beet-sugar. Until 1917 Kiev was home to a large and thriving Polish intelligentsia.

Economically, the separate zones of what had once been the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were moving in different directions and according to different rhythms. The growing dependence of Poznanian agriculture on the German market and of the

Kingdom’s industrial sector on the Russian market integrated those regions with the German and Russian economies. The railway systems constructed across Poland in the nineteenth century reflected this vividly. Warsaw’s long circuitous railway links with Poznan, Krakow and Lwow were hardly those that would have been built had Warsaw been the capital of a united Poland. Only with Wilno was a direct line established in 1862 as part of the Warsaw-St Petersburg railway. The railway networks continued to grow, but even as late as 1914 only three mainline and three secondary rail routes crossed from Prussia into Russian Poland. A cursory glance at a map of the Polish state railways today clearly highlights the dense network in the areas that had belonged to the German Reich before 1918.

Against this background of economic and social change it is difficult to be precise about the degree and extent of the Polishspeaking peasantry’s national sentiments. A complex set of regional factors was at play here. While military service, especially in the Austrian army, had some influence in inculcating loyalty to the three empires among young male Poles, official Prussian and Russian hostility towards Catholicism and the Polish language, not to mention a misguided tsarist campaign against the wearing of national dress, had the opposite effect. The migration of thousands of peasants into the towns also affected cultural and social mores. The peasants brought with them traditions of rural religiosity and in turn were exposed to the patriotism of the urban artisans and to the ideas of the early socialists. The end of serfdom and the growing awareness through education and literacy of a wider world beyond the village community were undoubtedly key factors in shaping the peasants’ consciousness. Yet there were unusual contrasts in this respect. In Prussian Poland primary education was compulsory and illiteracy was virtually eliminated by 1900, but all schools used German as the language of instruction; nevertheless, evidence of an emerging Polish identity could be observed even among the Kashubians of Danzig Pomerania who started electing Polish deputies to the Reichstag. In Russian Poland, government-sponsored primary education was in Russian, but the provision of schooling at all levels remained woefully inadequate; at the end of the nineteenth century illiteracy levels there still hovered about the 65 per cent mark. The teaching of the Polish language, in both Prussian and Russian Poland, became the activity primarily of voluntary and autodidactic educational societies sponsored by private philanthropists and by socialist and nationalist parties. By the early 1900s such secret teaching embraced about a third of the Kingdom’s population. In aristocratic and well-to-do families, and among the intelligentsia, the written language was taught at home by the ladies of the house or by tutors. At all levels of society effective counter measures were deployed against the onslaught of cultural germanization and russification.

Only Galicia enjoyed a formal system of primary education in Polish, even though as late as 1900 it was available to only about 30 per cent of the province’s children; in the case of Ukrainian youngsters the proportion was even lower. A major government-sponsored expansion of village schooling under viceroy Bobrzynski between 1908 and 191} did lower illiteracy levels to below 50 per cent. Galicia’s extensive national and political freedoms (universal male franchise was introduced in Austria in 1907), its Polish-language schools and newspapers, and opportunities of participating in public life all helped to nurture a sense of a Polish identity among the rural population. The memoirs of Jan Slomka (1842-1927), the first written by a Polish peasant, who described the evolution from serfdom to constitutional government in Galicia, provide a vivid illustration of this process.

Just as feelings of national consciousness were spreading among wider sections of the Polish-speaking population, so similar developments could be observed among other ethnic groups inhabiting what had been the eastern half of the former Commonwealth. In due course, the new national movements in the east, led by the native clergy and the emerging local intelligentsias of peasant descent, acquired a political character; they rejected the concept of rhe old multicultural Commonwealth and challenged the continuing Polish social and cultural supremacy in the east. The earliest strides in this direction had been made by the Ukrainians of eastern Galicia where, in conditions of relative freedom under Austrian rule, their cultural and learned societies gave evidence of impressive vitality. Conservative clerical leaders among the Galician Ukrainians initially favoured closer bonds of affinity with Russia, but in rhe 1880s they were successfully challenged by a younger radical group, inspired by the writer Ivan Franko, which espoused the cause of an all-Ukrainian national identity, clearly distinct from Russians and Poles alike. Many Polish and Ukrainian communities existed peacefully side by side under Habsburg rule, but the Polish domination of Galicia’s public life and the prevalence of Polish-speaking landlords in eastern Galicia accentuated inter-ethnic and class resentments and eventually contributed to bitter mutual antagonism. A Ukrainian literary and cultural movement also emerged in the Russian Empire in the 1840s; its chief ideologist was Mykolą Kostomarov and its leading bard Taras Shevchenko. A single Ukrainian literary language, based on the dialects of the Poltava and Kiev regions, was eventually adopted by Ukrainian writers and publicists on both sides of the Austro-Russian border.

The tsarist government was not only uncompromisingly hostile towards all Polish-inspired seccssionism, but it also adopted a negative attitude to the awakening of other local national cultures in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian language, for instance, was banned from Russian schools in 1863, and from printing and publishing in 1876, as was the case with Belarusian. The existence of these Slavonic languages was denied by Russian officialdom; indeed, their encouragement was seen as part of a Polish conspiracy to weaken the Russian nation. Discriminatory restrictions against the Tithuanian language, which is not a Slavonic tongue, were less severe, but the tsarist authorities insisted, until 1904, that the Lithuanian language could only be printed in the Cyrillic alphabet. However, they could not effectively prevent the illegal distribution from East Prussia of Lithuanian-language publications printed in the Latin alphabet and vigorously expressing a new linguistically based Lithuanian national identity. The most important journal was Auszra (Dawn), edited by Jonas Basanavičius and Jonas Šliupas. In 1863-4 ntost ethnic Lithuanians had sided with the Poles against tsarist despotism, but the paths of the two nationalities began to diverge soon after that. Indeed, the new Lithuanian national revival, despite its indebtedness to Polish Romanticism and the support of several eminent bi-cultural bishops and writers, acquired strong anti-Polish characteristics, born out of a resentment towards the cultural polonization of most of the szlacbta and of the educated classes in the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The modest beginnings of a Belarusian literary revival, based largely on Polish models and even encouraged by local Polish patriots as a means of resisting Russian influence, could also be observed in this period. The pattern of inter-ethnic relationships in the western gubernii was complicated by social, linguistic and religious factors. While the Roman Catholic faith tended to reflect Polish cultural orientation in Belarus and in the Ukraine, it was the linguistic divide, and not religion, that came to distinguish modern Lithuanians from Poles or polonized Lithuanians.

The world of the Jewry of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was also changing. In the Congress Kingdom the process that had begun with the emancipation decree of 1862 continued; many able, better-off and enterprising Jews left the confines of their traditional religious and cultural communities to

play a full part in the Gentile world. Indeed, in large urban centres cases of assimilation into the upper bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia were not uncommon, the most prominent examples being the banking and industrial families of the Kronenbergs, the Blochs and the Poznanskis. Assimilation could also be observed in Galicia, especially in Krakow and Lwow, where Jews were granted equal civil rights after 1867. On the other hand, large numbers of poorer Galician Jews sought a better life by migrating to Vienna. In Poznania most Jews gravitated towards German culture, and indeed left for Germany proper. In the western gubernii, where about 40 per cent of the urban population was Jewish, secularized Jews were increasingly drawn to Russian culture, despite the continuation there of a wide range of tsarist restrictions on Jewish life.

The expansion of industry and trade, and the rising proportion of Jews in the towns of the Kingdom also accentuated the economic rivalry between Gentile and Jewish shopkeepers, pedlars and all sorts of middlemen, and added a further dimension to popular anti-Jewish sentiments. These were also fuelled by the arrival there in the 1880s of thousands of russianized Jews (the so-called ‘Litvaks’) fleeing poverty and pogroms in western Russia, and by the emergence of an exclusive ethnically based Polish nationalism. The hopes that Gentile and Jew would act together in the cause of civil rights and of national liberation, so strong in the Kingdom from 1861 to 1864, burnt much less brightly as the century wore on, although they did continue in the Polish socialist movement and among the progressive intelligentsia. Jewish emigration, especially to the New World, grew apace; over a million Jews left the lands of the former Commonwealth between 1870 and 1914. The extraordinary diversity of the Jewish world was further accentuated in the late 1 890s by the rise of two rival secular political movements: Zionism, with its vision of Jewish statehood, and rhe socialist Bund, which set out to embrace the large Jewish working population of the Russian Empire.

As elsewhere in central and parts of eastern Europe, new ideological and political movements were emerging in Polish society: socialism, modern nationalism and agrarian populism. A new generation of radicals took up the mantle of the exiles of 1 864 and challenged the Polish elites who had sought some form of accommodation with the prevailing political realities. Although these movements were eventually to acc|uire a mass and pan-Polish dimension, they also possessed their own specific regional characteristics, reflecting the different conditions under Russian, German and Austrian rule.

Modern Polish socialism, which appeared in the i 870s, drew not only 011 the inspiration of Marx and Engels but also on the native Romantic insurrectionary tradition and the revolutionary potential of Russia’s militant populists (the Narodniks). From the start there were tensions between the movement’s national and internationalist objectives. The early socialist Boleslaw Limanowski, who was based in Geneva, favoured the former; Ludwik Warvnski, who in 1882 founded the first Marxist group on Polish soil, stressed the primacy of the latter. Warynski’s organization was quickly broken up by the tsarist police and the focus of Polish socialist activity moved abroad. In 1892 in Paris the Polish Socialist Party (the PPS) was formed, soon to be led by the conspiratorial Jozef Pilsudskį.

Just as the earlier generations of radicals hoped to mobilize the peasants in the struggle for independence, so now Pilsudskį saw in the growing industrial working class of Russian Poland a revolutionary instrument with which to overthrow tsarist rule. Central to this was the presupposition that socialism could only be achieved in an independent and reunited Poland, which would be open on a voluntary basis to all its historic national groups. This met with the bitter opposition of those doctrinaire Marxists, like Rosa Luxemburg, who rejected the cause of Polish independence as fundamentally incompatible with the supranational nature of socialism, and running in the face of capitalist development which had bound the Kingdom economically to Russia. In 1893 Luxemburg and her associates formed the rival Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (the SDKP); in 1900 it was given a new lease of life, largely through the efforts of Feliks Dzieržynski (Dzerzhinsky), as the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (the SDKPiL). In terms of size the PPS was to have a marked advantage over the SDKPiL, with 50,000 members compared to 50,000 in 1906; but it was clear that Polish socialism was bitterly divided. It is ironic that Pilsudskį and Dzieržynski, who both experienced tsarist repression in their youth and whose personal careers were to lead in totally different directions, both came from gentry families in Lithuania. The two socialist parties were to remain unreconciled over the ‘national question’; and even within the PPS tensions between the party’s social and national objectives would surface repeatedly. And although Rosa Luxemburg was a secularized Polish Jewess from Zamosc, the establishment in 1898 in Russia of a distinct Jewish socialist party, the Bund, was a further reflection of the problematic relationship between socialism and nationality in eastern Europe.

Whether in its German or its Polish variety, socialism failed to strike deep roots in Prussian Poland. In Poznania the number of industrial workers was small, and the association of Polishness with Catholicism was too strong. In Upper Silesia the large industrial labour force (numbering about 360,000 in 1900) tended to vote for the German Catholic Centre Party until the 1890s. The advanced system of social security introduced in the 1880s by Bismarck also lessened material deprivation and class tensions in the German east. Socialism made a little more headway in Galicia, where it tapped into the local radical traditions. The socialist party was able to function legally in Austria and adopted a gradualist non-revolutionary programme of extending workers’ political and social rights. But socialism in Austria had to contend with the monarchy’s complex nationality problems which brought about the movement's fragmentation into autonomous linguistic-ethnic components. The most outstanding among the Polish socialists in Galicia was Ignacy Daszynski, a talented orator and future parliamentarian; among the Ukrainian socialists it was Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk.

However significant the rise of socialism in Poland, there existed in Polish society even more powerful nationalist undercurrents which could be tapped and profitably manipulated by a modern nationalist party. The potential attraction of nationalist sentiments was reflected, for instance, by the enormous popularity of Henryk Sienkiewicz’s historical Trilogy, published between 1883 and 1888. Although himself not a nationalist, Sienkiewicz’s swashbuckling epic, set in the seventeenth century during Poland’s difficult wars against rebellious Cossacks and invading Swedes and Turks, provided a powerful Romanticized vision of Poland’s past which was to leave its mark on the historical consciousness of subsequent Polish generations. Strong anti-German sentiments were also given vent in Boleslaw Prus' Placowka (The outpost) of t 885 which dealt with the rivalry of Polish and German peasants over land, and in Sienkiewicz’s medieval tale of conflict with the rapacious Teutonic Knights (Krzyiacy, 1890).

The origins of the modern Polish nationalist movement can be traced to the clandestine Polish League founded in Geneva by the emigre Zygmunt Milkowski, a veteran of the 1863-4 insurrection, and to the secret youth organization ‘Zet’ created by Zygmunt Balicki in Krakow, both in 1887. Milkowski’s nationalism, however, contained too many liberal elements to be acceptable to Warsaw’s hard young nationalist activists such as Roman Dmowski. The movement was renamed in 1893 the National League and then, in 1897, the National Democratic Party (nicknamed in Polish the ‘Endecja’). Dmowski and his associates attacked the political passivity of the Positivists, the tri-loyalism of the conservatives, as well as all manifestations of the ‘sentimental patriotism’ and ‘false doctrinaire humanitarianism’ of the Romantic era. New strategies were needed if the Poles were to survive under foreign rule in the age of imperialism and Realpolitik. Without abandoning the dream of independence, the National Democrats focused on pragmatic but effectively organized political action, and developed a nationalist ideology that owed much to the new ideas of Social Darwinism. A naturalist by education, Dmowski was attracted to the idea, best expressed in his book Thoughts of a modern Pole (1902), that a struggle for survival existed among states and national groups, and that conflict had a vital functional role in strengthening the identity and resilience of a nation. The ethical values of the individual, Balicki argued in turn in his National egoism and ethics (1903), had to be subordinated to the collective national interest.

By moderating their early social radicalism, which had initially alarmed many wealthy Poles, the National Democrats made impressive strides in the Kingdom, wanning considerable middle-class and artisan support. Their skilful propaganda campaigns and educational activities in the countryside also brought them many peasant adherents, just as their gymnastic societies and youth organizations attracted many youngsters. By emphasizing their opposition to socialism, the National Democrats were able to attract many members of the Catholic clergy, although in the Kingdom the party’s relationship with the Church was not always harmonious. The National Democrats saw in the recently united and economically dynamic German nation a greater threat to the Poles than the sluggish empire of the tsars. The anti-German stance of the ND party also enabled it to extend its influence in Poznania and among the industrial workers of Upper Silesia where the local ND leader Wojciech Korfanty attained prominence. The ND attitude to the non-Polish nationalities in the east, especially to the Ukrainians in Galicia, was uncompromising: they had to submit to cultural and linguistic polonization or had to prove their own claim to nationhood in an uneven political and economic battle with the Poles. Hardly surprisingly, anti-Semitism became a key element in the ND ideology. The Jews were depicted not just as a prominently visible alien religious-cultural entity, but also as an economic and elemental threat, all the more menacing through their influence on Polish intellectual life, to the creation of a strong integrated and ethnically based Polish nation. It was all a categorical repudiation of the early Romantic vision of a pluralist Poland bringing freedom to all its national and ethnic groups, and as such horrified Polish conservatives and left-wing democrats alike. Nevertheless, the National Democrats were to succeed in inculcating xenophobic attitudes among numerous Poles who were at this time acquiring a semblance of political awareness and a sense of their national identity.

The modern Polish populist or peasant movement made its gradual appearance in Galicia in the mid- 1870s. Much of the early leadership was provided by Stanislaw Stojalowski, a priest with a considerable flair for demagogy who tried to instil among the peasants of Galicia the virtues of self-reliance, economic cooperation and civic patriotism. The sight of Stojalowski entering Krakow in 1883 at the head of a 12,000-strong peasant rally to commemorate the bicentenary of Sobieski’s victory over the Turks outside Vienna must have amazed anyone still remembering the jacquerie of 184b. But Stojalowski's methods soon met with the strong disapproval of state and church authorities alike, and his influence waned. More lasting proved the efforts of Boleslaw Wyslouch, an exile from Russian Poland, who as a student in St Petersburg had been associated with Russian populists and later with Polish socialists in Warsaw, and who had since settled in Lwow. In his journals, in the late 1880s, Wyslouch attacked the conservatism of the Stanczyks and outlined the vision of a prosperous, fully politicized and nationally conscious peasantry as the basis for a future democratic Polish state that would embrace all ethnic Polish lands and which would recognize the national rights of the Ukrainians and of other peoples in the east. With his indefatigable wife Maria and his talented follower Jan Stapinski, Wyslouch launched his political peasant party in Rzeszow in 1895. Although its anticlericalism brought it into conflict with the Catholic Church, the new party successfully entered Galician political life, and gradually widened its ambitions; in 1903 it adopted the title of the Polish Peasant Party (the PSL).

The response of the Catholic Church to the new social conditions and to the accompanying ideological ferment varied in the different regions of the country. As already indicated, the Kulturkampf had strengthened the link between Polishness and Catholicism in Prussian Poland. In Galicia the Church’s privileged position in public life and its long hostility to independent political action among the peasantry militated at first against the emergence of a priest-peasant solidarity of the Poznanian type. Although the clergy here were heavily involved in the rural temperance movement, it was only during the first decade of the twentieth century that the Church hierarchy modified its negative attitude to the populist movement.

Despite a welcome general thaw in tsarist policy towards the Kingdom after the accession of Tsar Nicholas II in 1894, the scope for open social and educational work by the Church in Russian Poland was hampered by the authorities until 1905. Considerable help to the rural and urban poor was provided by worker-nuns, who wore ordinary clothes, lived privately or at home, and thereby concealed their membership of officially banned religious orders. The Church’s involvement in social work was encouraged by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical ‘Rerum Novarum’ (1891) which recognized the rights of workers to form trade unions and to receive fair pay. It was a belated but significant response by the Vatican to the problems of modern industrial society and to the threat of godless socialism. Out of this arose in the Polish lands a Church-sponsored Christian political-social movement which promoted social harmony; it struck roots especially in Prussian Poland and, not surprisingly, was to find much common ground with the programme of Dmowski’s National Democrats.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in February 1904 and the Russian Revolution of 1905 brought out in sharp relief the political and social divisions in the Kingdom; like an X-ray, the Revolution illuminated starkly the new realities that had arisen in Russia’s Polish lands since 1864. All political groupings expected some benefits for Poland from Russia’s discomfort in the Far East. Conservative elements among the Kingdom’s wealthy classes formed a Party of Realistic Politics, and hoped that their public loyalty to the tsar would be rewarded with religious, linguistic and legal concessions. Dmowski’s NDs hoped for a fair degree of autonomy. The PPS, on the other hand, as the inheritor of the Romantic insurrectionary tradition, started preparations for an uprising. To seek assistance against Russia Pilsudskį even travelled to Japan, only to discover that Dmowski had preceded him there and had helped to dissuade the Japanese from sponsoring a Polish revolt against Russia. Nevertheless, Pilsudskį did return with some funds and arms to equip PPS fighting squads. Tension continued to grow in the Kingdom. The war disrupted trade, brought a fall in industrial production, and increased unemployment. The situation was exacerbated by a poor harvest and widespread opposition to the mobilization for the Russian army. Demonstrations became more frequent, and PPS squads started regular shoot-outs with the police. News of ‘Bloody Sunday’ on 22 January 1 905, when tsarist troops fired into a procession of unarmed workers outside the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, electrified opinion throughout the Kingdom, which was soon paralysed by a month-long general strike of industrial workers. Students and pupils boycotted Russian schools and demanded the restoration of Polish in educational institutions. The peasants, increasingly aware of their nationality and responsive to political militancy, also agitated for the wider use of the Polish language in public administration.

In April 1905 the tsarist government introduced religious toleration and rescinded some of the restrictions on the use of local languages. Worker protests, inspired by the socialist parties, continued regardless. Even agricultural labourers stopped work and demanded higher pay. In June an armed workers’ uprising gripped Eodž, resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives. An all-Russian railway strike in October led to a general strike throughout the empire, plunging Russia further into revolutionary chaos. Disorder spread in the Kingdom, and the scale of terrorist attacks on tsarist officials and policemen approached that of i86y. The gulf between the militant PPS and the pragmatic NDs widened as a result, and then degenerated into mutual hatred. The NDs condemned the unequal struggle against the tsarist regime as grossly irresponsible, and formed their own worker organizations and fighting squads to oppose the socialists. The revolution in Russian Poland was turning into a civil war. The conservative Realists and the Catholic hierarchy, led by the archbishop of Warsaw Wincenty Popiel, increasingly felt obliged to look to the tsarist government for the preservation of the threatened social order. Tsar Nicholas IPs October Manifesto, promising political liberalization and the introduction of a Russian parliament (the Duma) gave heart to the NDs and to the Realists in their hope that the restoration of a Polish administration would calm tempers in the Kingdom and weaken the forces of socialism; it was a calculation very reminiscent of Wielopolski in the early 1860s. But the Russian authorities were not prepared to make any substantial political concessions to the Poles; a delegation of ND and Realist leaders returned empty-handed from St Petersburg. On n November martial law was introduced in the Kingdom. Political polarization in Russia continued as the future of the revolution hung in the balance. On the heels of the workers’ uprising in Moscow in December, the PPS made another armed bid to overthrow the tsarist regime in the Kingdom, and to transform the revolution into a national uprising. But events were slowly turning in favour of the authorities.

The Russian army, which in the main remained loyal to the tsar, proceeded to crush the remaining pockets of resistance within the Russian Empire. Moderate elements in the Kingdom, as in Russia proper, remained willing to participate in the new constitutional order promised by the tsar. Fissures emerged within the PPS: between the young left-wingers ready to seek benefits for Poland within a wider revolutionary settlement in Russia, and the ‘elders’ under Pilsudskį, with his paramilitaries, who continued to press for an independent socialist Poland. In November 1906 the PPS formally split into the ‘Revolutionary Fraction’ under Pilsudskį, and the ‘Left’, which then gravitated to the SDKPiL, hostile as ever to independence. Pilsudskį reorganized his fighters, who continued their terrorist attacks throughout 1907, until the futility of the internecine killings between the PPS and the NDs made both sides see sense.

None of the political parties operating in the Kingdom gained their full objectives during the revolutionary turmoil. Tsarism had survived, the Kingdom’s status was not altered, and martial law remained. The animosities and hatreds exacerbated by the revolution left their poison in Polish society. On the other hand, 1905 did bring about important benefits to the Poles under Russian rule. Workers’ pay and conditions improved, trade unions were legalized, and a vigorous co-operative movement was able to mushroom. The lifting of many restrictions on political, social and cultural life, and on the public use of the Polish language was welcomed by the Poles, especially in the western gnbernii where they were again allowed to buy land. A ‘Polish Circle’ of fifty-five deputies, dominated by the NDs and led personally by Dmowski, was to sit in the Duma. Dmowski had every intention of using his team in parliamentary horse-trading to win further benefits for the Poles, playing a role not dissimilar to Redmond’s constitutional Irish Home Rule party in Westminster. There is also no doubt that the dramatic events of 1904-7 heightened the political awareness of wider sections of the urban and rural population, and gave encouragement to the radicals. On the other hand, for many men of property and for many Catholic clergymen the attraction of the National Democrats, as a force against socialism and all revolutionary methods, grew.

The failure of Edward Ropp, the bishop of Wilno, to create a broad Catholic front embracing Poles, Lithuanians and Belarusians demonstrated that new national loyalties were also at work among the population of historic Lithuania. Lithuanian political agitation in 1904-5 had won concessions for rhe use of the Lithuanian language in primary schools and in village administration. There were unmistakable stirrings among the Belarusians, the least advanced of the nationalities in the east, who were allowed to publish their first newspaper Nasba niva (Our Soil) in both Latin and Cyrillic script. Among Ukrainian radical activists in the Russian Empire there was even less interest in a Polish connection, and most preferred to co-operate with their larger Russian counterparts, especially the pro-peasant Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Social Democrats.

The ripple effects of the 1 905 revolution in the Kingdom reached Galicia with some force, encouraging the left-wing parties to attack the conservative-dominated constitutional order. Demands for democratizing the Austrian electoral system were successful: in 1907 universal male suffrage w'as introduced for elections to the central Austrian parliament in Vienna. But there were strings attached. The NDs, wTio had established themselves as a major party in Galicia in 1905, secured the continuation of Polish influence in east Galicia bv the creation there of two-member constituencies. Lurther attempts to abolish the class-based system of electoral colleges in elections to the Galician Sejm in Lwow were bogged down until L914 in complex political horse-trading, made all the more acrimonious by the rise in Polish and Ukrainian nationalist passions. In 1908 the viceroy, Count Andrzej Potocki, was assassinated by a Ukrainian student, while in 1913 his moderate successor, the history professor Michal Bobrzyhski, was forced to resign by an ND-led campaign for promoting reconciliation between the two communities. In 1913 the NDs succeeded in splitting the peasant movement, winning over its right wing (PSL-Piast) led by Wincenty Witos. The left -wing peasant group now veered towards Pilsudskis pro-independence socialists. It was yet another contributory factor to the continuing polarization of Polish politics in a period that witnessed increasing international tension over the Balkans and ominous talk of a general European war.

How the Poles should react to the growing likelihood of a conflict between Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany, and Russia inevitably came to prey on Polish political thinking. Several

conflicting strategies emerged, based on different geopolitical calculations and ideological preferences, and shaped by contrasting experiences of life in Austrian and Russian Poland. Matty of Galicia’s conservatives and democrats, acutely conscious that only in Austria did rhe Poles enjoy full political and cultural freedoms, favoured the so-called ’Austro-Polish Solution’; in the event of war, the former Congress Kingdom would be attached to Galicia, to form the third component of a triune Austro-Hungarian-Polish state. However, the increasingly enlivened political and intellectual climate in Galicia also encouraged more adventurous concepts. The Young Poland (Mloda Polska) movement in literature and the arts, of which rhe most outstanding and original representative in Krakow was Stanislaw Wyspianski, issued a neo-Romantic challenge to the complacency and conservatism of Galicia’s traditional elite. The impact of Wyspianski’s dramas, with their blend of mystical visions and national myths, was electrifying. In his historical play November night (1904), set in Warsaw in 1830, Wyspiaiiski utilized the Greek legend of Demeter and Persephone to produce a powerful poetic expression of faith in Poland’s rebirth. The acquisition in 1905 by the Galician authorities of the former royal castle of Wawel (the ‘Polish Acropolis’), hitherto used as an Austrian army barracks, and its subsequent restoration to its former glory, was not without symbolic significance.

It was therefore hardly surprising that it was in Galicia, where he had moved in 1908, that Pilsudskį found many students and youngsters responsive to his charismatic appeal and ready to join his paramilitary riflemen formations which he was able to organize with the tacit approval of the Austrian military authorities. Pilsudski’s flirtation with Marxism was coming to an end; he was now studying Napoleon and Clausewitz, and preparing for the moment when he could assume the mantle of Poland’s military liberator. The riflemen's role was enhanced when they were recognized as the military wing of a broad pro-independence association, formed in 1912. This included representatives of most of Galicia’s left-wing parties and PPS-controlled groups in the Kingdom. In the event of war, Pilsudski’s 10,000 riflemen were to fight alongside the Austrians, but above all they were to promote an uprising in Russian Poland and, ultimately, to provide the nucleus of a future Polish army. In such a climate the influence of the internationalist left was weakening across Poland.

Diametrically opposed to Pilsudskį stood Dmowski, who argued in L908 that German imperialism, and not tsarist Russia, posed the fundamental threat to the survival of the Polish nation. He considered it unlikely that an independent Polish state would emerge out of a major European war; the most realistic solution, in the short run, was the reunification of all Polish lands as an autonomous unit under the tsar. Dmowski’s appeal for Russo-Polish reconciliation, and his endorsement of neo-Slavism (with its emphasis 011 the equality of all Slavs) echoed some of the ideas of Adam Czartoryski a century earlier. And like Czartoryski, Dmowski discovered that it was not easy to win over to his ‘realistic’ programme either Russian officialdom or indeed many of

34 Stanislaw Wvspianski (1869-190-). Self-portrait, 1902. Playw right, poet, painter, designer of furniture and textiles, and an innovator in the graphic arts, Wvspianski was the most outstanding and versatile artist of the neo-Romantic ‘Young Poland’ movement in literature and the arts. Creator of modern Polish drama, his plays drew on tragic episodes in Polish history and on ancient Greek myths. Wyspianski’s artistic life was closely associated with the city of Krakow.

his own fellow countrymen. The Russian government under the premiership of Stolypin and his successors was at that very moment pursuing nationalist policies against many of the minorities of the western borderlands, including Jews, Finns and Poles. If anything, the behaviour of the Russian authorities was a slap in Dmowski's face: in 1907 the size of the Polish representation in the Duma was cut by two-thirds, and appeals for Polish autonomy were rejected.

In 19 11 local elected councils (zemstva) were finally introduced in the western gubernii, but on the basis of a restricted franchise that favoured ethnic Russians; Russian officials were also given disproportionate voting rights in the municipal councils introduced in the Kingdom in 1913. And 7912 proved to be a particularly bad year for Russo-Polish relations: the region of Chelm was detached from the Kingdom and incorporated administratively and legally into the empire as a new Russian guberniya; the Russian state purchased the Warsaw-Vienna railway and dismissed many of its Polish employees. The recently completed Orthodox cathedral of St Alexander Nevsky, in the very centre of Warsaw, already provided a monumental symbol of Russia’s domination of the ‘Vistula Land’.

In such circumstances, Dmowski’s geopolitical calculations seemed to make little sense. Many of his disenchanted younger and more radical followers seceded from the NDs and gravitated towards Pilsudskį. To counter this serious haemorrhage from his movement, Dmowski turned increasingly, from 1911 onwards, to anti-Semitic propaganda. His call for an economic boycott of Jewish shops met with a favourable response among large sections of the Kingdom’s lower middle classes, although it alienated enough voters for him to lose his seat (representing Warsaw) in the 1912 Duma election. Yet for all their reverses the NDs remained the largest political movement in the Kingdom, with tentacles reaching far beyond, and with a claim to a monopoly on Polish patriotism.

Dmowski’s anti-Germanism found an exceptionally fertile soil in Prussian Poland, where the German-Polish struggle over land and language resumed with extra vigour after 1 902. The former was graphically illustrated by the case of the peasant Michal Drzymala, who defied a 1904 law restricting the right of the Poles to build on newly purchased land, by living in a circus caravan which he had wheeled onto his plot of land. Drzymala lost his case, but not without a legal battle that went on for many years and ended in the Prussian supreme court. Berlin’s policy of promoting German settlement in the east was not always as successful as expected, with many Germans in the east even preferring to move to seek better-paid industrial jobs in western Germany. The Poles managed to hold on tenaciously to the land they had, but in the long run their prospects seemed grim: among the estate-owners and the upper bourgeoisie of Poznania and Danzig Pomerania (West Prussia) the German element was already dominant, while a government bill introduced in 1908 authorized for the first time the compulsory purchase of Polish-owned estates.

Other forms of administrative pressure were also deployed. First came the replacement of Polish with German as the language of religious instruction in primary schools. The large-scale resistance of pupils and parents, which lasted from 1901 to 1906, was eventually broken by the use of the cane, fines and even imprisonment. Numerous towns and villages received new German names, and in 1908 restrictions were placed on the use of Polish at public gatherings. Extra numbers of German civil servants and teachers were directed to Poznania, giving that province the highest ratio of state officials to the size of the population within the Reich. It was all a boon for the NDs whose influence increased in most Polish cultural and social organizations of Prussian Poland. The NDs came to dominate the Polish Circle of parliamentary deputies in the German Reichstag, and in 1912 voted against further credits for the German naval programme. The ability of the NDs to establish an active and co-ordinated political presence in all parts of Poland and in the parliaments of the three occupying empires was a remarkable achievement.

Nothing could disguise the fact that as 1914 approached the lands of the former Commonwealth were deeply divided by conflicting political preferences, ideological values and ethnic loyalties, as well as profound economic, social and legal disparities brought about by the simple fact of partition and the integration of the ex-Polish lands within three very different empires. No region of what could be considered ‘Poland’ was exclusively homogeneous in terms of nationality, religion or speech: there were numerous Germans in the west and north-west, large highly diversified Jewish communities in the centre and the east, and of course substantial non-Polish populations in the east. Different historical experiences accentuated local identities and created different regional flavours of Polishness. With its largest concentration of Polish-speakers, and with its traditions of conspiracy and insurrection centred on

Warsaw, the primacy of Russian Poland was unquestioned. It was here that Polish Romanticism and Positivism first appeared as well as Polish socialism and modern nationalism as mass movements. Yet despite its largely archaic social order, Galicia’s role as the centre of free political and cultural expression could not be underestimated. Here conspirators and exiles from Russian Poland could find refuge; here Poles of both sexes from all parts of the partitioned country could study in Polish universities; here great national anniversaries, such as the 500th anniversary of the Polish victory over the Teutonic Knights at the battle of Grunwald (14 10), could be publicly celebrated. Here too the Poles gained the widest experience of parliamentary government (of a specific Austrian variety) and developed a native class of professional civil servants and educationalists which would play a crucial role in independent Poland after 1918. In their turn, the Poles of Prussia were economically hardened and socially disciplined through their exposure to and confrontation with Prussian rule.

The trappings of modern civilization, in the shape of electric trams, luxury hotels, telephones (first introduced in Warsaw and Lodz in 1883), or Parisian fashion, could be observed in all major cities of partitioned Poland. The cinema too was making inroads in the provinces. On the other hand, in the central and eastern regions there were overcrowded urban slums in which Gentile and Jewish families eked out a miserable daily existence. There was poverty and disease in the countryside. The ratio of one doctor per 800 people in the larger towns and one per 30,000 in the rural districts is just one indicator of the deep contrasts in the former Kingdom. In fact, an unmistakable civilizational faultline could be traced between the more advanced territories of the German Reich and those within the Austrian and Russian Empires. In terms of levels of literacy, agricultural and industrial productivity, urban infrastructures, and the general standard of living, Prussian Poland outclassed the other regions. At the same time it was in Prussian Poland that clerical and National Democrat influences were strongest; ironically, it was also in Poznania that the percentage of the Jewish population was the lowest of all regions of historic Poland.

The different standards and quality of public administration in the three parts of Poland also helped to shape different cultures of civic behaviour. In Russian Poland the wholesale evasion of government rules and regulations, as an expression of contempt for the tsarist regime, was proverbial; it was a habit that was to weigh heavily on life in restored Poland after 1918. In one anecdote among many, a Jewish merchant living near the meeting point of the three empires complained that German customs officials never took bribes, that the Russians always did, and that with the Austrians it was never quite certain. Different lifestyles also generated popular inter-regional prejudices; jokes abounded about ‘Galician misers’, about ‘dopey Poznanians’, or about Warsaw’s notorious ‘tricksters’. The mutual distrust between the neighbouring industrial communities of Upper Silesia (in Prussia) and the Dąbrowa basin (in Russian Poland) continues to be reflected to the present day in the intense hostility between the football clubs of the two regions.

Yet for all the regional and social differences, there were also strong cohesive cultural forces at work. Despite the absence of a Polish state, Polish national consciousness had spread widely since 1864 among the Polish-speaking sections of the urban and rural population. The growing emphasis on an ethnic-linguistic national identity meant, however, that Polish cultural influence was on the retreat in the east, that it was consolidating in the centre, and that it was making some gains in the west. On the eve of the First World War about 15.5 million Polish-speakers occupied a relatively compact area of settlement in the basin of the Vistula and Warta rivers, and along the upper Oder. A further 1.3 million lived in eastern Galicia, constituting a third of that area’s population, and perhaps 2 million Poles lived scattered along the length and breadth of Russia’s western gubernii, with a substantial concentration in the Wilno area.

The Poles’ distinct sense of nationality was fostered by extensive cultural bonds which transcended the state frontiers and reached wider sections of society. A single literary language and a common literary tradition, dating back to the sixteenth century, linked all educated Poles, irrespective of where they lived. Poems, novels, plays and works of scholarship criss-crossed the borders. In one way or another literacy was growing among the masses. A vivid example of the existence of a single Polish reading public was the

35 The Teatr Miejski (Municipal Theatre) in Lwow (L'viv) in Galicia. Built in i 897-г 900, it was one of the most modern theatres in contemporary Europe, and was one of the great centres of Polish drama in the early twentieth century, although it never equalled Krakow in this respect. Among the better-known actors and actresses who made their debut or appeared on its stage were Ludwik Solski and Helena Modrzejewska (known as Modjeska in the English-speaking world).

The photograph dates from the early 1940s, during the Nazi occupation of eastern Galicia.

simultaneous serialization in 1911 of Sienkiewicz’s best-selling adventure story W pustyni i w puszczy (‘In desert and wilderness’) in Polish-language newspapers of Warsaw, Wilno, Poznan and Lwow. The lives of great poets and writers were celebrated with festivities in the major cities of Austrian and Russian Poland: in 1898, on the centenary of his birth, statues of the great Romantic bard Adam Mickiewiez were erected in Warsaw, Krakow and Lwow. The Polish universities and other institutions of higher

36 Our Lady of Ostra Brama (Aušros Vartų Madona) in Wilno (Vilnius). The icon was painted by an unknown local artist around 1620-30, and was probably based 011 a sixteenth-century Flemish print. The cult of the Ostra Brama Madonna started in the second half of the eighteenth century, and has since spread throughout Poland, Lithuania and Belarus. The Madonna is venerated by Roman and Greek Catholics, and Orthodox alike.

learning in Kraktnv and I.wow attracted and brought together students from all parts of Poland. Journalists, physicians, scientists and musicians attended professional gatherings spanning all regions of the country. The impressive development of historical scholarship and scientific research; the existence of a diverse press and of a lively theatre scene; the emergence of a native cinematography; the musical accomplishments of Karol Szymanowski and of Ignacy Paderewski; the literary achievements of Henryk Sienkiewicz (Nobel Prize in 1905), of Stefan Zeromski, or of Wladyslaw Reymont (Nobel Prize in L924), not to mention the bohemian artistic milieu of Krakow, all provide compelling evidence of a creative cultural vibrancy during the two decades or so before 19 14.

And despite the Roman Catholic Church’s potentially divisive leanings towards the National Democrats, traditional Catholicism played an important integrating role in Polish society, still predominantly rural and in the main conventionally pious. Without belittling the existence of well-established but relatively small Polish-speaking Protestant, Moslem or Armenian communities in some areas of the country, it was Roman Catholicism which highlighted most Poles’ difference from the predominantly Protestant Prussians and Orthodox Russians, not to mention the unassimilated bulk of the Yiddish-speaking Jewish population. Polish hymns and carols, religious festivals, and the intensely moving atmosphere of the Christmas Eve supper held in most Polish homes all promoted powerful emotional bonds. These were reinforced at a popular level by the annual participation of hundreds of thousands of people from all parts of Poland in pilgrimages to the shrine of the Black Madonna in Czystochowa, to that of Our Lady of Ostra Brama (Aušros Vartų Madona) in Wilno, and to many other lesser centres of Marian devotion.

In the realm of culture Poland certainly existed, although very few ordinary Poles realistically expected the early arrival of reunification and independence. As the clouds of war gathered over Europe in July 1914, few contemporaries could have foreseen the extensive human losses, the large-scale material destruction, and the unexpected political vicissitudes that this disparate nation would soon experience.

6

Independence regained and lost, ^I9^I4^_I945

The outbreak of the First World War created an unprecedented situation in the Polish lands. For the first time since the destruction of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the three partitioning powers (or their successor states) were now at war with each other: on the one side Germany and Austria-Hungary (the Central Powers), and on the other Russia in alliance with France and Great Britain (the Entente). Some patriots in the previous century had considered that an independent Poland could only emerge out of a great European war. Yet there was nothing inevitable about Polish independence. Although both sides in the war were to make general appeals to their Polish populations, for neither of them was Polish independence initially a war aim. However, by the end of 1918 rhe core of an independent Polish state had come into being, made possible by the unexpected collapse of the three eastern empires, and by the readiness of the Poles to exploit this advantageous situation.

The outbreak of the war found the Poles bitterly divided. The anti-Russian Pilsudskį was the first to act, anxious to establish a distinct Polish military presence in the war with Austrian permission. The incursion of his riflemen into the former Kingdom in August Г914 ended in a fiasco; the local population was unmoved by the appeal to rise against the Russians. As a result Pilsudskį had to submit his legions to stricter Austrian control. The legions' subsequent exploits against the Russians on the Galician front were to sow the seeds of a legend which was to elevate Pilsudskį to the starus of Poland’s man of Providence. But at the turn of 1914-15 Pilsudski’s cause seemed unpromising. Not only were the National Democrats hostile to Pilsudski’s anti-Russian campaign but they also welcomed the manifesto of the Russian commander-in-chief Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich of 14 August 1914 which called, albeit in vague and semi-religious language, for a reunified autonomous Poland under the tsar. Indeed, the prevailing mood of the population in the Kingdom was at first pro-Russian. The Russians even created a volunteer Polish force of their own to counteract Pilsudski’s legions.

The first year of the war brought no significant political gains for the Poles, but much suffering and destruction. Conscripted in their hundreds of thousands into the three fighting armies, the Poles found themselves killing each other for the tsar and for the two kaisers. The eastern front ran across historic Polish lands, whose economic resources were ruthlessly exploited by the warring sides. The occupation of the whole of the former Kingdom by the Central Powers in August 1915 altered the situation dramatically. The century-old Russian occupation of Warsaw ended, while Dmowski and the leadership of the ND and of the Realist parties left for Petrograd; there they continued their thankless task of lobbying the tsarist government to declare itself more resolutely on the issue of Poland. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Dmowski left Russia in November 1915 to campaign in Britain and France. In the meantime the Germans embarked on wooing the Poles of the Kingdom with significant concessions: the use of the Polish language was permitted in local government, in the courts, and especially in education, and a Polish university and polytechnical institute were reopened. The idea of a Habsburg kingdom of Poland was briefly floated in Vienna, but the Austrians finally gave way to Berlin’s proposal for a small puppet Polish state under German control which could provide the German war machine with Polish cannon-fodder. On 5 November 1916 the German and Austrian emperors issued a decree proclaiming the creation of a Polish constitutional monarchy. This kingdom still had no fixed borders and no monarch, while its Provisional Council of State was granted merely consultative powers. Nevertheless a breakthrough had been made. Pilsudskį agreed to head the new kingdom’s military department, but insisted that the formation of a regular Polish army had to be conditional on the creation of a genuine Polish state. This the Germans were not prepared to accept at this stage.

Although ousted from their Polish lands, the Russians were encouraged by the western allies to respond to the German initiative. On r January J917 Nicholas II announced as a war aim the restoration of a free and reunited Poland in union with Russia. The bartering for Poland’s future took a further step when the February Revolution toppled the Romanov dynasty. Both the Petrograd Soviet and the Russian Provisional Government, encouraged by the Polish liberal Aleksander Lednicki, declared their support for an independent Poland, but left the issue of borders to a future Russian Constituent Assembly. The Provisional Government not only permitted the Poles in Russia to organize their own military formations but also agreed to the creation of a Polish army in France to fight on the side of the Entente. Now that their Russian ally had publicly endorsed Polish independence, both France and Britain no longer felt restrained in their attitude to the Polish Question and recognized Dmowski’s Polish National Committee (established in Paris in August 1 917) as an ‘official Polish organization’.

While the prospect now appeared of Poland becoming, at least on paper, a member of the Entente, the realities in the country were still determined by the Central Powers. The refusal of Pilsudskį and most of his legions to take an oath of ‘military brotherhood’ with the armies of the Central Powers ruined Berlin’s plan to raise a ‘polnische Wehrmacht’, and obliged the Germans to raise their bids in the Polish stakes. Pilsudskį was imprisoned for his defiance, but on 12 September 1917 the Central Powers bestowed on their Polish Kingdom the equivalent of ‘home rule’: a three-man Regency Council was created with powers to appoint a government with full control of educational and judicial affairs, as well as a partially elected legislative body. There was still no king. On the Regency Council sat three highly respectable figures: the archbishop of Warsaw Aleksander Kakowski, Prince Zdzislaw⁷ Tubomirski and Count Jozef Ostrowski. But no sooner had the Regency Council been established when the political and military landscape in eastern Europe went through another convulsion brought about by

the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in Petrograd and their readiness to sign a separate peace with the Central Powers. As the former Russian Empire disintegrated, German priorities and tactics in the east changed, to the marked disadvantage of their puppet Polish Kingdom. Berlin recognized Ukrainian and Lithuanian statehood, while the Austrians also agreed to create out of eastern Galicia a separate imperial Ukrainian crownland within the Dual Monarchy. The treaty of Brest-1.itovsk with Bolshevik Russia, signed on 3 March 19 r8, confirmed the total victory of the Central Powers in the cast. In view of Berlin’s aims to extend the eastern frontier of the Reich into formerly Russian Poland, it was clear that what remained of the Polish Kingdom would end up as little more than a dependency of a German-dominated Mittelenropa.

Poland’s fate did not rest, however, entirely in German hands. The energetic campaigns led by Dmowski and Paderewski on both sides of the Atlantic in the cause of Polish independence were having a marked impact on governments and public opinion alike. The inclusion of the demand for the restoration of an independent Poland with access to the sea in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 191 8 was highly significant. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war, and the failure of the great German offensive in the West in March to May 1918 removed whatever reservations the Entente Powers had with regard to Poland. On 3 June 1918 the restoration of an independent Poland was officially endorsed as a war aim by the Entente. Not that the Poles were passively awaiting developments: an anti-German Polish army in Russia was 30,000 men strong, while the Polish army in France under General Jozef FTtller attracted thousands of volunteers, many from Polish communities in America, and fought alongside the western allies in France.

With the evident exhaustion of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and with the growing prospect of independence, the struggle for political power in Poland resumed with intensity between the proindependence left and the National Democrats. The NDs, however, only brought ridicule on themselves by an inept attempt to seize power from the Regency Council which was in any case trying to wriggle out from German tutelage. The situation was further complicated by the disintegration of Austria-Hungary at the end of October. Local Poles took control of parts of Teschen Silesia and of western Galicia. In Lublin a pro-independence left-wing People’s Republic, led by the socialist Daszynski and supported by Pilsudski’s allies, was proclaimed on 6-7 November as a rival to the Regency Council in Warsaw. Workers’ councils appeared in the FTybrowa basin and other industrial centres. The outbreak of revolution in Germany, the creation of a socialist government in Berlin on 9 November, and the all-important decision of the German garrison to evacuate Warsaw removed the remaining obstacles to independence. In December the Poles of Poznania took up arms and wrested the control of their province from the Germans.

The three empires that had ruled Poland in 1 914 were no more; the unbelievable had happened. But a single Poland still had to be created out of the disparate regions and out of the conflicting political and social forces that were now in the open. Pitsudski’s return from German captivity on to November provided the catalyst for the dramatic events of the following days. His role proved providential. His legendary exploits as a fighter for national freedom, his left-wing background yet his readiness to rise above party factionalism, and his sixteen-month spell in German captivity had earned him wide support among a population desperate to escape wartime privations yet euphoric about the imminence of independence. On 1 i November the German troops in Warsaw-allowed themselves to be disarmed. On the same day (celebrated since as Poland's Independence Day) the Regency Council appointed Pilsudskį commander-in-chief of its armed forces. Three days later, before dissolving itself, it conferred on Pilsudskį the authority of head of state with almost dictatorial powers. On 18 November the People’s Republic in I.ublin recognized Pilsudski’s authority, while the new head of state nominated the socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski to lead a left-wing government. Pilsudski’s position was very strong: it had been sanctioned by the conservative Regents and enjoyed the undisputed support of the pro-independence socialist and peasant parties. To wan even wider popular support for the reborn state, Moraczewski’s government introduced a wide package of social reforms and welfare measures, and an eight-hour working day; it also promised compulsory land reform. Yet all was not harmony⁷. The NDs resented Pilsudski’s authority, and the predominantly ND-run administration in Poznania still refused to recognize the left-wing government in Warsaw. The SDKPiL and its allies, who merged in December 1.918 to form the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland, refused to recognize Polish independence altogether, and put their faith in local workers’ councils and the imminence of a Bolshevik-led universal revolution.

Industry was paralysed and over four-fifths of industrial workers were unemployed, communications were severely ruptured, agricultural production had fallen dramatically, and poverty and malnutrition stalked the land. About 400,000 Poles had perished while serving in the three imperial armies. The new state, which now consisted of the former Congress Kingdom and western Galicia, also faced the burning and intractable issue of frontiers. Fighting raged for control of Lwow (L’viv) with the West Ukrainian Republic which had established itself in eastern Galicia. The situation in the borderlands between Poland and Russia was ominously fluid as the Red Army advanced west in the wake of the German forces retreating from Russia (in accordance with the November 19J8 Armistice provisions), and as local national movements laid conflicting claims to the region. The precise delimitation of the boundary between Poland and Germany had to await the decision of the Versailles peace conference.

The Entente Powers still recognized the Paris-based and ND-led Polish National Committee, and not the government in Warsaw, as Poland’s official representation. It was clearly apparent to Pilsudskį that national unity, so vital if Poland was to exert any effective influence at the peace conference, could only be achieved by a compromise with the NDs, and consolidated by early democratic parliamentary elections. In an inspired move to ease internal tension, Pilsudskį replaced Moraczewski with the eminent pianist Paderewski, who was highly respected by the NDs, as head of a non-party government of experts. The elections of January 1919, based on universal suffrage and proportional representation, produced a fragmented but relatively evenly balanced Sejm (parliament). Just over a third of the seats went to the NDs, who emerged as the single largest grouping, while about 30 per cent each went to the centre (including the peasant PSL-Piast led by Wincenty Witos) and to the Left (including the left-wing peasant parties and the socialists). The communists’ appeal for a boycott of the elections was largely ignored.

On 20 February the new Sejm adopted the so-called ‘small’ constitution modelled on that of the French Third Republic: ministers were to be responsible to the Sejm which also elected a head of state with very limited powers. Pilsudskį retained the latter post which was now shorn of effective constitutional authority; his position as commander-in-chief, however, gave him considerable influence. Indeed, the creation of a large national army within months of independence was a remarkable early achievement. In late February the restored Polish Republic was finally recognized by France, Britain and Italy. It now faced the daunting task of securing its frontiers.

Poland’s western borders and its access to the sea proved to be the most contentious territorial issue at the Versailles peace conference. Dmowski’s extensive claims were challenged by Lloyd George and had to be modified. The treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919) transferred outright to Poland Poznania and most of Pomerania along the lower Vistula (West Prussia), providing Poland thereby with direct if narrow access to the Baltic Sea. Some compromises had to be made: Danzig (Gdansk), Poland’s natural and historic port but with an overwhelmingly German population, became a Free City under the League of Nations and within the Polish customs area; plebiscites were to decide the future of Upper Silesia and the southern part of East Prussia.

In the south-east the Poles destroyed the West Ukrainian Republic and occupied eastern Galicia, and thereby confirmed in the minds of many local Ukrainian patriots that Poland was the main enemy of their nation. But since the Ukrainian cause enjoyed some Entente support at the peace conferences, the province’s future was by no means a closed issue. Of even greater magnitude and complexity was the question of the future western frontier of Russia, still in the throes of a civil war. The Entente, especially France, hoped in 1919 for a White victory which would restore France’s earlier anti-German alliance with Russia. The NDs too, in line with Dmowski’s earlier geopolitical thinking, believed in the possibility of an accommodation with a non-Bolshevik Russia. In his turn Pilsudskį refused to support the Whites, whose traditional nationalism appeared more anti-Polish than the internationalism of the Bolsheviks.

There existed two conflicting visions of Poland’s role in the eastern lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with their complex mosaic of intermingling nationalities and religions. Overall, Polish or polonized Roman Catholics, landowners, various professionals, as well as declasse petty nobles and peasants, were in a minority here, but were important economically and socially. The narrowly nationalistic NDs called for the outright annexation of Lithuania, most of Belarus and western Ukraine, areas which they considered could be effectively absorbed within a unitary Polish state and assimilated in terms of national identity. Pilsudski’s patriotism, on the other hand, was not based on modern ethnic criteria but owed much to the traditions of the former multiethnic Grand Duchy of Lithuania. He felt that there existed a rare historic opportunity to achieve wider regional security under Polish leadership against a resurgent Russia by creating an extensive east European federation, encompassing ethnic Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus and the Ukraine. While Polish and Lithuanian nationalists rejected any federalist structures in favour of nation states, a federalist concept for the lands of Lithuania and Belarus was favoured by an important section of the Polish-speaking elite (the so-called ‘Regionalists’) of the Wilno region and by some Belarusian national activists. In April 1919 Polish forces expelled the Bolsheviks from Wilno and Minsk, providing Pilsudskį with two of the building blocks of his large eastern federation. But it was clear that Pilsudski’s so-called 'Jagiellonian Idea', with reference to the vast Polish-Lithuanian realm of the late Middle Ages, could only be achieved by war against Bolshevik Russia. Despite ND opposition and the misgivings even of his left-wing allies, but in the light of Bolshevik intentions to transport their revolution to the West, Pilsudskį won approval for his plan. Consequently, while retaining the contested east Galicia, Poland recognized the independence of rhe Ukraine, and formed a military alliance with rhe Ukrainian government of Symon Petliura which was battling against the Red Army.

The Poles and their Ukrainian ally launched their offensive on 25 April 1920; on 7 May they entered Kiev. But the euphoria proved short-lived. The Poles had underestimated Bolshevik strength and overestimated popular support in the Ukraine for Petliura. Bolshevik forces under Tukhachevsky counter-attacked in the north while the cavalry army of Budenny struck in the south. Numerous former tsarist officers, enraged by the Polish attack, rallied to the cause of ‘National Bolshevism’. The Poles had to retreat. It was now Lenin’s turn to implement his grand vision; over the corpse of ‘bourgeois Poland’ the Red Army was to bring the proletarian revolution into the heart of Europe. In the van of the Red Army travelled a committee of Polish communists, including Felix Dzerzhinsky, all set to bolshevize their country.

In the face of a possible disaster, the Polish government sought Entente mediation in the war and reluctantly accepted the so-called Curzon Line (named after the British foreign secretary) as a provisional demarcation line in the east, corresponding roughly with the eastern limit of the former Congress Kingdom. The Bolsheviks ignored the proposal and continued their advance towards the Vistula. Across western Europe and in Germany workers and trade unions protested against Polish ‘aggression’. The workers and peasants of Poland did not, however, rise to welcome the Red Army. If anything, the threat of godless Bolshevism generated an outburst of patriotism. On 24 July an all-partv Government of National Defence was formed in Warsaw under the premiership of the peasant leader Witos and with the veteran socialist Daszyriski as deputy. Its radical programme of land reform helped to neutralize Bolshevik propaganda. Thousands of volunteers, including students and schoolboys, rallied to the colours as the Bolsheviks approached Warsaw. It was not the French military mission under General Weygand, whose unhelpful advice was ignored, which turned the tide of the w'ar, but Pilsudski’s bold counter-attack on 16-18 August from the south against the over-extended Bolshevik lines east of Warsaw'. That Polish cryptographers were able to read much of the Red Army’s radio signals gave the Polish High Command a decisive advantage during the battle; they were also able to jam Bolshevik radio communications, broadcasting for this purpose extracts from the Book of Genesis in Morse Code. And in the last great cavalry battle of modern warfare, involving 20,000 horsemen on each side, Budenny’s army was destroyed near Žarnose. The Bolshevik rout was confirmed by a subsequent Polish victory on the Niemen river in September.

Not since Sobieski’s triumph outside Vienna in 1683 had Polish arms met with such success; but the so-called "Miracle 011 the Vistula’ was a close-run thing. What the impact of a Soviet victory in 1920 would have been on the much-troubled societies of Germany and western Europe can only be speculation. The Poles like to think that in 1920 they saved Western Civilization from the Bolshevik hordes. In one sense they certainly repaid some of their debt for the Entente’s victory over Germany which had made Polish independence initially possible in Г918. The Polish-

Soviet war ended with the peace of Riga of 18 March 1921. It established a frontier well to the east of the now infamous ‘Curzon Line’, but closer to the limit envisaged by the assimi-lationist National Democrats; the Polish delegation at the peace talks was dominated by Stanislaw Grabski, a National Democrat opposed to Pilsudski’s federalism, who declined the Bolshevik offer of Minsk. The National Democrats were very conscious that their electoral position would be weakened by the inclusion of any more ethnic minorities in the east. At Riga the Poles also abandoned their Ukrainian allies. Pitsudski’s federal scheme, for which so much blood had been shed, lay in ruins. By the same token, Bolshevik ambitions of a European revolution had been checked. In Moscow the idea of Socialism in One Country was born, while

Lenin’s New Economic Policy represented a partial compromise with capitalism.

While fighting for its very survival against the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1920, the fledgling Polish state was unable to press its territorial claims effectively in southern East Prussia, where the Polish-speaking Mazurians, whose national identity was still indeterminate, voted overwhelmingly to remain in Germany rather than risk inclusion in a Bolshevik Poland. At the same time the Czechs obtained the Entente’s recognition of their occupation of the disputed industrial region of Teschen (Cieszyn), a move that was to damage Polish-Czech relations during the rest of the interwar period. The violent Polish-German dispute over Upper Silesia, one of the main industrial areas of central Europe, was not resolved until October 1921 when, following a plebiscite, the League of Nations divided the region: Poland obtained only 29 per cent of the territory but 46 per cent of the population and most of the mines and industrial plants. Polish Upper Silesia was to enjoy considerable regional autonomy in the inter-war period.

The city of Wilno (Vilnius), which the new Lithuanian state claimed as its historic capital but whose population was predominantly Polish- and Yiddish-speaking, was seized in October 1920, with Pilsudski’s unofficial authorization, by allegedly mutinous local Polish units. But Pilsudski’s proposal for a bi-cantonal Lithuania (including Wilno) in a federal association with Poland was rejected both by the Lithuanians and by the Wilno regional assembly which voted in January 1922 for simple incorporation into Poland. The old multilingual Grand Duchy of Lithuania could not be recreated in an age of ethnic nationalism. Unreconciled to the loss of Wilno, the Lithuanians established a provisional capital in Kaunas, and insisted until 1 938 that a formal state of war existed with Poland. Polish attempts in the 1920s to create a Baltic security zone were to suffer as a consequence.

It was only in March 1923 that the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, acting as the executive organ of the Allied Powers, finally recognized Poland's eastern frontiers. The struggle for the frontiers had lasted for over four years, almost as long as it took to achieve a final settlement in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire. Poland’s inter-war borders were no more unfair than many of those redrawn elsewhere in central and eastern Europe. Most Poles now found themselves within a Polish nation-state; nevertheless, national minorities constituted nearly a third of Poland’s population of 27 million in 1921. While the western border corresponded roughly with the ethnic-linguistic division (and with Poland’s pre-partition frontier), that was mostly not the case in the east, where strategic considerations were paramount. What was more worrying was that Poland had emerged as a sizeable independent state only because of the temporary weakness of Germany and Russia. Only with Latvia and Romania was Poland to maintain good neighbourly relations throughout the inter-war period. The failure of both Poland and Czechoslovakia, who remained divided over Teschen and over their very different strategic priorities, to form an alliance in the inter-war period was, in retrospect, highly unfortunate. Security against Germany was provided, for the time being, by a French alliance of February 1921, but no major power was committed to defending Poland in the east. Poland’s sovereignty was also restricted by international treaty obligations with regard to the legal rights of its national minorities. The net result of the struggles of 1918-21 was that the Poles came to distrust the Great Powers while acquiring an exaggerated belief in their own military capabilities.

A new constitution, adopted in March 1921, symbolized the consolidation of the Polish Second Republic, but also introduced what was to prove an unwieldy system of parliamentary government. Fearing Pilsudski’s return to power, the NDs prevented the creation of a strong presidency. In their turn, the left-wing parties secured the introduction of proportional representation in parliamentary elections to prevent the domination of the NDs, who were the largest party. But since the Polish parliamentary scene was composed of at least eighteen parties, it was a recipe for unstable coalition government. A wide range of civil rights and political and religious freedoms was guaranteed as well as the sanctity of private property; it was clear that the land reform, so eagerly adopted in 1920 and so important in a country in which a third of all peasant holdings were under two hectares in size, was going to be a limited affair. On the other hand, the advanced social welfare provisions of 1 9 118 were retained.

A kind of normality began to return after the political and military upheavals of the war years. The outburst of patriotic feelings in 1920 and the start of post-war reconstruction did much to dampen the earlier social tensions. The authority of the new state was also increasingly felt in most areas of national life as the previously disparate regions of the country were gradually reintegrated administratively and economically. A vigorously expanded national system of education and a national army provided two important foci for the cultivation of a supra-regional national identity. Yet the new state lacked a well-established tradition of constitutional government, while within its new borders there still functioned four different legal systems. The inheritance of three different railway systems also hampered communications. The collapse and loss of the Russian market forced Poland’s industry to reorientate itself to the highly competitive markets of the west. The strong regional differences, in terms of contrasting levels of economic and social development and popular literacy, remained, and were further accentuated by the existence of national minorities.

The largest minority, concentrated in the south-east and numbering over 4 million, were the Ukrainians, many of whom retained strong aspirations for their own statehood. The idea of autonomy for eastern Galicia had been mooted since 1919, but the fact that nothing was to come of it had damaging results for inter-ethnic relations. Indeed, in the early 1920s Ukrainian nationalists waged an underground war against the Polish state. Ukrainian nationalism was to have a serious destabilizing impact on political life in inter-war Poland. Among the 1.5 million Belarusians there was social unrest. As for the Germans, many thousands had left Poland by 1921, but there remained a scattered yet economically and socially important German minority of nearly 1 million; those in the ex-German regions resented their separation from the Reich. In 1921 Poland's highly diverse Jewish population numbered about 2.2 million, of whom well over four-fifths used Yiddish as their mother tongue. While Polish national aspirations were alien to most Jews, some of whom were even hostile to Polish independence, many members of the Jewish intelligentsia were willing to co-operate with the Polish state. Assimilated Jews could be found among the ranks of Polish patriots, for instance the eminent

Map 9 Inter-war Poland: a land of many nationalities and faiths.

Source: Petit annuairc statistique de'la Pologne 1939 (Warsaw, т939)-

F

Nationalities according to language (Polish 1931 census):

Each pie-chart on the map represents a province (wojewodztwo) with its population in millions. The City of Warsaw enjoyed the status of a separate province. Divisions of the pie-charts represent percentages.

Key

| Polish

|-111 ■ ■ 11: ■ • 11 Ukrainian

\ Yiddish

_L ' Belarusian

[ • —¹ 'Local'

ЮН I ID German

Russian Lithuanian Others

1. Ukrainian includes Ruthenian (ruski) which was a separate category in the census.

2. Yiddish includes Hebrew which was declared by 7.8% of the Jews, although few of them would have used it in daily life.

3. 'Local' was declared as their mother tongue by 707,000 Belarusian-speakers in Polesie.

Religious affiliations 1931

j Roman Catholic _ j Greek Catholic

Orthodox

J Jewish Щ Protestant ! Other Christians Щ Others

historian Szymon Askenazy who from 1920 to 1923 represented Poland at the L.eague of Nations. On the other hand the anti-Semitism propounded by the NDs did much to poison Jewish-Gentile relations, and only increased among many young Jews the attraction of communism (Jews were to constitute about a third of the inter-war Polish Communist Party) and of Zionism. The Jewish contribution to Polish life, however, whether in medicine, law or literature, was to be enormous in the inter-war period. The poet Julian Tuwim and the writer Bruno Schulz provide just two examples of a remarkable Polish-Jewish cultural osmosis.

With the achievement of independence, Polish writers, poets and artists were freed from the obligation to fight for the national cause. Some remained involved in politics, as apologists for Pilsudskį and the legend of his legions, or as commentators on the lives of ordinary working people, but others embarked on the search for new forms of expression. Among the most creative were the lyrical poets of the ‘Skamander’ group who tackled exotic, sexual and surreal themes; amongst them stood out the painter, playwright and novelist Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, known simply as Witkacy.

With the end of the national emergency of 1920-1 the NDs renewed their struggle for political domination. They toppled Witos’ centre-left government in June 1921, and consolidated the forces of the right in the so-called Christian Union of National Unity, but failed to secure a majority in the parliamentary elections of November 1922. The defeat of the ND candidate in the presidential election a month later and the victory of Professor Gabriel Narutowicz, made possible by the support of the parties of the left and the centre and of the National Minorities Bloc, drove the NDs to fury. On 16 December an ND fanatic assassinated the president-elect. Only narrowly did Poland avoid an outbreak of the kind of wider violence that was raging at the time in Germany, Italy and Spain. The murder of Poland’s first president brought 110 immediate gains to the shamed NDs, who felt obliged to draw back and meekly accept the appointment of a strong government under General Wladyslaw Sikorski and the election as president of the veteran socialist Stanislaw Wojciechowski.

The National Democrats had to acknowledge that to achieve ‘a government of the Polish majority' they would have to make concessions. In May 1923 they reached a compromise agreement with Witos’ centrist peasant party Piast, the second largest grouping in the Sejm, and assumed office in a coalition government led by Witos. In return for the ND offer of support for a moderate land reform, PSL-Piast moved to the right and endorsed the NDs’ programme to restrict the rights of the national minorities, and to reduce Pilsudski’s influence by subordinating the army to a Ministry of War. Pilsudskį thereupon resigned as chief of the General Staff. But the centre-right's success was blighted by the impact of the economic depression that had started in March. Inflation wreaked general havoc. In practical terms, a peasant who had borrowed funds from the state in 1919 to buy twelve horses was able to repay his debt in August 1 923 for the equivalent of one kilogram of meat. Social distress grew as well as the number of strikes, from which Pilsudski’s haw^rks and both the constitutional and revolutionary left hoped to benefit. In an atmosphere of mounting tension, accompanied by terrorist outrages, Witos’ government decided to act against the left; in October it placed striking railwaymen under military discipline. A general strike on 5 November, initiated by the socialists, led to bloody confrontations with the army and the police. Witos’ government lost its parliamentary majority when Piast split over the proposed land reform, and resigned in December.

The prospect of political and economic disaster brought the main parties to their senses. The moderate non-party government that took office in December under the stern Wladyslaw Grabski was empowered by the Sejm to restore financial stability and to come to grips with the escalating inflation; between June and December 192; the value of the Polish mark had fallen from 71,000 to 4.3 million to the US dollar. Grabski’s policy of financial retrenchment, coupled with the rigorous collection of taxes, put brakes on inflation and restored confidence. In April 1924 a new¹ currency, the Polish zloty, was introduced. But the effectiveness of Grabski’s reforms w^ras blunted by a disastrous harvest in 1924 and the damaging tariff war started in early 1925 by Germany, with which Poland conducted half of its trade.

Indeed, associated with the German economic offensive against

Poland was Gustav Stresemann’s avowed intention of recovering some of the territories lost to Poland at Versailles. For General von Seeckt, the commander of the German army since 1919, the destruction of hated Poland was the ultimate objective. Already alarmed by the willingness of Weimar Germany and the USSR to co-operate at Rapallo in 1922, the Poles now observed with nervous concern the weakening of French influence after the Ruhr crisis and the international rehabilitation of Germany with a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. The inviolability of Germany's western border, guaranteed at Locarno in October 1925 by the west European powers, was not extended to Germany’s eastern frontier. Neither an arbitration treaty with Germany nor a much diluted Franco-Polish mutual assistance pact could conceal the reversal suffered by Poland.

At home, Grabski’s government succeeded in other important areas of national life. In 1925 construction began of a new port and city in Gdynia which, unlike Danzig, was situated on sovereign Polish territory, and of a railway between Gdynia and Upper Silesia to facilitate the export of Polish coal. In February 1925 state-church relations were regularized with the signing of a Concordat which granted considerable privileges to the Roman Catholic Church in return for a government say in episcopal appointments, and for the recognition by the Vatican of Poland’s new state boundaries. A moderate land reform, passed in December 1925, provided for the annual transfer of 200,000 hectares, on a voluntary basis and over a ten-year period, from large landed estates into peasant ownership. The government also came to grips with Soviet-inspired agitation along the long eastern frontier by creating a special border force and by encouraging the settlement of military colonists, although the latter were often deeply resented by the local non-Polish populations. Indeed, official policy towards the national minorities was hardening. A law of 1924 promoting bilingual schools led to a drastic reduction of single-language Ukrainian schools in eastern Galicia; another law in the same year banned the use of the Ukrainian language in governmental agencies.

In November 1925 the renewed economic crisis overwhelmed Grabski’s administration. Alarmed by the prospect of yet another

political crisis and by the mutinous rumblings among Pilsudski’s followers in the army, the main parties patched up their differences in a grand coalition government under the even-tempered Alek-sander Skrzynski, a distinguished diplomat and recent foreign minister with no formal party affiliation. But the days of Poland’s young parliamentary system of government were numbered. A sense of disillusionment with the political order was growing, exacerbated by financial scandals and by a lack of consensus for dealing with the continued economic difficulties. Matters came to a head after Skrzynski’s resignation on 5 May 1926 and the failure of the president to recreate Grabski’s non-partisan administration. As a result the peasant leader Witos returned to office on 10 May at the head of a centre-right cabinet. But memories of Witos’ disastrous administration of 1923 were still very fresh. Pilsudskį now took it upon himself to save the country from what he saw as a contemptible breed of corrupt and bickering politicians. From his country retreat in Sulejowek outside Warsaw he marched on the capital on 1 2 May at the head of rebel army units. At a dramatic meeting on the Poniatowski bridge over the Vistula, President Wojciechowski rejected Pilsudski’s unconstitutional demands for a change of government. After three days of fighting between Pilsudski’s men and government troops, both the president and Witos agreed to resign. A railwaymen’s strike, inspired by the socialists, prevented pro-government reinforcements from reaching Warsaw. Pilsudski’s coup was welcomed by all the non-communist left, by Poland’s industrialists, and by wide sections of the population, including many Jewish organizations. Only in ND-dominated Poznania were there mass protests. There were specific Polish causes and features of Pilsudski’s 1926 coup, but it does provide another instance of the fragility of parliamentary institutions in much of continental Europe after the First World War.

Pilsudskį had no wish to assume a public role as a dictator, preferring to deploy lesser figures to carry out his ultimate objective of introducing strong presidential government in Poland. The overawed and humiliated Sejm legalized the coup. Pilsudski’s choice, the former socialist and eminent chemist Ignacy Mošcicki, was elected president by the National Assembly. Kazimierz Bartel, another professor of no party affiliation; was to serve intermittently

as prime minister until 1930. Until his death in 1935 Pilsudskį retained control of the army as minister of war and as the General Inspector of the Armed Forces.

Pilsudski’s coup was carried out in the name of Sanacja, a term used in the sense of restoring ‘health’ to the body politic, and which gave the name to the political regime that continued until 1939. With its emphasis on discipline, anti-corruption and loyalty to the state, the Sanacja hoped to appeal to a wide cross-section of the population, including the national minorities. Significant if limited steps were taken in 1927 to abolish some anti-Jewish restrictive laws from the tsarist period which were still in operation in ex-Russian Poland. And in Volhynia, under governor Henryk Jozewski, considerable efforts were made after 1928 to foster a Ukrainian patriotism that would be compatible with Polish statehood; little ultimately came of this but it was enough to increase

Stalin’s suspicions of Polish intentions towards the Soviet Ukraine. Formally Poland retained a multi-party parliamentary system, but the constitution was modified in August 1 926 by the augmentation of the president's powers to dissolve parliament and to rule by-decree, and also to determine the state budget. With no political party at his disposal, the marshal exerted his authority indirectlv through his faithful followers within the parties of the centre and the left, and those promoted in the armed forces and the civilian administration. Not wishing to be beholden to the left, and determined to weaken the right, Pilsudskį skilfully engineered a rapprochement with the conservative elements in Polish society: aristocratic landowners, industrialists and even the once hostile Catholic Church.

Pilsudski’s regime was further strengthened by the marked improvement of the Polish economy between 1926 and 1929. The pace of cultural life also quickened, whether measured by the expansion of the press and periodicals, or by the number of radios, which increased from 120,000 in 1927 to 246,000 in 1930. Elementary education expanded with extra vigour, and social security provisions were further extended. Considering Poland’s very modest economic base of 192.1 these were noticeable improvements. Yet while the demand for agricultural products brought substantial gains to the peasantry, the 1925 land reform was inadequate to resolve the acute problem of rural over-population, especially in the south of the country. Alleviation continued to come in the form of large-scale emigration to the Americas, and especially to France, which alone received 320,000 Polish immigrants between 1925 and 1930; most headed for the coal-mines in the region of Lille, where their descendants still represent France’s largest Polish community. The existence of only 30,000 passenger cars in 1.930, representing one-ninth of Germany’s car ownership on a per thousand of population basis, provides a telling index of Poland’s relative poverty. The cost of maintaining Poland’s armed forces, which consumed 35 per cent of total state expenditure in 1929, continued to be an unavoidable burden on a country in a precarious geopolitical position.

Conditions were now ripe for Pilsudskį to consolidate his regime. Despite his aversion to party politics, the marshal realized

that he needed a formal pro-government political grouping in the Sejm. The resulting Non-Party Bloc of Co-operation with the Government (BBWR), formed in early 1928, embraced individuals of diverse ideological standpoints; its two guiding principles were service to the state and loyalty to the marshal. Although the 1928 election saw the effective eclipse of the National Democrats and of Piast, the BBWR won only a quarter of the parliamentary seats, not enough to push a revision of the constitution through the Sejm. A long war of attrition now began against the opposition in the Sejm.

To browbeat the Sejm into submission, the marshal deployed a variety of intimidatory tactics, including placing in office hard-line ‘colonels’ from among his coterie of close ex-legionary followers. The public declaration in July 1929 by W'alery Stawek, the most ambitious of the colonels, that ‘it is better to break the bones of one deputy than to bring machine guns into the streets’, well reflected the incipient threat of violence. Determined to restore full parliamentary democracy, the parties of the centre and the left formed an alliance in September 1929; their cause was facilitated by the impact of the Great Depression, which by mid-1930 had brought a painful end to the recent years of relative prosperity. With the virtual paralysis of parliamentary government, the centre-left embarked on a campaign of mass public demonstrations, starting in Krakow on 29 June 1930. But it underestimated the marshal’s readiness for a final confrontation.

On 2у August J-930 Pilsudskį personally assumed the premiership, announced new elections for November, and on the night of 9-10 September had the opposition leaders, including Witos, arrested and incarcerated in the fortress of Brzešč (Brest Litovsk). Thousands of opposition activists were detained. The inability of the centre-left to establish a common front with the National Democrats, the communists and the national minorities prevented the creation of a broad movement of resistance to the regime. The elections of November 1930 finally yielded an absolute parliamentary majority of 55.6 per cent of the seats to the BBWR. The centre-left alliance altogether managed to muster only 21.9 per cent, while the NDs tailed far away with 14 per cent. The victory of the Sanacja was such that Pilsudskį could afford to pass the premiership back to Slawek and to leave the country on a three-month rest cruise to Madeira.

In the meantime the Great Depression was making ever deeper cuts in the Polish economy. By 1932 industrial production had fallen to 54 per cent of the 1929 level, and in 1933 nearly a third of the industrial workforce was unemployed. The steep fall in agricultural prices brought severe hardship to the peasants. The regime’s initial response to the crisis was a deflationary economic policy aimed at maintaining the value of the zloty, and the tightening of political control over the judiciary, local government and academic institutions. The arrested opposition leaders were tried in Brzešc between 1931 and 1933 and either jailed or, as in the case of Witos, obliged to leave the country. A ‘camp of isolation’ was established at Bereza Kartuska in 1934 f°^r the most militant critics of the regime: communists, right-wing extremists and Ukrainian nationalists.

The Sanacja under Pilsudskį was a secular authoritarian system of government of a non-fascist type. The government did try to mobilize mass support for the regime, but large areas of national life remained outside its direct control: opposition political parties, many trade unions, a host of social, cultural and sporting organizations from the co-operative movement to the scouts, much of the economy and the press (although subject to limited censorship), as well as rhe country’s many religious denominations with their charitable societies. Many of the old szlachta values of individualism and personal liberty remained deeply ingrained in many areas of Polish culture. The creation of a strong modern state did, however, open a multitude of careers to the intelligentsia: in the civil service, in education, or in the armed forces. Responses to the new political realities among the intellectual and artistic elite varied. Some writers, like Julian Knden-Bandrowski, the father of the Polish political novel, endorsed the Sanacja; others, such as Witold Gombrowicz or Julian Tuwirn (especially in his scathing poem ‘The ball in the Opera’ written in 1956), responded with acid satire. The greatest asset of the Sanacja was of course Marshal Pilsudskį himself, with his brusque manner, simple lifestyle, and heavy-handed paternalism. Until his death from cancer in May 1935 he concentrated on military and foreign affairs and left the day-to-day business of government to his colonels.

Essentially Poland was still a pluralist society. Nevertheless, the scale of the Great Depression obliged the authorities to consider increasing state intervention in the economy. Some of the opposition parties, even those with a democratic pedigree, now veered towards more radical collectivist solutions to Poland’s problems, (n 1931 the main peasant parries united to form a single Polish Peasant Party (PSI.) of 100,000 members, which adopted as its programme the expropriation, without compensation, of private landed estates. In its turn, in 1934 the PPS called for the nationalization of the major branches of the economy, and even endorsed the principle of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ as a temporary necessity. Needless to say, the communist KPP gained new followers. The Christian Democrats, weakened by desertions to the government camp, turned towards ideas of Catholic corporatism. The National Democrats, relying increasingly on the Gentile lesser bourgeoisie, moved even further to the right; in 1932 the elderly but still active Dmowski launched the so-called Camp of Greater Poland with 250,000 members, only to see it banned by the government the following year. The appeal of fascism and of anti-Semitism was most pronounced among young radical NDs, who in 1934 formed the ‘National-Radical Camp’ (ONR), from which emerged the distinctly totalitarian ONR-Falanga under Boleslaw Piasecki. The grim warnings coming from Witkacy, the leading ‘catastrophist’ writer, about eastern totalitarianism and about the creation by contemporary civilization of a ‘socially perfect, mechanized man’ seemed particularly apposite in the new antidemocratic and anti-liberal climate sweeping the continent in the 1930s.

On the other hand, the Roman Catholic episcopate, led since 1926 by the calm but resolute Cardinal August Hlond, distanced itself from its earlier pro-ND tendencies. Despite the Church’s good relations with the state, Hlond publicly criticized the authoritarianism creeping into government policy in the 1930s. Indeed, this period witnessed the revitalization of Polish Catholicism and the rise of the Church’s moral prestige across a broad spectrum of the Polish population. The parochial system was reformed and expanded; seminaries were improved. The growth of lay Catholic organizations, such as Catholic Action and the so-called ‘rosary brotherhoods’, involved many millions of faithful, mostly in the rural areas; membership of Christian trade unions exceeded membership of those of the socialists. The introduction of religious instruction in schools, the creation of a Catholic university in Tublin, the appointment of inspired university chaplains, and the Church’s concern for the easing of social tensions helped to weaken the anticlericalism that had been widespread among the left-wing and liberal intelligentsia before 1918, and promoted the emergence of a new open-minded Catholic intelligentsia. All this provided the roots of the Church’s resilience during the ordeals that were to face it and the nation after 1939.

In the meantime, Poland’s continuous search for security presented new problems, new opportunities and new traps. In July 1932 Poland signed a non-aggression treaty with the USSR which strengthened Poland’s hand in responding to Hitler’s rise to power. Indeed, the ideological enmity between Nazi Germany and the USSR militated against the ‘spirit of Rapallo’ and encouraged Pilsudskį, through his new foreign minister Colonel Jozef Beck, to develop a policy of ‘balance’ with regard to Poland’s two dangerous neighbours. Increasingly apprehensive about the reliability of the French alliance and sceptical about French plans for an eastern security pact, Pilsudskį decided on a direct resolution of all Polish-German problems. In his turn, Hitler was eager to separate the Poles from the French. The ensuing Polish-German non-aggression treaty of January Г934 ended the tariff war, but equally raised French fears about Polish intentions. Pilsudskį was under no illusion about Poland’s vulnerability; confidentially he predicted in 1934 that Poland had gained perhaps four years of breathing space in its relations with Germany.

In view of Pilsudski’s rapidly declining health and the growing political radicalism in the country, the Sanacja moved to give a new legal framework to the post-1926 system of government. A new constitution, introduced in April 1935, emphasized the primacy of the state and endowed the president, who would now be elected by a small electoral college, with enormous powers. By the same token the powers of the Sejm were reduced, while a subsequent electoral law abolishing proportional representation nearly halved the number of deputies, and gave the authorities a major say in the selection of parliamentary candidates. The election of the Senate ceased to be by universal and direct voting.

Marshal Pilsudskį did not live long enough to assume the new-style presidency, which had been the original idea. Despite the highly controversial nature of his regime, Pilsudski’s death on 12 May j 935 was deeply felt by the majority of the population who recognized his enormous contribution to the struggle for independence. But his death deprived the ruling elite of its main focus of unity. President Mošcicki, hitherto an obliging executor of Pilsudski’s wishes, refused to surrender his office to Slawek, envisaged as Pilsudski’s successor; rejecting the advice of the colonels, Mošcicki appointed General Edward Rydz-Smigfy as head of the armed forces. The elections of 193 5, boycotted by over half of the electorate, further accelerated the divisions within the Sanacja. Two distinct groupings emerged: one centred around President Moscicki and the distinguished economist Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski which laid emphasis on efficiency and professionalism in government, the other of a more military and authoritarian flavour around Rydz-Smigly. A compromise between the two in May 1936 resulted in the creation of a surprisingly stable caretaker administration under the malleable General (and ex-physician) Felicjan Stawoj-Skladkowski which survived until the outbreak of war in 1939. Although lacking rhe necessary political talents, Rydz did not abandon his ambition of stepping into Pilsudski’s shoes. In November 1936 he was promoted to the rank of marshal, and in 1937 his followers formed a new highly centralized political party, the Camp of National Unity (Ozon), with a strong nationalist and anti-Semitic programme. This attempt to appeal to the right backfired 011 Rydz, who had to moderate his tone; too many of Pilsudskis followers, including the Moscicki group, were horrified by this betrayal of the dead marshal’s essentially non-extremist ideals. Thereafter even Ozon softened its line.

The failure of the Sanacja to win wider popular support was vividly portrayed by the continued political agitation and social turmoil in the country which was only slowly emerging out of the Depression. During 1936 and 1937 the police responded violently to large-scale outbreaks of strikes by industrial workers and peasants. On the other hand, the opposition parties were too divided to organize an effective common front against the Sanacja. The National Democrats, still the largest party in the country, refused to have any dealings with socialists and freemasons, and spent most of their energies on anti-Semitic outrages and internecine leadership struggles for the succession to Dmowski (who was to die in January 1939). As a result only a small, if eminent, group of centrist politicians, including Sikorski, Witos and Paderewski, was involved at the inception of the ‘Morges Front’, named after Paderewski’s Swiss residence. The socialist and peasant parties refused to collaborate in a ‘Democratic Front’. The prospect of a ‘Popular Front’, launched by the Comintern in Moscow in 1935 to unite all European left-wing and democratic parties against fascism, fared little better in Poland; in Г937 Stalin put to death most members of the Polish Communist Party (KPP) residing in the USSR, and in 1938 dissolved the entire organization on charges of Trotskyism. Furthermore, in 1937-8 over 100,000 Soviet Poles (half of them from the Soviet Ukraine) were summarily executed on his orders.

The Great Depression, and the political and nationalist radicalism it encouraged, accentuated the problems of Poland’s national minorities. The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church under the outstanding leadership of Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi, the extensive Ukrainian co-operative movement, and moderate Ukrainian political parties strove through legal means to protect Ukrainian cultural and economic interests. The horrors of Stalin’s collectivization in the Soviet Ukraine had also dissolved any attraction the USSR might have exerted on Poland’s Ukrainians. However, despite some conciliatory gestures made by the Polish government in the mid-.1930s, instances of official anti-Ukrainian discrimination only hardened the bitterness of the increasingly assertive Ukrainians. Nationalist paramilitary groups, some trained in Germany, turned to terrorism to undermine Polish rule. The social and material position of Poland’s Jews also deteriorated in the 1930s. Polish nationalist groups encouraged peasants to boycott Jewish shops and organized anti-Jewish demonstrations at the universities. Some professions imposed restrictions on Jewish membership, while the government even endorsed unrealistic plans for Jewish emigration. The Zionist movement also promoted Jewish emigration to Palestine, although, of the 400,000 Jews who left Poland between 1921 and 1937, only about a third headed there. Nevertheless, by 1937 Polish Jews constituted 40 per cent of the mandate’s Jewish population. The growth of Nazi influence among Poland’s German minority further compounded nationalist tensions in the country. Discreet attempts to seek a reconciliation with Lithuania, endorsed by the Lithuanian-born Pilsudskį, gave way after his death to a hardening of official Polish attitudes towards the Lithuanian republic, still resentful of the loss of Vilnius (Wilno) and still refusing to establish normal diplomatic relations with Warsaw.

The most constructive undertaking of the Sanacja in this period was the new interventionist economic policy inaugurated in 1936

by Kwiatkowski, deputy prime minister and minister of finances since 1935. The most important element in his four-year state investment plan was the establishment of the Central Industrial Region (COP) in the most over-populated and strategically secure area between the Vistula and the San rivers. The construction of hydroelectric power stations, of aircraft, rubber and motor vehicle factories, of chemical plants, and of a new industrial centre at Stalowa Wola was to make possible the modernization of the armed forces, due to be completed by 1942. Further investment plans envisaged the modernization, by 1954, of Poland’s communications, agriculture and education. Already in 1938 Poland’s industrial production and real industrial wages well exceeded those of T928; its per capita national income was now similar to that of Spain.

By 1939 an entire generation had been brought up for whom national independence was the norm. After the long period of partitions, the different parts of the country had been quite successfully reintegrated, government institutions and the civil service functioned effectively, and the process of unifying the legal system was far advanced. The railway network had been expanded; several shipping lines and a national airline ‘Lot’ had been created. Higher and secondary education was still limited but of a good standard, and many Polish scholars and academics, especially mathematicians, gained international renown; popular illiteracy, still mostly evident in the eastern provinces, had been reduced from 33 to 15 per cent; mortality rates had been cut by half; the infrastructures and appearance of most towns had been improved; and by 1939 wireless ownership had reached 1 million. Overall, however, living standards were still modest, and in the countryside hidden unemployment affected an estimated 5 million people. The nationalities issue also remained as intractable as ever; Polish officialdom continued to perceive the nationalist aspirations of the minorities as a threat to the integrity of the Polish state.

However impressive the early fruits of Polish economic etatisnie, Poland had neither the means nor the resources, nor the totalitarian controls, ever to achieve economic or military parity with either of its two big neighbours. In 1937 Polish steel production was 1.5 million tons, that of Germany 19.8 million, and of the USSR 17.8 million. And time was running out. While Warsaw considered the USSR temporarily weakened by Stalin’s purges of the Red Army, Poland's international position became increasingly vulnerable as a result of Hitler’s blatant policy of overthrowing the Versailles system, and the irresolute response to the dictators by Britain and France in their anxiety to avoid war. France’s failure to challenge Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 undermined Foreign Minister Beck’s confidence in the French alliance. However, Beck’s sceptical attitude to collective security, and his attempt to strengthen Poland's position without unduly irritating Berlin, gave the misleading impression that Poland was acting in collusion with the predatory dictators. When Hitler annexed Austria in March г93 8, Beck, with a veiled threat of war, forced Lithuania to establish diplomatic relations with Warsaw. Even more shameful was the manner and timing of Poland's annexation of Teschen (Cieszyn) in October 1938 from a prostrate Czechoslovakia which had been sacrificed at Munich by Britain and France in the greatest act of appeasement. Nothing was to come either of Beck’s ambition to assert Polish influence over Slovakia and to establish, with Hungary and Romania, a middle-European bloc between Germany and the USSR. Nor did an improvement in Polish-Lithuanian relations in late 1958 lead to any wider Polish association with the Baltic States.

Germany’s sights focused next on Poland itself. Initially Hitler’s preferred intention was to turn Poland into a vassal stare which would act both as a springboard for the conquest of Lebensraum in the USSR, and as an eastern screen should Germany first have to fight France. Poland’s anti-communist record and anti-Russian traditions, the anti-Semitism of its right-wing parties, and even from a ‘racial’ point of view the strong Baltic and Germanic elements in its population qualified Poland in Hitler’s eyes as a possible and useful ally. To establish Germany’s domination over Poland, Berlin requested the return of Danzig, already controlled by local Nazis, and the creation of an extra-territorial highway and railway across Polish Pomerania (the so-called Polish Corridor); the Poles were also invited to join the Anticomintern Pact.

Hitler’s occupation of Prague on 15 March 1939 and the destruction of the rump of Czechoslovakia proved to be a turning-point for Poland and for the Western Powers. Hitler’s attempt to intimidate the Poles into subservience had the opposite effect, while the collapse of appeasement prompted Britain and France to show more resolve in checking Nazi expansion. On 26 March the Polish government politely but unequivocally declined the Fiihrer’s ‘magnanimous’ offer. Chamberlain’s public declaration of support for Poland on 3 i March was followed by a formal British guarantee on 6 April, which only stiffened Polish resolve to resist Hitler’s demands. Hitler responded furiously by repudiating both the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German non-aggression treaty of 1934. The Wehrmacbt was now instructed to plan an attack on Poland. On 19 May France signed a military agreement with Warsaw, but France's commitment to launch ‘the bulk of its forces’ against Germany on the fifteenth day of a

German attack on Poland was hedged with political reservations. The Polish high command in its turn took the French assurances at face value.

The deterioration of international relations in 1938 and 1939 and the economic recovery had calmed political tensions within Poland and encouraged national solidarity. The election of November 1938, held under the restricted arrangements introduced by the J935 constitution, and coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of independence, proved a success for the government, which gained more than 80 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The government rejected all suggestions for the creation of a coalition government of national defence on the 1920 model. Nevertheless, its decision to defend the country’s sovereignty had the overwhelming backing of Polish public opinion.

Just as Poland had refused to be drawn into the German embrace, so it also remained highly suspicious of British and French efforts to include the USSR in an eastern ‘peace front’. For the Polish government the Soviet conditions for such co-operation were unacceptable for they were equally tantamount to the loss of sovereignty. Moscow demanded the stationing of Soviet troops in eastern Poland, the dissolution of the Polish-Romanian alliance, and the limitation of the British guarantee to Poland’s western frontier. In his turn, Stalin was deeply mistrustful of western motives, especially after Munich, and was keen to buy time. Placing imperial interests over ideology, Stalin opted for a deal with Hitler, who offered him more than the West. The secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 2 у August 1939, revealed only in 1946 but denied by the USSR until 1989, provided for the joint division of eastern-central Europe and the partition of Poland.

Hitler now schemed hard to drive a wedge between Warsaw and the Western Powers in order to complete his victim’s isolation. However, the failure of Franco-British talks in Moscow and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact removed the last obstacle to the conclusion, on 25 August, of a formal treaty of alliance between Britain and Poland. Hitler was momentarily unnerved, while the West persuaded the Poles to delay their mobilization in the hope of last-minute talks. Hitler did not really expect the West to fight for Poland; and in any case, in this game of double bluff, he was

willing to take the risk. Early in the morning of 1 September Germany unleashed the bulk of its forces against Poland. Two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Poland would fight. Honour and national interest made the alliance with Britain and France, whose effective help had been promised and was expected, preferable to becoming a German satellite. The September campaign was an uneven struggle. The bitter resistance of the partly mobilized Polish armed forces could not alter the enormous superiority of the Nazi war machine in terms of men, modern equipment, mobility and firepower. While the Germans applied the new doctrine of Blitzkrieg with awesome effect, the Poles tried to defend their long and over-exposed frontiers. Yet the campaign was no simple walkover. The small Polish air force bravely harried the Luftwaffe, while from 9 to 12

September the Polish counter-attack on the river Bzura, west of Warsaw, mauled five German divisions. The Germans suffered a total of 50,000 casualties (more than in France in 1940) and lost 500 aircraft and over a thousand armoured vehicles. Polish military casualties numbered over 200,000, not to mention the civilian victims of indiscriminate German bombing, or the mass executions of Polish officials and civilians. The half-promised French general offensive in the west, which might have turned the course of the campaign, never materialized. Plans to create a redoubt in the south-east, along the Romanian border, were finally dashed by the entry of Soviet troops on 17 September, which sealed the Poles’ fate. Warsaw did not surrender until 27 September, while General Kleeberg’s Polesie Army held out against both Soviet and German forces until 5 October, the day on which Hitler presided over a victory parade in the Polish capital. A Nazi-Soviet agreement of 28 September divided Poland fairly equally along the rivers Narwa, Bug and San (the original plan had envisaged the line of the Vistula), although the Germans acquired the more populous and more developed regions.

The Polish state, in Molotov’s words ‘that hideous creation of the Versailles treaty’, had yet again been wiped off the map. But for the Poles the war was by no means over. Tens of thousands of soldiers and airmen managed to escape via Hungary and headed for France; most of the Polish navy had earlier left the Baltic for British ports. The Polish government and high command refused to capitulate and sought refuge in Romania where, to their surprise, they found themselves interned. On 1 October, under French pressure. President Mošcicki appointed Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, a moderate Sanacja politician, as his successor, while General Wladyslaw Sikorski, a leading critic of the Sanacja, became prime minister of a broad coalition government-in-exile, residing in Paris and recognized by Britain and France. Constitutional legality was thus preserved. As commander-in-chief, Sikorski began the business of reconstructing a Polish army in France, and established contact with the resistance groups that were sprouting in occupied Poland. A quasi-parliamentary body, a National Council, under the nominal chairmanship of the elderly Paderewski and with representatives from all the main political parties, was also formed;

significantly enough, it included a Jewish Bundist member, but none from the other national minorities.

Both occupying powers focused their terror on the educated and ruling elite of the country, and, in the Nazi case, also on the Jews. The eastern half of Poland, except for the region of Wilno (Vilnius) which was handed over by the Soviets to the Lithuanians, was formally annexed by the USSR after bogus local plebiscites. Mass arrests took place of key figures in the Polish military, political and economic establishment, of civil servants and trade union leaders. All private and public enterprises were taken over; the press was shut down; and all Polish political, cultural and social organizations were dissolved. At first the Soviets made strenuous efforts to win over the local non-Polish populations by promoting the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages, by distributing confiscated landed estates among the peasants, and by extending the welfare system. Once effective control had been established, the Soviets launched an attack 011 all religions, dissolved all local autonomous organizations, including the highly developed Ukrainian co-operative movement, and arrested all local Ukrainian and Zionist leaders. Conscription into the Red Army was introduced, and in April 1940 Soviet-style collectivization was imposed. The entire population was now terrorized into obedience.

In 1940 and 194.1 up to half a million people from all social classes and all ethnic groups, but mostly Poles and Jews, were deported from the Soviet-occupied territories to Siberia and Soviet Central Asia. Entire families, deemed in any way ‘unreliable’ by the Soviets, suffered this ordeal; scores of thousands were to perish in the inhospitable conditions of their places of exile or from forced labour in the Gulag. By mid-1941 many small towns of pre-war eastern Poland had lost much of their Polish character. The NKVD meted out special attention to captured Polish officers (regulars and reservists), civil servants, policemen and border guards. On orders signed on 5 March .1940 by Stalin and the Politburo, over 21,000 such prisoners were shot in April 1 940; of these 4,000 perished in Katyn near Smolensk. For half a century, until Gorbachev’s admission in April 1990, Soviet governments were to deny their responsibility for these atrocities. Yet while merciless to those he considered enemies of Soviet power, Stalin sought to recruit Poles, especially left-wing intellectuals, willing to co-operate with the USSR. This policy gained momentum after the unexpected defeat of France in June 1940 which left rhe USSR alone facing a Nazi-dominated European continent. In any confrontation with Germany, the Poles could be useful. In the autumn of 1 940 the 85th anniversary of Mickiewicz’s death was publicly celebrated in Lwow (L’viv), and in early 1941 the Comintern revived its Polish section.

Soviet terror was soon outstripped by its Nazi counterpart. The Nazi occupation lasted longer, it affected the majority of the Polish population (indeed, between 1941 and 1944 Nazi control extended to the entire area of pre-war Poland), and it took a heavier toll of life. A vast tract of western Poland, including Poznan and Lodz (renamed Litzmannstadt), was incorporated directly into the Third Reich, and its population classified according to crude and inconsistent ‘racial’ criteria. To affirm the German character of Upper Silesia and especially of Pomerania, two-fifths of their population were registered wholesale as ‘German’ (and therefore subject to military service) as opposed to 2 per cent carefullv screened in the Wartheland. Those classified as ‘Poles’ were reduced to the status of a helot underclass, deprived of all property and of access to all but the most basic schooling, and subject to compulsory labour or deportation. In the Wartheland virtually all Polish Catholic churches, monasteries and charitable institutions were closed; in Upper Silesia and Pomerania German was enforced as the language of religious life. Patriotic Polish priests were either expelled, arrested or shot. The central part of Poland, administered separately by the Germans as the so-called General Government (to which east Galicia was added in 1941), was subject to a regime of terror, semi-starvation and ruthless economic exploitation. It became a dumping ground for all unwanted Poles and Jews from the lands annexed by the Reich. Most Catholic parishes were allowed to function in the General Government but under many restrictions. Polish Protestants were especially victimized by the Nazis. A policy of ‘spiritual sterilization’ brought with it an attack on Polish high culture: museums, libraries, universities, most secondary schools, and theatres were closed down, and the public playing of Chopin’s music was forbidden. Only some primary schooling and limited technical training was permitted, while

♦ Main Nazi concentration

and extermination camps, eg AUSCHWITZ

j Territories annexed by the Reich, 1939 ] General Gouvernement, 1939 2] Territory annexed by the USSR. 1939

Q Sites of execution of Polish

officers, policemen, and other officials by the Soviet NKVD, April-May 1940

Мар to Poland during the

World War, 1939-1944.

cheap entertainment was provided in the cinemas and through a so-called ‘reptile’ gutter press.

The incarceration in concentration camps in September 1939 of the staff of Krakow University was a foretaste of the fate awaiting the entire Polish educated class under Nazi rule. Indeed, a large proportion of the Polish intelligentsia and professional classes, including of course most of the Jews amongst them, perished through mass executions or in concentration camps: from 15 per cent of all teachers and 18 per cent of the Catholic clergy to 45 per cent of all doctors, 50 per cent of all qualified engineers, and 57 per cent of all lawyers. The rest of the Poles were treated as a slave workforce, ‘ein Arbeitvolk’; from 1939 to 1944 about 2.8 million Poles were sent to Germany as compulsory labourers. About 200,000 Polish children with ‘racially appropriate features’ were removed from orphanages and from their parents in order to be brought up as ‘Aryan’ Germans in Nazi homes. And for every German killed in occupied Poland a hundred hostages were executed. Public hangings and shootings became commonplace in towns and villages. The Nazi ‘Generalplan Ost’ of April 1942 envisaged that the remaining Poles would eventually be scattered over the eastern wastes of conquered Russia as so much unwanted, racially inferior trash. All of Poland was to become a region of German settlement.

However vicious and costly in lives the Nazi treatment of Polish Gentiles was, the fate of the ‘subhuman’ Jews and Gypsies of Poland was to be catastrophically w'orse. Subject to mass killings and brutal maltreatment from the very beginning of the war, the Jews were herded into 400 sealed ghettos, where disease and hunger ravaged their inhabitants; the largest was the Warsaw ghetto with 450,000 people. After the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 the Nazis were able to get their clutches on the Jews of eastern pre-war Poland. At the notorious Wannsee conference in January 1942, the Jews of occupied Europe were condemned to total extermination. To implement this unprecedented act of genocide a whole system of death camps was developed in occupied Poland, the largest centres being Auschwitz-Birkenau (Ošvvięcim-Brzezinka), Majdanek and Treblinka. Here the inhabitants of the ghettos and Jews from all over occupied Europe were transported by the trainload. The uprising in the Warsaw ghetto in April and May 1943 ^{was a} hopeless but powerfully symbolic act of Jewish defiance against their oppressors. By the end of 1944 the Nazis had put to death about 90 per cent of pre-war Poland’s Jewish population of 3 million, and had virtually wiped out a community which had been on Polish soil for centuries.

The reaction of Polish Gentiles to the fate of their Jewish fellow citizens during the Holocaust varied. On the dark side there were extortionists who exploited Jewish misfortunes, informers who betrayed Jews to the Nazis, and extreme right-wing nationalists even willing to kill Jews. The insidious influence of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda, the introduction of the death penalty for anyone caught helping the Jews, the sight of mass executions, and the general atmosphere of terror gradually numbed the moral responses of many people, prompting indifference, fear for their own skin, and even fanning old anti-Jewish sentiments. Reports that some Jews in eastern Poland had welcomed the Soviets in 1939 also strengthened the widely held stereotype of ‘Judaeo-communism’ which had been promoted by right-wing parties before the war; such was the background to the massacres of Jews in Jedwabne and elsewhere by local Poles in areas the Germans had occupied during their invasion of the USSR in 1 94 1. Contemporary accounts suggest that numerous Poles easily came to accept the dispossession of the Jews and their isolation in the ghettos. The observed willingness of many peasants to help the Jews, even in 1941, had definitely altered by the autumn of 1942. On the other hand, there were Gentile Poles willing to take the risk of offering sanctuary to the Jews, to which the Yad Vashem Institute in Israel today provides considerable testimony; religious convents were also able to save many Jewish children. Assimilated middle-class Jews had the best chance of survival outside the ghettos, while orthodox religious Jews, with their distinct dress and appearance, were the easiest targets for the Nazis. The influential Catholic writer Zofia Kossak-Szczucka condemned the genocide in no uncertain terms. In August 1942 the Polish Underground established a separate council (known by the acronym ‘Zegota’) for co-ordinating assistance to the Jews; this came in the form of money, false identity papers and safe places of refuge. The Polish

45 The Holocaust in art. El Mole-Racbmim from the scries ‘Kamienie krzyczq’ (‘The stones arc screaming’), painted in 1946 by Bronislaw Wojciech l.inke (1906-62). ‘El Mole-Rachmim’ (God full of mercy) is sung at Jewish funerals and at the Day of Atonement. Except for the period 1939-46, Linke spent most of his working life in Warsaw. He deployed a pow erful surrealist form of art to attack cruelty, meanness and hypocrisy.

government in London provided an initially incredulous outside world in June and December J942 with details of the Nazi atrocities; the role of the courier Jan Karski, who provided much of this information, merits mentioning. In the circumstances, the saving of up to 45,000 Jews, including 12,000 within Warsaw itself until autumn 1944, could be seen as something of an achievement.

The absence of civilized norms of government during the Nazi occupation of Poland and the general brutalization of the population not only generated bitter Polish hatred of the Germans but created ripe conditions for the outbreak of other inter-ethnic conflicts, especially in the eastern areas of pre-war Poland where traditional social structures had already been destroyed by the Soviets in 1939-41. Polish underground fighters clashed with Lithuanian police units raised by the Germans and with Soviet-sponsored partisans. In 1943 terrible atrocities occurred in Volhynia, where local Ukrainian nationalists, many of whom had learnt their murderous craft during the Holocaust of Volhynia’s Jews in 1942, set out to ‘cleanse' the area of its remaining Polish population. The Poles retaliated, and so began a long brutal Polish-Ukrainian civil war which spread to other neighbouring regions. In the Belarusian-speaking districts nothing comparable happened, and in early 1944 many Belarusians in the Nowogrodek region, fearful of the return of the Soviets, even joined the Polish ‘Home Army’. But it was clear that the traditions of a multi-ethnic Polish state were largely erased during the Second World War.

The bestial nature of Nazi policies in Poland and the intensity of Polish nationalism ruled out any prospect of serious political collaboration with the Nazis; there was simply no scope for a Polish Pėtain or a Polish Quisling. For General Sikorski’s government there was 110 alternative but to continue the w^rar effort. Polish troops displayed characteristic valour during the Allied expedition to Narvik in May 1940 and during the French campaign in which four Polish divisions took part. After the fall of France, the Polish government, with 20,000 soldiers, was evacuated to Great Britain. On the basis of the British-Polish treaty of 5 August 1940 Britain undertook to equip the remaining Polish armed forces which were to fight under overall British command. And in an attempt to break with Poland’s pre-war foreign policy, the exiled Polish and

Czechoslovak governments signed in November 1940 a declaration of intent for a post-war confederation between their two countries. A Polish brigade helped to defend Tobruk in late 1941. Initial British doubts about the competence of Polish airmen were rapidly dispelled, and Polish pilots (numbering 10 per cent of Fighter Command) showed their real mettle during the Battle of Britain when they downed over 200 German aircraft, one-seventh of the total. The Polish squadron 303, based at Northolt outside London, was the highest-scoring fighter squadron in the air battle of 1940. By 1944 the Polish air force in Britain comprised fourteen squadrons; its bombers took part in raids over Germany and its fighter aircraft were active during the invasion of Normandy. The Polish navy acquired additional ships, and participated alongside the Royal Navy in most operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. A particularly significant contribution to the Allied cause was the transfer by Polish military intelligence to the French and British, in August 1939, of a replica of the German ‘Enigma’ machine, the coding system of which had been cracked by Polish cryptologists. Out of this grew Station X at Bletchley Park, where British cryptographers were able to decipher German military communications; there is little doubt that this shortened the war. Polish intelligence networks operated throughout occupied Europe, including Germany, in north Africa and in the Middle East, and provided London with vast amounts of valuable military and industrial information. It is estimated that over 40 per cent of reports from occupied Europe, many of great operational value, came from Polish sources; they included details of the German preparations for the invasion of the USSR and of subsequent German troop movements to the east, as well as details of the German Vi flying bomb and the Vi rocket project.

The Polish tradition of conspiracy and resistance, reinforced now by the legacy of inter-war independence, found full expression again. Diverse resistance groups began to emerge spontaneously as early as September 1939; their activities were gradually coordinated by General Stefan Rowecki, appointed commander of the underground forces by General Sikorski in June 1940. By mid-1944, when it reached its maximum size of 400,000 members, the so-called Home Army (Armia Krajowa or AK) formed the largest underground organization in the whole of occupied Europe; it embraced within its structure all Polish resistance groups with the notable exception of the smaller communist-led People’s Army (AL) and the ultra-nationalist ‘National Armed Forces’ (NSZ). Although officers of the pre-war army who had evaded capture provided much of its cadres, the Home Army drew on all sections of the Polish population and represented a veritable citizen army on a scale hitherto unknown in Polish history. Its main area of activity was the General Government, but it also established sizeable units in the Wilno-Nowogrodek region and in Volhynia. At first the AK concentrated on intelligence gathering, organizing propaganda, punishing collaborators, bandits and extortionists, and on organizing numerous acts of sabotage, especially along German lines of communication to the eastern front. It increased its military activity in early 1943, and, although woefully under-equipped, prepared for a nationwide insurrection in propitious circumstances.

The AK was the military wing of an extensive ‘underground state’ led since autumn 1940 by a Delegate appointed by the government-in-exile in London. The Polish Underground State was endorsed by the four main Polish political parties which continued to function clandestinely and which in February 1940 managed to overcome their pre-war rivalries to form a broad coalition committed to the creation of a genuine parliamentary democracy after the war: the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the National Party (SN) as the successor to the National Democrats, and the Catholic centrist Party of Labour (SP). The supporters of the pre-war Sanacja, humbled by the defeat of 1939, were mostly absorbed into the main resistance movement. Only the communists, who remained relatively inactive until the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941, and the right-wing extremists, dreaming of a nationalist one-party Poland, did not join the broad national coalition, nor recognize the authority of the Government Delegate.

Within the limits imposed by conspiratorial activity, the Underground State maintained the continuity of Polish statehood and carried out a remarkable number of the functions ot a regular government. It possessed a civil service with quasi-ministries, a judicial system, and it promoted educational and cultural activities as a counter-measure to the Nazi policy of debasing the cultural life of the population. Clandestine university teaching and secondary schooling took place in many cities and towns, at great risk to those participating, and ensured the survival of a core of educated people. Works of art were hidden; textbooks, journals and newspapers appeared off secret printing presses; banned Polish classics were staged in covert dramatic theatres and at poetry readings. Indeed, much of Polish organized cultural, social and sporting life, from trade unions to the scouts, operated underground. Charitable institutions allowed by the Germans, such as the Polish Red Cross, also provided cover for conspiratorial activity. Street ballads, mocking the Germans, helped to maintain popular morale, while intentionally slow and shoddy ‘tortoise’ work in German-run armaments factories damaged the Nazi war effort. German-language black propaganda was also distributed in large quantities among German troops in Poland.

The prospect of an early liberation of Poland was very bleak as the Axis Powers extended their control of mainland Europe. Britain by itself could not liberate Europe. It was the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, and Hitler’s ultimate failure to destroy the USSR which dramatically altered the character of the war in Europe; it also changed Poland’s prospects, although not necessarily in accordance with many Polish hopes. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 the war became a global conflict, the outcome of which would be decided primarily by the USA and the USSR. The Poles were to make costly attempts to recover their independence, but once again, as in 1814-15, Poland’s fate was ultimately to rest in the hands of the Great Powers.

In the wake of the British-Soviet alliance of 13 July 1941, Churchill pressed Sikorski to sign an agreement with the USSR (the so-called Sikorski-Maisky treaty) on 30 July 1941: diplomatic relations were restored, the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland was annulled, Polish prisoners in the USSR were freed, and a Polish army was to be formed on Soviet territory. With all of pre-war Poland now under Nazi occupation Stalin could afford to make temporary concessions to the Poles. Sikorski hoped that a Polish army, under the jurisdiction of the Polish government in London and fighting on the eastern front alongside the Red Army, would help to liberate Poland, and that the USSR would respect Poland’s future sovereignty. However, the absence of a precise Soviet commitment to respect the pre-war Polish-Soviet border split the Polish leadership and led to a government reshuffle which raised the profile of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the leader of the Peasant Party (PSL). Nor was Stalin ultimately willing to nurture an independent Polish army that was being formed under the command of General Wladyslaw Anders in Soviet Central Asia. Numerous Soviet bureaucratic obstructions, Moscow’s refusal to recognize as Polish citizens all but ethnic Poles from eastern Poland, and finally the unexplained absence of thousands of Polish officers captured by the Soviets in 1939, all militated against Sikorski's strategy of cooperation with the USSR. The logical outcome was the evacuation of Anders’ army of 70,000 men to Iran in the summer of 1942 to reinforce British and Commonwealth forces in the Middle hast. With Anders left 40,000 emaciated civilians. Never before nor since during Stalin’s rule were so many prisoners and detainees, with such personal knowledge of the Gulag, allowed to leave the USSR. However, tens of thousands of the original deportees remained behind in what the writer Jozef Czapski, one of the freed prisoners, aptly labelled ‘the inhuman land’.

Polish-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate just when the war on the eastern front, after Stalingrad, began to turn in Stalin's favour. Any Polish hopes that there might be a repetition of the outcome of the First World War were to be mere illusions. It is clear that, as a consequence of the Nazi attack on the USSR, Stalin had revised his earlier, inimical, views on Polish statehood; yet he was adamant that he would be the arbiter of the territorial and political configuration of a restored Polish state. Since the Polish government in London remained equally resolved in pressing for full Polish sovereignty and the restoration of the pre-1939 eastern border, there was ultimately to be no scope for a genuine compromise between the two sides. Stalin therefore set to work to create rival institutions to those of the Polish government in London and of the Polish Underground State.

To promote his influence within Nazi-occupied Poland, Stalin had already encouraged the establishment, in January 1942, of a revived Polish communist party under the modified name of the Polish Worker Party (PPR). Led after autumn 1943 by Wladyslaw Gomulka, a Moscow-trained Polish communist, and by Boleslaw Bierut, a former Comintern agent and member of the NKVD, the PPR not only refused to subordinate itself to the underground Government Delegature but began to lay a rival claim to represent the ‘real’ interests of the Polish nation. In early 1943 Stalin sanctioned the activities of a Union of Polish Patriots, led by Polish communists and fellow-travellers, the most eminent of whom was Wanda Wasilewska, the daughter of one of Marshal Pilsudski’s closest associates, and the formation of a Polish army under Soviet control commanded by Colonel Zygmunt Berling, a former prisoner now willing to collaborate with the USSR. Into this army, which was to taste action at Lenino in Belarus in October T943, flocked thousands of Poles who had failed to reach Anders. The discovery by the Germans of the mass grave with the corpses of 4,000 Polish officers at Katyn in April 1943, followed by Sikorski’s request to the Red Cross to investigate, amid justified suspicions that the Soviets had perpetrated the atrocity, provided Stalin with an excellent opportunity to ‘suspend’ diplomatic relations with the Polish government on 25 April 1943.

The year 1943 brought further blows to the Polish cause. The death of General Sikorski in a still not fully explained air crash off Gibraltar on 4 July deprived the Poles of an internationally respected leader. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the new prime minister, was shrewd and able but lacked his predecessor’s authority, and was on bad terms with General Sosnkowski, the new commander-in-chief, who had opposed the Sikorski-Maisky treaty. Secondly, unknown to the Poles, at the Allied conference in Teheran on 28 November to т December 1943 both Roosevelt and Churchill expressed their broad agreement with Stalin’s request that the Curzon Line should form Poland’s future eastern border, thus leaving Wilno (Vilnius) and probably I.wow (L’viv) in Soviet hands, and that Poland should be compensated in the west at Germany’s expense. For the Western Powers the Poles were a gallant and useful ally, but in the cold realities of the global Allied strategy after 1 941, and at a time when the Red Army was bearing the brunt of the land fighting against Nazi Germany, the Soviet alliance was inevitably given precedence over Polish interests and sensibilities.

To weaken communist influence, the coalition parties of the Underground State announced their commitment, in August 1943 and March 1944, to a sweeping land reform and to the nationalization of the industrial base (although the nationalist SN was least keen on this part of the programme), the re-establishment of the pre-T939 eastern border, and territorial compensation from Germany for the human losses and material damage inflicted 011 Poland. What at this stage distinguished the non-communist Underground State and the crypto-communist PPR, which avoided any dogmatic posturing and presented itself in patriotic garb, was not so much the radical social and economic reforms advocated by both sides, but their attitudes towards national sovereignty, the frontier issue and the nature of future Polish-Soviet relations. The PPR attracted a variety of splinter groups from the peasant and socialist parties, but it remained for the moment a small player in Polish politics; its armed wing, the People’s Army, was still only a fraction of the size of the AK. All this was to change with the approach of the Red Army.

In 1944 the Polish armed forces in the west were at last making a significant contribution to the Allied war effort: in May the Second Corps under General Anders stormed the heavily defended Alonte Cassino and opened the road to Rome; in August General Maczek’s 1st Armoured Division distinguished itself at the battle of Falaise, making possible the early liberation of Paris; while in September General Sosabowski’s Parachute Brigade fought hard at Arnhem. All these men were fighting for Poland’s freedom, but they were to be cruelly deceived by the wider course of events. The ground was rapidly slipping from under the government-in-exile. On the one hand Churchill pressed Mikolajczyk to come to terms with Stalin and to give way on the frontier issue; on the other hand, Stalin now demanded not only the explicit recognition of the Curzon Line but the exclusion from the Polish government of elements ‘hostile to the Soviet Union’, that is, the resignation of none other than President Raczkiewicz himself, General Sosnkowski, and other prominent ministers.

Nor was the Polish Underground State able to prevent Stalin,

with his overwhelming power and ruthless methods, from imposing Soviet control on the ground. The attempt in rhe summer of 1944 to establish Polish authority in rhe former eastern territories of Poland in the path of the Soviet advance ended in tragedy. Initially joint action between the AK and the Red Army proved successful, as in the battle for the liberation of Wilno in July 1944. But once the front had moved on to the west, the Soviets arrested the local Polish leaders and demanded that the AK soldiers join the Soviet-sponsored Berling army; most refused and found themselves dispatched to the Gulag.

On 21 July 1944 the Red Army crossed the Bug river into what Stalin recognized as Polish territory. Yet even here he had no time for the independent Polish underground. On 22 July, in Chelm, a Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) laid its claim to be the effective government of liberated Poland. The PKWN announced its commitment to the democratic constitution of 1 921, to radical reforms, and to Poland’s expansion in the west at Germany’s expense. It presented itself as a broad left-wing and democratic body of a Popular Front type, although none of rhe major Polish political parties was represented. Its chairman, Edward Osobka-Morawski, was a hitherto unknown member of a socialist splinter group. Security, propaganda and military affairs were all controlled by communists. On 26 July the PKWN was installed in Lublin, from which it began to extend its authority within the areas occupied by the Soviet forces, and to conscript men for its armed forces.

In the summer of 1944 there were therefore two rival centres claiming authority in Poland. On one side, there was the noncommunist Underground State with the AK, enjoying the support of most Poles, and owing allegiance to the legitimate Polish government in London, which was still recognized by the Western Allies; and 011 the other, the Soviet-sponsored PKWN which, despite its feeble roots among the Polish population, enjoyed the full material support of the Red Army and of the Soviet security forces in the creation of structures of government behind the Soviet front line.

The approach of the Red Army to Warsaw heralded the final tragedy of the Polish Underground State. On т August the AK in

Warsaw launched a wholescale attack on the Germans with a view to establishing an independent Polish administration in the city before the arrival of the Soviets. Expecting to seize control of the city from the retreating Germans within several days, the poorly equipped AK found itself fighting for two months. The Germans turned some of their most vicious units on the city. Desperate street fighting was accompanied by large-scale massacres of the civilian population. The Red Army halted its operations on reaching the Vistula, while Stalin delayed granting permission to Allied aircraft bringing supplies to the insurgents to use Soviet airfields. He simply had to wait while the Nazis annihilated the last Polish obstacle to his control of Poland. A late attempt by Soviet-sponsored Polish troops to cross the Vistula in September received little Soviet help, and failed.

While Paris was liberated in August with limited loss of life and little material damage, Warsaw was the scene of one of the most desperate and savage urban battles of the Second World War. The city’s agony ended with capitulation on 2 October. Military losses on each side numbered about 17,000 killed, but up to 200,000 civilians also perished. The remaining population was driven from the city, which, in a barbaric act of vengeance, was then systematically destroyed; in Hitler’s words, Warsaw was henceforth to be no more than 'a point on a map’. While the rising’s heroism might have impressed on Stalin the strength of Polish nationalism, the heart of the Polish Underground State had been torn out and the AK effectively decapitated. The final concerted bid to assert Poland’s independence had failed.

In the areas of Poland cleared of the Germans the PKWN deployed a carrot-and-stick policy. On the one hand, its security forces and the NKVD mercilessly hounded surviving units of the ‘counter-revolutionary’ AK; on the other hand, the PKWN moved deftly to win wider support among a sceptical population. The new, largely Soviet-officered Polish army, formed out of the fusion of General Berling’s forces and the communist People’s Army (AT), retained all the trappings of a national army. Indeed, this army was to expand to 400,000 men and was to participate in the subsequent Soviet drive into Germany and in the final assault on Berlin. Other gestures were made to patriotic sentiment. The authorities in

Lublin sponsored cultural activities, for which there was a powerful thirst after five years of occupation, and thereby attracted the collaboration of many actors and writers. And, in a highly effective move urged by Stalin to win over the rural poor to the emerging new political order (though the Underground State had been preparing similar legislation), a radical land reform of September г944 inaugurated the distribution among poor peasant families of all private estates and farms with over 50 hectares (1 25 acres) of arable land; in 1944 alone over 100,000 such families benefited in this way, although most ended up with tiny holdings of under 3 hectares. The remaining aristocracy and landed gentry were hounded out of their ancestral homes.

Most of the cards were now neatly stacked in Stalin’s favour: his control of Polish territory was growing every day, and he was now

less interested in securing changes in the Polish government-in-exile than in using the PKWN as the basis for a new Polish government to which acceptable ‘democratic elements’ from the London government might be added. Although more concerned about Poland and more realistic in his attitude to the USSR than Roosevelt, Churchill felt that if genuinely free democratic elections could be built into a deal with Stalin then Poland, within new frontiers, could be assured of a degree of internal freedom. But ultimately, neither the IJnited States nor Britain (increasingly dependent on its transatlantic ally) was prepared to damage their relations with the USSR over Poland. On the contrary, Roosevelt was anxious to secure Soviet help in the war with Japan and Soviet co-operation in the building of a new post-war order, symbolized by the creation of the United Nations Organization in 1945.

Having failed to secure his ministerial colleagues’ agreement to Stalin’s territorial and political demands, Mikolajczyk resigned from the premiership on 24 November 1944, taking the Peasant Party (PSL) out of the coalition government. For Stalin the games with the London Poles were over. On 31 December 1944, the PKWN declared itself the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland; as such it received formal Soviet recognition in January 1945. The Polish government-in-exile, now leci by the veteran socialist Tomasz Arciszewski, was still recognized by the United States and Britain, but to all intents and purposes it was no longer relevant in the settlement of the Polish Question. On 17 January 1945 Soviet-sponsored Polish troops entered the ghostly ruins of Warsaw.

At the end of the First World War Poland's western border had been decided with Polish participation at Versailles, while the eastern border had been secured after a victorious war with Bolshevik Russia. The scenario in 1945 was dramatically different; if anything, it resembled the settlement of the Polish Question at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. At the Yalta conference of February 194 5 Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to the establishment of ‘a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland’; its eastern border was roughly to follow the Curzon Line, while in the west Poland was to obtain substantial but still unspecified territory from Germany. The western leaders also secured Stalin’s agreement to broaden the Provisional Government in Warsaw with the inclusion of ‘democratic leaders from Poland itself and from among Poles abroad’; this government would pledge to hold early and free democratic elections. For many Poles Yalta was the ultimate betrayal by their western allies. For the Western Powers it seemed, in the circumstances, a practical resolution of the Polish issue with plausible safeguards against the total Soviet control of Polish internal affairs. Mikotajczyk expressed his willingness to return to Poland on that assumption. It all depended, of course, on whether such free elections would take place and whether their results would be respected.

Two events in Moscow on 2j June 1945 demonstrated the new realities of power in Poland. In the Kremlin, Stalin graciously concluded a conference establishing the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. In accordance with the Yalta agreement, Mikolajczyk and five other non-communists joined a twenty-man cabinet dominated by the PPR and its allies, and led by the pro-Soviet socialist Osobka-Morawski. Mikolajczyk was offered the agriculture portfolio and was made one of two deputy prime ministers, the other being the communist Gomulka. Meanwhile, a few hundred yards away, in the Hall of Columns of the trade union headquarters, the show trial ended of the sixteen military and civilian leaders of the non-communist Underground State, including the Government Delegate Jankowski and the last commander of the AK, General Okulicki, who had all been kidnapped by the NKVD outside Warsaw in March 1945. They were convicted, and in most cases imprisoned, on charges of belonging to illegal organizations and, what was most grotesque, of collaborating with the Germans. The tragedy that befell these men, and indeed many members of the now-dissolved AK, who for five years had struggled against the Nazi oppressors and more recently had defied Soviet designs on their country’s independence, vividly symbolized some of the moral ambiguities of the Second World War. Indeed, between 1944 and 1947 some 50,000 Poles, mostly members of the AK and activists of the Underground State, were deported to the Soviet Gulag. On 5 July Britain and the United States finally withdrew their recognition of the Polish government-in-exile in London. It was to continue its phantom existence until

Poland's boundar.es in i Э39 Territories re-incorporated by me USSR. 1945 German territories tand Dan/ig'GdansK) transferred to Poland, 1945 Restored to Czechoslovakia. 1945 Poland's boundaries since 1945 Minor modifications made in 1951. (T) to the USSR (2) to Poland тнкшшшш Boundaries ot individual republics within the USSR (1945) LATVIAN SSH Names of Soviet republics (1945)

Map i i Poland’s ‘move to the vvesr", i 945 .

1-Л

Klaipeda;

(Memei)V T I T I

SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPATION (1945)

BERLIN (J)

GERMAN

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

(established 1949)

From Cr.’L¹'-⁵ to !he USSR

1990, as a symbol of constitutional legitimacy, bearing witness before the world of the violence inflicted on its nation.

Of all the countries of Nazi-occupied Europe the Poles had fought the Germans the longest, and had suffered appalling human and material losses. It is estimated that Poland’s total wartime losses (including both Gentiles and Jews) amounted to a fifth of the country’s population. The Poles also had good reason to distrust the Soviets. Yet Poland’s tragedy again was its geography. The country lay directly on the Soviet route to Berlin and to what was to become the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany; in that critical sense Poland was of greater strategic concern to the USSR than Hungary, Romania, or even Czechoslovakia, not to mention Finland. Soviet territorial demands from the latter three states were also relatively limited when compared to the Soviet annexation of over two-fifths of pre-war Poland. Despite the fears of some Poles, Stalin had no intention after 1941 of incorporating the rest of Poland as an integral part of the USSR, in contrast to the Baltic States. Nevertheless, Soviet imperial interests demanded that, even if allowed nominal statehood, Poland had to be under total Soviet control. Any resistance to Soviet domination therefore had to be quashed, while the admission of Mikolajczyk to the ‘Provisional Government of National Unity’ provided a democratic fig-leaf to cover the reality of communist control, and the price for western recognition.

At the Potsdam conference in July-August 1945, the United States and Britain reluctantly agreed to the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) Line as the western limit of Polish administration, prior to a final peace conference, and to the expulsion of the remaining German population in the areas under Polish control. Transferring to Poland extensive ex-German lands was bound to make Poland dependent on Soviet support in the face of any future German demands for the restoration of these lands. The non-communist Underground State had certainly envisaged some territorial acquisitions in the west at Germany’s expense, but the push for the whole of Silesia and Pomerania as far as Stettin (Szczecin) came at first primarily from the pro-Soviet communist leadership which proudly proclaimed Poland’s return to the frontiers of Piast Poland of the tenth century. With Stalin’s blessing, and using the language of the pre-war nationalist National Democrats, Poland’s communists endorsed the idea of a homogeneous nation-state within the new borders.

About 8 million Silesian, Pomeranian and East Prussian Germans, including those who had already fled before the Red Army and those who were now evicted by the Poles, paid a tragic price for the bankruptcy of Nazi dreams of Lebensraum in the east. Nazi ethnic cleansing in Poland was now reversed with a vengeance; so ended over seven centuries of German settlement east of the Oder river. In the place of the departing Germans there arrived in 1945-6 about 2 million settlers from central Poland and 1.5 million Poles uprooted and ‘repatriated’ from the eastern provinces annexed by the USSR. Most of the Polish population of Lwow (L’viv), for instance, found new homes in the largely ruined ex-German city of Breslau, now renamed Wroclaw. Most of the Polish population of Wilno also moved into the new Poland; Vilnius was now to become a Soviet and Lithuanian city. A communist-run Ministry for the Recovered Territories had the monopoly of allocating to the new settlers former German homes and land, although half of the arable land there, which had belonged to great landed estates, was transferred to newly created state farms. Life in the new Polish ‘wild west’ was not easy at first as all sorts of looters descended on the ex-German lands during 1945 ^ancl ^I94^- Most of the so-called ‘autochthonous’ Polish-speaking inhabitants of East Prussia and former German Silesia were allowed to remain, but were discriminated against by outsider bureaucrats ignorant of local conditions; their future in communist Poland was not to be a happy one. Between 1945 and 1947 over 1.5 million Polish forced labourers and prisoners returned from Germany. Much of the new Poland in those years was like a vast railway station, with hundreds of thousands of people on the move.

The cause of Polish independence was not only weakened by the withdrawal of Western recognition of the Polish government-in-exile, but also by the demobilization by the British government of the Polish armed forces in the west; it was a painful blow for those Polish politicians expecting an imminent East-West conflict. Members of General Anders’ 1 10,000-strong Second Corps, stationed in Italy , and composed largely of men and women from pre-war eastern Poland, were particularly embittered by the war’s outcome. The existence of the Corps and of all the other Polish armed formations in the west was now a source of political embarrassment and a financial burden for the British government; these units had also been swollen by Poles released from German prisoner-of-war camps and by Poles who had been conscripted by the Wehrmacht and who had changed sides at the earliest opportunity. However, although the new British Labour government urged all Polish servicemen to return home (and indeed about a half did so), it refused to hand over overall command of the Polish armed forces in the west to the new pro-Soviet authorities in Warsaw. Most of the remaining Polish forces were moved to Great Britain; their ambiguous legal status was resolved by the creation in 1946 of the Polish Resettlement Corps, a transitional non-combatant unit in the British army, which was to prepare the demobilized men and women for civilian life in Britain. In 1951 there were 136,000 Poles on British soil, of whom 49,000 were in London, forming there the second largest ethnic minority until the mid-1950s. Altogether, about 500,000 Poles chose political exile and ultimately a new life in the west: primarily in Britain, North America and Australia.

In Poland thousands of cx-AK guerrillas and other armed groups hostile to the new regime continued a desperate struggle against Soviet security forces and those of their Polish allies. But for millions of ordinary Poles, exhausted, impoverished, mourning the deaths of their loved ones, and forced to survive by barter or on the black market, the end of the war naturally brought profound relief; there was an overwhelming desire for reconstruction and for a return to a normal everyday existence. The early pragmatism of the new pro-Soviet government, with its appeal to many young radicalized peasants and workers, and to some intellectuals dreaming of careers in the shaping of a better world, appeared to respond to those expectations. At the same time, the presence of Mikolajczyk and the legal activity of his large Peasant Party seemed to indicate that the cause of freedom and democracy within Poland’s imposed borders might perhaps not be lost. In reality, however, the next few years proved to be merely a transitional phase between one totalitarianism and another.

7

Communism and the Cold War, 1945-1989

Out of the ordeals of the Second World War emerged a new Polish state starkly different from the pre-war republic in terms of its territory, the size and composition of its population, its political and social order, and its relations with its neighbours. Poland’s territorial losses in the east and its compensatory expansion in the north and west dramatically altered the country’s shape and position on the map of Europe. The new Poland was 20 per cent smaller, but it was more compact and it had acquired a 300-mile-long Baltic coastline. Although much devastated, the ex-German lands were more developed than the provinces lost to the USSR. The demographic changes were also conspicuous. The new Poland had just under 24 million inhabitants in J946, as opposed to 35 million in 1939, but it now contained an overwhelmingly ethnic Polish population. Death, displacement and dispossession had all but obliterated the country’s pre-war political and social elite. With wartime material destruction estimated at two-fifths of its productive capacity, Poland was the most devastated country in Europe, comparable only to the ravaged Soviet republics of Belarus and the Ukraine. Accompanying this were malnutrition, acute shortages of housing, and the widespread incidence of tuberculosis and venereal diseases. The war had also left thousands of invalids and orphans.

The new Poland was also firmly under Soviet military and political control. All the key levers of power within the country rested in communist hands, while a Ministry of Public Security

directed by the NKVD-trained Stanislaw Radkiewicz, and backed ultimately by the Red Army and the notorious NKVD itself, tightened its grip over the country. On the other hand, lacking genuinely popular leaders, the communist PPR was more than aware that it needed time to consolidate its position and to build up a mass membership. To mobilize the population in the awesome task of post-war reconstruction and to win for itself a degree of legitimacy, the regime had to make a broad patriotic appeal, not least by depicting the post-1945 frontiers, within which a purely Polish nation-state could at last be created, as representing a return to the original Poland of the Piasts. Furthermore, the decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam demanded a limited gesture to pluralism. And so, while brutally destroying the remnants of the anticommunist underground, the Temporary Government of National

Unity pursued pragmatic and flexible policies in the realms of economic reconstruction, culture and religion.

All industrial enterprises employing over fifty workers per shift were nationalized in January .1946, but much economic activity, notably in the retail trade and in agriculture, remained outside direct government control. Indeed, the moderate etatiste proposals emanating from the newly created Central Office of Planning, where non-Marxist socialists and experts held sway, envisaged the continuation of a mixed economy. Current political issues were subject to strict censorship, but otherwise a broad range of publishing and artistic work, including films and radio broadcasts, was permitted. There was still no ideological supervision of teaching in the rapidly growing network of schools or in the hurriedly restored universities.

Although the 1925 Concordat was annulled by the government in September 1945, the Church recognized the need for compromise with the new political order. It retained full freedom of worship, and proceeded, not without a touch of triumphalism, with the creation of new parochial structures for the millions of Poles settling in the so-called ‘Recovered Lands’ and with taking over the ruined churches of the departing, mostly Protestant, German population. Indeed, as a result of the frontier and population changes, and for the first time since the fourteenth century, Poland was now an overwhelmingly Catholic country. The sufferings endured by the clergy and the patriotic and dignified behaviour of the Church during the war had enhanced the Church’s status in Polish society and contributed to an even closer identification of the Church with the nation than had been the case before 1939. Little wonder that the authorities moved cautiously in their relations with the Church; the Stalinist Bierut even used the traditional formula ‘So help me God’ at his presidential inauguration in 1 947.

However, the struggle for political power went on unabated, generating in many regions an atmosphere of insecurity and violence, even of civil war. Illusions that an armed conflict between the Western Powers and the USSR was imminent, and that it would reverse the Soviet domination of Poland, encouraged the survival until the end of 1947 of many armed anti-communist guerrilla groups or ‘forest battalions’. Up to 30,000 people, mostly opponents of the new regime, perished in this internecine struggle. Anti-Semitic outbursts against Jews who had survived the Holocaust, the most notorious in Kielce in July t 946, were also a grim feature of this unsettled period. The Jewish background of some of the most prominent members of the new communist leadership exacerbated anti-Jewish feelings at the end of the war; disputes over ex-Jewish homes and property, which had acquired new occupiers, also aggravated inter-communal tensions. In these circumstances a large number of the remaining Jews opted for emigration. And in the extreme south-east of the country the forcible eviction of the local Ukrainian population, as part of the communist campaign to build a nationally homogeneous state, resulted in a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against nationalist Ukrainian partisans who waged a forlorn struggle against communist-led Polish and Soviet forces.

Far more dangerous for the PPR was the newly reconstituted Polish Peasant Party (PSL), led by Mikolajczyk; with its million members at the end of 1945 it was more than twice the size of the PPR. The PSI. enjoyed widespread support in the villages and, in the absence of the main pre-war centrist and right-wing parties, it also became the focus for many elements in Polish society opposed to the communists. Conscious of its weakness, and desperate to avoid the kind of electoral disaster that befell Hungary’s communists in November 1945, the PPR resisted Mikolajczyk’s insistence on the free elections promised for Poland by the Yalta agreement.

Using intimidation, violence and electoral fraud, it took the communists just over two years to eliminate the PSL from public life. To delay an electoral contest the communists resorted to the ploy of a national referendum on 30 June 1946, with three questions relating to the abolition of the Senate, approval of the government’s economic policies, and endorsement of the Oder-Neisse frontier. It was hoped that all voters would vote unanimously for the government propositions and thus endow the authorities with a degree of legitimacy. To assert their independence, the PSL recommended a ’no’ vote to the first question; the anti-communist underground called for two or even three ‘no’ votes. The communists, who retained sole control of the electoral commissions, claimed that 68 per cent of the voters had endorsed all three of their proposals; the real figure, as revealed by confidential PPR records, was only 27 per cent. The falsification of the referendum result was to remain one of the most closely guarded secrets of the communist era. The final confrontation with the PSI. occurred during the general election which finally took place on 19 January 1947. The PSL refused to join a single electoral list under PPR auspices, and stood as a distinct rival party. Thousands of PSL activists and over 100 PSL candidates were detained by the authorities; the number of polling stations was drastically reduced; over a fifth of the electorate was disenfranchized for alleged right-wing sympathies. A vicious propaganda campaign presented the PSL as stooges of the west. The officially announced outcome of the rigged election was hardly surprising: the PPR-led bloc obtained 80 per cent of the votes, and the PSL only 10 per cent. Recent fragmentary studies suggest that even with this heavy intimidation the PSL received between 60 and 70 per cent of the popular vote. The free elections promised at Yalta were little more than a farce. American and British protests had no effect, but the nature of the communist take-over in Poland contributed to the widening of the rift between the Western Powers and the USSR.

The new government formed in February 1947 (no longer ‘provisional’) was led by the pro-communist socialist Jozef Cyrankiewicz, a flexible politician who was to survive as prime minister until 1 970, while the key ministries continued to remain in communist hands. In October 1947 Mikolajczyk fled the country. The PSL was reduced to impotence and its rump taken over by-communist sympathizers; in November 1949 it was formally-absorbed into the pro-communist United Peasant Party (ZSL). Despite the inauguration of a superficially democratic ‘little constitution’ in T947, effective power lay with the Politburo of the PPR, whose general secretary- owed his position directly to Stalin.

On the political scene there remained for the communists the awkward problem of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) whose wartime leaders, both in Poland and abroad, had little time for Soviet communism. Although the PPS had been reconstituted in Poland after rhe war under a left-wing faction which collaborated with the PPR, many rank-and-file socialists expected full equality for their party (whose membership exceeded that of the PPR until 1.947) and the avoidance of sovietization. They hoped that Poland would retain a pluralism of autonomous social organizations, trade unions and co-operatives. Yet by associating themselves with the iniquities of the PPR and by co-operating with the PPR during the 1947 election, the PPS had allowed themselves to be tarred with the same brush.

In 1947 and 1948, in the ever-worsening climate of the Cold War, Moscow tightened its grip over its satellites. Not only were they obliged to abandon any involvement with the Marshall Plan but they were also forced to accelerate the adoption of the Soviet model of political, economic and social control. In 1948, after Stalin’s split with Tito, steps were taken to eliminate all so-called ‘Titoist’ or ‘nationalist’ deviations within the communist parties of the Soviet bloc. In September 1948 Wladyslaw Gomulka, the advocate of a milder ‘Polish’ road to socialism, was dismissed from his post as deputy prime minister and was replaced as secretary of the central committee of the PPR by Bierut. In December 1948 a thoroughly purged and browbeaten PPS agreed to unite w^rith the PPR to form the PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party), under which appellation the communists were to rule Poland until 1989.

r

All of Poland's large pre-war political parties had either been banned, obliged to dissolve themselves, absorbed by the communists, or transmogrified into mere appendages of the PZPR; the latter were useful to demonstrate to foreigners as evidence of political pluralism. The PZPR had achieved hegemony. There was no room for any independent political or social movements in the ‘brave new world’ of Stalinist Poland in which the communist PZPR controlled all state institutions through the exercise of the patronage of jobs (the so-called nomenklatura) and the establishment of party cells at every level of public employment. For many opportunists and ‘realists’, often possessing little formal education, membership of the PZPR offered prospects of careers. In July 1952 a new constitution, amended personally by Stalin, enshrined the industrial workers as ‘the leading class in society’, and proclaimed the creation of the Polish People’s Republic. Elections after 1952. became a collective ritual in which over 99 per cent of the electorate voted unanimously for a single list of candidates of the so-called Front of National Unity dominated by the PZPR. Consequently the Sejm was reduced to the role of a rubber-stamp on all Party decisions. The communist-controlled system of government was never to enjoy legitimacy based on a freely expressed and genuine democratic mandate.

A vast and repressive police and security apparatus (by 1957 numbering over 200,000 functionaries, or nearly sixfold the si/.e of the pre-war police force) kept a vigilant eye on the population, which was intimidated by a continuous atmosphere of tension and fear, and mobilized in carefully staged public processions and other artificial expressions of joyful togetherness. Pear of informers stifled all free speech and corroded all natural social relations. Between 1945 and 1956 5,000 death sentences were passed for political reasons; half of them were carried out. Tens of thousands of people suffered longer or shorter periods of arbitrary detention; files were kept on nearly a third of all Polish adults. The judicial system, all trade unions, youth and student organizations, and the press came under Party control. Nor did Stalin trust the Polish army, whose native officer corps was purged and then in November 1949 placed tinder the command of the Soviet Marshal Rokossov-skv, an appointment strikingly analogous to that of Grand Duke Constantine in the Congress Kingdom of Poland in 1815 to TS50. By the end of 1 952 three-quarters of all active generals in the Polish army were Soviet citizens. At the same time the million or so Poles who had remained in the USSR following the border changes were deprived of their cultural and social organizations, and gradually of their parish priests and churches; only in Soviet Lithuania were some Polish-language schools allowed to function. Thousands of Polish prisoners continued to languish in the slave labour camps of the Gulag.

A Soviet-stvle planned economy was imposed. In 1950, Hilary Mine, the hard-line Stalinist chairman of the state planning commission who had already destroyed the private retail sector and deprived all co-operatives of their autonomy, launched the Six Year Plan, an ambitious programme of rapid heavy industrialization. Its triumphal showcase was the Lenin steel mill in Nowa Huta, a new ‘socialist’ town that was intended to dwarf the neighbouring ancient city of Krakow, that bastion of Polish conservatism. As international tension heightened during the Korean War, much of the industrial expansion, brought about at the expense of real wages and of consumption but accompanied by Stakhanovite propaganda, was geared to the production of armaments. Hundreds of thousands of young, mostly poor, peasants were uprooted from their village communities, lodged in workers’ hostels at the industrial sites, and promised a share in a glorious proletarian future. Their often genuine enthusiasm was dampened by drunkenness, low productivity, and a sense of dislocation. The state provided a basic welfare system, although it favoured those who were economically active in the industrial sector at the expense of the elderly and the rural population. Nevertheless, the pre-war curse of unemployment seemed to have gone for good. For thousands of peasants and workers there was the prospect of social advancement in the new urban centres, and in the new vast economic and administrative structures created by the state; all this encouraged their loyalty to the new order and provided the regime with a growing core of supporters. But while industry mushroomed at breakneck speed, agriculture suffered. Having handed over to the peasants most arable land in 1944 and 1945, the communists began slowly in 1949 to enforce collectivization. By 1955 nearly a quarter of all arable land belonged to collective or state farms, although most of the latter were to be found in the still sparsely settled ex-German territories. Food production inevitably fell, which in turn led to compulsory requisitioning (especially in 1950 and 1951) and food rationing. The integration of the ex-German lands proceeded apace, although it would take many years before the new inhabitants there would begin to feel at home.

The methods of social engineering and Marxist indoctrination were applied also in educational policy and in the creation of a new intelligentsia. Youngsters from peasant and proletarian homes were encouraged, through positive discrimination, to enter higher education, while opportunities were narrowed for children with ‘bourgeois’ or ‘reactionary’ backgrounds. Syllabuses were revised in a Marxist spirit, many Soviet textbooks were translated for Polish use, and the teaching of Russian became compulsory in schools. All youths and young adults between the ages of 14 and 25 were drafted into Soviet-stvle pioneer and Komsomol organizations, while army conscripts received a two-year dose of ideological

instruction. Culture was made available to the masses on an unprecedented scale through the heavily subsidized expansion of publishing, of the cinema, the theatre and of concert halls. By 195-Poland could boast twenty-seven symphony orchestras and nine major opera houses. But the content of this cultural diet was strictly controlled; anything deemed religious, anti-Russian or ‘decadent’ was excluded. In 1951 all university departments of English were closed, except in Warsaw, as potential centres of ideological contagion.

The main thrust of cultural policy as directed by the cultural commissar Wlodzimierz Sokorski was socialist realism, defined many years later by Andrzej Wajda, one of Poland’s most distinguished film directors, as the ‘representation of reality not as it is, but as it ought to be’. Novels about the achievements of socialism, or about heroic workers who exceeded production targets and foiled the wicked schemes of imperialist spies and native counter-revolutionaries were the order of the day from 1949 to 1953. Poets and writers such as Zbigniew Herbert or Stefan Kisielewski, who refused to join the ‘Stalinist choir', were pushed aside. The other officially approved theme in books and films was the horrors of the Nazi occupation. Academic research in the arts and social sciences had to bend to the ideological requirements of Marxism-Leninism; even in the sciences the Stalinist condemnation of the ‘bourgeois’ theories of genetics and relativity had to be endorsed. The first incisive attempt to analyse the illusions of the Polish intelligentsia and its vulnerability to Stalinism was provided by Czeslaw Milosz in The captive mind, published abroad in 1953 after his defection to the West.

As the upholder of an alternative spiritual and ethical system of values and the only remaining autonomous all-national institution, the Roman Catholic Church could hardly escape the onslaught of Stalinist atheism. The fact that in 1949 Pius XII had threatened to excommunicate all Catholics who were members of communist parties, and that the Vatican had not formally recognized Poland’s new western border and continued, until 1956, to recognize the exiled Polish government in London, provided convenient ammunition for attacking the Church. Despite an understanding between the Catholic hierarchy and the authorities in 1950 whereby the

Church’s loyalty to the state was rewarded with a degree of independent activity, many church-run organizations and charities were dissolved, religious activities were banned from schools, hospitals and the army, and church attendance was discouraged; priests and bishops were harassed. Diverse ploys were used to split the Church from the inside; schemes were even hatched to sever the Polish Church’s links with Rome and to create a state-controlled national church. Bierut’s grotesque plan to secularize Warsaw’s skyline by cutting off all church spires was fortunately never implemented, but in 195 1 there arose in the centre of the city a Palace of Culture and Science, Stalin’s ‘gift’ to Poland and a towering symbol of Soviet domination.

The height of the anti-Church campaign was reached in 1953 when the state unilaterally assumed the power to control all church appointments and demanded an oath of loyalty to the state from all clergy. The new primate, Archbishop Stefan Wyszynski, eventually advised compliance but himself publicly and symbolically refused: ‘We are not permitted to place the things of God on the altar of Caesar. Non possumus!’ His resultant detention was followed by large-scale arrests of bishops and clergy, and the closure of numerous monasteries and churches. The leading Catholic weekly, Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly) of Krakow, was banned for refusing to publish a panegyric upon Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953. While Wyszvnski remained isolated in detention, the episcopate bowed in September r953 to the state’s demands.

As Stalinism tightened its grip on Poland, the Polish exiles in Great Britain, numbering some 150,000, maintained a veritable ‘state in exile’. The exiled President Raczkiewicz continued in office, as did Arciszewski’s government, still recognized by the Vatican, Spain and a handful of lesser states. Most pre-war political parties, and new political groupings, continued to operate in Britain and maintained branches around the world wherever Polish communities existed. Despite difficulties of life in exile and the exiles’ physical dispersal across Britain, Polish cultural and social life thrived, bolstered by ex-servicemen’s associations and by scores of social, educational and religious organizations. Something of the atmosphere of pre-war Poland was recreated in ‘Polish London’ by

Marian Hemar’s satirical cabaret and institutions such as the ‘Polish Hearth Club’ in Exhibition Road. Journals, newspapers, scholarly works and wartime memoirs poured off emigre presses. The exi les waited for international changes that would favour their legitimist cause, and shunned anyone tainted with collaboration with the communists; this included Mikolajczyk, who arrived in London after his escape from Poland in 1947. Mikolajczvk soon moved to the United States where he secured the co-operation of the Congress of American Poles, the largest Polish organization in the USA; many Poles in France also followed his lead.

Just as the ‘Great Emigration’ of the 1830s and 1840s had warned the west about Tsarist despotism, so now the post-1945 exiles, regarded by some as the ‘Second Great Emigration’, promoted an awareness in the west of the dangers of Soviet communism and of the realities of Soviet atrocities. They scored a notable success when in December 1952 the US House of Representatives declared the USSR responsible for the Katyn massacre. The outbreak of the Korean War raised emigre hopes that the Polish issue would return to the international forum. The US government declined General Anders’ offer to recreate a Polish army in the west, but it did draw a variety of exile groups into pro-American espionage activity; something which inevitably damaged the emigre cause. More constructive and long-lasting was American support for the Polish-language Radio ‘Free Europe’, established in 1952 and directed by Jan Nowak Jezioranski, a talented journalist and lobbyist, and a war-time courier between the Polish government in London and the Underground in Nazi-occupied Poland. Radio ‘Free Europe’ was beamed from Munich for nineteen hours every day and, despite extensive communist jamming, was widely listened to across Poland. The war in the ether became a major battleground of the Gold War. Fiver vigilant for foreign spies and domestic counter-revolutionaries, the communist authorities remained on high alert against the activities of the emigres and their organizations, and impeded contact between Poles living in Poland and their fellow countrymen abroad. Yet one thing, paradoxically, united the ideological and political foes: for while insisting on Poland’s rights to its pre-war eastern border, the exiles called also for the international recognition of the Oder-Neisse Fine as

Poland’s western border and campaigned energetically against West German revanchism.

Needless to say, the world of exile politics was wrought with deep fissures. August Zaleski, a former foreign minister, succeeded Raczkiewicz as president-in-exile after the hitter’s death in 1947, but alienated the exiled socialists and the nationalist SN; he then refused to step down after the expiry of his term of office in 1954. A rival presidential body was created, the so-called ‘Council of Three’, consisting of General Anders, Tomasz Arciszewski (replaced after his death in 1955 by General Bor-Komorowski, the former commander of the Home Army), and Count Edward Raczynski, a highly distinguished diplomat and former Polish ambassador to the Court of St. James. The ‘Council of Three’ gained wide support among the exiles, while the position of the increasingly isolated Zaleski was further undermined when two of his ‘prime ministers’ decided to return to communist Poland. Launching a propaganda campaign among the Polish diaspora in 1955, the Polish communist authorities also set out to undermine the exiles’ political role.

Despite its totalitarian features, Stalinist rule in Poland never became a clone of its Soviet model and avoided some of the excesses witnessed in other satellite states, such as the purge trials of communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary between 1949 and 1952. But the post-Stalinist political thaw was a slow process, limited at first to the PZPR. It started with discreet purges in 1953 within the Polish security apparatus. The defection to the West in December 1953 of Jozef Swiatlo, a high-ranking officer in the security police (the UB), and his revelations on the airwaves of Radio Free Europe in autumn 1954 about the iniquities of the UB, aroused widespread ferment within the Party. Scapegoats were sought for the now admitted illegalities of the security police. In December 1954 the Ministry of Public Security was restructured and its notorious chief Radkiewicz transferred, in a mild post-Stalinist manner of demotion, to the ministry for state farms. Gomulka, who had been under arrest since August 1951, was quietly released from jail. In January 1955 the central committee of the PZPR publicly condemned the repression of the Stalinist period. It proved increasingly difficult for the Party leadership to contain its internal critics, many of them young communists associated with the weekly Po prastu (Straight Talk) and a host of discussion clubs that appeared all over the country. An attack on socialist realism in literature was launched by Marek Hlasko, a young rebellious exponent of black realism, while the poet Adam Wazyk questioned the price paid for ‘the great building of socialism’ in his published ‘Poem for adults’. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinism at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party on 25 February 1956 was a clear message that the old style of repression had to go; in Poland and Hungary it provided a powerful boost for change.

The death of Bierut in Moscow on 12 March 1956 increased the pressure on the beleaguered Stalinists. It also provided the dispirited PZPR, now led by Edward Ochab, with a timely opportunity to break with the euphemistically labelled period of ‘errors and distortions’, for which Bierut could be blamed. But an amnesty for thousands of political prisoners could not by itself appease the growing demand for change. The lowering of the threshold of fear across the country and the continuing low living standards contributed to the outbreak of mass demonstrations in the city of Poznan on 28 June 1956. Crowds carrying national flags and singing religious hymns demanded ‘bread and freedom’; security police and PZPR headquarters were attacked. Although quelled by troops with tanks, the protests in Poznan were a sharp warning that the communist system in Poland was facing a profound crisis. The participation of over a million pilgrims at the shrine of the Black Madonna in Czystochowa on 25-26 August 1956 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the deliverance from Swedish invaders indicated that powerful national emotions were at play.

Within the Party, whose leaders had become isolated from the mass of the population, two rival strategies were proposed for dealing with the crisis. Advocates of reform called for the controlled liberalization of the system; the hardliners tried to channel discontent against scapegoats, including Jewish members of the now discredited security apparatus. Both groups were looking for a new leader with clean hands. Gomulka, the recently freed victim of Stalinist repression, appeared the ideal choice. The reformist grouping succeeded in winning over many workers and Party

intellectuals, and in making common ground with Gomulka. The Party boss, Ochab, also wisely showed willingness to step down. But Moscow was not consulted. And so when on 19 October 1956 the central committee of the PZPR met at its VUIth plenary session to resolve the internal crisis, Soviet forces stationed in Poland started converging on Warsaw. The scent of a national revolution was in the air and preparations were made for resistance. At that juncture a furious Khrushchev, accompanied by most of the Soviet leadership, made an unexpected appearance in the Polish capital. But in a dramatic nocturnal talk, Gomulka succeeded in persuading the Soviet leader that the undertaking of repairs would not undermine the principles of the system or deflect Poland from the road to socialism. Mao Tse-Tung’s support for Gomulka also carried wei ght in Moscow. In a major speech on 20 October, Gomulka attacked the Stalinist illegalities, the misconceived methods used in collectivization, and the excessive dependence on the USSR. On zi October a new Politburo, with Gomulka as first secretary, was elected. While anxious to allay Soviet fears, Gomulka at the same time had to moderate the enthusiastic expectations of a population that saw in him a national leader against Soviet domination. The sobering effect of the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956 played well into Gomulka’s hands. Hungary demonstrated to the Poles the limits of Soviet tolerance.

Poland remained within the Soviet bloc and the Party retained its monopoly of power. Yet the changes following Gomulka’s appointment marked a radical break with the Stalinist past, and opened the road to a milder form of communist rule. It was a turning-point in the history of post-war Poland. Rokossovsky was deprived of the command of the Polish army and returned to the USSR, the security police was tamed, some of the worst Stalinist torturers were put on trial, and Party bosses were changed at every level. The most hated factory directors found themselves removed by the workers in wheelbarrow's, while workers’ councils were established in many factories as an antidote to rigid bureaucratic methods. Nearly all collective farms were dissolved. Cardinal Wysz.ynski was freed, his moral authority enhanced. A compromise was reached with the Church which in turn helped to restore stability within the country. Religious education returned to the schools and five Catholic deputies of the Znak group were allowed to sit in the Sejm. Gomulka successfully renegotiated in Poland’s favour a number of military and economic agreements with Moscow; the USSR was no longer to buy Polish coal at paltry prices. The repatriation of over 200,000 Poles still detained in the USSR was secured. Foreign travel was eased, as was contact with Poles living in the west. In i960 the USA granted Poland most favoured nation status in trade. The barriers between east and west were becoming more permeable.

Although the exiles were still capable of concerted action, such as the demonstration in London by 20,000 Poles in 1956 during the visit to Britain of the Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin, by the late 1950s the appeal of the ’state in exile’ or the ‘nation in exile’ was beginning to wane among their rank and file; problems of daily life and the concern to preserve the Polish language and culture among their children were taking priority over politics. There were also consolations and even attractions of life in the west. Committed to the overthrow of communism, the emigre leaders found it difficult to adjust to the new realities in Poland. More imaginative proved to be the message coming from the Literary Institute outside Paris, founded by Jerzy Giedroyc, a political thinker of vision and something of an enfant terrible among the exiles. The monthly journal Kultura, which Giedroyc edited with his associate Juliusz Mieroszewski, proved to be the most influential Polish emigre publication of the entire Cold War period. Rather than call for the overthrow of communism, they thought in terms of its evolution, and set out to influence that process in Poland by an open-door approach. On the pages of Kultura appeared some of the best exiled writers, including individuals who had worked for the regime in Warsaw, such as Milosz, as well as writers (under assumed names) living in Poland, and Russian writers banned in the USSR. Kultura also embarked on diffusing historical animosities between the Poles and their immediate eastern neighbours; it called on the Poles to accept the loss of Wilno (Vilnius) and of I.wow (Lviv), still regarded by most exiles as an inalienable historical and territorial legacy, in the name of reconciliation with the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. Kultura discussed the Jewish issue, a subject largely ignored by Poland’s officially sanctioned publications. Despite communist border controls, Kultura and its message reached numerous scholars and students in Poland, and was to have a formative influence on the new post-war Polish intelligentsia, and indeed among Poland’s eastern neighbours.

In Poland Gomulka’s regime acquired the qualified acceptance of much of the population, while the relative stability in the country obviated the need for preventive repression. In the field of culture, freed from ideological restraints, there was renewed vigour after 1956. The innovative musical compositions of Witold Lutoslawski and Krzysztof Penderecki quickly acquired an international renown, while Andrzej Wajda’s epic war films marked a breakthrough in the post-war Polish cinema. Slawomir Mrožek published his first satirical works, while Stanislaw Lem began his long career as Poland’s most famous science-fiction writer. New student cabarets introduced a breath of fresh air in the arts. Greater pluralism was tolerated in the academic world. Even Poland’s Olympic successes in Rome in i960 enhanced the country’s reviving national pride. Poland was now effectively the most liberal country of the Soviet bloc, or as some wits put it: ‘the most cheerful barrack in the camp’.

But there was only disappointment for those who expected further liberalization of the system. For all his courage in 1956, Gomulka remained adamantly hostile to revisionism, that is democratization within the Party and worker self-rule. In October 1957, the journal Po prostu was closed down, and in 1958 the workers’ councils were dissolved and replaced by supine Party-led groups. The authorities’ attack on revisionist communist intellectuals gradually widened into a general campaign to force all the country’s writers and intellectuals to toe the Party line: in 1963 Mrožek left Poland, while the highly popular writer Melchior Wahkowicz, who had returned from exile after 1956, received a three-year sentence in 1964 for including in a private letter information ‘liable to damage the interests of the Polish People's Republic’. In 1965 the young revisionists Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, who had argued openly that the country’s ruling class was the Party bureaucracy and not the workers, were expelled from the Party, to be followed the next year by the eminent philosophy professor I.eszek Kolakowski.

Expectations of economic reform led nowhere. The retention of rigid planning, the continued emphasis on heavy industry, and Gomulka’s incompetence in economic matters allowed only a modest improvement in living standards in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Polish agriculture continued to stagnate: obstacles were placed in the way of the modernization of private farming, while the highlv subsidized state farms remained grossly inefficient. Food shortages, especially of meat, continued to plague the Polish scene for decades. And it was in the 1960s that the gulf between Poland’s economy and standard of living and that of the countries of western Europe, even poorer ones like Spain, began to widen at a growing pace.

There was also a retreat from the concessions made to the

Catholic Church. By 1961 religious instruction in schools had ended and drastic official limits had been placed on the building of new churches. The nadir in church-state relations occurred between 1965 and 1966. In November 1965 Poland’s bishops sent a formal letter to the German Roman Catholic episcopate seeking reconciliation between the two nations. While reminding the Germans of Nazi atrocities in Poland, the letter also acknowledged the sufferings inflicted by the Poles on the Germans. For Gomulka this was an unacceptable interference by the Church in foreign affairs, all the more resented since the communist authorities had used the threat of West German revanchism as one of their kev arguments in defence of communist rule in Poland and of Poland’s alliance with the USSR. But whatever points the government was able to score from the ensuing propaganda attack on the Church were lost the following year. The celebrations organized by the Church in 1966 to commemorate the millennium of Christianity in Poland (the baptism of Mieszko I in 966) confirmed the loyalty of the faithful to the Church. The authorities’ attempt to hold rival celebrations of the millennium of Polish statehood introduced an element of theatrical farce and only weakened their standing among the population. Bruised, the communist party withdrew from any further direct confrontation with the Church, whose position in the country was gradually but remorselessly strengthened by the implacable Cardinal Wyszynski. In the late 1960s the Polish Church was even able to spare 800 priests, monks and nuns for missionary work around the world; a Polish cleric, archbishop Kozlowiecki, became the metropolitan of Lusaka in Zambia.

Within a year the country lurched into another phase of turmoil. For while Gomulka was able, for the moment, to silence the revisionists, a far stronger and more sinister threat was emerging within the Party apparatus in the form of an anti-intellectual communist grouping which was to make a bid for power by riding the nationalist tiger. Led by Mieczyslaw Moczar, the deputy minister of the interior and a shady wartime communist guerrilla fighter, the so-called ‘Partisans' espoused a crude nationalism that was anti-German, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Semitic; they even offered a partial rehabilitation to former AK soldiers whose wartime record had been vilified by the communists since the war. The ‘Partisans’ targeted liberalizing pro-reformers within the Party, as well as ‘cosmopolitan’ writers and film-makers. The tensions within the Partv between Moczar’s Partisans on the one hand, and the remaining reformers on the other, came to a dramatic head in 1967-8. The condemnation of Israel and Zionism by the USSR and most of its east European satellites during the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 was not shared by Poland’s small number of Jews or indeed by many young Poles. Gomulka personally had no record of anti-Semitism (and his wife was of Jewish origin), but his public condemnation of Polish ‘Zionists’ who had rejoiced in Israel's victory as a potential ‘fifth column’ provided an excellent opportunity for Moczar and his followers to exploit anti-Semitism in their bid for power. In a climate of political hysteria, tantamount to a witch-hunt, old Party members of Jewish origin were expelled from their posts. An attack was also launched on the young radical revisionists (Kuron, Modzelewski and the student activist Adam Michnik) whose support for Dubček’s reform movement in Czechoslovakia further enraged the Party authorities.

The final push by the Partisans to topple Gomulka took place after students cheered all liberal and anti-Russian statements in Mickiewicz’s play Forefathers’ eve staged in Warsaw’s National Theatre in January J968. In an inept move of cultural censorship, probably inspired by Moczar to provoke disturbances, Gomulka ordered the play's suspension. The ensuing student protests, first in Warsaw and then in most university towns in March 1968, were met with a violent police response and thousands of arrests. All over the country, orchestrated demonstrations of hatred, endorsed by the Moczar-controlled press, were staged against ‘Zionists’, students and ‘Stalinist criminals’. Protests against this came from the Church, the Union of Polish Writers, and the small Catholic Znak parliamentary group. Gomulka next tried to limit the wild anti-Semitism, but the damage was done: up to 20,000 people of Jewish descent, in the main fully assimilated and almost all belonging to rhe intelligentsia, and some non-Jewish intellectuals were pressured into leaving the country. Gomulka survived Moczar's onslaught, but serious damage had been inflicted on the international reputation of the communist regime in Poland. Indeed, the anti-Semitic campaign exposed the ideological hollowness of the Marxism propagated by the Polish communists. Gomulka’s relentless hostility to all forms of revisionism, whether of the Polish or Czechoslovak variety, and a desire to maintain his credit in Moscow led him to support militarily (with 28,000 Polish troops) the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

For the moment the Party apparatus was triumphant, but it had alienated an entire generation of young educated people by its brutal police methods and mendacious propaganda. Convinced that the communist system could not be reformed from within, the revisionists began to turn their backs on Marxism and to seek collaboration with non-Marxist student activists, Giedroyč’s

Kult ura in Paris, and the liberal Catholic intelligentsia. The deteriorating economic situation and continuing food shortages brought Gomulka no credit either. Nor did his apparent foreign policy success, in the shape of a treaty with the West German government of Willi Brandt on 7 December 1970, which recognized de facto Poland’s post-war western border, enhance his domestic position.

Whatever self-satisfaction Gomulka’s team may have felt at the signing of the treaty with Bonn evaporated a week later with the outbreak of strikes in the shipyards of Gdansk and Gdynia. A programme of modest economic reform, intended to give some autonomy to factories and to introduce a system of wage incentives, went badly wrong when its first phase, a large increase in food prices, was introduced without warning on jz December. It was a blow for many working-class families, who often spent about three-fifths of their budget on food. The timing of the measure, a fortnight before Christmas when Polish families make considerable and costly preparations for the festivities, was nothing short of crass stupidity.

The authorities’ inept and bloody response to the strikes on the coast, especially the gunning down in Gdynia on 17 December of scores of workers on their way to work, led to a veritable workers’ revolt across much of northern Poland. To economic demands was now added the demand for the creation of independent trade unions, in complete contravention of the Leninist principle that trade unions under communism were merely ro serve as ‘transmission belts’ of Party orders to the masses. Faced with the prospect of a general destabilization of the entire country, Moscow agreed to the dismissal of Gomulka, taken ill after a mild cerebral stroke, and the appointment of Ldward Gierek as first secretary of the Party on zo December. As Party boss in Upper Silesia, Gierek had acquired a reputation for efficient management and had been the Party’s rising star since 1968.

New strikes broke out in January 1971 and a general strike-paralysed the port city of Szczecin on 23 January. Gierek’s direct personal appeals to the workers of Szczecin and Gdansk, his promises of reform and improvement of workers’ living standards, and the freeing of detained workers, coupled with further personnel changes at ministerial and top Party level, finally helped to ease the situation. But it took a further strike bv the textile workers of Lodz, a city much neglected by the authorities since the war, before the price rises were withdrawn on 15 February.

Although Gierek’s team emerged from the crisis with some degree of public confidence, an end was put to all attempts to endow trade unions with greater autonomy. The workers remained cautious even if very much aware of their strength. The nationalist-communist Moczar, who had challenged Gomulka in 1968, was eased out of the interior ministry in the spring of 1971, after which Gierek skilfully kept ambitious colleagues away from the levers of power. Relations with the Church, now respected by the state as a key bastion of social peace in the country, improved. In June 1972 Pope Paul VI finally recognized the post-war ecclesiastical administration in the ex-German territories. There was a marked liberalization in cultural policy, especiallv evident in the realm of experimental theatre and in film-making. Repression was eased and government propaganda now emphasized the ‘moral-political unity of the Polish nation’. The decision to rebuild the Royal Castle in Warsaw, which had been destroyed by the Nazis, was welcomed by Poles at home and abroad; Gierek’s government was even able to attract some emigres to co-operate in the fields of business and culture. On the other hand, the continuing emigration to West Germany of many Mazurians, Upper Silesians, and even Kashub-ians, who had been alienated from Polishness over the years by an insensitive administration, was a shameful indictment of the communist regime.

As for the London emigres, it was only in 1972, after Zaleski’s death, that their main groupings achieved a belated reconciliation. The succession of Edward Raczyhski to the presidential office in 1979 restored some prestige to the exiled presidency. Outside this new bond of emigre unity remained the National Party (the nationalist heirs of Dmowski) who sought a more ‘realistic’ approach to Gierek’s Poland and who continued to warn of German and Jewish intrigues in destabilizing the country. A great boost to the morale of the Poles in the United States was the appointment in November 19-76 of the Polish-American scholar Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, an expert on Soviet affairs, as President Carter’s national security adviser, as well as the prominent role played in US political life by Senator Edmund Muskie, a Democrat presidential hopeful, and Klement Zablocki, chairman (in 1977) °f the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives.

The key to the early buoyancy of Gierek’s regime was the rapid expansion of the economy, fuelled by western credits amounting to 24 billion dollars, and the introduction of modern technology with a view to increasing Poland’s role in international trade. Gomulka’s policy of economic autarky was abandoned. There was a marked improvement in the general standard of living. Emphasis was put on reversing the chronic housing shortage, and motor-car production under licence increased, notably of the Fiat 125P; between 1970 and 1980 car ownership grew from 450,000 to over two million. The easing of foreign currency restrictions gave many Poles access to otherwise rare western consumer goods. At the same time the state continued its heavy subsidy of housing, transport, holidays and of the health service, and it even brought independent peasant farmers within the social security system. Compulsory requisitioning of agricultural produce from the peasants, in force since 1945, finally ended in 1971. In the new climate of east-west detente, Gierek paid official visits to several western countries, including the USA, and in return was host in Warsaw' to the French president Giscard d’Fstaing, and the American presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the latter came in 1977, accompanied by Professor Brzezihski.

But Gierek’s ‘economic miracle’ rested on flawed foundations. The centralized economy, run inefficiently by a privileged and venal Party leadership, still revolved round heavy industry which underwent no structural reform. Many of the investments were misdirected and indeed wasted. Many new' Polish products intended for export proved to be of shoddy quality and failed to win foreign markets. External factors, such as the 19^4 oil price rise (following the 1975 Arab-Israeli war) and rising western interest rates, compounded the economic difficulties. By 1974 the economy was overheating, inflation was growing, and there was a return of food shortages; in 1976 sugar was rationed. Gierek’s honeymoon with the nation, whose consumer appetites had been whetted, was coming to an end. There were also serious squalls 011 the political

front. As a price demanded by Moscow for Poland’s greater diplomatic activity, the government proposed in mid-1975 to include in the text of the Polish constitution clauses stipulating that the Party held the ‘leading political role in society’ and, in a manner reminiscent of Poland's relations with Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century, that the alliance with the USSR was ‘permanent’. A campaign of indignation and protest, backed by the Church, did not prevent the inclusion of the first amendment, but did succeed in watering down the second. The socialist character of the Polish state and the ideal of full collectivization were also enshrined in the constitution. However, the whole affair consolidated a wide opposition movement, ranging from the Catholic intelligentsia to the former communist revisionists, with significant implications for the future.

The government was further discredited when, faced with mounting foreign debts and growing inflation, it announced price rises on 25 June 1976. Widespread strikes and protests forced the authorities to back down. Although the authorities did not use firearms (unlike in 1956 and Г970), they meted out brutal punishments against the demonstrators. In September 1976 a Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR) was formed which organized quick and effective materia] assistance to the victims of repression. KOR’s early members came from diverse backgrounds, but among the most active were the former revisionists Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, and the veteran socialist Jan Jozef Lipski. Highly augural was the link which KOR provided between the intellectual opposition and the disaffected workers, something that had been lacking in 1968 and 1970 when both groups had fought their separate battles. In September 1977 KOR broadened its aims by becoming a permanent institution committed to the defence of human and citizen rights, and by stating as its aim the ‘selforganization of Polish society’. Despite police harassment, KOR became an important focus for the opposition, publicizing acts of illegality committed by the state, and successfully assisting with the founding in 1978, in Gdansk, of an independent (and of course illegal) trade union movement. Other dissident groups, some even demanding independence for Poland, also appeared.

In the less repressive climate of Gierek’s Poland, and in marked contrast to the rest of the Soviet bloc, there was a burgeoning of unofficial cultural and publishing activity beyond the reach of the censor. The works of exiled writers like Czeslaw Milosz, Witold Gombrowicz and Leszek Kolakowski, as well as translations of hitherto banned foreign writers such as Orwell, saw the light of day; outstanding among the illegal publications of authors living in Poland was Tadeusz Konwicki’s Minor apocalypse (1979) with its entertaining yet disturbing caricature of life in People’s Poland. A so-called ‘flying university’, drawing on the services of many academics and publicists, and very reminiscent of unauthorized teaching during the tsarist period, organized lectures in private homes on officially forbidden historical and political subjects.

Emigre publications and Polish-language radio stations abroad, especially Radio Free Europe in Munich and the Polish section of the BBC, also contributed to this effervescence of ideas. At the same time the relaxation on foreign travel and the spread of television (45 per cent of Polish homes possessed a television set in 1970) increased popular awareness of the ever-widening gulf between Polish and western living conditions. Dependent on western loans and being a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 ^whh its emphasis on human rights, the Polish government was unable to root out the vigorous and pluralist world of dissent which now flourished behind the increasingly sterile official political order.

The Catholic Church contributed significantly to the creation of a broad-based movement in defence of human rights, which embraced Catholic and secular intellectuals active in the opposition. The Church had already been strengthened by Cardinal Wyszynski’s deft, yet relentless, extension of its influence as a mass organization firmly rooted in the national tradition. Its prestige soared to unexpected heights when Karol Wojtyla, the archbishop of Krakow, was elected pope on 16 October 1978, assuming the name of John Paul II. For the authorities, who had strongly disapproved of Wojtyla’s robust support for evangelization, it came as a shock: ‘By God’s wounds, what are we going to do now?' Gierek was supposed to have exclaimed on hearing the news from Rome. The pope’s triumphal pilgrimage to Poland from 2 to 10 June 1979, which the authorities did not dare to stop during a period of east-west detente, confirmed not only the adherence to the faith of the bulk of the Polish population, which turned out in hundreds of thousands to greet the pontiff, but also the enormous capacity for ‘self-organization’ of Polish society. The pope’s frequent references to human and national rights, and his appeal for courage and for change did not fall on deaf ears.

The papal visit had a powerfully liberating impact on the national psyche at a time when, despite official propaganda to the contrary, the economic situation continued to deteriorate; in 1980 over four-fifths of Poland’s income from exports went to service the foreign debt. Yet the scale and intensity of the strikes that swept across the country in July 1980, after the government had intro-

duced minor meat price rises in factory canteens, took the government and the opposition by surprise. And this time, unlike 1970 or 1976, the strikers did not pour out into the streets or attack local Party headquarters; they occupied factories and formed strike committees. Attempts to appease the strikers with pay rises and extra food supplies failed to stem the tide of protest. The creation of an interfactory strike committee in Gdansk on 16 August under the chairmanship of I.ech Walysa, a 47-vear-old electrician, provided a model for similar committees in other coastal cities, and proved to be a turning-point. On 1 7 August the strike committee in Gdansk issued its twenty-one demands, which included the right to organize independent trade unions, the right to strike, and the right to freedom of expression. Members of the political opposition offered their services as experts; individuals such as Tadeus/.

Mazowiecki, a leading Catholic journalist, and Bronislaw Geremek, a distinguished medieval historian and doughty negotiator, joined Walpsa’s team.

Yet again a large section of the Polish working class, created by the communist-led programme of post-war industrialization, turned against its bureaucratic masters. When on 26 August the strikes spread to rhe coal-mines of Silesia, Poland’s industrial heartland, the government had little choice but to negotiate with the strike committees. To his credit, Gierek rejected Soviet advice to use force against rhe strikers. On 30 and 3 т August, in Szczecin and Gdansk respectively, the floundering authorities capitulated over the central demand for independent trade unions. To consolidate their position against any future government intrigues, the trade union leaders voted on 17 September to create a single national trade union called ‘Solidarity’. Under the leadership of

Walysa, who displayed a shrewd political instinct, combined with dynamism and a sense of mission, Solidarity built up its internal democratic structures and became a magnetic focus for a wide range of protest groups. By mid-November it had 8 million members, roughly a third of Poland’s adult population; a year later its membership exceeded to million. The discredited Gierek was removed from office on 6 September and replaced by Stanislaw Kania, an experienced apparatchik.

The developments in Poland made the headlines around the world, while Milosz’s Nobel Prize for Literature in December 1980 also focused international attention on Polish affairs. In the west there was considerable sympathy for Solidarity which also enjoyed the support of the Polish pope. In Moscow and East Berlin there was horror and alarm. President Carter was briefed on the Polish situation by Brzezirtski, and his threat of sanctions against the USSR, made to the Kremlin via the ‘hot line’ at midnight of 3-4 December .1980, may have dissuaded the Soviet leadership from ordering an imminent invasion of Poland. The likelihood of Polish resistance was probably another deterrent to a Soviet invasion which would have created a major international crisis. In any case, Moscow remained unyielding in its hostility, and leant heavily on the Polish authorities to crack down on Solidarity. For Solidarity was not an ordinary trade union; it was evolving into a mass social movement committed to the democratization of political life, the dismantling of the command economy, and the introduction of autonomous production units. Although its leaders were realistic enough to hold back from seizing political power (Kuron described it as ‘a self-limiting revolution’), an effective state of ‘dual power' was emerging. By its very existence, Solidarity represented a challenge to the communists’ monopoly of political control within Poland, and ultimately to the Soviet empire in eastern Europe.

Under Waiysa’s leadership Solidarity not only withstood the government’s attempts to infiltrate its regional branches and to promote a split within its ranks but also grew in strength, most vividly demonstrated by the all-national four-hour general strike on 27 March 198.1. In May Rural Solidarity of peasant farmers was legalized. The Polish authorities were not yet ready for a decisive confrontation. Indeed, under the impact of the euphoric expectations of greater freedom gripping the country, the Party itself was in turmoil and in a veritable state of decline. Of its у million members, about a third abandoned the Party altogether, while a further 700,000 members actually joined Solidarity. A reformist wing called for more democratic ‘horizontal structures’ within the Party, while the hardliners, encouraged by Moscow, urged decisive action against the ‘counter-revolution’.

The Church’s effective mediatory role in diffusing repeated crises between the authorities and Solidarity was temporarily blunted in May 1981 by the attempted assassination of the pope, probably instigated by the KGB, and by the death of Cardinal Wyszynski. The new primate Cardinal Jozef Glemp did not have his predecessor’s dominating prestige and had a hard act to follow. In am case, the day of reckoning was fast approaching, for the abnormal situation in Poland could not continue indefinitely. The appointment of the defence minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski as prime minister in February was an early indication that the Party leadership was bracing itself for action. Although of gentry origin and a young victim of Stalin's deportations, the aloof Jaruzelski was a loyal communist general with a long, successful military career behind him. At frequent meetings throughout the spring and summer of 1981, the Polish communist leaders assured the impatient Soviets of their resolve to end the crisis by their own means. At the extraordinary 9th Party congress in July, the first to be attended by democratically elected delegates, Kania succeeded in restoring some order within the Party. With the appointment in August of General Kiszczak, the head of military counterintelligence, as interior minister, the authorities accelerated plans devised earlier for the introduction of martial law.

The drastic deterioration of food supplies triggered off further wage demands and deepened the weariness of the population. The hardening of the authorities’ attitudes radicalized many Solidarity activists. At its national congress, held in Gdansk in September, Solidarity overwhelmingly endorsed an appeal of fraternity to the workers of eastern Europe and of the USSR; it was a romantic gesture that only served as a red rag to the Soviet bull. The gravity of the situation and the high stakes involved were reflected when, on l8 October, the central committee of the Party replaced Kania with Jaruzelski as first secretary. Control of the state and Party apparatus and of the country’s armed forces now rested in one pair of hands. The failure of General Jaruzelski, Cardinal Glemp and Walysa to secure a national compromise at a meeting on 4 November, followed by Solidarity’s announcement of a great demonstration in Warsaw for 17 December, and continuing Soviet pressure, forced Jaruzelski’s hand.

During the night of 12-13 December 1981, in a well coordinated and efficiently executed operation, observed closely by the Soviet Marshal Kulikov, and involving most of the Polish army and all the security forces, martial law (‘a state of war’) was imposed over the entire country. To all intents and purposes it was a coup d’etat: a so-called Military Council of National Salvation, headed by Jaruzelski, assumed supreme authority in the land. Taken by surprise, 6,000 Solidarity activists, including Walysa, were arrested and interned. Only in Wroclaw was the local Solidarity leadership fully prepared for such an eventuality and avoided detention. All social organizations were suspended, and all factories, transport and communications militarized. Force was used to crush the strikes that erupted over the country, but largescale bloodshed was avoided; the worst incident was the killing of nine miners in the ‘Wujek’ coal-mine in Katowice. Within days the president-in-exile Raczynski broadcast to his fellow countrymen in Poland calling on them to keep their faith and hope; it was an echo of the broadcast he had made in September 1939 when serving as ambassador in London, and possessed a vivid historical dimension.

The military crackdown restored a semblance of public order and drove people back to work, but did little to resolve Poland’s fundamental political and economic problems. The Solidarity leaders who had escaped detention rebuilt the movement’s structures underground and prepared for a ‘long march’. A propaganda war against the authorities was launched. Substantial amounts of printing and communication equipment, supplied by the CIA via American trade union organizations, was smuggled into Poland. Illegal ‘samizdat’ journals and books, many on historical and political topics banned by the authorities, rolled off secret printing presses. And it was fortunate that the call of some radicals to resort to terror and sabotage was rejected by the Solidarity leaders and strongly opposed by the Church. Walgsa refused to be cowed by the authorities, while his Nobel Peace Prize in October :9s у enhanced his international reputation and was a moral fillip to Solidarity.

There existed in Polish society a widely felt respect for the armv, but Jaruzelski was unable to restore the badly damaged authority of the Party, despite extensive efforts to the contrary. Periodic amnesties were issued, Watysa was set free in November 1982 (but treated only as a private citizen), the pope was allowed to revisit his homeland again in June 198’,, and martial law was formally suspended in July 1983. During the course of 1983-4 a new government-sponsored trade union was expanded as a counter-attraction to the banned Solidarity. Of limited effect were gestures to patriotic sentiment, such as rhe restoration of pre-war national feastdavs or the festive commemoration of the 300th anniversary of King John Sobieski’s victory over the Turks outside Vienna in September 1683.

With the dissolution of most social-political organizations, the role of the Church as the only publicly active autonomous focus of national life expanded in a manner highly reminiscent of earlier troubled periods in Polish history. Millions of people with Solidarity banners attended church services while the episcopate, although not directly involved in the political opposition, intervened on behalf of the repressed. During his second visit to Poland in June 1983, Pope John Paul II expressed his hope for the relegalization of Solidarity to the to million Poles who came out to greet him and during a long meeting with Jaruzelski called for dialogue with the opposition. The murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, a vocal critic of the regime, in October 1984 by agents from the interior ministry backfired badly on the government. Several hundred thousand people attended the funeral of the martyred cleric, whose grave became a shrine.

By the mid-: 980s there was political stalemate. Jaruzelski, who believed that he had saved the country from civil war, economic collapse and a probable Soviet invasion, curbed the advocates of violent police methods and strove for moderation. But the government’s inability to tackle the structural economic problems,

56 The bogeys of communist Poland. ‘From the darkness of the middle ages: a crusade against Poland.’ A propaganda poster in response to the imposition of US sanctions on Poland by President Reagan after the introduction ot martial law; it includes a medieval Teutonic Knight and the former West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, suitably attired. Hostility towards Germany, presented as Poland’s greatest historical enemy, was a powerful, and probably the most widely accepted, element in the state ideology of the Polish People’s Republic. Although a gradual change in public perceptions of the Germans starred in 1970, the real watershed in Polish-German relations occurred in 1989/90.

compounded by the vast foreign debts ($4obn in 1988) and the west’s unwillingness to advance further credits, not to mention US economic sanctions, continued to gnaw at the very sinews of national life. Industrial production and living standards continued to fall; prices rose; shops emptied; the state budget faced a dramatically growing deficit. Alarming effects of industrial pollution were observed in many areas of the country. Poland’s prospects seemed hopeless and some half a million Poles, mostly young and enterprising, left the country or chose to remain abroad in this period. In 1986 the government released all remaining political prisoners but the Solidarity leadership, although no longer prevented from acting openly, refused to participate in a government-sponsored consultative assembly. Treated by visiting foreign politicians as the effective leader of the opposition and encouraged by the pope’s third visit in June 1987, Walysa continued to insist on the restoration of political pluralism as a precondition for any allnational action to deal with the economic crisis.

Jaruzelski’s government and the Party sought other measures to break out of the impasse without having to surrender their monopoly of power. A referendum, held on 29 November 1987, to seek the nation’s endorsement of the government’s hesitant attempt at economic reform, was a resounding defeat for the authorities. Nevertheless, the government refused to give way to Solidarity demands and responded with force against widespread strikes in April and May 1988. A second wave of strikes enveloped the country in August 1988. Fearing that the country was on the edge of an uncontrolled major explosion, the authorities drew back from reintroducing martial law.

Of decisive significance for the situation in Poland was now the dramatic reversal of the policy of the USSR towards its satellites. Forced by the stress of renewed military rivalry with the USA into a radical overhaul of the Soviet economic and political system, the new Soviet leader Gorbachev was no longer prepared to underwrite the unreformed communist regimes of eastern Europe. Disoriented by the changes in the USSR, and no longer able to justify a restoration of martial law as preferable to a Soviet invasion (as had been the case in 1981), the Polish communists now faced two stark choices: to maintain control by force over a restless population and a degraded economy, or retain some degree of power and the benefits of wider economic reform by an accommodation with the opposition which would secure for the regime popular legitimacy and international respectability.

In a televised broadcast on 26 August J988 the interior minister General Kiszczak proposed ‘round table’ talks between the government and the opposition. Emerging as a level-headed politician, Walysa next succeeded in bringing to an end the strike campaign that was destabilizing the country. On 31 August Kisz.czak met Walysa privately for the first time. Extremists in both camps opposed the talks, and it took five months of complex political manoeuvring before they got off the ground on 6 Eebruary .1989. It was only by threatening to resign that Jaruzelski and Kiszczak secured the consent of the central committee of the PZPR to the relegalization of Solidarity.

The deliberations of the ‘round table’ ended on 5 April with a compromise agreement which heralded extensive changes to the constitutional order. The offices of the president and the Senate, abolished in 1952 and 1946 respectively, were restored; the former was to be chosen jointly by the Sejm and the Senate, and the latter was to be elected on the basis of fully free national elections. Both the president and the Senate would exercise the power of veto over the Sejm in which 65 per cent of the seats would be reserved for the PZPR and its allies, while 3 5 per cent of the seats would be decided by a free electoral contest. Solidarity and Rural Solidarity were relegalized on 17 and 20 April, respectively.

The semi-free elections took place on 4 June Г989. Although boycotted by a sceptical third of the electorate, they were an overwhelming disaster for the Party and exceeded all expectations of the architects of the ‘round table' agreement. In retrospect, the Polish elections of Г989 proved to be the first key move in the dismantling of the communist system in east-central Europe. All but one of the hundred seats in the Senate and all the free seats in the Sejm were won by the Solidarity-backed Citizens’ Committee, while only five government-backed candidates passed the 50 per cent vote needed to secure the reserved seats in the Sejm. A second round of voting was therefore needed on 18 June to enable the pro-government parties to fill their guaranteed places. On 3 July

Gorbachev’s envoy made the momentous announcement that Poland was free to determine the shape of its own government. In another compromise arrangement, Jaruzelski was elected president on i 9 July; ten days later he resigned from the Party secretaryship. On the other hand, Walęsa skilfully wooed the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and the Democratic Party (SD), hitherto communist-controlled parliamentary groupings but now eager to assert their independence, to prevent the creation of a coalition government led by General Kiszczak. On 19 August President Jaruzelski invited the respected Catholic intellectual Tadeusz Mazowiecki to form a coalition government. With the almost unanimous support of the Sejm, Mazowiecki became the first non-communist prime minister in what was still formally communist eastern Europe - and received a congratulatory telegram from Moscow. Walęsa himself eschewed all public office for the time being. Although the PZPR retained the key ministries of the interior and of defence, in accordance with the ‘round table’ agreement and to reassure Moscow, its days as a ‘Marxist-Leninist’ party were over.

The forty-five-year period of communist rule in Poland cannot be simply dismissed as one in which nothing constructive or beneficial was achieved. And Poland’s satellite status was certainly preferable to the fate of the Baltic States, which were incorporated in the USSR. But the forcible imposition of an ideology alien to most of its inhabitants, the cynical travesty of the concept of democracy, the decades of mendacity, the humiliating subservience to the USSR, and the sheer wastefulness of much economic activity all weigh heavily in any objective assessment of the communist legacy in Poland. In terms of living standards, communist Poland not only did not catch up with the west, but fell further behind. Impressive statistics of coal or steel production were no substitute for chronic shortages of basic goods. It now remained to be seen how Polish society, so long in a communist straitjacket, would respond to the sudden challenges of freedom and independence.

8

A new republic, 1989-

Although many hardline Solidarity supporters resented the lack of a clean break with the communist past and no settling of scores with the communists, the constitutional changes and the elections of 1989 are now generally accepted as marking the birth of the Polish ‘Third Republic’. On 29 December 1989 Poland formally ceased to be a so-called ‘People’s Republic’ and recovered the crowned white eagle as its emblem; references to the ‘leading role’ of the PZPR, to the Soviet alliance, and to socialism were expunged from the constitution. What made possible Poland’s peaceful transformation in 1989-90 was the ‘self-organization’ of Polish society that had evolved since the 1970s and the self-restraint and sense of responsibility of the country's political leaders, whether communists or members of the former opposition. As a result a dangerous political vacuum was avoided and social peace was maintained. Indeed, the much greater political realism of the Poles in the second half of the twentieth century, as witnessed in 1956, in 1980-1, and now, marked a powerful contrast with the disastrous Romantic insurrections of the previous century and with the Warsaw uprising of 1944.

fvlazowiecki’s ‘great coalition’ showed exceptional energy in dragging Poland out of its economic marasmus. January 1 990 saw the introduction of a wide-ranging programme of economic reform, the most radical in the whole of ex-communist Europe and prepared by the new finance minister Professor Leszek Balcerowicz. The resulting ‘shock treatment’ halted the galloping inflation and propelled Poland fast towards a market economy, a process assisted by the favourable re-negotiation of the country’s vast foreign debts and by financial assistance from western financial institutions. The former dissident Jacek Kuron, with his direct and engaging manner, did much as minister of labour to allay popular alarm at the painful social effects of the reform which by the end of 1990 had generated one million unemployed. The dismantling of the socialist planned economy and the restoration of free enterprise inevitably created social divisions. Ironically, many former communist officials and managers gained materially from the privatization of state enterprises, while many workers who had helped to topple the communist system now found themselves the victims of economic rationalization. The appearance of new well-stocked shops ended the chronic shortages of the 1980s and began to alter visibly the hitherto drab appearance of most Polish towns. The location of the new Warsaw stock exchange in the former central headquarters of the communist party added a nice touch of historical irony.

Unexpectedly liberated from the Soviet yoke, Poland was entering a new era in its history. During the decade following 1989 a profound transformation of Polish political and economic life occurred. A parliamentary democracy was established with a popularly elected president and an accountable system of local government; civil rights were restored; the death penalty was abolished; and the armed forces were depoliticized. In cultural life there w'as a move away from great political and ideological issues, while Polish mass culture came under strong western influence. In the realm of politics, the most striking phenomenon in the early 1990s was the disintegration of Solidarity as a broad social and moral movement of protest. Mazowiccki hoped to retain Solidarity unity and the ‘round table' agreements during the difficult period of economic transformation. Walesa on the other hand argued that the collapse of the PZPR justified the acceleration of constitutional changes. His subsequent presidential ambitions only deepened the rift within the movement. The introduction in July 1990 of a generous system of proportional representation in parliamentary elections in its turn encouraged the proliferation of small parties. By 1 99 г the bulk of Solidarity had fragmented into several rival

A new republic, lyHp-

trade union organizations and a host of populist anti-communist and nationalist-Catholic groupings. Most remained suspicious of the free market economics propounded by Solidarity’s liberal intelligentsia wing, represented by Mazowiecki and Geremek which, under the name of the Democratic Union (UD) and then the Freedom Union (UW), became the most successful post-Solidarity party.

The political parties of the communist era also underwent change. The communist PZPR dissolved itself in January 1990 and most of its members formed a disciplined social democratic party (SdRP) led by Aleksander Kwasniewski, a young but experienced activist and sports minister in the last communist administration. In 1991 it allied itself with other left-wing groups to form the Left Democratic Alliance (SLD), still one of the most important parties in Poland today and, as heir to the PZPR, with considerable wealth and organization at its disposal. It is noteworthy that the postcommunist left has respected the democratic process. The former pro-communist peasant party went through more traumatic upheavals, but eventually in .May 1990 linked with other peasant groupings and adopted its pre-1947 label of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Attempts to revive the historic Polish Socialist Party (PPS) have so far failed.

Walysa won the i 990 presidential election and chose to receive his insignia of office not from the outgoing Jaruzelski but from Ryszard Kaczorowski, the last president-in-exile, who travelled in person to Warsaw for this purpose, thus establishing a symbolic constitutional link with the legitimist successors of the pre-war Second Republic residing in London since Г945. Following Walysa’s election the Polish government-in-exile dissolved itself, its historic mission completed. The way communism had ended in Poland and the territorial configuration of the Polish Third Republic were not exactly what the emigre leaders had been praying for, but no one could deny that Poland was again free. Yet there was no mass return of the wartime exiles; for many it was too late. Some notable individuals did take that step, such as Pilsudski’s two daughters who had lived in Britain since the war. Yet many British-born professionals of Polish origin have elected to work in the country of their parents’ birth. Some of the exiles from the first

Solidarity period have also returned. By the same token, the relationship between the Polish state and the many-million strong worldwide Polish diaspora, which had been poisoned during the Cold War by ideological differences and mutual suspicions, has inevitably altered for the better. There is greater and more fruitful contact today, and the Polish government supports Polish-language teaching in the diaspora, especially in the former USSR where Polish communities were often deprived of the possibility of cultivating their national and cultural identity.

The first fully free parliamentary elections since the Second World War, those that had been promised at Yalta in 1945, finally took place in October 199т. They produced a fragmented Sejm and a series of short-lived centre-right coalition governments betwen 1991 and 1993. The growing demands from the right for the ‘de-communization’ of public life and for the ‘lustration’ or purging of politicians who had collaborated with the communist security services, and Watysa’s increasingly confrontational style and headstrong attempts to strengthen presidential authority all contributed to an atmosphere of political acrimony.

The parliamentary elections of September 1993, based on a reformed electoral system aimed at eliminating the smallest political groupings front the Sejm (5 per cent minimal threshold for parties) produced unexpected results. Despite winning over a third of the popular vote, the right-wing parties paid for their internecine divisions by being virtually wiped out from the parliamentary scene. The post-Solidarity liberals (UD) fared moderately well. But the largest number of seats went to the post-communist SLD (т71 seats) and the peasant PSL (132 seats) who formed a coalition that survived until 1997. Watysa’s narrow defeat in the 1995 presidential election at the hands of the more tactful and urbane SLD leader Kwasniewski confirmed the ascendancy of the left, ironically at a time when the population was beginning to feel the benefits of economic reform.

The fragmented post-Solidarity right had to learn the lessons of its electoral disaster. Under Marian Krzaklewski, a 4T-year-old cybernetician from Silesia, it consolidated itself into the so-called ‘Electoral Action Solidarity’ (AWS) and successfully entered the hustings in T997, gaining 34 per cent of the popular vote and

emerging as the single largest grouping in the Sejm. A coalition with the liberal Freedom Union (UW), led now by Balcerowicz, produced a centre-right government. The coalition of the two main post-Solidarity parties was not an easy one, but until the resignation of the UW ministers in May 2000 it did provide a degree of stability in Polish parliamentary life. Indeed, the AWS prime minister Jozef Buzek, a chemistry professor, remained in office from T997 until 2001, a record so far in the Third Republic. That Buzek was a Protestant was also a telling comment on the openness of the Polish political system. Unquestionably the single most significant event of Buzek’s administration occurred on 12 March T999 when Poland, together with Hungary and the Czech Republic, formally joined NATO. For the Poles, conscious of their country’s vulnerability over the centuries, it was a major political and psychological breakthrough.

The status of the Roman Catholic Church, a powerful champion in the ideological struggle against communism and a key mediator in the transfer of power in 1989, remains high in Polish society. It is noteworthy that a quarter of all Catholic priests in Europe are Polish. The Church has also successfully lobbied for the tightening of legislation on abortion, one of the most explosive issues in Polish politics in the 1990s. Other events, however, have shown that in a democratic and pluralist Poland, the Church’s political influence can no longer be taken for granted. The blatant intervention of the hierarchy and of many priests during the 1991 parliamentary election alienated many voters, including Catholics, and contributed to the victory of the left two years later. The episcopate’s warnings failed to prevent both Kwasniewski’s presidential victory in 1995, and the endorsement by a popular referendum of a new liberal constitution in 1997. Yet as the Church comes to terms with the new Poland, a process eased by the long delayed ratification in 1998 of the concordat with the Vatican, it has encountered difficulties within its ranks in the form of ‘Radio Maryja’, the mouthpiece of a vociferous religious and xenophobic fundamentalism which has attracted many followers. The episcopate has not acted firmly against the radio, and there is concern that the Church is becoming excessively defensive and conservative.

Despite all the inter-personal rivalries and acrimonious political infighting of the last decade and a half, all the post-1989 governments have maintained a considerable degree of continuity in economic policy. After a short sharp recession in 1990-1 the Polish economy continued to expand until the end of the decade. Real incomes increased after T994, foreign investment grew rapidly, and by 1998 inflation had fallen to below 10 per cent, securing thereby a stable currency. In the period 1993-9 the per capita GNP of the Polish population increased from 33 per cent to nearly 40 per cent of that of the European Union (and 60 per cent of that of Greece, the lowest then in that respect of all EU states). Private firms now produce over two-thirds of Poland's GNP. The pursuit of education and professional qualifications among the younger generation is a marked feature of the meritocratic nature of Polish society today.

However, the changes since 1990 have not been without pain for large sections of the population. The restructuring of heavy industry, especially coal mining, has proved difficult. The bankruptcy of the Gdansk shipyard, the home of Solidarity, and its recent acquisition by the neighbouring Gdynia shipyard dramatically symbolized the ongoing transformation process. The great city of Lodz, once known as ‘the Manchester of Poland’, has ceased to be a major textile centre and has had to diversify its economic activity. Manual workers, and especially those on former state farms, have keenly felt a fall in real wages and in status. Fewer youngsters from peasant families now' enter higher education. Indeed, the most backward sector of the economy remains agriculture with its low yields and small holdings. It is peasant farmers, still representing a fifth of Poland’s labour force, who were most fearful of the country’s move towards the European Union. High unemployment (15 per cent of the work force in 200.1 and 20 per cent in 2003), housing shortages, underfunding of the public health and education services, and the growth of corruption and crime represent the bleaker aspects of Polish reality today. Many former owners (or their descendants) still await satisfactory compensation for property nationalized during the earl}' years of communist rule. Yet for all its difficulties, Poland became, in the 1990s, one of the most stable and dynamic countries of the former Soviet bloc.

In the early 1990s Poland also found itself in the middle of a dramatic and historical upheaval in the geo-politics of the region. In the course of three years (1990-3) all three of Poland’s neighbouring states of the Cold War era disappeared: the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. They were replaced by seven new states: a united Germany, separate Czech and Slovak Republics, independent Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, wedged between Poland and Lithuania. Under the direction of the new foreign minister, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, an academic (specializing in international law) of no parry allegiance, Poland carefully and systematically asserted its interests as a newly independent state. Of central importance to Poland's security and future association with western structures was Germany, about to embark 011 re-unification. Despite a moving gesture of reconciliation and

Map 12 Poland and its ‘new’ neighbours, 1989-2005.

HUN

GERMANY

(united 1990)

SCALE

Poland's boundaries since 1945

New provincial (IVo/ewodzfwo) boundaries introduced in 1999

POMORSKIE Names of the new provinces

(Wojewodztwa) with administrative centres e.g. Gdansk

Average per capita income in each province as a percentage of the average per capita income in the European Union (1999)

The national Polish average was 37%

Provinces with 40% and above

Provinces with 30-39%

Provinces with under 30%

Boundaries of new states since 1989, following the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia

Eastern external boundary of the European Union, 2004

peace between Mazowiecki and Chancellor Kohl in rhe former palace of the von Moltkes in Krzyzowa (Kreisau) in Lower Silesia on tz November 1989, the Polish government and public opinion remained nervous over the issue of Poland’s western border; indeed, during the following months Mazowiecki’s government even supported the continued existence, if temporary, of the Warsaw Pact in order to avoid international isolation during the next delicate stage in Polish-German relations. Although Poland was excluded from the early phases of the so-called ‘4+2.’ Great Power talks on Germany’s future, American insistence that Germany should be re-unified but within the existing external borders of the two German states proved decisive. On 14 November 1990 Poland and united Germany finally signed a treaty in Warsaw confirming the Oder-Neisse frontier; this was followed on 17 June [ 991 by a treaty of friendship signed in Bonn. The issue of the German minority in Poland, numbering some 300,000 and whose existence had been denied by the communist authorities, proved to be a short-lived irritant; the German minority was granted representation in the Sejm and participation in local government.

Voices raised in the German parliament in 1998 in support of the property rights of Germans who had been expelled from Poland at the end of the Second World War strained relations. On the other hand the growing number of German visitors to Poland and the activity of various Polish-German organizations promoting reconciliation (one of these was even the result of the initiative of a descendant of Bismarck’s) all helped to mellow some of the deeply felt historical animosities. Co-operation across the Polish-German border improved with the creation of Euro-regions, of a joint university in Frankfurt on the Oder, and of a European School in Gubin/Guben. By the end of the 1990s Germany was Poland’s most important trading partner and the largest contributor of foreign investment, and had emerged effectively as the main champion of Poland’s integration with western institutions. Polish-German relations had entered an era that would have been inconceivable a generation or two earlier. Indeed, Professor Geremek, who had served as foreign minister in Buzek’s AWS-led government and who since 2004 has been a Polish Member of the European Parliament, did not hesitate in describing the reconciliation with Germany as ‘one of the political miracles of the end of the twentieth century’.

Relations with Moscow did not only remain correct but improved dramatically with Gorbachev’s official admission in April

1990 of Soviet responsibility for the 1940 Katyn massacre. Gorbachev’s statesmanlike action marked a momentous watershed in Polish-Russian relations: the great lie and the unmentionable taboo of the communist period had been lifted. In June and July-

1991 the Comecon, the Moscow-led economic association of communist states, and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved. During his visit to Warsaw in August 1993 President Yeltsin made a personal gesture of apology for Katyn and other Soviet acts of repression against the Poles; he also submitted details of two other mass killings of Polish prisoners which had taken place in 1940 at Starobelsk and Ostashkov. Agreements were signed in 1993 for the extension through Poland of a major gas pipeline and for the supply of Russian gas; that same autumn the last Russian troops left Polish soil. After the high point of 1993 relations cooled. The uncertainty of political developments in Russia during Yeltsin’s illness, the revival of the communist party, the rise of the nationalists led by Zhirinovsky, the war against the Chechens whose cause won widespread sympathy in Poland, concern with dependence on Russian energy supplies, and finally the Russian campaign against Poland’s membership of NATO all revived suspicions in Poland of the giant neighbour in the east. President Vladimir Putin’s defence in May zoo3 of the Soviet wartime record in eastern Europe was also badly received in Poland and in the Baltic States; some commentators have seen it as the Kremlin’s response to Poland’s (and Lithuania’s) encouragement of Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004. Be that as it may, diametrically opposed interpretations of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, of the Yalta conference, and of the nature of Soviet ‘liberation’ of central and eastern Europe in 1945, which jarred official Polish-Russian relations on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 2003, are highly symbolic of deep disagreements still left by history. Ironically, it was the blossoming of unofficial trading across Poland’s eastern border and the appearance of Russian bazaars in Poland in the 1990s, unthinkable during the ‘internationalist’ era of Soviet hegemony, that did most to enhance mutual knowledge of ordinary Poles, Russians and the other peoples of the eastern borderlands.

Poland was well prepared in 1989-90 for the dissolution of the Soviet Union: while maintaining official relations with the Soviet authorities in Moscow, the Polish foreign ministry also approached the governments of the individual Soviet republics. Indeed, Poland’s case in securing the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was considerably strengthened by Warsaw’s early and willing readiness to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of its eastern neighbours within their Soviet-era frontiers. In what was another ironic twist in Poland’s recent history, the broad directives of post-communist Poland’s policy towards its immediate eastern neighbours had been formulated in the 1970s and 1980s by the emigre Jerzy Giedroyc who had successfully redirected Polish political thought towards reconciliation with the modern nations of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. It was largely due to the consistent pursuit of Giedroyč’s vision by foreign minister Skubi-szewski and his team of experts in 1989-93 that the collapse of communism did not re-ignite nationalist hatreds and irredentist conflicts along Poland’s eastern border. Nor did Poland’s communists and ex-communists play the nationalist card after 1989 in a bid to retain political influence - unlike the tragic cases of former Yugoslavia and post-Soviet Transcaucasia. Even before the dissolution of the USSR the Polish foreign ministry treated Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as emergent nation-states. The cultural rights of national minorities were to be protected by the mutual adoption of ‘European standards’, and not by frontier changes or blatant interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states.

In December 1991. Poland recognized the independence of Ukraine - and was the first country to do so. Not threatened by any Polish revanchism, and supported by Poland’s post-Solidarity elite, Ukraine’s national movement ‘Rukh’ felt more confident in asserting its country’s emancipation from Moscow. The constructive development of Polish-Ukrainian relations, confirmed by the treaty of May i 992, was all the more impressive if one bears in mind the horrific inter-ethnic slaughter and the ethnic expulsions of the 1940s. The joint declaration about reconciliation signed in Kiev in May 1997 by the presidents of Ukraine and Poland, Kuchma and

Kwasniewski, led the way towards a ‘strategic partnership’ between the two countries. Poland had become Ukraine’s main ally in Kiev’s proclaimed orientation to the West. In 2000 a joint Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping batallion was sent by NATO to Kosovo. The good relations maintained with Ukraine for over a decade enabled President Kwasniewski to play a vital mediatory role during Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ in November-December

2004.

Although Polish public opinion warmly supported Lithuania’s bid for independence in 1990, it took much longer than in the case of Ukraine for Polish-Lithuanian relations to achieve normalization. Seeking historical continuity with Lithuania’s medieval past and with the legacy of the inter-war Lithuanian republic, the new government in Vilnius adopted a negative attitude to their country’s historic links with Poland; hostile administrative action was also taken against the Polish minority which had voiced separatist aspirations. Vilnius demanded that the Polish government should condemn the inter-war Polish ‘occupation’ of Vilnius (Wilno) as a condition of an inter-state treaty. Fortunately wiser counsels prevailed and the treaty of April 1994 focused on state interests and not on historic grievances; as it was, the Lithuanian parliament did not ratify it until October 1994. The late 1990s saw a marked improvement in mutual relations; under President Valdas Adamkus, a returned emigre from the United States, Lithuania began to perceive Poland as a useful link in its aspirations to join NATO.

The independence of Belarus, another former Soviet republic, was welcomed in Poland and a treaty was signed by the two states in June 1992. Since then the development of formal political and economic relations has been hampered by the consolidation in Minsk of an autocratic quasi-Soviet regime under Lukashenko. Concerned with the condition of the large Polish minority in western Belarus, Poland did not endorse international sanctions against Belarus in 1998. With Poland’s entry into the European Union in 2004, Poland had to end the no-visa arrangements with Belarus and Ukraine, but offered free visas instead; Ukraine accepted and Belarus did not.

Relations with Poland’s southern neighbour Czechoslovakia, whose oppositionists had close personal contacts with their Polish counterparts, were cordial at first. Ghosts of history were buried when Poland offered fulsome apologies for the Polish occupation of Teschen in 1938 and for the military intervention against the ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968. On the other hand, neither Jaruzelski nor Walesa was able to establish a congenial relationship with the ex-dissident Czech leader Vaclav Havel. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992-3, the Czech Republic distanced itself from Poland in the hope of improving its prospects of joining the west. In У997 the Czechs were told to join the queue with the other aspiring ex-communist states. Relations with Poland became correct but not overtly friendly. Warsaw’s cool relations with Slovakia changed for the better with the election of a pro-western government in Bratislava in 1998.

Only with the end of communist censorship and the return of political freedom after 1989 was it possible to confront the darker aspects of Poland’s recent past. Exposing communist and other crimes has been the work primarily of the Institute of National Memory (IPN), a non-political body (although not free of accusations to the contrary), which has access to thousands of secret police files. There has also been an attempt to re-evaluate the difficult history of inter-ethnic relations in Poland and of Poland’s relations with its neighbours. The communist authorities had minimized the suffering of the Jews and focused on German and Ukrainian atrocities against the Poles. The recent open debate about the killing of Jew s by local Poles in Jcdwabne and elsewhere in 1941, or revelations about the maltreatment of Germans in the closing stages of the Second World War and during the post-war deportations generated heated arguments in the media and among public opinion, but have also revealed a willingness in many quarters to question taboos and to come to terms, in the spirit of truth and reconciliation, with the past. Official reconciliation with Ukraine has been successful, although painful memories and hostile stereotypes still linger at the popular level on both sides. The expressions of sympathy and support in Poland for the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Kiev in 2004 and the moving ceremonies of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation held in June 2005 in Warsaw? and at the Polish military cemetery in L’viv may bring beneficial

Л new republic, i pS’p-

changes. And the fact that former Polish Home Army (AK) soldiers and their wartime Lithuanian enemies are talking to each other is another encouraging phenomenon. In academia there has been real progress in treating Poland’s eastern neighbours as equal nationstates; the publication by the Catholic University in Lublin, in Polish translation, of a series of histories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (former territories of the old ‘Commonwealth of the Two Nations’) by historians from those countries is a notable achievement. The Jewish festival held in the old ghetto in Krakow, participation in the annual ‘march of the living’ in Auschwitz, and the construction of a museum in Warsaw devoted to the history of Polish Jewry are further positive examples. It is also worth noting that since Poland joined the F.U in 2004 numerous Israelis of Polish origin have applied for Polish passports. The myth of an ethnically homogeneous nation state created by the communists, and long flaunted as one of their historic achievements, has also been questioned. The existence of a German minority has been officially recognized although an attempt to secure the recognition of a separate Silesian national identity has met with opposition. There is a growing sense of a shared past in the lands which Poland acquired from Germany in 1945, ^an£l ^a departure from the rigid adherence to the ‘Piast’ origins of the ‘recovered lands’. Nevertheless, Polish opinion is still unnerved by suggestions that former German owners might make claims under European law' to their erstwhile private property now in Poland, and is ready to react in its turn with a litany of German wartime atrocities and acts of destruction. Chancellor Schroeder tried to reassure the Poles in this respect during his attendance at the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising of 1 944, but the ghosts of the past have clearly not yet all disappeared.

The early years of the twenty-first century witnessed continuing turbulence in Polish political life (in 2004 there were over 100 registered political parties in the country) and the stalling of economic growth. On the other hand, the cause of Poland's membership of the European Union received a massive boost despite fears that foreigners (especially Germans) wotild buy up Polish land and despite some nationalist-clerical hostility towards ‘Godless’ western Europe. Of those who participated in the

Poland's European Union referendum 2003

Turnout of those entitled to vote (percentage by commune)

Source: Leszek Szewczyk, sociologist and economist, formerly of the Institute of Culture in Warsaw (1974-2002); editor of A. Wallis' Atlas Kultury Polski 1946-1980 (Eco, 1994), and co-editor Wskazniki realizacji milenijnych celow rozwoju w polskich gminach (UNDP Poland 2004)

59 - 76% 46 - 59% 21 - 46%

Map i ;a

national referendum in June 2003 on joining the EU, 76.8 per cent voted in favour.

The elections of September 2001 witnessed dramatic twists and turns in Poland’s political kaleidoscope: nothing less than the implosion of Solidarity as a political alliance. Neither AWS nor its recent ally the liberal Freedom Union (UW) gained a single seat in

Poland's European Union referendum 2003

'Yes' vote for membership of the EU (percentage by commune)

Source: Leszek Szewczyk, sociologist and economist, formerly of the Institute of Culture in Warsaw (1974-2002); editor of A. Wallis' Atlas Kultury Polski 1946-1980 (Eco. 1994), and co-editor Wskazniki realizacji milenijnych celow rozwoju w polskich gminach (UNDP Poland 2004)

77 - 92% 53 - 77% 12 - 53%

Map 13b

the Sejm. The pendulum swung to the left: a coalition of postcommunist SLD and the Union of Labour (UP) gained 41 per cent of the votes and, together with the Peasant Party (9 per cent), formed an administration under Leszek Miller, a member of the last communist Politburo but now a reformed advocate of modern European social democracy and of Poland’s membership of NATO and the F.U. Out of the defunct post-Solidarity parties there emerged new centre-right groupings: the ‘Civic Platform’ (PO) committed to reducing income tax and red tape, which scored 15 per cent of the vote, and ‘Law and Justice’ (PiS) led by the twins Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski who fought the election on an anticorruption and anti-organized-crime ticket, and who scored 9.5 per cent. Possessing something of Christian-Democrat character, ‘Law and Justice’ attracted some of the anti-communist votes that used to go to Solidarity. In 2005 it is also calling for the overhaul of the constitutional order and the creation of a ‘Fourth Republic’ in the name of a ‘moral revolution’ which would break with the legacy of the ‘round table’ agreements of 1989, impose a further purge of ex-communists in positions of authority, and review¹ all major cases of privatization of state enterprises since t 990. In many quarters there is a strong feeling that the break with communism has not been as thorough as it could have been, and that this has left a poisonous and debilitating legacy which will take years to get out of the system.

Two other significant parties, this time of a populist character, have also made a dramatic entry on the political scene. The ‘League of Polish Families’ (LPR), a Christian-nationalist party opposed to Poland’s membership of the EU, which it regards as an instrument of German domination of the continent, won 8 per cent. Two of its leaders, Maciej and Roman Giertych, provide the LPR whth a family link with the historic National Democrats. The most surprising newcomer was ‘Self-defence’ (Samoobrona), a radical party led by Andrzej Lepper, which scored to per cent. Casting himself as the protector of the poor against the country’s ‘thieving’ political class, Lepper won the support of many Poles who had lost out from the post-communist changes since 1989. In early 2004 opinion polls suggested that ‘Self-defence’ enjoyed the support of about a quarter of the electorate. On the other hand, it alienated respectable opinion by its blatant disregard for parliamentary procedures, its abusive behaviour in the Sejm, and by its aggressive demonstrations and blockades across the country.

Miller tried to appeal to those Poles who sought stability and modernization, but his government faced difficult problems: shaky state finances and proposed cuts in public spending, falling foreign investments, continuing high unemployment, and erratic public support for the EU. In March 2003 the Peasant Party left the ruling coalition, leaving Miller with a parliamentary minority. In the absence of a creditable alternative candidate for the premiership, and buoyed briefly by the successful F.U referendum, Miller continued in office, only to face new challenges. Two long and complex battles in 2003-4 over a new law regulating radio and television and over the reform of the ailing national health system brought to light serious cases of corruption; these badly tainted the government and further deepened public disillusionment with the ruling elite. In foreign affairs, Miller’s government continued Poland’s active role in NATO and tightened defence links with the United States. Poland actively supported the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and assumed control of one zone in rhe south of the country. Despite growing public unease about the presence of Polish troops in Iraq, Poland remains one of the most staunchly pro-American countries on the continent, and has earned a special place in Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘New Europe’. It is also the largest, by far, of the new member states of the European Union, and has already made an assertive impact on EU affairs, protesting with Spain against a planned new decision-making system that would end both countries’ advantageous voting rights acquired at the Nice conference in December 2000, and calling with several other traditionally Catholic countries for the inclusion of a reference to united Europe’s Christian legacy in the projected new European Constitution. Over Iraq and over the European Union Poland has found itself at odds with both France and Germany, but there are signs that this may be changing.

By the end of 2003 the increasingly unpopular SI.D was in trouble, plagued by a constant stream of political scandals, and in March 2004 a splinter group defected to form the Polish Social Democracy (SDPL). Having secured Poland’s formal entry into the EU on 1 May 2004, described by many commentators as a decisive date in Poland’s modern history, Miller resigned as prime minister. His successor Marek Belka is an experienced politician and economist with a background 011 the left but independent of the SIT). His caretaker government of experts remained in office until September

2005. Renewed economic growth, increased foreign investments

^oLSWA WfcAGA Ko Europy

58 Poland returns to Europe. A self-mocking parody by one of Poland’s leading cartoonists Andrzej Mleczko which appeared on the front cover of the weekly Polityka on i May 2004. Poland’s terms of entry into the EU provide the country’s farmers with only 25 per cent of the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy (supplemented by a further 25 per cent from the Polish exchequer); they also restrict for five years the free movement of Polish labour to most EU states, except for the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Republic of Ireland. On the other hand, there is a i2-year restriction on the purchase of agricultural land in Poland by citizens of other member states. Between May 2004 and March 2005 nearly 100,000 Poles, from plumbers and builders to medical staff, have registered for work in the UK; most have taken ‘hard-to-fill’ jobs.

(8 billion pounds in 2004), and the overwhelmingly positive early effects of EU membership, especially on Poland’s hitherto sceptical farmers, may yet erode the appeal of the populist parties and produce a ‘yes’ vote in favour of the proposed European constitution. Much will also depend on whether the centre-right can act together.

The year 2005 will also see the end of President Kwasniewski’s second and last term in office. Until recently, his record and reputation remained high, and his dignified and effective representation of Poland on the international stage was only strengthened by his constructive mediatory role during the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine at the end of 2004. In early 2005 there was still no clear successor to the presidential office, but in July of that year opinion polls suggested Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former SLD prime minister and foreign minister and currently speaker of the Sejm, as the front-runner with Lech Kaczynski in second place. Cimoszewicz soon withdrew from the race, and Donald Tusk, a native of the Kaszub region near Gdansk and one of the leaders of Civic Platform, emerged as Kaczynski’s main rival. Although both Kaczynski and Tusk have a Solidarity pedigree, the former is stressing conservative national values and the importance of a strong state, while the latter represents a more liberal and free-market response to the nation’s problems.

The death of Pope John Paul II on 2 April 2005 has deprived the Poles of their iconic ‘guardian angel’ in Rome. While it is too early for a conclusive evaluation of the Polish Pope’s impact on his country, there is no doubt that in some areas his role has been profound. His first pilgrimage to Poland in 1979 did much to inspire the movement of liberation identified with Solidarity, while his appeal for moderation and dialogue contributed to the peaceful transition from communism. In the face of the still ambivalent attitude of the Polish Catholic hierarchy towards the European Union, the Pope’s public endorsement of Poland’s aspirations to join the EU did sway many Poles to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum of 2003. On the other hand, the Pope did criticize Poland’s post-1989 transformation as too liberal and insufficiently based on Christian foundations. Not all of his teachings have been followed by Polish Catholics in their private and public lives, nor was he able to halt the gradual secularization of Polish society. Fierce electoral battles would be fought in Poland in the autumn of 2005, but during the month of April 2005 something of the spirit of Solidarity did briefly revisit the nation united in common grief.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century the 38.6 million inhabitants of Poland enjoy a degree of national freedom and national security which had been painfully denied to so many of their previous generations. The future of Ukraine and of Russia do remain areas of intense interest and even concern, but that Poland is at peace with all its neighbours, and in close partnership with most of them, is truly remarkable, given the history of the past centuries. Much has been achieved since 1989, and the possibilities of further development are great. The entry into the HU symbolized Poland rejoining the mainstream of European civilization, and confirmed Poland’s re-emergence as a major actor in European politics - as it had been until the end of the seventeenth century and, too briefly and not entirely happily, in 1919-39. Yet many challenges face Polish society today, not least political corruption, the low quality of much political debate, the lack of confidence in many of the state’s institutions, and a sense of apathy and exclusion of large sections of the population. The danger of populism is a cautionary warning of this. Whether membership of the European Union will in due course promote a greater sense of responsible citizenship, more equitable economic betterment and accompanying social harmony remains to be seen - and to be wished for.

POSTSCRIPT

Results of the parliamentary elections of September 2005: ‘Law and Justice’ (PiS) came first (with 26.8 per cent of the popular vote), ‘Civic Platform’ (PO) was in second place (24.2 per cent), and ‘Self-Defence’ in third (i t.7 per cent). The previously ruling SED dropped to fourth place with only 11.4 per cent of the vote. The final round of the presidential elections of October 2005 was won by Lech Kaczynski who gained 54 per cent of the votes cast; Donald Tusk came second, with 46 per cent.

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Chart II The Jagiellonian dynasty: kings of Poland and grand dukes of Lithuania

Gediminas, prince of Lithuania (e. 1316-421

[ a

Algirdas 11 345-—) Kęstutis (1337-82)

Jogaila; r 377-1434 grand duke of Lithuania Vytautas,

from 1386, Wladyslaw II Jagiello, king of Poland f 1386-1434) grand duke of Lithuania (1392-1430)

= (r) 1386 Jadwiga of Poland (1383-94)

= (4) 1422 Sonia of Gol'shany

Wladyslaw III ‘of Varna’ Casimir IV grand duke of Lithuania, 1440-92 = 1454 Elizabeth of Habsburg

king of Poland, 1434-44 king of Poland, 1446-92

king of Hungary, 1440-4 Į

1-⁵ I I I

Wladyslaw: King Vladislav II of Bohemia, 1471-1516 John I Albert Alexander Sigismund I‘the Old’

j King Ulaszlo II of Hungary, 1490-1516 king of Poland, 1492-1501 grand duke of Lithuania, 1492-1506 king of Poland and grand duke

I---1 king of Poland, 1501-6 of Lithuania, 1500-48

Anna (1503-4-i Louis II, king of = I' > 495 Barbara Zapolya

I г» i • j i i = 12) 1518 Bona Sforza

Bohemia and Hungary, 1516-26

Ferdinand I of Habsburg I I I I

Holy Roman F.mperor Isabella и 519-59) Sigismund II Augustus Anna (1523-96) Catherine (1526-8;)

1556-64 = 1539 John Zapolya of Hungary reigned in Poland and = 1506 Stefan Batory = 1562 John III Vasa,

Lithuania 1548-72 elective king of Poland, duke of Einland, king

1576-86 of Sweden 1569-92

Sigismund III Vasa, elective king of Poland, 158--1632 king of Sweden, from 1592 deposed, 1599

Chart III Elective rulers of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (and others)

(The Swedish Vasa line)

1

Catherine Jagiellon = John III Vasa Charles IX

(1526-85) i king of Sweden 1569-92 regent of Sweden (599-160“

_I king of Sweden i6o~-ii

Sigismund I‘the Old’ 1506-48

Henry I, duke of Anjou elective king of Poland, 15-3-4 King Henri 111 of France, 1574-89 j-

Stefan Batory = (1576) Anna Jagiellon

prince of Transylvania ( i 525-96)

elective king of Poland, i5~5-86 |-¹

Anna of Habsburg (1592) 1. = Sigismund III Vasa 2. = (1605) Constance of Habsburg

elective king of Poland [ 580-1632 j king of Sweden 1 592-9 {deposed)

Wladyslaw IV John H Casimir Karol Ferdynand

Gustavus II Adolphus

( arherine = John

king of Sweden, 161 j-52

Casimir ot Zweibrucken

Christina _{( :har}|_{es x}

queen of Sweden, i 632- 54 _{kmg ()f Svv}eden, . 654—0

( Earles XI

king of Sweden, 1660-9“ Charles XII

king of Sweden, 1 697- 1 1 8

elective king of Poland, 1632-48 elective king of Poland (1613-55)

I 1648-68 (abdicated; died 16-z)

Prince Sigismund Casimir (1640--)

Michael I Wisniowiecki, elective king of Poland, 166X--3 John 111 Sobieski, elective king of Poland, 1673-96

Frederick Augustus I, elector of Saxony (1694-1733); also Augustus II, elective king of Poland, 1697-1-33

Stanisiaw Leszczynski, elective anti-king, 1-04-10; elective king 1733-3; tdnlnr kinу of I'olnnd and Juke <>i innrninc tn /я, denth m 1 - ее Frederick Augustus II, elector of Saxony (1733-63); also Augustus III, elective king of Poland, 1733-63

Stanisiaw August Poniatowski, elective king of Poland, 1-64-95 (abdicated-, died i-yX)

(Frederick Augustus, duke of Warsaw, 180--13

also Frederick Augustus III, elector of Saxony, 1763-1806

then King Frederick Augustus I of Saxony, 1806-2-)

Chart IV Rulers of the partitioned Polish territories (regnal dates only are shown)

Romanov emperors of Russia (bearing the title of ‘Polish king’ after 1815)

Catherine II ‘the Great’ (1762-96)

Paul I (1796-1801)

Alexander I (1801-25)

Nicholas I (1825-55)

Alexander 11 (1855-81)

Alexander 111 (1881-94)

Nicholas II (1894-1917)

(■abdicated)

The Habsburgs of Austria (Holy Roman Emperors until 1806; emperors of Austria 1804-1918)

Maria Theresa (1^40-80)

Joseph II (1765-90)

Leopold II (T790-2)

Francis (II) I (1792-1835)

Ferdinand [(1835-48)

Francis Joseph (1848-1916)

Charles I (1916-18)

(abdicated)

The Hohcnzollern kings of Prussia (also grand dukes of Posen after 1815; German emperors after 1871)

Frederick II ‘the Great’

(1740-86)

Frederick William II (1786-97)

Frederick William III (1797-Г840)

Frederick William IV (1840-61)

William I (1861-88)

Frederick III (1888)

William 11 (1888-1918) (abdicated)

The Wettins of Saxony (electors of Saxony until 1806; kings of Saxony after 1806)

Frederick Augustus, duke of Warsaw (1807-15)

(abdicated)

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346 Heads of state, presidents, Communist Party leaders

LEADERS OE THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS PARTY (PZP

Chairman of the Central Committee Boleslaw Bierut (December 1948-March 1954)

First Secretaries Boleslaw Bierut (March 1954-March т956)

Edward Ochab (March-October T956)

Wladyslaw Gomulka (October 1956-December .1970) Edward Gierek (December 1970-September T980) Stanislaw Mania (September 1980-October 1981) Wo]ciech Jaruzelski (October T98i-July 1989) Mieczyslaw Rakowski (July 1989-January 1990)

The Third Republic (since 1989)

PRESIDENTS

Wojciech Jaruzelski (July 1989-December 1990)

Lech Walysa (December Tppo-December 1995) Aleksander Kwasniewski (December 1995-December 2005)

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POLAND, PRE- 1 79 5

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Fletcher, R. The conversion of Europe: from paganism to Christianity 771-7786 AD, London: HarperCollins, 1 997 Frick, D., Meletij Smolryc’kyj, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995

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genealogy of modernity, Berkeley: University of California Press, Z004 Kaminski, A. S. Republic ns. autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 16H6-1697, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993 Kaplan, H. H. The First Partition of Poland, New York: Columbia University Press, T962 Kirby, D. Northern Europe in the early modern period: the Baltic world 7492-1772, London: Longman, 1990 Knoll, P. W. The rise of the Polish monarchy: Piast Poland in east central Europe, 1320 — 1370, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19-2 Kochanowski, J. fan Kochanowski: Laments, trans. S. Heaney and S.

Baranczak, London: Faber, Г995 Levine, H. Economic origins of antisemitism: Poland and its Jews in the early modern period. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Umversitv Press, T99T Lord, R. H. The Second Partition of Poland: a study in diplomatic history, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, T9T5 Lukowski, J. T. Liberty's folly: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century, London: Routledge, 199 г Lukowski, J. T. The Partitions of Poland 1771, -1793, 7793, London: Longman, 1999

Mączak, A., Samsonowicz, H. and Burke, P. (eds.) East-central Europe in transition: from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, Cambridge: University Press, 1983 Manteuffel, T. The formation of the Polish state: the period of ducal rule, 963-71 94, Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, i 982 Musteikis, A. The Reformation in Lithuania: religious fluctuations in the sixteenth century, Boulder, Colo.: Last European Monographs, 1 988 Pasek, J. Ch. Memoirs of the Polish baroque: the writings of fm

Chryzostom Pasek, a squire of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, ed. C. S. Leech, Berkeley: University of California Press, 7976

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I’OLANI), POST-1795

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thought from the iSjos to the 1850s, Toronto: University Press, T977 Bromke, A. Poland's politics: idealism vs. realism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967 Brown, J. F. Surge to fre edom: the end of communist rule in eastern Europe, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 199т Brzezinski, Z. K. The Soviet bloc: unity and conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, T97T Ciechanowski, J. M. The Warsaw Rising of 1944, Cambridge: University Press, T974

Cienciala, A. M. Poland and the Western Powers 293 8- T9 5 9: a study in the interdependence of eastern and western Europe, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, T968 Cienciala, A. M. and Komarnicki, T. From Versailles to Locarno: keys to Polish foreign policy 1919-25, Lawrence, Kans.: Kansas University Press, 1984

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Carton Ash, T. The Polish revolution: Solidarity, London: Penguin, 1999 Gilbert, M. The Holocaust: The Jewish tragedy, London: Fontana/Collins, T989

Gross, J. T. Polish society under German occupation: the general

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1980

Hayden, J. Poles apart: Solidarity and the new Poland, Blackrock: Irish Academic Press, 1994 Howard, A. E. D. (ed.) Constitution making in eastern Europe, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, T993 Jaworski, R. and Pietrow-Ennker, B. (eds.) Women in Polish society, Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1992 Jedlicki, J. A suburb of Europe: nineteenth-century Polish approaches to western civilization, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999

Jydrzejewicz, W. Pilsudskį: a life for Poland, New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982

Kaminski, B. The collapse of state socialism: the case of Poland, Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1991 Karski, J. Story of a secret state, London: Hodder and Stoughton, T945 Karski, J. The Great Powers and Poland 1919-194 7: from Versailles to Yalta, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985 Kaser, М. C. and Radice, E. (eds.) The economic history of eastern Europe 1919-197у, Oxford: Cleveland Press, T986 Kenney, P. Rebuilding Poland: workers and communists 1947-1 970, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997

Kersten, К. The establishment of communist rule in Poland 1941-1 948, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 Kieniewicz, S. The emancipation of the Polish peasantry, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969 Kirby, D. The Baltic world 1772-1 993. Europe's northern periphery in an age of change, London: Longman, 1 995 Komarnicki, T. The rebirth of the Polish republic: a study in the diplomatic history of Europe 1914-1920, London: Heinemann, 1957 Korbel, J. Poland between East and West, Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1963

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INDEX

(regnal dares only of rulers are given)

Adamkus, Valdas (1926- ) 331

Adelaide of Hesse (d. 1371) 3 3 Adenauer, Konrad (1876-1967 ) 3 1 5 Albrecht of Habsburg ( j 248-1308)

2 L

Albrecht of Hohenzollern-Ansbach, Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights and first secular ruler of Ducal Prussia (1525-68) 50, 60 Aldona, Lithuanian princess (1 309-39) ² 5, 33

Algirdas, Lithuanian prince (1345—77) 39,44

Alexander, king of Poland (1 501-06)

44, 5 ¹, 55, ^6z, ⁶3~4 Alexander I, tsar of Russia ( l 80.1 -25) and king of Poland (1815-25) 140, 141, 146-7, 150-2 Alexander II, tsar of Russia (1855-81) t74, 177, г79-80, 183 Alexei Mikhailovich, tsar of Muscovy (1645-76)96 Altmark, truce of (1629) 93 Anders, Wladyslaw (1 892-1970) 267, 269,279,293,²94 Andrew II, king of Hungary (1205-35) 22

Andrew III, king of Hungary (1290-130т) 21 Andrew the Hunchback, prince of Polotsk (i 342-87) 40

Andrusovo, truce of (1667) 100, 106 Anna, Hungarian Jagiellonian princess (1503-47)55 antitrinitarians 104

Arciszcwski, Tomasz (1877-Г955) 274, 292, 294

Armia Krajowa (AK) see Home Army (AK)

Armia Lrndowa (AL) see People’s Army (Aid

Arnhem, battle of {т944) 269 Askenazy, Szymon (1865-1935) 236 Asnyk, Adam (1838-97) 186 Astrakhan 58

Augustus II, king of Poland (1697-1733) Ю6-9, i t2 Augustus III, king of Poland (1733—63)

110-1 1, 112, 124, 125, 126 Auschwitz (Oswiycim) 260, 533 Austerlitz, battle of (1 805) 14 1 Australia 166, 280

Austria (and Austria-Hungary) 83, 98, IO4, IO6, IO9-IO, I 12, 1 17-22, 123, 12-7, 128, 131, 13^-8, 140-1, 147, 156, 184-6, 2/8, 220, 111

Bacciarelli, Marceli (1731-1818) 142 Badeni, Kazimierz (1 846-1909) 1 85 Bakunin, Mikhail A. (1 824-76) 1 80 Baleerowicz, Leszek (1947- ) 3 J 9,

Balicki, Zygmunt (i 858-1916) 200

Bank of Poland 1 54, 156

Bar, Confederacy of (1768-72) 116,

^{1 1} 7

Bartel, Kazimierz (1882-1941) 240 Basanavičius, Jonas (18 51 -1927) 195 Batoh, battle of (1652) 96 Beck, Jozef (1894-1944) 247, 251-2 Belarus and Belarusians (see also Rus’; western gubernii of the Russian empire) 4, 39, 79, 86, 137, 158, 179, 191, 195, 205-6, 224, 225, 233, 263, 28т, 325, 330, 331, 333 Belka, Marek(i952- ) 337 Bclorussia see Belarus Bern, Jozef (1794-1 8 50) 172 Beresteczko, battle of (165 1) 96 Bereza Kartuska 244 Berg, Feodor F. (r 793-т 874) 179, 1 8 r Berling, Zygmunt (1 896-1980) 268, 271, 272 Bialystok 141

Bibikov, Dmitri G. (1792-1870) 165 Bicrut, Boleslaw (1892-1956) 268, 283, 292, 295

Bismarck, Otto von (1815-98) 180, i 84, 199, 328 Black Death 30

Bobrowski, Stefan (1.840-63) 178 Bobrzynski, Michaf (1849-1935) 186, 193-4, 206 Bochnia 32

Bohemia 2, 3,4, 5, 7, 19-20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 38,41,51, 60, 82 Boleslav I, prince of Bohemia (d. 972) 5 Boleslaw 1 ‘the Valiant’ (‘Chrobry’),

king of Poland (992-1026) 7, 8-9,

TO

Boleslaw II (1058-8 1), king of Poland 7, 9-10

Boleslaw III (1 102-38) ‘Wrymouth’ (‘Krzywousty’), prince of Poland 7,

1 o, 11, 25 Boleslaw the 'lall (‘Wysoki’)

(i 1 65-1 201), duke of Silesia 11,

'4

Boleslaw the Bashful (‘Wstydliwv’)

(i243—79) 15 Boleslaw II, duke of Pfoek (d. 1315) 19

Boleslaw-Iurii, duke of Halych and Vladimir (1323-40) 27 Boniface VIII, pope (1294-1303) 21 Bor-Komorowski, Tadeusz (1895-1966)294 Boris Godunov, Tsar of Muscovy (г 598-1605)92 Boryslaw 189

Bourbon-Conti, Franyois Louis de, prince of (1664-1709) 106 Brandenburg 8, 20, 2т, 22, 24, 25, 56, 6o, 93, 98, 104 Brandt, Willy (19т 3-92) 303 Brazil 189

Breslau see Wroclaw Brest (Brzešč, Brest'-Litovskii), 244 Union of (i 596) 87-8 Treaty of (т 918) 220 Briansk 60

Brzezihski, Zbigniew (1928- ) 304,

305, 311

Brzoska, Stanisiaw (c. 1832-65) 180 Buczacz, treaty of (1672) 105 Buda, Privilege of 1 355 34, 46 Budenny, Semyon (1883-1973) 225, 229 Bug, river 271

Bund, Jewish socialist party (see also Jews) 197, 199, 256 Buonaccorsi, Filippo (1437-96) 72 Buzek, Jerzy (1940- ) 323, 328 Bzura, battle on the (1939) 255

Calvinism 76-7, 79, 86, 104 (see also Protestantism)

Camp of Greater Poland (Oboz Wielkiej Polski) 246 Camp of National Unity (Ozon) 248 Caprivi, George Leo von (1831-99)

184

Carlowitz, peace of (1699) 106 Carter, Jimmy, US president (1924- )

304, 305,511 Casimir 1 ‘the Restorer’ (‘Odnowiciel’), prince of Poland (1039-58) 7 Casimir II The Just’ (‘Sprawiedliwy’), prince of Poland (1 177-94) ^{1 1} Casimir III The Great’ king of Poland (13 33—70) 2б-34> 36, 4 i

Casimir IV, king of Poland (1447-92) 44, 48, 51, 52, 56, 61, 63 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart (1769-1822)147 Catherine II ‘the Great', empress of Russia (1762-97) 115-6, ii7,

1 20, 1 23-4, 128, 131, t 36, 306 Catherine of Habsburg (153 3-72) 77 Catherine Jagiellon (1 526-8 3) 93 Catholic Church in Poland 3, 5, 6, 8-9, i o, 1 1,14, 17, 2.2-3, 27, 30, 31-2.,

3 31 37, 38, 40, 42, 55-6, 61, 65, 76, 77, 78, 80, 8t, 86-7, 94, 104,

106, 1 i i, t 1 5, i 27, 13 5, 138, 183,

Г 84 — 5, 19 5, 20 Г, 202, 205, 2 Г 6,

238, 246, 257, 283, 290, 297, 299-3ОО, 304, 308, 3 12, 314, 324, 3 39 (see also Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church)

Cecora (Tutora), battle of (1620) 92 Cegielski, Hipolit (1 81 3-68) г 67 Celtis, Conrad (1459-1 508) 72 Central Industrial Region (COP) 250 Chamberlain, Neville (1869-1940) 252 Charlemagne, Emperor (800-814) 9 Charles I Robert of Anjou, king of Hungary ( j 308-42) 21, 25, 26 Charles IV, king of Bohemia (1346-78), Holy Roman Emperor (13 55-78) 2.1

Charles V (1516-56) Holy Roman Emperor emperor 5 5 Charles IX (1 560-74) king of France 83, 84

Charles IX (1604-11) king of Sweden

95

Charles X (1654-60) king of Sweden 98 Charles XII (1 697-1718) king of Sweden 107, 109, 1 1 о Chelm 183, 210, 27т Chelmno (Kulm) 22, 25 Chicago 189 Chile 166

Chlopicki, Jozef (17T1 — 1 854) 1 59-60,

161

Chojnice, battle of (1454) 48 Cbojnice, Privilege of (1454) 63 Chopin, Fryderyk (Frederic) (1810-48)

164,257,289

Christian Democrats 245-6 Churchill, Winston (1874-1963) 266, 268, 269, 274 Cieszkowski, August (1814-94) 1 68 Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz (1 950- )

3 3 9

cinema in Poland 21 2, 260, 298 {sec also Smosarska, Jadwiga and Wajda, Andrzej)

Cistercians 14

Civic Platform (PO) 336, 339, 340 collectivization (of agriculture) 288,

297, 306 Colombia 166

Comintern (Communist International) 248,257

Commission for National Education 122

Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR) 307 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 338 Commune of the Polish People 166 Communist Party of Poland (KPP) 222, 223, 245, 249, 265 (see also Polish Workers' Party (PPR), Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR)) Condė, Louis II de Bourbon, ‘the Great Conde’ (1621-86) 100 ‘Congress' Kingdom of Poland (under Russian rule 1815-1914) 147, 156-7, i 68, 173-4, 182-3, ¹ 87, 189, i 93, 202- 5, 21 1 -2, 21 9 Conrad 1, duke of Masovia (1 202-47)

1 8, 22

Conrad III, king of Germany 1 1 Conrad von Feuchtwangen (i 291-6), Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights 25 Conrad (Korzeniowski), Joseph (1857-1924) 191 Constantine Nikolaevich, grand duke (1827-92) i~7, 1-8, 179 Constantine Pavlovich, grand duke (1779-1831) 123, 152, 154, 157, i 59, i 60, 28-Constantinople 52, 87, 93 Constitutions:

of 3 May 179 1 1 25-8 of i 807 141-3

Constitutions {cunt.)

of 1815 j 50- 1, i 62, 178

of 1919 22 i

of i 92 j 23 i, 271

of 1 935 ²47, ²53

of 1947 28 5

of 1952 286

amendments of 1975 3°6 amendments of 1989 317, 319 ofi99-324 Copernicus, Nicholas (1473-1543) 72,

7 3i t 56

Cossacks, of the Ukraine 54, 87, 92, 95-6, 100 Coup d'etat of J926 240-1 Courland, duchy of 59 Crimea 1 8, 117, 123 Crimean Tatars 18, 52, 53 — 5, 56, 59, 69, 75, 78, 96, 106, 117 Crimean War (1854-56) L73 Cudnow (Khudniv, Khudnov) battle of (i 660)85 Curzou Line 229, 230, 268, 269, 274 Cvrankiewicz, Jozef (191 1-89) 285 Czapski, Jozef (1896-1993) 267 Czartoryska, Izabela (1746-1835) ¹4° Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy (1770- j 86 г) 136, I 40, t 46, 150, 151, t 53, 154,

¹ 5“' ¹ 59> i 64-5, 168-9, ¹70, 208

Czartoryski, August (1697-т782) 115 Czartoryski, family of 112, 117, Г23 Czartoryski, Michael (1696-1775) 115 Czech Republic 323, 325, 3 32 Czechoslovakia {sec also Czech

Republic, Slovakia) 231, 252, 252,

263-4' З⁰²- 3 AT 33 ¹ ~^z Czechs (see also Bohemia) 5, 2т, 22, 25,

Czerwihsk, Privilege of (1422) 63 Czestochowa 98, 99, 216, 295, 300

Dqbrowa basin 189, 221 Dqbrowski, Jan Henryk (1755-1818) 139, 141

Dgbrowski, Jaroslaw (1836-71) 177 Dqbrowski, Jerzy (1899-1967) 254 Danzig (see also Gdansk) 48, 68, 69, 76,

8 [, г 20, 124 , 141, 155

Tree City of Danzig (1919-59) 224, 238-9, 252 Danzig Pomerania (see West Prussia) Daszyhski, Ignacy (1866-1936) 199.

221,229 Decembrists (in Russia) 153 Delavigne, Casimir (1793-1843) 162 Dembihski, Henryk (1791-1864) 172 Dembowski, Edward (1822-46) 169-то Democratic Party (SD) 3 18 Democratic Union (UD) (see also Freedom Union) 321, 322 Denmark 59, 98

Dmitrii Donskoi, Grand Prince of Moscow (1350-89) 40 Dmowski, Roman (1864-1939) 200, 203, 205, 208, 209, 210, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224, 246, 248, 304 Dobrava, first wife to Mieszko I 5 Dobrzyn 25—6, 27, 30, 34 Domeyko, Ignacy (1802-89) r66 Dorpat (Tartu) 59 Dresden 111, 112 Drohobycz189

Drzymala, Michal (1857-1937) 2to Dubček, Alexander (1921-92) 302 Dunajewski, Albin (1 8 т 7-94) 185 Durnkriitt, battle of (1278) 20 Dybowski, Benedvkt (1833-89) 191 Dzerzhinsky (Dzieržynski) Feliks (1877-1926)198-9,225

Elbląg (Elbing) 48, 68

Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) 322,

3 34

Elizabeth, daughter of Wladyslaw Eokietek (1305-80) 25, 34 Elizabeth, widow of I.ouis the Great (c. 1340-87) 37 Elizabeth of Habsburg (1526-4 5) emigration (economic) 189, 191, 197, 242 (see also 'Great Emigration' of 1831; and Polish exiles after 1945)

Enghien, Henri-Jules de Bourbon, duke of (1646-1709) 100 England (see also Great Britain) 17, г 1 i, 112, 127 ‘Enigma' (decoding machine) 264

Eperyt's (Prešov), battle of (1492) 51 Krik XIV, king of Sweden (1 560-9) 59 Ernest of Habsburg, archduke

(1553-95) ^8z

Hstonia 25, 59, 93, 107 European Union (EU) 324, 325, 333, 337, 338, 339, 340 European Union referendum (2003) 334-5

Falaise, battle of (Г944) 269 ЕеЫin 59

Feodor Alexeevich, tsar of Muscovy (16-6-82) 106 Ferdinand 1, Holy Roman Emperor (1 556-64) 55.77 Fersen, Ivan (1747-99) 1 3 1 Fijalowski (aka Fijalkowski), Antoni (1797-1883)175 Ford, Gerald, US president (1913- )

305

France 3, 17, 60, 65, 77, 83, 84, 100, 104, 106, 109-ri, 722, 124, 127, 129, 131, 139, 162, 170-1, 779, 181, 218, 224, 232, 238, 247, 251, 252-3

Franko, Ivan (1856-1916) 194, 199 Frederick 1 Barbarossa, German Emperor (1155-90) 17 Frederick II ‘the Great’, king of Prussia (1740-86) 112, 117-20 Frederick Augustus I, elector of Saxony see Augustus II, king of Poland Frederick Augustus II, elector of

Saxony see Augustus III, king of Poland

Frederick Augustus III, elector of

Saxony (1763- i 82-) (later king of Saxony and grand duke of Warsaw) i 26, 127, 143 Frederick William, the ‘Great F'lector' of Brandenburg (1640-88) 98 Frederick William II, king of Prussia (1786-97) 124, 128, 129, 131 Frederick William IV, king of Prussia (i840-61)168 Freedom Union (UW) (see also

Democratic Union (UD)) 334, 321, 3*3

Galicia (Austrian Poland 1772-1918)

1 37-8, 147, 155, 156, 168, 169, j 79, 184-5, 189, 193-4, 199, 206, 207, 208, 212, 221, 233, 257 Galician jacquerie (1846) 770, 175,

185, 20 7

Gall, anonim (‘the anonymous Gaul'), medieval chronicler of Poland (fl. c. 1110)3 —4 Garibaldi, Giuseppe (7 807-82) 1 --Gdansk {see also Danzig) 7, 19, 22, 23, 27, 48, 68, 69, 76, 8 7, 120, i 24, 503, 309-10, 325 Gdynia 238-9, 303 Gediminas, prince of Lithuania (c. 1316-c. 1342)25,30,34 ‘General Government’ (Nazi-occupied Poland) 257-61 George of Podebrad, king of Bohemia ( t 4 5 S — 7 t ) 57 Gerei, Mengli, Crimean Khan (14-8-7515)54 Geremek, Bronislaw (193 2— ) 510,

321, 328 Germany (and Germans) (see also

Holy Roman Empire; and Prussia) 4-6, 7, 8. 7 1, 74-16, 17, 7 9,

20-7, 22, 23, 24, 27, 3 I , 32, 48.

“6, 77, l62, T 70- 7 , 172, l8l, 184,

I 87, 7 99-200, 27 8, 227-2, 233,

237-8, 242, 247, 249, 25 1 -3,

278-9, 300, 303, 3 7 5, 325' 3*8-9, 3 3*’ 333

Giedroyč, Jerzy (7906-2000) 298, 302, 3 3°

Giedroyč (Giedraitis), Jozef Arnulf (1754-1838)140 Gierck, Edward (1913-2001) 303-4, 305-6, 308, 3 10 Giertvch, Roman (1977- ) 336

Giervmski, Aleksander (1 850- 1901)

7 96

Giseard d'Estaing, Valėry (19*6- )

305

Gižanka, Barbara (d. 1589) 82 Glemp, Jozef (1929- ) 312, 313

Glogdw (Glogau) 21, 22, 24

Gniezno 4,7, 16, 17, 20, 25,26, 5042, 67, ИЗ

Gofuchowski, Agenor (the elder)

(1812-75)¹73^ 1X5

Gofuchowski, Agenor (the younger) (1849-1921)185 Gombrowicz, Witold (1904-69) 245, 307

Gomulka, Wladyslaw (1905-82) 268, 273, 286, 295-7, 298-9, 303 Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931- ) 256,

3 i G 3 ² 9

Gorchakov, Mikhail D. (1793-1861) 173

Gorka, family of 76

Gornicki, Eukasz (1 527-1603) 7²

Grabowski, Stanislaw (1780-1845)

152

Grabski, Stanislaw (1871-1945) 230 Grabski, Wladyslaw (1874-1958) 237, 238, 240

Great Britain 112, 115, 163, 1 79, 219, 252, 2.53-4, 263, 274, 275,

279-80,338 battle of Britain (т 940) 264 Great Depression (1929) 244-5, ²4⁸ 'Great Emigration’ (of 1851) 165-5 Greece 324

Greek Catholic Church {see Uniate Church)

Grochow, battle of (1 8 51) 1 60-1 Grodno (Gardinas, Hrodna) 86, 128-9,

207

union of (1432) 41 Grottger, Artur (1837-6"?) 176 Grunwald, battle of (also known as battle of Tannenberg) (1410) 45,

21 2

Gulag (Soviet labour camps) 256, 267,

275. ^28-7

Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden (1611-52)93 Gvpsies 260

I Ialler, Jozef (1873-1960) 221 Halych (Halicz, Galich) 27-30, 32-3 Havel, Vaclav (1936- ) 5 32

I Ielsinki, treaty (1975) 308 Hcltman, Wiktor (1796-1 874) 1 66 Hemar, Marian (1901-72) 295 Henri, duke of Anjou, king of Poland (1573-4) (king Henri III of France, i574-89)83,84 Henrician articles 83, 84 Henry, duke of Glogow (1 27 3 -1309) 21,24

Henry, duke of Žagan (Sagan)

(1342-64)33 Henry II, German Emperor (1014-24) 7 Henry V, German Emperor (1 1 1 1-25)

1 о

Henry VI, German Emperor (1 190-97)

19

Henry VIII, king of England (1509-47)

Henry IV Probus (1 257-90) duke in Silesia 16, 19, 20, 21 I lenry the Bearded (1 201-38), duke of Silesia 14, 15, 16 Henry the Pious, duke of Silesia (1238-41) 18 Herbert, Zbigniew (1924-98) 290 Hertzberg, Friedrich von (1 725-95), Prussian minister 124 I Ierzen, Aleksandr (г 8 т 2-70) i 80 Hitler, Adolf (1 889 -1945) 251-2, 255,

272.

Hlasko, Marek (1954-69) 295 I Ilond, August (188 i -1 948) 246 Holocaust 260-5 [see dlso Jews)

'I Ioly Alliance' (1815) т 52, i 63 Holy Roman (German) Empire (see ills о Germany) 5, 7, 27, 31 Home Army (AK) 265, 264-5, ^26lX 271-3, 275, 280, 301, 335 Homel (Gomel) 58 Horodio, union of (14 13) 41-2, 5 5 I Iorodyski, Andrzej (1773-1 8 57) 1 50 Hungary 5, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21 -2, 25,

26-7, 50, 35, 34, 56-7, 5 8, 4 i, 44, 50- i, 52, 55, 60, 73, 82, 98,

I 7 I — 2, 252, 295, 297, 323 Hunyadi, John (1407-56) 51

Ibrahim ibn Yakub, tenth-ccntury Arab traveller 6 industry and industrialization 154, 155, 167-8, 187-9, 197, 198-9,

202-3, 21 3, 244, 249-50, 287-8, 305 Ingria 107

Institute of National Memory (1PN) 332 Ireland 338 Iraq 337

Isabella (r 5 19-59), daughter of Sigismund I 5 5 Israel 301, 533 Italy 65, 73, i 10—i, 139 Ivan III, grand prince of Moscow (1462-1505)56 Ivan IV the Terrible, tsar of Muscovy (i 533-84) 54-5, 58, 59, 82, 9t, 93

Jablonskį, Henryk (1909-2003) 309 Jadwiga, queen of Poland (1384-99)

37, 38, 39, 44 Jadwiga of Žagan (c. 1345-90) 33 Jagiello (Wladyslaw II Jagiello, king of Poland, grand prince of Lithuania) (1386-1434) 37, 38 39, 40-4^ 45t 50, 52, 60-1, 63, 72 ‘Jagiellonian Idea' (Poland’s federation with eastern neighbours) 225 Japan 203

Jaruzelski, Wojciech (1923- ) 312-3,

318, 332 Jedlnia, Privilege of (1430) 63 Jedwabne massacre (1941) 26т, 332 Jesuits 87, 104, iii, 122 Jews 4, 6, 31, 32, 65-8, 96, 101, i 27, 138, 146, 154, 174■> ^l~>, 195““'

201, 210, 212, 216, 233, -36, 241, 249, 256, 260-3, 1S4, 295, 298, 301-2

Jezierski, Franciszek (1 740-9 1) 124-5 Jogaila, grand prince of Lithuania see Jagiello

John 111, king of Sweden (1 569-9-1) 93 John XXII, pope (131 6—34) 24-5 John I Albert (Jan Olbracht)

(1492—1501) 44, 50, 51,53, 62-3 John II Casimir (1 648-68) 88, 96,

98-9, 100, 104

John III Sobieski (1674-96) 90-1, 105-6, 129, 201, 229, 314 John of Luxemburg, king of Bohemia (1310-46) 22, 24, 25-6, 27 John Paul II (Karol Wojtvla), pope (1978-2005) 308-9, 314, 339 Joseph II, Emperor (1765-1790) 1 23 Jozewski, Henryk (i 892-1981) 24 1 Jungingen, Ulrich von (1407-10), Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights 45

Kaczorowski, Ryszard (1919- ) 3 21 Kaczyhski, Jaroslaw (1949- ) 336

Kaczyhski, Lech (1949- ) 336, 339,

340

Kaden-Bandrowski, Juliusz (1885-1944)245 Kadlubek, Wincenty see Vincent of Krakow

Kakowski, Aleksander (1862-1938)

219

Kaliningrad 325 Kalisz i 52

treaty of ( t343) 27 Kamieniec Podolski (Kam’ianets-Podil’skyi) 75, 105, 106 Kamienski, Henryk (1813-66) 169 Kania, Stanislaw (1927- ) 3 11, 3 1 2

Karelia 107

Karski (born Koziclewski), Jan (1914-2000)263 Kashubians (Kaszubi) 155, 193, 304,

3 3 9

Katyn massacre (1940) 256, 267, 293,

329

Kaunas (Kowno) 231 Kazan 58

Kazimicrz Dolny 9т

Kažko, duke of Slupsk (

34

Kęstutis (1337-82) 39, 44 Kettler, Gotthard, last Grand Master of the Livonian Order and hrst duke of Courland (i 561 -87) 59 KhmePnvtskyi (Chmielnicki), Bohdan (1595—1657) 96, 99, ioi, 105 Khotin (Chocim), battles of (1621) 92, 94;(1673) >05

Khrushchev, Nikita (1894-1971) 295, 296, 297

Kiev 4, 6, 7, io-ii, z~, 86, 88. 95. loo, 106, 191, 225 Kircholm, harrlc of (1605) 8 5 Kisiclewski, Stefan ([911-91) 290 Kiszczak, Czeslaw (1925- ) 3 1 2, 3 17,

318

Kleeberg, Franciszek (1888-1941) 255 Kniaziewicz, Karol (1762-1842) 139 Knyszyn 82

Kochanowski, Jan (1 5 30-84) 72-3 Kohl, Helmut (1930- ) 328

Kolakowski, Leszek (1927- ) 299,

307

Kollątaj, Hugon (1750-181 2) 123,

136

Konarski, Stanisiaw (1-00--3)

l I L - 1 2, 12 3

Konigsberg 21, 48, 50, 73 Konwicki, Tadeusz (1926- ) 307

KOR see Committee for the Defence of Workers Korean War (1950-53) 287 Korfanty, Wojciech (1873-1939) 201 Košciuszko, Tadeusz (1746-1817)

129-3 i, 136, 139, 147, 166, 175 Kosice, Privilege of (1374) 34, 36 Kossak, Wojciech (1856-1942) 160 Kossak-Szczucka, Zoha 11 890- 1968)

261

Kostomarov, Mykolą (181 ”-85) 194 Kozlovviecki, Adam (1911 - ) 30г

Krakow io, it, 14, 15, 18, 19,21,

22, 25-4, 25, 30, 3 l, 32, 33, 36,

37, 38, 50, 60, 65, 68, 72, 84, i 22, 129, 131, [41, [43, 147, 154-5,

169-70, 17L, 185-6, 189, 214, 260, 287, 333 treaty of (1 525) 50, 60 Krasicki, Ignacy (1735 — 1801) 1 25 Krasihski, Zygmunt (1812-59) 163 Krėva (Krewo, Krevo), treaty of (1385) 37i 41“²

Kronenberg, Leopold (1812-78) 174,

177

Krukowiecki, Jan (17-2- r 8 50) 16 1 Krysrvna of Prague 3 3 Krzaklewski, \1 arian (1 949- ) 3 22

Kuchma, Leonid (1938- >330

Kuchuk Kainardji, peace of (1 774) 1 т7 Kujawy, region of 19, 26, 2-, 5 3 Kulikov, Viktor (1921- >313

Kulikovo Pole, battle of (г 380) 40 Kultam (emigre journal) 298, 303 Kulturkampf 184, 187, 202 Kuron, Jacek (1934-2004) 299, 302, 307, 3 i i, 320 Kwasniewski, Aleksandcr (1954- )

32т, 322, 323, 331, 338-9 Kwiatkowski, Eugeniusz (1888-1974) 248, 250

Lamartine, Alphonse de (1790-1869) 171

land reform 222, 229. 232, 23-, 238, 242, 273 {see also peasant emancipation)

Langievvicz, Marian (1827-87) 179 Latvia 23, 2 52

Law and Justice (PiS) 336, 340 League of Nations 231, 238 League of Polish Families (LPR) 336 Lednicki, Aleksander (1866-1934) 219 Ledochowski, Mieczyslaw (1822-1902) 184

Left Democratic Alliance (the postcommunist SLD) 521, 322, 335,

337, 340

Legnica (Liegnitz), battle of (1241) 18 Leipzig, battle (1813) 146 Lelewel, Joachim (1786-т 861) 140.

15-, 159. Г65-6 Lem, Stanisiaw (1921-2006) 298 Lenin, Vladimir Iliyich (i 870-1924)

225,230 Lenino, battle (Г945) 268 Leo X111, pope (1878-1903) 202 Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor (1658-1705)98 Lepper, Andrzej (1954- ) 536

Lestek, 10th century pagan ruler of Polish tribes Leszczyhska, Marie (1 -03-68) 109 Leszczynski, family of -6 Leszczynski, Ratal (1650-1-05) 125 I cszczvnski, Stanisiaw sec Stanisiaw l eszczynski, king of Poland

liberum veto 90-1, 100, j i г-2, 116, 120, T26, I 86 1 .ille 242

Limanowski, Boleslaw (1835-1955) 198

L .inde, Samuel Bogumil (177 r - 1 84^)

139 l.inz 61

Lipski, Jan Jozef (т 926-9 1) 307 Lithuania:

medieval and early modern (until r79 5): 4, 2-5. 3°> 3²> 33> 37i 38-42, 44-8, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55-60, 63-4, 72, 73, 75-6, 77, 79-81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93,98,99-100, i o t , 105, 107,

112, 120, 127, i 28, 129 Russian rule (1795-1918) (seealso western gubernii of the Russian empire): J37, 146, 158, 165, 179, г91, 195, 205-6 since 1918: 220, 224-5, ²3 Ь ²44-251, 252, 287, 325, 330, 331, 533 Litomyšl, Privilege of (129 г) 20 Livonia 45, 58-60, 91, 93, 107 Lloyd George, David (1863-1945) 224 Locarno, treaty (1925) 238 Lorraine 111

Louis I the Great, king of Hungary and Poland (1342-82) 26, 27, 30, 33,

34- 36, 37' 44 Louis II, king of Hungary (1516-26)

5 5

Louis XIV, king of France (1 645-1 ~ 15)

100

Louis XV, king of France (171 5—^4}

109

Louise-Marie de Gonzague (16 r 1 -66) 100

Lubecki-Drucki, Ksawerv (1778-1846)

¹54' ¹57 Lubiąž (Leubus) 5

Lublin 53-4, 80, 8 1, 14 i, 221, 271,

3 3 3

Union of (i 569) 80-1, 86, 91, 92 Lubomirski, family of 88 Luboinirski, Jerzy (1616-67) 100-1 Lubomirski, Zdzishnv (1865-1943)

Lubusz (Lebus) 25

Lukashenko, Alexander (1954- ) 331

Lusatia (Lausitz, Lužyce) 7, 5 1 Luther, Martin (1485-1546) 50, 76 Lutheranism 50, 58, 75, '’6-7 95, 104, ro6, t 15 (see also Protestantism) Lutosfawski, Witold (1913-94) 198 Luxemburg, Rosa (Roža) (1871-1919) 198, 199

Lwovv (L’viv/Lvov/Lemberg) 30, 32, 65, Г05, 156, 171, 189, 206, 214, 223, 257, 268, 279, 298, 332

Lęczyca 16, 19, 25, 33

Lodž 154, 188-9, ²°4' ²57- 304, 325

Lukasinski, Walerian (1786-1868) 1 53

Macieiowice, battle of (1794) 131 Macko Borkowic (d. c. 1360) 31 Mączak, Antoni, Polish historian (1928-2003)78 Maczek, Stanislaw (1892-1994) 269, 270

Magdeburg 6, 1 5, 32 Magdeburg law т 5 Maisky, Ivan (1884-1975) 266 Majdanek, extermination camp 260 Majewski, Karol (1833-97) 179 Malachowski, Stanislaw (1736-1809) 142

Malbork (Marienburg) 23, 32, 45, 47, 48, 155

Mao Tse-Tung (1895- 1 976) 296 Maria of Hungary (1374-95) 56 Marienburg see Malbork Masovia (Mazowsze) 18, 19, 22, 23,

24, 25, 27, 44, 54, 61 Matthias I Corvinus, king of Hungary (1458-90)51 Marcinkowski, Karol (1800-46) 168 Marshall Plan 286 Matejko, Jan (1838-93) 121, 185 Mqtwy, battle of (1666) 100-1 Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor

(1493-1519)5^1_1 Maximilian II, Holy Roman Kmperor (1 564 — в) 82 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz (192^- )

309- 10, 3 19, 320, 32т, 318

Mazurians (of Hast Prussia) 156, 2.31,

304

Mažvydas, Martynas (t*. 1 520-63) 73 Mehmet 11, Ottoman Sultan (1451-81)

5 ²

Meisels, Beer (1798-1 870) 175 Melno, peace of (1422) 48 Metternich, Klemens (1773-1 859) 147 Michael Romanov, tsar of Russia {1613-45) 92.

Michael I Wisniowiccki, king of Poland (1669-74)90, 104-5 Michnik, Adam (1946- ) 302, 307

Mickiewiez, Adam (1798-1855) 140, 153, T57, 158, 165, 164, 170, 173, 214, 257, 302 Mieroslawski, Hudwik ( 18 14-78) 169,

170- i, i 74, i 78-9 Mieroszewski, Juliusz (1906-86) 298 Mieszko I, prince of Poland (r. 960-92) 3-4, 5, 6-7, 10, 18 , 301 Mieszko II, king of Poland (1025-54) 7, 9

Mieszko III 'the Old' ('Stary’), prince of Poland (117 5-1202) 11 Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw (1900-66) 267, 268, 269, 274, 275, 278, 280, 284-5, 2.93 Milan 64 Militz (Milsko) 7

Miliutin, Nikolai ( t 8 г 8-72) 180, r S4 Miller, Leszek (1946- ) 55 5, 556-7 Milosz, С zeslaw (19 г r-2004) 290,

298, 507, 511 Mine, Hilary (1905-74) 28-Minsk 225, 250

Mleczko, Andrzej (1949- ) 558

Mochnacki, Maurycy (1 804-54) 1 5^_.

¹ 59

Moczar, Mieczysfaw ( l9 15-86) 301-2,

304

Modrzejewska (Modjeska), Helena (i840-1909)214 Modrzewski, Andrzej Fryez (т зоз-^г) 74

Modzelewski, Karol (1937- ) 199, 302 Mohacs, battle of (1526) 55 Mohylew (Mogilev, Mahiliai, Mahiyow, Mohvliv) 116, 122

Moldavia 38, 52-3, 54, 62, 65 , 72, 75,

82

Molotov, Vyacheslav (1890-1986) 255 Mongols 18, 27-30, 32, 45 [sccjIso Crimean Tatars)

Moniuszko, Stanislaw (1819-72) 1 68 Monte (,'assino, battle of (1944) 269 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron (1689-T755) T27 Moraczewski, Jędrzej (1 870-1944)

222, 223 Moravia 7, 51

Morando, Bernardo (1540-1600) 89 Moscicki, Ignacy (1 867-1946) 191, 240, 247, 248, 255 Moscow 40, 55, 54-5, 56, 59, 74, 75, 86, 8"^, 92, 106 (and sec Russia) treaty of (1686) 106 motor cars 242, 305 Mrožek, Slawomir (1930— ) 298

Muraviev, Mikhail (1794-1866) 1 -9 Muscovy see Russia Muskie, Edmund (19 14-96) 305

Namystow (Namslau) treaty of (1348)

27

Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769-182т), emperor of the French (1 804-14) 159, 141 — 3, 146 Napoleonic Code 143, 150, 154 Narutowicz, Gabriel (1865-1922) 191, 236 Narva 59

battle of f 1700) i o~

Narvik, battle of (1940) 26 5 National Democratic Party (ND)

200- i, 203, 204-5, 206, 210-1, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224-5, 250, 232, 236-7, 243, 246, 248, 265, 279

National Radical Camp (ONR) 246 Nazi occupation of Poland 257-63 Netherlands (Austrian) т28 Netherlands (Dutch Republic) 1 1 5 Neuburg, Philip Wilhelm, duke of (1615-90)100 Nicholas I, tsar of Russia (1825-55) and king of Poland (1 825-31) I55-4, I59, l6l, 170, 172

Nicholas II, tsar of Russia (r X94- 19 1 7) 202, 2.04, 219 Nicmojowski brothers, Winccnry (1 "N4- j 8 ^4) and Bonawentura (178"-18 3 s) 152 Nieszawa, Privilege of (1454) 63 'Nihil Novi', Statute of (1 505) 64 Nijinsky, Vaslav (Nizyhski, Waclaw)

(i888-1950) 191 Nixon, Richard, US president (1913-94)305 NKVD, Soviet security police 256, 275, 282

Non-Party Block of Co-operation with the Government (BBWR) 243,

244

North Atlantic Treat} Organisation (NATO) 323, 329, 331, 337 Norwid, Cyprian (1821—83) 164 Novosiltsev, Nikolay (1761-1 836) 152, ¹ 53

Nowa I Inta 28-

Nowak Jezioranski, Jan (1914-2005)

293

Nuremberg 65, 67, -3 Nvstad, peace of(172 1) 10^

Ochab, Edward (1906-89) 295-6 Ode, second wife to Mieszko I (d. 1023)

6

Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) Lane 278, 284, 29 3, 3 28, 3 50 Odessa 1 3^-

Ogodei, Mongol Khan (1 227-4 1)18 Oku lieki, Leopold (1898-1 946? 1275 Oliva (Oliwa) , peace ot f 1660) 98-9-104

Olympic Games (Rome i960) 299 Oprichnina 59

'organic work' [ргасл orgj///cc>u)

16--S, 1 86 Orsha, battle of the ( 1514) 57, 58 Orthodox Church 6, 9, 31-3. 39- 40,

41, 42, 5 5-6. 73, ”9, 80, 8 i, 86-8, 94,95, 100, 104, 106, i 1 5-6, 1 22, 137, 165, 183 Orzeszkowa, Eliza ( i S4 1 — 1 9 r o) i 86 Osdbka-Morawski, Edward (1904-i99”) ¹ -s

Ostashkov 329

Ostrdg (Ostnh), Academy of 8-Ostrogski, Konstanty, prince (1526-608)8^_

Ostrolęka, battle of (1831) 161 Ostrowski, Jozef (1850-1923) 219 Otto I, German Emperor (962-73)

50

Otto II, German Emperor (975-85) 6 Otto III, German Emperor (983-1002) 6, 8-9

Ottoman Empire see Turkey

Рас, Michael (1624-82) 105 Paderewski, Ignacy (1 8бо-1941) 191, 215-6, 221, 223, -4N - Š š Padlewski, Zygmunt (1855-63) 1 Palestine 249

Papacy 163, 183 (see j/so Vatican, and individual popes)

Paris Commune 118-1) 182 Party of Labour (SP) 265 Party of Realistic Politics 203, 204 Paskevich, Ivan (i ^_782-1 856) 161, 162,

172

Paul VI, pope (1963-^8) 504 Pavlyk, Mykhailo (1853-1915) 199 Pawel Wlodkowic (Paulus Vladimiri)

(c. 1370-1436) t’2 peasant emancipation (>tv jI<<> land reform, and Polish Peasant Partv [PSLD

in the duchy of Warsaw 143, 146 in Galicia 1 ^-1, 1 ^_2 in Russia and the western gnheniii 174

Penderecki, kr/.ys/tot (1 933 — ) 298

People's Army (Aid 265, 269. 272 Pcreiaslav, Union of (1 654) 96 Peter I 'the Great', tsar of Russia (i682-i725)1o^-,i09,i15 Peter I Mushat, hospodar of Moldavia (r. i 3^8-c. i 393) 38 Petliura, Symon (18^9-1926) 225 Philomats (Viloniaci), society of 1 5 3 Piarists, religious order mi, 123 Piasccki, Boleslaw (191 5-~9) 246 Piast. legendaig figure 3 Pilsudskį, Bronislaw (1 86u- 1918) 191

203-4, ²°5* ²°G 208, 217-8, 219, 221-2, 225, 229-30, 237, 240-4,

247

Pilrz, Erazm (1851-1929) 220 Piotrkow 65. 78 Pius XII, pope (1939-58) 290 Plock 19, 25, 26, 27, 37, 6.1 Ptowce, battle of (13 31) 26 Podlasie 80, 180

Podole (Podolia) 44, 105, 106, 1 16 Pokucie (Pokutija) 53 Polanovo, peace of (1634) 92 Polesie 179, 191-2 Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) 271-4 Polish Democratic Society (founded 1832) 165-6, 169-70 Polish exiles after 1945: 279-80,

297-8, 304, 307, 308 Polish kingdom (1916-18) 218-22 Polish insurrections:

(1830-31) 157, 159-62.

(1846) 169-70 (1863-4)178-81 Polish intelligence operations (1920) 229; (1939-45) 264, 292-4 Polish Peasant Party (PSL):

(until 1949) 201-2, 206, 223, 237, 245, 265, 274, 280, 284—5 (since 1990) 321, 322, 335 Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 198-9, 203-4, ²4C ²65^ 285-6 285 Polish Underground State (1940-44)

264-6, 269, 271-2, 275 Polish United Workers¹ Party (PZPR) 286, 295-7, 299, 302, 303,

312-13, 316-18, 320, 321 Polish Workers¹ Party (PPR) 268, 269, 275, 282, 284-6 Polotsk (Polock) 40, 59, 82, 91 Poltava, battle of (1709) 107 Polaniec, Proclamation of (1794) 131 Pomerania (Pomorze) 5, 7, 16, j8, 19, 20, 21, 23, 2 5, 27, 44, 224, 257, 278, 279 (see also Prussia, West) Poniatowski, Jozef (r 763-1813) 13 6, 141, 146

Poniatowski, Stanislaw August see

Stanislaw August Poniatowski, king of Poland (1764-9 5)

Popiel, legendary figure 3 Popiel, Wincenty (1825-1912) 204 Popiehiszko, Jerzy (1947-84) 314 Po prostH {journal) 295, 299 Posen see Poznan Positivism 186-7 Potocki, Alfred (1 786-1 862) 18 5 Potocki, Andrzej (1861-1908) 206 Potocki, family of 88 Potocki, Stanislaw Kostka (1752-1 821) 143, 152 Potsdam, conference (1945) ²7^

Poznan (Posen) 4, 24, 48, 60, 65 , 257, ²95

Poznania (and the duchy of Posen) 143, 147, 155, 167-8, 169, 172, 179, 183-4, 191-2, 193, 199,

21 o-11, 221, 224, 240 Praga, massacre of ( t 794) 13 т Prague 9, 20, 3 3

Prague, treaty of (1515) 55 Prazmowski, Nicholas (1617—73) ^T°5 Premysl Otakar II (1253-78), king of Bohemia 20, 22 Protestantism in Poland 73, 76-7,

83, 87, T04, 11 5-6, i 20-2, 216, 257 (see also Calvinism, Lutheranism)

Provisional Government of National Unity (1945-47) 274, 275, 278, 282-3

Prus, Boleslaw (1847-1912) 186, 200 Prussia: Ducal (‘eastern’) Prussia 48-50, 58, 60, 93, 98, 105 East (after 1772) Prussia 128, 155-6, 224

Hohenzollern kingdom (from 1701) 98, 112, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 131, 137, Г47, 170-1 medieval 48

Royal (‘Polish’) Prussia 48, 55, 68,

74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 93, 98, 104, 112, 11 5

West (after 1772) Prussia 147, 155-6, 183-4,²²4 Prussians, pagan tribe 9, 18, 22-3 Przemvsl 73

Przemysl II, duke of Wielkopolska, king of Poland (i 295-6) 19,20 Pugachev revolt 117 Pufawy 140

Putin, Vladimir (1952- ) 329

Raclawice, battle of (1794) 129-3 ¹ Raczkiewicz, Wladyslaw (1885-1947) 255, 269, 292, 294 Raczvhski, Edward (1891-1993) 294, 304, 313 Radio Free Europe 293, 294, 308 Radio Maryja 324 Radkiewicz, Stanislaw (1903-1987) 282, 294

Radnot (Iernut), treaty of (1656) 98 Radom 64

Radziwill (Radvilas), Lithuanian magnate family 51, 53, 88 Radziwill, Antom (1775-1833) 136, U55

Radziwill, Barbara (т 520-5 1)51 Radziwill, Boguslaw (1620-69) 98,

104

Radziwill, Mikolaj ‘the Red’ (1512-84) 55

railways 168, 188-9, ^r9²^ ^2IO-> ²33> ²₃8 Rakow i04

Rapallo, treaty of (1922) 23 8 Reagan, Ronald, LIS president (191L-2004)315 Rej, Mikolaj (1505-69) 72 Rejtan, Tadeusz (1742-80) 121, 122 Reval (Tallinn) 59

Revolutions: (1848-49) 170-2; (1905)

203-6

Revmont, Wladyslaw (1867-1925)

188,216 Riga 58, 59, 93 treaty of (1921) 230 Rokossovsky, Konstantin (1896-1968) 287, 297 Romania 232, 252, 253, 25 5 Romanticism in Poland 138, 150, 1 53, 157, 158, 163-4, ^r7²i ^r74’ i99-200 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, US

president (1882- 1945) 268, 274-5

Ropp, Edward (1851-1939) 205 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712-78) 125 Rowecki, Stefan (1895-1944) 264 Rudolf 1 of Habsburg (1273-91) L9,

20

Rus’ 5, 9, 22, 27-30, 32-3, 36, 39-40, 41, 42, 45, 48, 53, 55-6, 60, 69,

79, 80, 128 ( see also Belarus, Kiev, Ukraine)

Russia 40, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59-60, 64,

76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85, 91-3,

94, 96-100, 104, 106-10, 112-22,

123-4, ^I25> ¹²7^-3²’ -Пб, 140-1, L47, l50, 153, 173-4, 218, 219, 224, 329-30, 3 39

Bolshevik Russia (1917-22) 224, 225,229-30,231 {see also USSR) Rvdz-Smigly, Edward (1886-1941) 247-8

Salin, peace of (1398) 45 Salomea of Berg (c 1099-1 144) n Sanacja (post-1926 political regime) 241-2, 247-8, 249-50 Sandomierz 10, 11,14, 18, 19,21,25,

3 3-4 ‘rokosz’ of 88 Sapieha (Sapiega), Lithuanian family 105, 107

Saxony 48, 50, 76, 106-10, 112, 116, 126, 127, 143 Scheibler, Karl Wilhelm (1820-88 1)

188

Schroeder, Gerhard (1944- ) 33 3

Schulz, Bruno (1892-1942) 236 Sccckt, Hans von (1866-1936) 238 Sejm (Polish parliament) 62, 64, 65, 68, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79-80, 81,

83 — 5, 86, 87, 90-1, 93, 94, 96,

100, 104-5, 109, 115, 116, 120-2,

124-7, 129, 131, 143, 151, 152, 153-4, 159, 161, 162, 223, 237, 240, 242-4, 247, 286-7, 285-6

sejmiki 61-2, 63, 75, 79, 81, 84-5, 90, 107, 109

Self-Defence (Samoobrona) 336, 340 Serwin-Oracki, Mieczyslaw (1912-77) 289

Sforza, Bona (1494-1557) 64-5, 73

Sforza, Gian Galeazzo, duke of Milan (1476-94)64 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei (Szeptvcki,

Roman) {1865-1944) 249 Shevchenko, Taras (1814-61) 194 Siberia 180, 191, 256 Sicinski, Wladyslaw (1615-72) 90 Sicz (Sich) 93

Sieciech, palarinus (fl. c. 1095) ¹⁰ Siemomysl, pagan ruler of Polish tribes (d. c. 960) 5 Siemowit, tenth-century pagan ruler of Polish tribes 5 Sienicki, family of 76 Sienkiewicz, Henryk (1 846-19г6)

199-200, 2 r 6 Sieradz т9, 25, 5 5 Sigismund, King of Hungary

(i 387-1437); king of Bohemia (1419-37); Holy Roman Hmperor (141 r —37) 36-7,44,45 Sigismund (Zygmunt) I The Old', king of Poland (i 506-48) 50, 53, 55, 56-8, 60, 61, 62, 64-5, 68, 71, 73, 75

Sigismund II Augustus, king of Poland (1548-72) 54, 55, 58-60, 62, 65, 68, 75, 76, 77-82, 91, 93 Sigismund III Vasa, king of Poland (1587-1632) 84, 88, 90, 92, 93 Sigismund Casimir, prince (1640-47)

96

Sikorski, Wladyslaw (1881-1943) 256, 248, 255, 263, 264, 266-7, 268 Silesia (Sląsk) 5, 7, 11, 14-6, 1 8, 24, 25, 27, 36, 44, 5 i, 76, 77, 98, 112,

128, 155, 172, 1 87, 278-9, 3 3 3;

Upper Silesia 156, 184, 199, 201,

224, 23 i, 258, 257, 303, 310 Sinope 93

Skarga, Piotr (1 536-1 612) Skfodowska-Curie, Maria (1867-1954)

1 83, 190 Skrzynecki, Jan (1786-1 860) 1 6 1 Skrzynski, Aleksander (1882-1931)

240

Skuhiszewski, Krzysztof (1926- ) 325,

3 3°

Slawek, Walery (1879-1959) 243-4

Slawoj-Skladkowski, Felicjan (1885-i962)248 Slomka, Jan (1842- 1 927) 194 Slovakia 7, 252, 352 Slowacki, Juliusz (i 809-49) 158, 163,

¹⁷¹

Smolensk 56-8,92, 100, 120 Smosarska, Jadwiga (1900-71) 24 3 Smotritskii, Meletii (c. 1577-1635) 88 Sobieski, Jan see John III Sobieski Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) 198

Socialism 198-9 see also Polish Socialist Party (PPS) socialist realism {socrealizm) 289-90,

Sokorski, Wlodzimierz (1908-99) 290 Solidarity [Solidarnošč) 310-4, 5 L6-7, 320-1, 354\ see also Llectoral Action Solidarity (AWS)

Solski, Ludwik (1855-1954) 214 Sorbs 8

Sosabowski, Stanislaw (1892-1967)

269

Sosnkowski, Kazimierz (1895-Г969) 230, 268, 269 Spam 122, 143, 250, 299 St Petersburg 1 ro, 115, 120, 123, 1 28, i 3 t - 2

Conventions of (1772, First Partition) 120; (1795, Second Partition) 1 28; (1795, Third Partition) 151 Stalin, Joseph (1879-1953) 242,

248-9, 25 i, 253, 256, 266-7, 269, 271, 272, 275-5, -78, 286, 290, 292

Stalowa Wola 250

Stanislaw, bishop of Krakow and saint [d. 1078) 9-10, 19 Stanislaw August Poniatowski, king of Poland (1764-95) 115-6, 117,

120, 123, 124, 125-6, 128, 151, t 4 2

Stanislaw Leszczyhski, king of Poland (1704-10, 1753-5) 107, 109-1 i Stapihski, Jan (1 867-1946) 202 Starobelsk 529

Staszic, Stanislaw (1755-1 826) 1 so,

154

Stefan Batory, king of Poland (i 576-86) 88, 9 г - 2, 93 Stephen III ‘the Great’, hospodar of Moldavia (1457-1 504) 52-3 Stockholm, treaty of (1667) 104 Stojatowski, Stanislaw (1 845 -1911)

201

Stoss, Veit (Wit Stwosz), of Nuremberg (d. 1533)65,67 Stresemann, Gustav {1878-1929) 238 Strzelecki, (Sir) Paul Kdtnund

(■797-1873) i66 Suęeava 55

Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66) 53 Suvorov, Alexander (1729-1 800) 13 1 Sviatopolk ‘the Accursed’, Grand Prince of Kiev (1015-19) 7 Sweden 59, 60, 85, 93, 98-9, 104,

107-8, t 1 o, i 24, 338 Sword, Knights of the 23, 45, 58, 59 Szczecin (Stettin) 278, 303 Szczekociny, battle of (1794) 1 29 Szujski, Jozef (183 5 — 83) 186 Szymanowski, Karol (1883-1937) 216

Šeiegienny, Piotr (1 800-90) 169 Swiatlo, Jozef (1905-75) 294 Swidwa, Piotr, castellan of Poznan (fl. c. 1460) 48 Swiytochowski, Aleksander {i849-1938) 186 Svvinka, Jakub, archbishop of Gniezno (d. 1314) 16, 19,21

Šliupas, Jonas (1861-1945) 195

Tamerlane (Timur i l.eng, Turkie-

Mongol emperor, 1 570-1405) 45 Tannenberg (Grunwald), battle of (1410) 45, 212 Targowica, Confederacy of (1792-5) i 28, 161

Tarnogrod, Confederacy of (1715-1 6)

108

Tarnowski, Stanislaw (1857-1917) 1 86 Tatars see Crimean Tatars Te/ew (Dirschau) 22

Teheran, conference of (1945) 268 Teschen (Cieszyn, Tesin) 221, 231, 232, 2.5^ 33^z

Teutonic Knights, religious military Grder 18, 22-3, 24, 25-6, 27, 50, 32, 34, 58. 39, 40, 41, 44, 45-8, 50, 52, 58, 63, 72, 155, 5 i 5 Thorn see Torun Tilsit, treaty of (1807) 141 Tito, Josip (1892-1980) 286 Torun (Thorn) 48, 68, 115, 124, 147,

¹ 5 5

Thorn, peace of (1466) 48, 50, 52 Trakai (Troki) 38 Transylvania 22, 55, 98 Traugutt, Romuald (1826-64) 179-80 Trebizond 93

Treblinka, extermination camp 260 Trembecki, Stanislaw (1740-1812) 123 Tribunals, of the Crown and Lithuania

8 5

‘tri-loyalism’ 1 86

Tukhaehevsky, Mikhail (1893-1937) 225

Turkey 51, 52-3, 55, 60, 85, 92, 93-4, 96, 105, 106, i 1 2, 11 5, i 17, 1 23,

124, i2^

Tusk, Donald (1957- ) 339, 340

Tutora (Cecora), battle of (1 620) 92 Tuvvim, Julian (1894-1953) 236, 245 Tygodmk f?ou’szechny (Catholic weekly) 292

Ukraine and Ukrainians (see also Rus’; Cossacks; western gubernii of the Russian empire) 54, 77, 86-8, 93-6, 98, 99-100, 101, 105, 106, 128, .137, 156, i7i, i72, 179, 185, 191, 193, 194, 199, 201, 206, 220, 223,224,225,233,238,241-2, 249,256,263,281,284,325,329, 330-1,332-3,339 Ula, battle of rhe (1565) 39 Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church 87-8, 100, i 27, 137, i 65, 183, 249 Union of Labour (UP) 33 5 United Peasant Party (ZSL) 283, 3 18 United States of America 1 29, 1 89, 274, 278, 297, 304-3, 337

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1922-91; sec also Russia) 247, 25 i, 253, 256-7,

265-8, 274-5, 278, 295, 296, 303, 306, 3 i j, 312, 316, 318, 325, 530

Vaclav II, king of Bohemia and later Poland (t300-05) 20, 21-2, 24,

27, 36

Vaclav III, king of Bohemia (1305-6)

22, 24, 27 Valmy, battle of (1792) т 28 Varna, battle of (1444) 51, 153 Vatican 238, 290, 324 (see also Papacy) Venice 5, 23, 96

Versailles, peace conference and treaty (1919) ²²4* ²381 255» ²74 Viazma 60 Vienna

congress and treaties (1814-15) 147-50, 161, 162, 274 Preliminaries of (т73 5) in siege of (1683) 106, 201, 229, 314 Vilnius (Wilno, Vilna) 38, 39, 41-2, 45, 53, 56, 77, 79, 80, 98, 122, T23, 129, 205, 215, 225, 23 т, 249, 256, 268, 279, 298, 331 Privilege of (1563) 79 unions of (1401, 1499) 41-2 Wilno university and educational district (1803-32) T40, 153, 163 Vincent, bishop of Krakow, Polish chronicler (fl. c. 1 200; known as ‘Kadlubek’) 3, 9-10, 19 Vladimir (Wiodzimierz) 27-30 Volhynia (Woiyh) 44, 80, 24т, 263 Vorskla river, battle of (1399) 45 Vvkhovskyi, Ivan (d. 1664) 99-тоо Vytautas (Witold), grand duke of Lithuania (1392— Г430) 38, 39, 40—1, 44—5, 48, 55-6, 60

Waclaw (1313-36), duke of Plock 26 Wajda, Andrzej (1926- ) т 88, 290,

298

Walysa, Lech (1945— ) 309—т т,

313-14, 3 i6-t8, 320, 321, 322,

33²

Wallachia 52, 92

Wankowicz, Melchior (1892-1974)

299

Wankowicz, Walenty (1799-1842)

158

Warka, Statute of (1423) 68 Warmia (Krmeland) 48-50 Warsaw (Warszawa) 44, 54, 83, 98,

106, in, 112, 116, 123, 127, 1 29, 131, i 38, 151, 157, 175-7, 189,

21 1 — 12, 255, 274, 29O, 292 battle of (1920) 229 Confederacy of (1 573) 83, 104 duchy of (i807-15)141-6, 150 ghetto 261 Pact 323, 328, 329 royal castle 95, 304 Treaty of (1716) 109 Uprising (1944) 2.71-3^ 333 Wartheland 257

Waryhski, Ludwik (1856-89} г98 Wasilewska, Wanda (1905-64) 268 Wazvk, Adam (1905-82) 29 5 Wehlau, treaty of (1657) 98 Wends 8

western gubernii of the Russian empire (1795-1918) 136-7, 140, 146, 153, 161, 163, 165, тбб, 170, 175, 178, 183, 191, 194-5, 205-6, 2 10 {see also Belarus; Lithuania; Ukraine)

Wevgand, Maxime (1867-1965) 229 Wieliczka 32

Wielopolski, Aleksander (1 803-77)

*75* *77“^ ¹79-. 2.04 Wilanow, palace of 106 Wilhelm of Habsburg (1570-1406) 37 Wilno see Vilnius Wilson, Woodrow, US president (1856-1924)221 Wisniowiecki, family of 88 Wisniowiecki, Jarema (1612-51) 105 Witkiewicz, Stanisiaw Ignacy

LWitkacy¹) (1885-1939) 236,

246

Witold see Vytautas

Witos, Wincenty (1 874-1945) 206,

223, 229, 237, 240, 244, 248 Wittelsbach, family of 26-^

Wien (Lahn) 1 5

Wladyslaw, duke of Opole (1356-1401)44 Wladyslaw 1 Lokietek ‘the Short’, king of Poland (1 306-33) 19, 20-2, 23-6, 38 Wladyslaw II Jagiello see Jagiello Wladyslaw III ‘of Varna’, king of Poland (1434—44) 44> 50-¹, 61, 153 Wladyslaw IV, king of Poland

(1632-48) 84, 88, 92, 93, 95-6 Wladyslaw Wygnaniec ‘the Exile’, duke in Poland (1138-46, d. 1159) 1 1 Wladyslaw/Vladislav II/ Ulaszlo II, king of Bohemia (1471-1516) and Hungary (1490-1 516) 51, 5 5 Wlodzimierz see Vladimir Wodzislaw Herman, prince of Poland (1079-1100)10 Wojcieehowski, Stanislaw (1869-1953) 236, 240, 241 Wojtyla, Karol see John Paul II, pope Wroclaw (Breslau) 1 5, 19, 279, 313 Wybicki, Jozef (1747-J 822) 123, 139, t₄i

Wyslouch, Boleslaw (1855-1937) and Maria (1858-1905) 202 Wvspianski, Stanislaw (1869-1907) 207-8, 209 Wyszynski, Stefan (1901-81) 292, 297, 300, 301, 308-9, 312

Yad Vashem Institute (in Israel) 261 Yalta, conference (1945) 274-5, 3^Z9 Yaroslav the Wise, Grand Prince of Kiev

(1019-54)V ~7

Yatwings (Jadz.wingowie), pagan tribe 18

Zablocki, Klemcnt (191 2-83) 305 Zajączek, Jozef (1752-1826) 151 Zaleski, August (1 883-1972) 294,

3°4 Zambia 301 Zamosc 89, 229

Zamoyski, Andrzej (1 800-74) ^J 73^

174, 177, 178 Zamoyski, Jan (1542-1605) 89, 91 Zamoyski, Maurycy (1 871 -1939) 220 Zapolva, John (1487-1 540) 5 5 Zapolva, John Sigismund (r 540-71)

5 5

Zbigniew, son of Wodzislaw Herman

(d. i 111) TO

Zborowski, Samuel (d. 1583) 88 Ziemowit III, duke of Mazowsze (1341-70)27 Ziemowit IV, duke of Plock (1381-1426) 37 Zionism 197, 236, 249, 301 {see also Jews)

Zlotoryja 15

Zollner, Ernst von, Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights (1382-90) 38 Zubov, Platon (1767-1822) 128

Žeromskį, Stefan (1864-1925) 216 Zoikiewski, Stanislaw (1547-1620) 92 Zorawski, Stanislaw (1 863-193 5) 207 Zurawno (Zhuravno), treaty of (1676)

105

Žemaitija (Žmudž, Samogitia) 38, 45, 48