Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

the deaths of perhaps three hundred thousand Japanese: See Frank, Downfall, pp. 325–26.

killed almost as many Russians as the Nazis had: The actual number killed by Hitler and Stalin remains a subject of debate. Both men were responsible for many millions of deaths. Dmitri Volkogonov, a scholar who gained access to Soviet archives, claimed that Stalin killed about twelve million Russians — not including those who died during the Second World War. According to the historian Timothy Snyder, the Nazis deliberately killed about twelve million civilians, while the Soviets killed about nine million during Stalin’s years in power. The historian Anne Applebaum has argued that Snyder’s estimates for Stalin seem too low, noting “Soviet citizens were just as likely to die during the war years because of decisions made by Stalin, or because of the interaction between Stalin and Hitler, as they were from the commands of Hitler alone.” See Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988), p. 524; Anne Applebaum, “The Worst of the Madness,” New York Review of Books, November 11, 2010; and Timothy Snyder, “Hitler vs. Stalin: Who Killed More?” New York Review of Books, March 10, 2011.

“a militaristic oligarchy”: Quoted in Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 100.

The president was given the sole authority: The historian Garry Wills has argued that the decision to give this unchecked power to the executive branch had a lasting and profound effect on American democracy. See Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (New York: Penguin Press, 2010). For the constitutional and legal basis for such power, see Frank Klotz, Jr., “The President and the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in David C. Kozak and Kenneth N. Ciboski, eds., The American Presidency: A Policy Perspective from Readings and Documents (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1987), pp. 47–58.

“We are here to make a choice”: For the full text of Bernard Baruch’s remarks, see “Baruch Reviews Portent of A-Bomb,” Washington Post, June 15, 1946.

“all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous”: Ibid.

willing to hand over its “winning weapons”: Ibid.

The number of soldiers in the U.S. Army: In August 1945 the Army had more than 8 million soldiers and by July 1, 1947, it had only 989,664—a remarkably swift dismantling of a victorious military force. See John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 139, 263.

from almost 80,000 to fewer than 25,000: See Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume 1, 1907–1950 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), p. 378.

only one fifth of those planes: Ibid.

the defense budget was cut by almost 90 percent: The United States spent about $83 billion on defense in 1945—and about $9 billion in 1948. Cited in “National Defense Budget Estimates for FYH 2013,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2012, p. 246.

“No major strategic threat or requirement”: Quoted in Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), p. 78.

the Soviets were “fanatically” committed to destroying: Kennan’s quotes come from his famous “long telegram,” whose full text can be found at “The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” February 22, 1946 (SECRET/declassified), in United States State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946, Volume 6, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 696–709.

an “iron curtain”: For the speech in which Churchill first used that phrase, see “Text of Churchill’s Address at Westminister College,” Washington Post, March 6, 1946.

“terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio”: For Truman’s speech, see “Text of President’s Speech on New Foreign Policy,” New York Times, March 13, 1947.

the Pentagon did not have a war plan: The first major study of potential targets in the Soviet Union was conducted in the summer of 1947. For America’s lack of war plans, see L. Wainstein, C. D. Creamans, J. K. Moriarity, and J. Ponturo, “The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945–1972,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Study S-467, June 1975 (TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), pp. 11–14; Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas W. Wolfe, “History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945–1972,” Pt. 1, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, March 1981 (TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), pp. 21–22; and James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy; Volume 1, 1945–1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 70–75.