Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

a Snark that was supposed to fly no farther than Puerto Rico: For the story of the runaway missile, see J. P. Anderson, “The Day They Lost the Snark,” Air Force Magazine, December 2004, pp. 78–80.

The Army’s Redstone missile: Although its range was short, the missile was so reliable that it was used by NASA to launch America’s first astronaut into space. See “History of the Redstone Missile System,” John W. Bullard, Historical Division, Army Missile Command, AMC 23 M, October 15, 1965.

Launched from NATO bases in West Germany: Bob Peurifoy told me about the mismatch between the yield of the Redstone’s warhead and the distance that it could fly.

It would take at least fifteen minutes to launch any of the missiles: For the technical and operational details of the Thor, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 109–12.

as much as two days to complete its mission: Ibid., p. 111.

useful for a surprise attack: For an excellent summary of the inherent flaws of Thor and Jupiter missiles, the intermediate-range missiles that the United States shared with its NATO allies, see Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1997), pp. 80–85.

the Atlas missile loomed as America’s great hope: For the definitive account of the Atlas program, cowritten by one of its managers, see Chuck Walker, with Joel Powell, ATLAS: The Ultimate Weapon by Those Who Built It (Ontario, Canada: Apogee Books Production, 2005).

a “fire waiting to happen”: For the dangers of the Atlas and Titan propellants, see Charlie Simpson, “LOX and RP1—Fire Waiting to Happen,” Association of Air Force Missileers Newsletter, vol. 14, no. 3 (September 3, 2006). Colonel Simpson is the executive director of the Association of Air Force and worked with Titan I missiles.

a temperature of -297 degrees Fahrenheit: Cited in Walker, ATLAS, Appendix D, p. 281.

the odds of an Atlas missile hitting a target … no better than fifty-fifty: The estimate was sheepishly offered by Major General Thomas P. Gerrity, Commander, Ballistic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command. Another officer optimistically predicted that the reliability of the Atlas would reach 85 percent. Instead, all of the missiles were deactivated and removed from service within a few years. For the reliability estimates, see “Missile Procurement, Air Force,” pp. 529–30.

General Thomas Power: … thought the odds were closer to zero: See Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945–1960, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), p. 216.

During a test run of the first Titan silo: For more details of the accident, see Stumpf, Titan II, pp. 23–26.

about 170,000 pounds of liquid oxygen and fuel: The missile was fully loaded with propellants.

Donald Quarles was one of the leading skeptics: A few months before his death, Quarles was strongly attacked by the columnist Joseph Alsop for opposing new missile programs and allowing the United States to fall behind the Soviets. See Joseph Alsop, “Mister Missile Gap,” Washington Post, April 24, 1959.

how to bring the warhead close to its target: My description of ballistic missile guidance systems is based on a fine magazine article published more than half a century ago, Maya Pines, “The Magic Carpet of Inertial Guidance,” Harper’s, March 1962; a training manual for Titan II launch officers, “Missile Launch/Missile Officer (LGM-25): Missile Systems,” Student Study Guide 3OBR1821F/3121F-V1 through 4, Volume I of II, Department of Missile and Space Training, Sheppard Technical Training Center, September 1968; and an extraordinary book about how missiles hit their targets, Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

burned for only the first five minutes of flight: During the booster phase, the first-stage engine of the Titan II fired for about 165 seconds; during the sustainer phase, the second-stage engine fired for about 125 seconds; and during the Vernier Stage, the two small solid propellant engines fired for about 10 seconds. See “Missile Launch/Missile Officer (LGM-25),” p. 3.

about 80 percent of the warheads within roughly a mile of their targets: Cited in MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, p. 122.

a leading role in the miniaturization of computers: See ibid., pp. 159–61, 206–7; Edwards, Closed World, pp. 63–65.