Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

“less than enthusiastic about requiring more safety”: See “Memo, Conceptual Study of Super-Safety,” Colonel Richard H. Parker, United States Air Force, Assistant Director for Research and Development, Division of Military Application, May 14, 1968, in “Project Crescent,” p. 101.

“We are living on borrowed time”: Peurifoy interview.

Peurifoy and Fowler went to Washington: See Stevens, “Origins and Evolution of S2C,” pp. 115–16.

The “Fowler Letter”: “To Major General Ernest Graves, Assistant General Manager for Military Application, Division of Military Application, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, From G. A. Fowler, Vice President, Systems, Sandia Laboratories, Subject: Safety of Aircraft Delivered Nuclear Weapons Now in Stockpile,” November 15, 1974 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified).

PART FIVE: DAMASCUS

Balanced and Unbalanced

James L. “Skip” Rutherford III was working: Interview with Skip Rutherford.

“It’s about the Titan missiles”: Ibid.

The missiles were old, the airmen said: I spoke to one of the airmen, who preferred to remain anonymous, and he confirmed Rutherford’s account.

Pryor was disturbed by the information: Interview with David H. Pryor.

other members of Congress were concerned: Dan Glickman spoke to me about his efforts to retire the Titan II. I’m glad that he saved a copy of the Damascus accident report and donated it to Wichita State University, along with his other congressional papers.

At Launch Complex 533-7, about an hour southeast of Wichita: My description of the accident in Rock, Kansas, is based principally on “Report of Missile Accident Investigation: Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7, Assigned to 381st Strategic Missile Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas,” conducted at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, September 22–October 10, 1978. Albert A. Kamas, a Wichita attorney who represented a number of people hurt in the accident, not only shared his memory of the event but also sent me documents, newspaper clippings, and videotaped local news accounts of it. Julie Charlip, who covered the story for the Wichita Eagle, graciously shared her reporting on it. And Colonel Ben G. Scallorn, who headed the accident investigation, discussed its findings with me.

Malinger had never been inside a Titan II silo before: See David Goodwin, “Victim of AF Missile Accident Wanted Only to Be a Mechanic,” Wichita Eagle, January 18, 1979.

“Oh my God, the poppet”: “Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7,” affidavit of Charles B. Frost, Second Lieutenant, Tab U-4, page 3.

“What was the poppet”: Ibid.

“Get out of here, let’s get out”: Quoted in ibid.

“Where are you?”: Ibid.

“Come back to the control center”: Ibid.

“I can’t see”: Quoted in ibid., affidavit of Richard I. Bacon, Jr., Second Lieutenant, Tab U-7.

“Hey, I smell Clorox”: Quoted in ibid., Frost affidavit, Tab U-4, p. 3.

quickly registered one to three parts per million: Cited in ibid., p. 5.

“My God, help us, help us, we need help”: Quoted in ibid., p. 4.

“Hey, door eight is locked”: Ibid.

“Hey, you guys, get out of here”: Ibid., p. 5.

“Come help me”: Quoted in ibid.

“This is three-seven…. The locks are on the safe”: Ibid.

“Where’s the dep, where’s the dep?”: Quoted in ibid.

“We’ll get him later”: Ibid.

“My God, please help me”: Quoted in ibid., Affidavit of Keith E. Matthews, First Lieutenant, Tab U-3, p. 4.

“Get them under the fire hydrant”: Ibid., p. 5.

Jackson … climbed the ladder all the way to the bottom in his RFHCO: It was clearly possible to wear a RFHCO and enter the escape hatch. “Airman Jackson changed helmets,” the report said, “and went to the bottom of the air intake shaft (escape hatch) but could not find the entry to the control center.” Jackson had never been in it before and climbed down until reaching a pool of water at the very bottom. The darkness and the cloud of oxidizer — not the size of the shaft or the escape hatch — prevented him from getting into the control center. The quote is from page 8 of the report. See also the affidavit of John C. Mock, Jr., technical sergeant, Tab U-25, pp. 1–2. Mock was a PTS team chief and supervisor, but he’d never gone down the escape hatch, either.

Someone hadn’t put a filter inside the oxidizer line: See “Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7,” p. 10.

someone may have deliberately omitted the filter: According to Jeff Kennedy, oxidizer would flow more quickly without the filter, and the job could be completed in less time. Some PTS crews were willing to break the rules. But if you wanted to cut corners and not get caught, you also had to remove the O-ring. Otherwise it might clog the line and cause a leak — like it did during the Rock, Kansas, accident. Kennedy interview. See also Julie Charlip, “Missile Workers a Special Breed,” Wichita Eagle, May 31, 1981.