Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

The system had already proven unreliable: For the growing problems with the WWMCCS, see “Worldwide Military Command and Control System: Historical Perspective,” pp. 93–112; and the chapter entitled “Three WWMCCS Failures,” in David Pearson, The World Wide Military Command and Control System: Evolution and Effectiveness (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000), pp. 71–92.

“A more accurate appraisal”: Quoted in Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control,” p. 432.

“confused and frightened men making decisions”: May et al., “History of the Strategic Arms Competition, Part 2, p. 607.

Nixon tried to end the Vietnam War by threatening the use of nuclear weapons: The details of this risky and unsuccessful plan can be found in Scott D. Sagan and J. Suri, “The Madman Nuclear Alert,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 4 (2003), pp. 150–83.

“I call it the Madman Theory, Bob”: Quoted in ibid., p. 156.

nuclear weapons were once again utilized as a diplomatic tool: For the DEFCON 3 alert in 1973, see Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security, vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 122–31.

the administration’s bold diplomacy: The DEFCON 3 alert was part of a complex strategy aimed not only at the Soviet Union but also at the leadership of Egypt and Israel. Kissinger was pleased by the outcome, noting in his memoirs that “we had emerged as the pivotal factor in the diplomacy.” See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 612.

“What seems ‘balanced’ and ‘safe’ in a crisis”: Quoted in Sagan, “Alerts and Crisis Management,” p. 124.

He argued against the adoption of a launch-on-warning policy: Iklé’s opposition to launching missiles quickly was part of a larger critique of American strategic policy. See Fred Charles Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?” Foreign Affairs, January 1973, pp. 267–85.

“Launching the ICBM force on attack assessment”: “The U.S. ICBM Force: Current Issues and Future Options,” C. H. Builder, D. C. Kephart, and A. Laupa, a report prepared for United States Air Force Project RAND, R-1754-PR, October 1975 (SECRET/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), NSA, p. 81.

“accident-prone”: See “Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, Subject, SALT (and Angola), December 22, 1975” (TOP SECRETSENSITIVEdeclassified), NSA, p. 9.

“the Soviets must never be able to calculate”: Ibid., p. 9.

“It is not to our disadvantage”: Ibid.

a military aide carrying the “football”: The contents of the president’s football were described in Bill Gulley, with Mary Ellen Reese, Breaking Cover: The Former Director of the White House Military Office Reveals the Shocking Abuse of Resources and Power That Has Been the Custom in the Last Four Administrations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980). Despite its lurid subtitle, the book probably offers the most accurate description of the football at the time.

“any emergency order coming from the president”: See Carroll, House of War, p. 354–56. The quote is on page 355. For concerns about Nixon’s finger on the button, see also Janne E. Nolan’s fine book, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: New Republic Book, 1989), pp. 122–23. A number of the Joint Chiefs thought Schlesinger’s remark was a warning that Nixon might attempt a coup d’état. See Mark Perry, Four Stars: The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America’s Civilian Leaders (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 257–59.

The Wrong Tape

General William E. Odom, attended briefings on the SIOP: For his effort to change America’s nuclear plans, see William E. Odom, “The Origins and Design of Presidential Decision-59: A Memoir,” in Sokolski, Getting Mad, pp. 175–96.

“Limited Nuclear Options” and “Regional Nuclear Options”: Ibid., pp. 176–77.

“At times I simply could not believe”: Ibid., pp. 180, 183.

“absurd and irresponsible”: Ibid., p. 194.

“the height of folly”: Ibid.

The SIOP now called for the Soviet Union to be hit with about ten thousand nuclear weapons: See “Retaliatory Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, June 1978, p. 6.

“Things would just cease in their world”: Sokolski, Getting Mad, p. 180.

Carter had met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and asked: See Carroll, House of War, pp. 362–64, and Thomas Powers, “Choosing a Strategy for World War III, Atlantic Monthly, November 1982.