Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

“It may not be important whether the immediate cause”: Ibid., Tab I-8, pp. 2–3.

the vapor detectors … were broken 40 percent of the time: Cited in “Titan II Review Group Report,” pp. 16, B–7, C-25.

the portable vapor detectors rarely worked: Ibid., pp. 17, B-8.

the radio system … was unreliable: Ibid., pp. B-8, B-9, C-29.

missile combat crews should be discouraged from evacuating: Ibid., pp. B-9, B-10.

the shortage of RFHCO suits often forced maintenance teams: Ibid., p. C-28.

the suits and helmets were obsolete: Ibid., pp. 17, C-40.

the air packs were obsolete: Ibid., p. C-40.

some of the missile’s spare parts were either hard to obtain: Ibid., p. C-35.

security police officers should always be provided with maps: Ibid., pp. E-73, E-74.

“modern safing features” should be added to the W-53 warhead: Ibid., p. D-4.

“modern nuclear safety criteria for abnormal environments”: Ibid.

a warning siren at every launch complex might be useful: Ibid., p. 33.

“potentially hazardous” … but “basically safe”: Ibid., p. 1.

“supportable now and in the foreseeable future”: Ibid., p. x.

Jeff Kennedy was angered by both of the reports: Kennedy interview.

guidance in the medical literature was scarce: One of the few good studies on the danger of the oxidizer happened to be published during the same week as the explosion at Launch Complex 374-7. It was written by Air Force physicians. See “The McConnell Missile Accident: Clinical Spectrum of Nitrogen Dioxide Exposure,” Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Yockey, MC, USAF; Major Billy M. Eden, MC, USAF; Colonel Richard B. Byrd, MC, USAF, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 244, no. 11 (September 12, 1980).

nobody from the Air Force would speak to him, for three days after the accident: Anderson later told Morley Safer, a correspondent for 60 Minutes, that the Air Force didn’t share information about how to treat victims of oxidizer exposure until “three or four days” after the Damascus accident. Anderson was interviewed for “Titan,” 60 Minutes, November 8, 1981.

“Do not operate the switch”: “Report, Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 374-7,” Statement of Michael A. Hanson, Tab U-30, p. 7.

Kennedy thought the report was wrong: Kennedy interview.

Powell … blamed himself for Livingston’s death: Powell interview.

Jeff Kennedy was served with a formal letter of reprimand: For the reprimands sent to Kennedy, see Richard C. Gross, “Titan Accident: Air Force Reprimand for Heroics,” United Press International, February 12, 1981; and Walter Pincus, “‘Hero’ of Titan II Missile Explosion Is Reprimanded by Air Force,” Washington Post, February 12, 1981.

Air Force regulations permitted a violation of the two-man rule: In fact, a SAC training video about the Titan II encouraged airmen to break the rule in certain situations. According to the narrator of the video: “Under normal operating conditions, a solitary individual is never allowed inside a no-lone zone. However, during an actual emergency, a lone individual may have to take action to save lives or equipment, if at all possible. If you are working near a no-lone zone and see an emergency in that zone, you will be expected to take action by yourself to save the critical component or other equipment from damage, if possible. Yes, your action will be in direct violation of the SAC two-man policy, and you will have to report it as such. However, your action — provided it is taken under an emergency condition — is expected and condoned.” This “exception” to the rule is explained in “Nuclear Surety Program, Initial Training, Part 1: History — An Overview,” Aerospace Audiovisual Service, U.S. Air Force (n.d.). The tape can be found in the archives of the Titan Missile Museum. According to the museum’s archivist and historian, Chuck Penson, the video was most likely recorded some time between 1976 and 1979.

David Powell was given an Article 15 citation: Powell wasn’t charged with using a ratchet instead of a torque wrench — because the socket fell off before the ratchet could be “used.” See Carol Griffee, “Airman at Silo Is Disciplined,” Arkansas Gazette, February 13, 1981.

placed in the psychiatric ward there — along with Greg Devlin: Kennedy and Devlin interviews.

Bill Carter was an Air Force veteran and a former Secret Service agent: Carter spoke to me at length about his dealings with the Air Force over its management of the Titan II missiles in Arkansas.

“a substance no more dangerous than smog”: Quoted in Bill Carter and Judi Turner, Get Carter: Backstage in History from JFK’s Assassination to the Rolling Stones (Nashville: Fine’s Creek Publishing, 2006), p. 208.

A few months later, at a ceremony in Little Rock: Kennedy, Devlin, and Sandaker interviews. See also Walter Pincus, “Eight Honored as Heroes in ’80 Titan Missile Blast,” Washington Post, May 23, 1981.