Command and Control

nuclear weapons solely for city busting: The quote is from Air Marshal Sir George Mills, who made clear in 1955 that the British much preferred destroying “morale targets”—Soviet cities, not air fields. “Our aim in retaliation,” Mills wrote, “is to hit him where it really hurts.” See Ken Young, “A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2007, pp. 5–31. The quotes are from pages 11 and 24.

three air bases, six air defense targets, and forty-eight cities: Cited in ibid., p. 27.

“unnecessary and undesirable overkill”: Quoted in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, p. 55.

enough “megatons to kill 4 and 5 times over”: Quoted in Ibid.

“just one whack — not ten whacks”: Quoted in ibid., p. 56.

“I believe that the presently developed SIOP”: “Annex: Extract from Memorandum for the President from the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960,” in “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Strategic Target Planning,” January 27, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 1913.

“a 100 percent pulverization of the Soviet Union”: Quoted in “Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 20, 1958” (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 5.

“There was obviously a limit”: Ibid., p. 5.

3,729 targets:… more than 1,000 ground zeros: Cited in “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Annex B, p. 2.

3,423 nuclear weapons: Ibid., p. 4.

About 80 percent were military targets: Cited in “SIOP-62 Briefing,” p. 50.

295 were in the Soviet Union and 78 in China: See “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Annex B, p. 2.

54 percent of the Soviet Union’s population and about 16 percent of China’s: See Ibid., Annex A, p. 2; Annex B, p. 12.

roughly 220 million people: The population of the Soviet Union was about 210 million at the time; the population of China about 682 million.

Eisenhower agreed to let high-ranking commanders decide: For the best account of how the military gained the authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, see Roman, “Ike’s Hair-Trigger,” pp. 121–164.

“something foolish down the chain of command”: Quoted in ibid., p. 156.

“very fearful of having written papers on this matter”: The quote is a paraphrase by the author of the memo and can be found in “Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 27, 1958,” A. J. Goodpaster (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 3.

“It is in the U.S. interest to maintain”: The quote is a paraphrase by the author of the memo and can be found in “Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 19, 1958,” John S. D. Eisenhower (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p.1.

Breaking In

Colonel John T. Moser and his wife: Interview with Colonel John T. Moser.

The two had to rendezvous at a precise location: For the details of this tricky but essential procedure, see Richard K. Smith, Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refueling: Highlights, 1923–1998 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 38–9.

Leavitt made it clear: Interview with General Lloyd R. Leavitt.

Of the 119 West Pointers who graduated from flight school: Cited in Lloyd R. Leavitt, Following the Flag: An Air Force Officer Provides an Eyewitness View of Major Events and Policies During the Cold War (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2010), p. 57.

“Landing the U-2,” Leavitt wrote: Ibid., p. 175.

Of the thirty-eight U-2 pilots… eight died flying the plane: See ibid., p. 185.

“ordered everyone to evacuate the control center”: Moser interview.

When Ben Scallorn first reported to Little Rock: Interview with Colonel Ben G. Scallorn.

4.5 million pounds of steel: About 2,255 tons of steel were used. Cited in Stumpf, Titan II, p. 112.

30 million pounds of concrete: About 7,240 cubic yards of concrete were used — and a cubic yard of concrete weighs about two tons. Cited in ibid.

a management practice known as “concurrency”: The great advantage of concurrency was that it allowed new weapon systems to be developed quickly; the main disadvantage was that those weapons tended to be unreliable and often didn’t work. See Stephen Johnson, The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation: 1945–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002), pp. 19–22, 89–94.

one of the largest construction projects ever undertaken by the Department of Defense: For details of how the silos and launch complexes were built, see Joe Alex Morris, “Eighteen Angry Men: The Hard-Driving Colonels Who Work Against Crucial Deadlines to Ready Our Missile Launching Sites,” Saturday Evening Post, January 13, 1962; John C. Lonnquest and David F. Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Legacy Resource Management Program, Cold War Project, 1996), pp. 77–88; and Stumpf, Titan II, pp. 99–127.