Command and Control

“My dissenting opinion will be brief”: The cartoonist was Sidney Harris and the cartoon originally appeared in Playboy, March 1972, p. 208.

During the late 1960s, Stevens had begun to worry: Stevens interview.

Nozzles on the walls: The system was called the “sticky foam personnel barrier.” In addition to sticky foam, other “active barriers” were considered as a means of protecting nuclear weapons, including cold smoke, aqueous foam, and rigid foam. For a comparison of these active barriers and their merits, see “An Activated Barrier for Protection of Special Nuclear Materials in Vital Areas,” Ronald E. Timm, James E. Miranda, Donald L. Reigle, and Anthony D. Valente, Argonne National Laboratory, 1984.

Stan Spray found that one of the bomb’s internal cables: Peurifoy and Stevens interviews.

“base escape”: How long a B-52’s engines took to start was one of the most important determinants of whether the plane would get into the air before Soviet missiles arrived — or get destroyed on the ground. For some of the other factors, see “Nuclear Hardness and Base Escape,” Rayford P. Patrick, Engineering Report No. S-112, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Directorate of Aircraft Maintenance, March 31, 1981.

“our B-52s are planned for one-way missions”: See “Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, Subject, SALT (and Angola), December 22, 1975” (TOP SECRETSENSITIVEdeclassified), NSA, p. 5.

A study of all the nuclear weapons in the American arsenal: A portion of the study has been declassified, and I’ve filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain the rest of it: “An Examination of the U.S. Nuclear Weapon Inventory,” R. N. Brodie, November 30, 1977 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA).

The Mark 28 bomb was at the top of the list: Ibid.

a “retrofit for Enhanced Electrical Safety: Ibid.

it planned to spend at least $10 billion to equip B-52s: Cited in “Pentagon Says Even Vast Effort by Soviet Can’t Stop New Missile,” New York Times, November 15, 1978.

Jeffrey A. Zink was pulling an alert: My account of the Grand Forks accident is based on an interview with Jeffrey A. Zink and on “USAF Mishap Report, Parking Spot A-10, Grand Forks Air Force Base,” Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, September 29, 1980.

“What have I gotten myself into?”: Zink interview.

“I’ll throw up later”: Ibid.

“we’re going to die”: Ibid.

“Oh my God, it’s the real thing”: Ibid.

“I can’t do this”: Quoted in ibid.

“Alpha, Charlie, Delta…”: Quoted in ibid.

“Terminate, terminate, terminate”: Quoted in ibid.

“Get in”: Quoted in ibid.

gusts of up to thirty-five miles an hour: The mishap report cited gusts of up to thirty knots, and a knot is about 1.15 miles per hour. “USAF Mishap Report,” p. 1.

Tim Griffis was at home with his family: Interview with Tim Griffis.

“What do you think?”: Quoted in Griffis interview.

“Yeah, let me try it”: Ibid.

“Gene, you want to go with me?”: Ibid.

“Yeah”: Ibid.

“Chief, that engine is getting pretty hot”: Quoted in “USAF Mishap Report,” p. N-6.

“Yeah, go”: Quoted in ibid., p. N-6.

“Here, somebody wants to talk to you”: Quoted in Griffis interview.

“Mr. Griffis, I want to thank you”: Quoted in ibid.

During a closed Senate hearing, Dr. Roger Batzel: See Reed Karaim, “Nearly a Nuclear Disaster — Wind Shifted Fire on B-52 Away from Bomb, Experts Say,” Seattle Times, August 13, 1991. A map showed the potential contamination area.

the cause of the fire in engine number five: In addition to nearly contaminating Grand Forks with plutonium and/or causing a nuclear detonation nearby, the missing nut caused $442,696 worth of damage to the plane. See “B52H S/N 60-0059 Mishap Engine Investigation” and “Certificate of Damage,” in “USAF Mishap Report.”

Senator David Pryor once again introduced an amendment: See Congressional Record — Senate, September 16, 1980, pp. 25468–25470.

at least nine accidents or propellant leaks: Cited in ibid., p. 25469. See also Tom Hamburger and Elizabeth Fair, “9 Accidents Recorded in State Since January 1978,” Arkansas Gazette, September 28.

At a launch complex near Heber Springs: See Hamburger and Fair, “9 Accidents Recorded” and Pincus, “Aging Titan II Was Time Bomb.”

More than one third of the entire Titan II force: Cited in “Aging Titan II Was Time Bomb.”

“We have a responsibility to protect the civilians”: Congressional Record, p. 25468.

“Accidents have occurred in the past”: Ibid.

The Air Force had recently submitted a lengthy report: “Assessment Report: Titan II LGM 25 C, Weapon Condition and Safety,” Prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee, May 1980.

the accident rate at Titan II sites: Cited in ibid., p. 1.

“provide a high level of safety”: Ibid., p.3.

“considered by many to be better now than when it was new”: Ibid., pp. 2–3.

The safety record of the W-53 warhead was “commendable”: Ibid., Appendix C, p. 38.

“Airframe rupture”: Ibid., p. 9.