Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress

Cynics might be unimpressed by a form of progress that still leaves the world with 10,200 atomic warheads, since, as the 1980s bumper sticker pointed out, one nuclear bomb can ruin your whole day. But with 54,000 fewer nuclear bombs on the planet than there were in 1986, there are far fewer opportunities for accidents that might ruin people’s whole day, and a precedent has been set for continuing disarmament. More warheads will be eliminated under the terms of the New START, and as I mentioned, still more reductions may take place outside the framework of treaties, which are freighted with legalistic negotiations and divisive political symbolism. When tensions among great powers recede (a long-term trend, even if it’s in abeyance today), they quietly shrink their expensive arsenals.¹¹⁹ Even when rivals are barely speaking, they can cooperate in a reverse arms race using the tactic that the psycholinguist Charles Osgood called Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction (GRIT), in which one side makes a small unilateral concession with a public invitation that it be reciprocated.¹²⁰ If, someday, a combination of these developments pared the arsenals down to 200 warheads apiece, it would not only dramatically reduce the chance of an accident but essentially eliminate the possibility of nuclear winter, the truly existential threat.¹²¹

In the near term, the greatest menace of nuclear war comes not so much from the number of weapons in existence as from the circumstances in which they might be used. The policy of launch on warning, launch under attack, or hair-trigger alert is truly the stuff of nightmares. No early warning system can perfectly distinguish signal from noise, and a president awakened by the proverbial 3:00 A.M. phone call would have minutes to decide whether to fire his missiles before they were destroyed in their silos. In theory, he could start World War III in response to a short circuit, a flock of seagulls, or a bit of malware from that Bulgarian teenager. In reality, the warning systems are better than that, and there is no “hair trigger” that automatically launches missiles without human intervention.¹²² But when missiles can be launched on short notice, the risks of a false alarm or an accidental, rogue, or impetuous launch are real.

The original rationale for launch on warning was to thwart a massive first strike that would destroy every missile in its silo and leave the country unable to retaliate. But as I mentioned, states can launch weapons from submarines, which hide in deep water, or from bomber aircraft, which can be sent scrambling, making the weapons invulnerable to a first strike and poised to exact devastating revenge. The decision to retaliate could be made in the cold light of day, when the uncertainty has passed: if a nuclear bomb has been detonated on your territory, you know it.

Launch on warning, then, is unnecessary for deterrence and unacceptably dangerous. Most nuclear security analysts recommend—no, insist—that nuclear states take their missiles off hair-trigger alert and put them on a long fuse.¹²³ Obama, Nunn, Shultz, George W. Bush, Robert McNamara, and several former Commanders of Strategic Command and Directors of the National Security Agency agree.¹²⁴ Some, like William Perry, recommend scrapping the land-based leg of the nuclear triad altogether and relying on submarines and bombers for deterrence, since silo-based missiles are sitting ducks which tempt a leader to use them while they can. So with the fate of the world at stake, why would anyone want to keep missiles in silos on hair-trigger alert? Some nuclear metaphysicians argue that in a crisis, the act of re-alerting de-alerted missiles would be a provocation. Others note that because silo-based missiles are more reliable and accurate, they are worth safeguarding, because they can be used not just to deter a war but to win one. And that brings us to another way to reduce the risks of nuclear war.

It’s hard for anyone with a conscience to believe that their country is prepared to use nuclear weapons for any purpose other than deterring a nuclear attack. But that is the official policy of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Pakistan, all of whom have declared they might launch a nuclear weapon if they or their allies have been massively attacked with non-nuclear weapons. Apart from violating any concept of proportionality, a first-use policy is dangerous, because a non-nuclear attacker might be tempted to escalate to nuclear pre-emptively. Even if it didn’t, once it was nuked it might retaliate with a nuclear strike of its own.