Эпоха XX съезда: международная деятельность А. И. Микояна в 1956 году

According to the author of the book, Mikoyan was more than any other top Soviet executives ready for implementation of this strategy as well as for further change in Stalin's vector in the foreign policy. His speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was evidently indicative of it. However, his personal commitment was not enough for changes for the better; concrete practical measures had to demonstrate to the entire world the seriousness of the Soviet intentions. With regard to foreign policy, Mikoyan was restricted by the presence of a considerable number of "conservatives", besides "reformers", in the Soviet leadership (Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshylov, Lazar Kaganovich and others) who objected to radical transformation of the policy towards the outside world established in the Stalin period. It was necessary to convince these politicians, whose opinions carried weight in the higher echelons, of the rightness of the decisions and to obtain their consent to changes in the Soviet foreign policy. Another obstacle to Khrushchev-Mikoyan's line was disguised and undisguised opposition on the part of some leaders of the socialist camp (Mao Zedong, Kim-il-sung, Matyas Rakosi and others) anxious about their political future in the context of the denunciation of Stalin's cult of personality.

Mikoyan was the only person in the Soviet leadership who raised his voice against coercive intervention into the political crisis in Hungary. It was to a large extent thanks to his position on the eve of the uprising in Hungary that a military action in Poland, affected by anti-Soviet and anti-socialist mood, was prevented. According to the author, the tragic mistake of Nagy lay in his decision to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, which gave rise to a military solution to the crisis. Mikoyan's attempts to persuade his colleagues to seek an alternative variant were futile. He should be credited for his achievements in conducting negotiations with the Chinese Communist leadership enabling to delay Soviet-Chinese conflict and the second split in the international Communist movement (following the first Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948–1953).

The author posits that A. Mikoyan should not be idealized, however, some of his ideas concerning foreign policy articulated in 1956 and practical steps strengthened the position of the Soviet Union as one of the world leading states.

The book for introduces to the scholarship some of the archival documents and photographs (The Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, The State Archive of the Russian Federation, The Russian State Archive of the socio-political history, The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Archive of Foreign policy of the Russian Federation). Mikoyan's memoirs; evidence of the witnesses of the events; national and foreign works reflecting the historical context and the theme have been also extensively used.

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