Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia

In May 2009, EU policies toward the six In-Betweens were enhanced and grouped under the banner of the Eastern Partnership. The Commission described it as ‘a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU.’[59] Notwithstanding these lofty ambitions, the Eastern Partnership exacerbated the regional contestation. Although some differentiation was to emerge years later, the policy was initially the same for all the In-Betweens – regardless of their level of involvement in Russia-led institutions, or their adherence to the first two Copenhagen Criteria of democracy and market reform. For example, the decision to include Belarus, Russia’s closest ally, and arguably the most authoritarian government in the region, created a strong impression that geopolitics was driving EU decision-making.

Russia was not pleased. To Solana, it was apparent almost instantly that the initiative was raising eyebrows, and worse, in Moscow.[60] As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov put it in 2009, ‘We are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence, including to Belarus?’[61] It did not help that prominent European politicians and commentators viewed the programme in precisely these terms. As one German analyst wrote in response to Lavrov’s question, ‘The answer, of course, is yes…. In the post-Soviet space, neutrality is not an option for Europe…. We must face up to the fact that we are engaged in a systemic competition [with Russia].’[62]

Russia’s negative reaction to the EU’s foray into the In-Between countries thus was apparent several years before the Ukraine crisis began. So too was the reality that many members of the EU, particularly the new ones, always regarded the Eastern Partnership as an initiative intended to wrest their neighbours from Moscow’s grasp. Russia, in turn, rejected EU efforts on principle; if Brussels wanted to proceed, it would have to come to the Kremlin and kiss the ring. As the Russian analyst Andrei Zagorski puts it, ‘Moscow specifically underlines that no attempt at regional cooperation in this part of Europe is possible if it does not involve the Russian Federation.’[63] Russia’s dogged pursuit of a say in other countries’ decisions made the EU more determined to proceed with its plans and less inclined to discuss them with Moscow. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel told parliament in November 2013, ‘To put it unequivocally – the countries must decide themselves on their future direction. Third parties cannot have the right of veto.’[64] The regional elites had incentives to stoke this competition since they knew that their clout would be maximised if multiple external patrons were in competition with one another.

Less than a month after the Eastern Partnership was launched, Russia countered with its own initiative, and Moscow-led integration in post-Soviet Eurasia finally gained traction after almost 20 years of dithering. In June 2009, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to form an institutionalised Customs Union effective from 1 January 2010.[65] While any number of past geo-economic efforts had been stillborn, this for once was a concrete step. The failure of previous initiatives had led Moscow to trim down its ambitions for membership of the Customs Union, starting with only the two states most willing to move forward.

In form, the Customs Union was a significant departure from past post-Soviet practices and was closer to the early stages of the EU than to the moribund CIS. Under the 2009 agreement, a Customs Union Commission was to function as a permanent decision-making and adjudicative mechanism; it, and not the national governments, had the authority to set tariffs. The three founders quickly moved to create something more substantial, progressing from the creation of a single market in 2012 to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015. With the forming of the EEU, a Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), a fully fledged institution with its own bureaucracy, replaced the Customs Union Commission and a court was created to resolve trade disputes.