Forbidden Archeology: The Hidden History of the Human Race

Our thesis is that in spite of the various advances in paleoanthropological science in the twentieth century there is an essential equivalence in quality between these two sets of reports. We therefore suggest that it is not appropriate to accept one set and reject the other. This has serious implications for the modern theory of human evolution. If we reject the first set of reports (the anomalies) and, to be consistent, also reject the second set (evidence currently accepted), then the theory of human evolution is deprived of a good part of its observational foundation. But if we accept the first set of reports, then we must accept the existence of intelligent, toolmaking beings in geological periods as remote as the Miocene, or even the Eocene. If we accept the skeletal evidence presented in these reports, we must go further and accept the existence of anatomically modern human beings in these remote periods. This not only contradicts the modern theory of human evolution, but it also casts grave doubt on our whole picture of the evolution of mammalian life in the Cenozoic era.

In general, if A contradicts B it is not necessary to prove that A is right in order to prove that B is wrong. To discredit B, all that is required is to show that A and B are both equally well supported by arguments and evidence. Then they cancel each other out. That is the case with our two sets of reports.

In making this study, there are a number of basic features of modern geology and paleontology that we are accepting as a fixed reference framework. These are the system of geological time divisions, the modern radiometric dates for these divisions, the succession of faunal types in successive time divisions of the Cenozoic era, and the basic principles of stratigraphy.

It might be argued that if we are going to advocate a conclusion as radical as the one we just mentioned, then we might as well challenge these items as well. After all, if scientists can be completely wrong about the geological time range of human beings, why should we expect them to be right about the time ranges of various mammals?

The answer to this objection is that the various elements in our fixed reference frame may well be in need of reevaluation. However, in this study it would be impractical to delve into these matters in sufficient detail to demonstrate the specific defects that may exist in this geological and paleontological framework. Given the total body of available paleoanthropological evidence, we can only conclude that something must be seriously wrong with our current scientific picture of human evolution.

The point could be made that even if human beings existed in much earlier periods than is currently believed possible, this still does not contradict the theory of evolution. The evolution of humans could simply have taken place at earlier times. Our answer is that the material we are presenting can be interpreted in that way, and indeed it was so interpreted by most of the scientists who originally presented it. In fact, no matter what evidence is presented for the existence of human beings at a particular date, it is always possible to suppose that they evolved from lower forms at an earlier time.

It can also be said, however, that if the empirical basis for the current view of human evolution proves faulty, then the credibility of evolutionary theory in general is brought into question. After all, if the imposing empirical edifice of evolution from Australopithecus to Homo sapiens is just a house of cards, then how quick should one be to accept another elaborate evolutionary scheme?

1.10 Theories and Anomalous Evidence

We have spoken of “anomalous evidence” and “evidence accepted in support of modern theory.” in general, a piece of evidence is anomalous only in relation to a particular theory. If one could look at the world without any theoretical presuppositions (conscious or unconscious), one would see nothing anomalous. Unfortunately, one would probably experience little but a welter of meaningless sense perceptions, since it is through theoretical understanding that we give meaning to what we perceive.

In this connection a famous remark by Einstein is worth considering: “it may be heuristically useful to keep in mind what one has observed. But on principle it is quite wrong to try grounding a theory on observable quantities alone. In reality the opposite happens. It is the theory which determines what we can observe” (Brush 1974, p. 1167).