From 4 March 1919 onward, with skis and sledges employed to make progress through the deep snow still lying in the Urals passes, the offensive commenced along the entire front and was initially successful during its first month: the Western Army took Ufa from the 5th Red Army by 16 March, then Sterlitamak, Belebei, and Bugul′ma (6–10 April 1919), bringing Khanzhin within striking distance of the Volga crossings at Samara and Simbirsk. Meanwhile, to the south Dutov’s Cossacks captured Orsk (9 April 1919) and pushed on toward Orenburg; in the north the Siberian Army captured Sarapul (10 April 1919) and closed on Glazov. At this point, however, impetuosity and hot-headedness took hold: instead of digging in on the river Ik and sitting out the worst of the spring thaw, when snowmelt transformed roads into rivers, the Western Army pushed on (taking Buguruslan on 15 April 1919), as Kolchak, on 12 April 1919, ordered that all Red forces east of the Volga were to be eliminated. By this point 180,000 square miles of territory (populated by some 5–7 million souls) had been engulfed by the Siberian Whites, together with at least 20,000 prisoners and many guns and armored trains.56 This seemed impressive, but not everybody was fooled: “Don’t think that our successful advances are a result of military prowess,” an officer warned the Siberian Kadet Lev Krol′, “for it is all much simpler than that—when they run away we advance; when we run away they will advance.”57 Moreover, Khanzhin’s vanguard had lost touch with its supply trains and commissaries and—forced to live off the land like occupiers, not liberators—were the living, breathing, and all-consuming contradiction of the crudely reproduced leaflets they distributed among the villages promising the hungry Urals that “Bread is Coming!” from Siberia.
It would soon be time, as Krol′ had been warned, for the Siberian Whites to run away. The Red Eastern Front, erroneously set up by its commander Colonel S. S. Kamenev to absorb a strong push from the Siberian Army (and in general deprived of manpower and other resources, as the Red command prioritized the Western Front and Ukraine over the winter of 1918–1919), had been forced to fall back before Khanzhin’s initially rampant Western Army (which had a 4:1 local advantage in men and artillery over the opposing 5th Red Army around Ufa). But in April 1919, new reserves (many of them from central Russian Bolshevik and trade union organizations) were poured into that sector, swelling a maneuvering group under the hugely talented Red commander M. V. Frunze that, as the spring floods receded in May, would push northward from Buzuluk to bite into the side of the White salient formed by Khanzhin’s overextended advance. Belebei was duly recaptured on 15 May, and on 7 June charismatic
Over the coming months, Kolchak made several attempts to staunch the wounds inflicted upon the Russian Army, but to no avail. First Kappel′’s Volga Corps was thrown into the fray, followed by skeletal reserve formations from the rear; but both forces, utterly unprepared, melted away overnight, as thousands of White conscripts deserted to the oncoming Reds, many of them sporting their newly issued British uniforms and holding their newly acquired Remington rifles from the United States.61 Others went over to the partisan forces, which by the summer of 1919 had made much of the Siberian rear a no-go area for the Kolchak authorities beyond the narrow and fragile ribbon of the Trans-Siberian Railway (which was still policed by Czech and other Allied troops, though they were more motivated to protect it as their own escape route to the east than by any will to maintain Kolchak’s lifeline from the Pacific coast).