History of England 1-6

He had promised the troops that the nation was behind them. This was true in part, but to people in their late teens and early twenties, weaned on a progressive and even pacifist education, this was a war fought not to contain aggression but to keep the oil flowing. But if expressions of disquiet were small and even unpopular – it was not unknown for students to be jostled or even assaulted – they established a precedent that would be followed on a far greater scale. The war itself was won by the spring. As a war leader, Major had been vindicated. Now a very different kind of struggle beckoned, one which he was determined should not bear the character of a conflict.

1991 was the year in which the communities of Western Europe met in Maastricht to determine the future direction of the European project. Major described himself as neither Europhile nor Eurosceptic, but as chancellor he had made his support for Britain’s entry to the ERM plain. It was at Maastricht that the strands of theory, economic expediency and political necessity were woven together. There, the European Economic Community became the European Union. Major’s was among the younger, more vigorous voices, and this, combined with his tenacity, ensured that two treasured ‘opt-outs’ were embedded in the final document. The United Kingdom would be obliged to accept neither the Social Chapter, in which were enshrined the rights to a minimum wage and to a maximum working week, nor, in the immediate future, monetary union. But critics were quick to point out that these assertions of power placed Britain on the fringes of influence, while doing nothing to halt the federalist advance. The treaty cannot be said to have aroused much enthusiasm among the English people, but it had consequences that were overlooked in the usual partisan squabbling. The Single European Act of 1987 had turned the Common Market into the Single Market; Maastricht removed any doubt that something far more comprehensive lay ahead.

57

The fall of sterling

The journalist Simon Heffer went so far as to proclaim that ‘nothing happened at Maastricht to keep Britain off the conveyor belt to federalism; indeed, quite the reverse’. This was perhaps an exaggeration, but it could not be doubted that, in obtaining the concessions it did, the Major government was implicitly offering a concession of its own. Britain could be only a rock in the midst of the federalist tide; it had no power to turn it. When Major commended the treaty to the House of Commons, he appeared to acknowledge as much, if only by omission: ‘This is a treaty which safeguards and advances our national interests. It advances the interests of Europe as a whole. It opens up new ways of cooperating in Europe … It is a good agreement for Europe, and a good agreement for the United Kingdom. I commend it to the House.’

In the eyes of moderates across the House, quiet persistence had succeeded where intransigence had failed. Even some Eurosceptics were pleased, or at least relieved. Thatcher herself largely kept her counsel, though in a private letter to Sir Bill Cash, a prominent Eurosceptic, she expressed the belief that the new direction of the EU was ‘contrary to British interests and damaging to our parliamentary democracy’. The rapture, or relief, in England was not altogether echoed on the Continent. Many were irritated by the opt-outs that Britain had secured. A federal Europe was the inevitable destination, so why did Britain insist on a back route? It should be noted that throughout the process, the mandarins of the Commission were perfectly clear in their intent. As one negotiator observed, ‘It’s getting tiring having to drag Britain along … we can lose the word “federalism” if they want, but …’ The elision was eloquent. In the event, ‘subsidiarity’ was the genial obfuscation selected in preference.

It was at the committee stage in parliament that the treaty’s labour pains began. Beside the Labour party, which wanted the opt-outs removed, the government had to reckon with dissent in its own ranks. At the treaty’s second reading, twenty-two ‘Maastricht rebels’ either voted against the government or abstained. Having lost the whip for their integrity, or audacity, few among them were surprised when it was returned to them. Major had intended this as an act of magnanimity but it was interpreted as weakness. On and on the negotiations trudged, with the rebels tabling amendment after amendment. With defeat looming again, it seemed that only another election could resolve the matter, but rather than take the issue to the country, he took it to the House. A confidence motion was proposed, and Major obtained his mandate. And so, after almost two years of prevarication and obstruction, the Maastricht Treaty was passed, by forty votes, on 20 July 1993.