Hitler's peace

Hitler shrugged. “Oh, I won’t say that we can win the war. After the defeats at El Alamein in October ’42 and, more decisively, the defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, I know that victory is now beyond our capability. We cannot win this war. There, I say it openly-as you, Mr. President, have urged us all to be open. I will say it again. Germany cannot win this war. But, equally, Germany can still make it painfully difficult for you to win it yourselves.”

Roosevelt lit the cigarette in his holder and, removing the pince-nez once again, leaned forward to make a point. “I appreciate your candor, Herr Hitler. So let me be quite candid, too. The important strategic objective for the Allies is not a northern European landing, but rather to draw more German divisions away from the Soviet front. To this end, there are other operations available to us. A drive up through Italy, a thrust from the northeastern Adriatic, an operation in the Aegean Sea, even operations from Turkey. Any of these would oblige you to withdraw some of your forces from the eastern front. And yet, having said all that, there are many people in Britain and America who might think that the sacrifice of a quarter of a million men is a price worth paying for a free and democratic Europe.”

Hitler swept the forelock off his brow and shook his head slowly. “We all know that the Italian campaign is of value only in opening the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and is of no great importance as far as the defeat of Germany is concerned. Marshal Stalin will tell you as much himself when I am no longer in the room. At the risk of sounding pedantic, Mr. President, I must remind you of some European history with which Marshal Stalin is already doubtless familiar. In 1799, Marshal Suvorov discovered that the Alps presented an insuperable barrier to an invasion of Germany from Italy. And Turkey? Yes, that might open the way to an Allied invasion of the Balkans, but that is a very long way from the heart of Germany. No, gentlemen, no, Germany’s weakest spot is France, which, let’s face it, you and the British have had all year to invade. What is more, I do not see that you could even contemplate a French invasion until the summer of 1944, by which time it is my calculation that as many as a million more Red Army soldiers will be dead. Out of respect to Marshal Stalin, I do not say this lightly. The losses inherent in any European invasion are negligible to what he has lost already. And what he will lose. A million Red Army soldiers killed is four times as many losses as the quarter of a million British and American casualties that you and Mr. Churchill are hesitating about. Only after France has been secured will it make military sense to send more forces to Italy. In this way you will then be able to secure southern France and, after these two Allied armies have linked up, make your big push into Germany.” Hitler was speaking quickly, dismissively, as if considering Allied options off the top of his head. “But not Turkey. It would be a mistake for you to disperse your forces by sending two or three divisions to Turkey. Besides, Turkey is still a neutral country, and it is my understanding that she continues to reject Mr. Churchill’s attempts to persuade her to come into this war. Like Iran, perhaps, the Turks have a low opinion of British fair play after what happened at Versailles.”