Читаем I Am a Strange Loop полностью

Perceptual Looping as the Germ of “I”-ness

I FIND it curious that, other than proper nouns and adjectives, the only word in the English tongue that is always capitalized is the first-person pronoun (nominative case) with which this sentence most f lamboyantly sets sail. The convention is striking and strange, hinting that the word must designate something very important. Indeed, to some people — perhaps to most, perhaps even to us all — the ineffable sense of being an “I” or a “first person”, the intuitive sense of “being there” or simply “existing”, the powerful sense of “having experience” and of “having raw sensations” (what some philosophers refer to as “qualia”), seem to be the realest things in their lives, and an insistent inner voice bridles furiously at any proposal that all this might be an illusion, or merely the outcome of some kind of physical processes taking place among “third-person” (i.e., inanimate) objects. My goal here is to combat this strident inner voice.

I begin with the simple fact that living beings, having been shaped by evolution, have survival as their most fundamental, automatic, and built-in goal. To enhance the chances of its survival, any living being must be able to react flexibly to events that take place in its environment. This means it must develop the ability to sense and to categorize, however rudimentarily, the goings-on in its immediate environment (most earthbound beings can pretty safely ignore comets crashing on Jupiter). Once the ability to sense external goings-on has developed, however, there ensues a curious side effect that will have vital and radical consequences. This is the fact that the living being’s ability to sense certain aspects of its environment flips around and endows the being with the ability to sense certain aspects of itself.

That this flipping-around takes place is not in the least amazing or miraculous; rather, it is a quite unremarkable, indeed trivial, consequence of the being’s ability to perceive. It is no more surprising than the fact that audio feedback can take place or that a TV camera can be pointed at a screen to which its image is being sent. Some people may find the notion of such self-perception peculiar, pointless, or even perverse, but such a prejudice does not make self-perception a complex or subtle idea, let alone paradoxical. After all, in the case of a being struggling to survive, the one thing that is always in its environment is… itself. So why, of all things, should the being be perceptually immune to the most salient item in its world? Now that would seem perverse!

Such a lacuna would be reminiscent of a language whose vocabulary kept growing and growing yet without ever developing words for such common concepts as are named by the English words “say”, “speak”, “word”, “language”, “understand”, “ask”, “question”, “answer”, “talk”, “converse”, “claim”, “deny”, “argue”, “tell”, “sentence”, “story”, “book”, “read”, “insist”, “describe”, “translate”, “paraphrase”, “repeat”, “lie”, “hedge”, “noun”, “verb”, “tense”, “letter”, “syllable”, “plural”, “meaning”, “grammar”, “emphasize”, “refer”, “pronounce”, “exaggerate”, “bluster”, and so forth. If such a peculiarly self-ignorant language existed, then as it grew in flexibility and sophistication, its speakers would engage ever more in talking, arguing, blustering, and so forth, but without ever referring to these activities, and such entities as questions, answers, and lies would become (even while remaining unnamed) ever more salient and numerous. Like the hobbled formalisms that came out of Bertrand Russell’s timid theory of types, this language would have a gaping hole at its core — the lack of any mechanism for a word or utterance or book (etc.) to refer to itself. Analogously, for a living creature to have evolved rich capabilities of perception and categorization but to be constitutionally incapable of focusing any of that apparatus onto itself would be highly anomalous. Its selective neglect would be pathological, and would threaten its survival.



Varieties of Looping

To be sure, the most primitive living creatures have little or no self-perception. By analogy, we can think of a TV camera rigidly bolted on top of a TV set and facing away from the screen, like a flashlight tightly attached to a miner’s helmet, always pointing away from the miner’s eyes, never into them. In such a TV setup, obviously, a self-turned loop is out of the question. No matter how you turn it, the camera and the TV set turn in synchrony, preventing the closing of a loop.

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Андрей Януарьевич Вышинский был одним из ближайших соратников И.В. Сталина. Их знакомство состоялось еще в 1902 году, когда молодой адвокат Андрей Вышинский участвовал в защите Иосифа Сталина на знаменитом Батумском процессе. Далее было участие в революции 1905 года и тюрьма, в которой Вышинский отбывал срок вместе со Сталиным.После Октябрьской революции А.Я. Вышинский вступил в ряды ВКП(б); в 1935 – 1939 гг. он занимал должность Генерального прокурора СССР и выступал как государственный обвинитель на всех известных политических процессах 1936–1938 гг. В последние годы жизни Сталина, в самый опасный период «холодной войны» А.Я. Вышинский защищал интересы Советского Союза на международной арене, являясь министром иностранных дел СССР.В книге А.Я. Вышинского рассказывается о И.В. Сталине и его борьбе с врагами Советской России. Автор подробно останавливается на политических судебных процессах второй половины 1920-х – 1930-х гг., приводит фактический материал о деятельности троцкистов, диверсантов, шпионов и т. д. Кроме того, разбирается вопрос о юридических обоснованиях этих процессов, о сборе доказательств и соблюдении законности по делам об антисоветских преступлениях.

Андрей Януарьевич Вышинский

Документальная литература / Биографии и Мемуары / Документальная литература / История