Knowledge And Decisions

The modern equivalent of the ancient seer to whom men submitted their credulity is the “expert.” Deference to “experts” generally does not depend upon any consideration of (1) whether there is in fact any expertise on the particular issue (often there is not, especially in the social sciences), (2) whether the individuals selected have in fact any such expertise, as contrasted with an assortment of miscellaneous information, or (3) whether those who have expertise are in fact applying it, as distinguished from using it as a means of imposing personal preferences or group fashions. Politicians may also take issues to “experts” as a means of escaping political responsibility for unpredictable or controversial outcomes. Finally, there are “experts” whose expertise consists largely of detailed knowledge of some particular governmental program, whose institutional complexities and jargon make them incomprehensible to others. The enormous investment of time and effort required to acquire familiarity with intricate regulations and labyrinthine administrative procedures is unlikely to be made by someone unsympathetic to a program, both because the philosophic or cognitive interest would not be sufficient and because such an investment offers large payoffs only to those whom the particular bureaucracy would employ as consultants or officials — obviously not those unsympathetic to its programs. Even among “experts” in institutional detail who are unaffiliated with the program, their expertise has value only so long as the program itself exists. They would become experts in nothing if the programs were abolished, and a costly investment on their part would be destroyed. Under this set of incentives and constraints, it may be a truism that “all the experts” favor this or that program, but that may indicate very little about its value to the larger society. “Experts” of this sort can often devastate critics by exposing the latter’s misunderstandings of particular details, terminology, or legal technicalities — none of which may be crucial to the issue but all of which establish politically the superior knowledge of those favoring the program, and enable them to dismiss critics as “misinformed.”

It is not so much the bias of “expert” intellectuals that is crucial, but the difference between their perceived “objective” expertise and the reality which makes the political process vulnerable to their influence. Publicly recognized special interest groups — landlords discussing rent control, oil companies discussing energy, etc. — may have similar incentives and constraints, but are far less effective in getting their social viewpoints accepted as objective truth or social concern. But when an academic intellectual appears as an “expert” witness before a congressional committee, no one ever asks if he has been a recipient of large research grants or lucrative consulting fees from the very agency whose programs he is about to “objectively” assess in terms of the public interest. While special interest advertising carries not only that explicit designation but a heavy price tag as well, talk show hosts eagerly welcome “experts” extolling the virtues of this or that program, or raising alarms about the dire consequences of its possible curtailment or extinction. Such experts are then thanked warmly for “taking time out from your busy schedule” to come “inform” the public — i.e., to get free advertising for their special interest, with an audience in the millions. The print media are equally likely to bill such “experts’” statements as news rather than advertising.