Mao: The Unknown Story

At the end of World War II, Korea, which had been annexed by Japan early in the century, was divided across the middle, along the 38th Parallel, with Russia occupying the northern half and the US the South. After formal independence in 1948, the North came under a Communist dictator, Kim Il Sung. In March 1949, as Mao’s armies were rolling towards victory, Kim went to Moscow to try to persuade Stalin to help him seize the South. Stalin said “No,” as this might involve confronting America. Kim then turned to Mao, and one month later sent his deputy defense minister to China. Mao gave Kim a firm commitment, saying he would be glad to help Pyongyang attack the South, but could they wait until he had taken the whole of China: “It would be much better if the North Korean government launched an all-out attack against the South in the first half of 1950 …” Mao said, adding emphatically: “If necessary, we can stealthily put in Chinese soldiers for you.” Koreans and Chinese, he said, had black hair, and the Americans would not be able to tell the difference: “They will not notice.”

Mao encouraged Pyongyang to invade the South and take on the USA — and volunteered Chinese manpower — as early as May 1949. At this stage he was talking about sending in Chinese troops clandestinely, posing as Koreans, and not about China having an open collision with America. During his visit to Russia, however, Mao changed. He became determined to fight America openly — because only such a war would enable him to gouge out of Stalin what he needed to build his own world-class war machine. What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans for Stalin in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment.

Stalin received reports from both his ambassador in Korea and his liaison with Mao about Mao’s eagerness to have a war in Korea. As a result of this new factor, Stalin began to reconsider his previous refusal to let Kim invade the South.

Stalin was given a push by Kim. On 19 January 1950, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, reported that Kim had told him, “excitedly” that “now that China is completing its liberation,” South Korea’s was “next in line.” Kim “thinks that he needs to visit comrade Stalin again, in order to receive instructions and authorization to launch an offensive.” Kim added that “if it was not possible to meet comrade Stalin now, he will try to meet with Mao.” He stressed that Mao had “promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China.” Playing “the Mao card,” Kim told Shtykov that “he also has other questions for Mao Tse-tung, in particular the question of the possibility of setting up an Eastern bureau of the Cominform” (no mention of talking to Stalin about this). Mao, he said, “would have instructions on all issues.” Kim was telling Stalin that Mao was keen to give him military support, and that if Stalin would still not endorse an invasion, he (Kim) would go to Mao direct and place himself under Mao.

Eleven days later, on 30 January, Stalin wired Shtykov to tell Kim that he was “prepared to help him on this.” This is the first documented evidence of Stalin agreeing to start a war in Korea, and he shifted his position because of Mao, who possessed the critical asset — an inexhaustible supply of men. When Kim came to Moscow two months later, Stalin said that the international environment had “changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea.” He went on to make it explicit that this was because “the Chinese were now in a position to devote more attention to the Korean issue.” There was “one vital condition — Peking’s support” for the war. Kim “must rely on Mao, who understands Asian affairs beautifully.”

A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages: it could field-test both its own new equipment, especially its MiG jets, and America’s technology, as well as acquiring some of this technology, along with valuable intelligence on America. Both China and Korea would be completely dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine-tune the degree of Russia’s involvement. Moreover, he could test how far America would go in a war with the Communist camp.