Moscow, December 25, 1991

Yeltsin had not invited Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, to the meeting of the Slav leaders in the forest. The head of the powerful central Asian republic was a Gorbachev ally and had yet to declare independence. If they could get him to join them in Belovezhkaya Pushcha, they could present him with a fait accompli and ensure the support of the other Asian republics that deferred to him. But it was not so simple. Nazarbayev was at the time en route by air from Alma-Ata to Moscow. Korzhakov called the commander of Vnukovo-2 airport in Moscow and asked to be connected with the plane, identifying himself as “chief of security of the president of Russia.” The airport commander refused rudely, saying, “I have a different chief.” This was typical of dual power, thought Korzhakov. Gorbachev wasn’t being taken seriously, but Yeltsin didn’t have the mechanisms of power.⁵ Nazarbayev took the call when he landed in Moscow. All three leaders spoke to him. Yeltsin read him the documents. But the Kazakh leader was deeply offended at being left out. He telephoned Gorbachev at his dacha to tell him what was happening. Furious at the turn of events, Gorbachev persuaded Nazarbayev to join him and confront the conspirators together in Moscow the following morning.

The three men at the hunting lodge were worried that there might be a military response to what they had done. Gaidar admitted to being a little apprehensive that Gorbachev would take this option, “though I was more or less sure that it would be impossible for him to do because he would not find one regiment to obey his orders.” Shakhrai was unafraid, as “everybody knew there was no army anymore,” though he believed that the Belarusian KGB was keeping Gorbachev informed of everything going on in the forest.⁶ Years later the president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, bragged that if Gorbachev had given an order to the Belarusian KGB to arrest the threesome, the order would have been fulfilled “within minutes.” Gorbachev’s aide Andrey Grachev claimed that the conspirators had a helicopter standing by so they could flee to Poland if necessary, though Gaidar did not recall seeing any helicopter.⁷

The attitude of Marshal Shaposhnikov, head of the Soviet Union’s armed forces, would be critical. Throughout Sunday morning Gorbachev kept phoning him in an agitated state, always with the same question, “What have you heard from Minsk?” Each time Shaposhnikov replied, “Nothing yet.”

Yeltsin, with Kravchuk and Shushkevich beside him, eventually telephoned the marshal. “Today we in Belarus signed an agreement about a three-state union, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus,” he boomed down the line. “What’s your opinion about that?” Shaposhnikov asked if other republics would join in. “Yes,” said Yeltsin. “And one more question Boris Nikolayevich. Is there a reference to the armed forces in the treaty?” Yeltsin: “Yes. Of course.” The Russian president recited the article confirming that the commonwealth would preserve a common military-strategic space, including single control over nuclear weapons. He told Shaposhnikov that the three presidents had agreed that he should be the commander.

“Does Nazarbayev approve?” asked Shaposhnikov. “Yes, he has reacted positively,” replied Yeltsin. The marshal sensed that Nazarbayev was in fact cool towards the plan, but he didn’t argue. He realized something like this was inevitable sooner or later, though he believed the leaders were less intent on destroying the Union than getting rid of Gorbachev. He accepted the post offered.⁸

As soon as he replaced the receiver, the telephone rang again. “So, what’s happening?” barked Gorbachev. “What’s going on in Belarus?” Shaposhnikov summarized the conversation with Yeltsin, giving the impression that the Russian president had just called for advice. Gorbachev cut him short. “Don’t put your nose into somebody’s business. I’m warning you!” He slammed down the phone. Gorbachev realized Shaposhnikov had signed on to Yeltsin’s coup d’état and would always remember how he “wriggled and squirmed like a grass snake on a frying pan” as he lied.⁹

Yeltsin was meanwhile trying to get through to President George H. W. Bush. He gave the hunting lodge operator the number of the White House in Washington. She called back flustered to say that the White House switchboard couldn’t grasp who was calling. Kozyrev took the receiver and in fluent English explained who Boris Yeltsin was and why it was important to be put through to the president.