Moscow, December 25, 1991

Sitting beneath alabaster chandeliers at the end of the long teakwood table with fifteen chairs, the two antagonists discussed the implications of the agreement reached at Alma-Ata. Gorbachev was angry and heavy-hearted but resigned. As Grachev put it, “There was no way to put the toothpaste back in the tube.”

Gorbachev conceded to Yeltsin that for the sake of peace and order he would publicly accept the CIS as the constitutional successor to the Soviet Union. Yeltsin listened attentively to his warnings about the dangers of Balkanization. He in turn asked Gorbachev to lend him his support for the next six months, or at least not criticize him, while he imposed shock therapy on Russia.

It was inevitably going to be a tense encounter. Gorbachev’s aide Georgy Shakhnazarov noted that it was not in Gorbachev’s character to be humble nor in Yeltsin’s to be magnanimous. The two agreed to invite Alexander Yakovlev to “referee” the meeting.

The sixty-eight-year-old father of glasnost came limping into the room. He was intrigued to be there. It meant that he would be a witness “not only to the beginning but also to the end of the lofty career of Mikhail Gorbachev.” Like his mentor, the former ambassador to Canada and cheerleader for perestroika did not want to see the Soviet Union broken up, and he was opposed to what Yeltsin had done. Nevertheless, the Russian president respected him for his courageous role during the coup and for his campaign to expose the crimes of Stalin. In October Yeltsin had appointed Yakovlev to chair a commission for the rehabilitation of victims of political repression.

The two presidents agreed on a transition timetable. Gorbachev would abdicate two days later, on December 25. He would broadcast his resignation speech to the nation at seven o’clock in the evening of that day. After finishing his address, he would sign the decrees resigning as president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and giving up his position as commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces. Immediately after that, Yeltsin would come to his office with Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and take possession of the nuclear suitcase. Gorbachev and his staff could continue using their Kremlin offices for a further four days after Gorbachev’s resignation, until December 29, to conduct unfinished business and clear out their desks, after which Yeltsin would move in with his staff as president of Russia. The red flag would come down from the Kremlin on December 31.⁴ Shakhnazarov, who was called into the meeting briefly, would tell Gorbachev’s assembled staff of aides, officials, interpreters, receptionists, typists, and researchers the next day that they had to leave the Kremlin on December 29, and that the presidential apparatus would stop functioning on January 2.⁵

In return for all this, Gorbachev would step down gracefully, not challenge Yeltsin’s right to succeed him, and stay out of the political fray to give the Russian president a clear run to implement his economic reforms.

Once the basics were settled, the heads of Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s secretariats, Grigory Revenko and Yury Petrov, were brought in to take notes on the nitty-gritty of Gorbachev’s future welfare.

“Gorbachev submitted a list of claims—his compensation package—that ran to several pages,” claimed Yeltsin later. “Almost all the items were purely material demands. He wanted a pension equaling a presidential salary, indexed to inflation; a presidential apartment and dacha; a car for himself and his wife. But more than anything he wanted a foundation, a big building in the center of Moscow, the former Academy of Social Sciences, and with it car service, office equipment, and security guards. Psychologically his reasoning was very simple: If you want to get rid of me so badly, then be so good as to dig deep into your pockets.”

Yeltsin agreed that the Gorbachevs could see out their retirement in a smaller state dacha and apartment, with two official cars and twenty staff, including security, drivers, cooks, and service personnel. He declined to authorize a separate ex-president’s office and staff, and he cut back the amount of pension requested and the number of bodyguards. He signed a decree giving Gorbachev a pension equivalent to his salary of 4,000 rubles a month—ten times the average Soviet wage but a mere $40 at the official rate of exchange. The arrangement would not leave Gorbachev in penury. He was already wealthy from advance royalties for his memoirs.