Подвалы кантовской метафизики

Has the "complete" subjective deduction any innere subdivisions? – It is divided into two stages. At first, Kant proves that categories have an a priori relation to the manifold of sense intuition in general, then - that they have the same necessary relation to the manifold of our intuition, space and, primarily, time. Such a devision is necessary because when there is still a possibility that categories could have objective validity on the manifold of our sense intuition only, then the risk of amalgamation of categories with the modi of our sense intuition is not to the end avoided, while the tr. deduction should confirm the very fact of non-sensual origin of the categories.

What role does the "sufficient" deduction play in the structure of the "complete" subjective deduction of the categories? – This role could be clarified on the basis of the original version of "complete" deduction which Kant had created some time before the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. On the one hand, in the "sufficient" deduction Kant tried to prove that only perceptions which stay under categories could have relation to a transcendental object. On the other hand, Kant believed that all possible objects of perception are to have a necessary relation to the tr. unity of apperception. As Kant was sure that there was a parallelism between the tr. unity of apperception and a transcendental object he could overturn the result of the "sufficient" deduction on the apperception and so came to the conclusion that all objects of apprehension are to be in the correspondence with the categories. The parallelism between the tr. unity of apperception and transcendental object is due to the fact that former as well as latter seem to be the things as they exist in themselves, and the original apperception is an exemplar of tr. object. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant has changed this position and made a sharp distinction between the unity of apperception as a form of thinking and a hypothetical unity of subject itself, and the tr. deduction lost its evidence.

Это электронное издание полностью повторяет печатное издание 1998 г., за исключением нескольких незначительных исправлений.

Замысел этой книги состоял в том, чтобы смоделировать логический лабиринт на материале дедукции Канта. Между тем, итог проведенного анализа состоит в признании ошибочности мнения, что труднее всего выбираться из лабиринта - неважно, реального или логического. Думая так,   забывают, что  в лабиринте у нас всегда   есть четкая   цель. Основные проблемы  начинаются   по выходу из лабиринта.  В случае с Кантом это особенно очевидно. Решив историко-философские вопросы, мы должны приступать к философским - но здесь почва сразу же уходит из под ног.

В анализе кантовской дедукции я, разумеется, опирался на достижения современной кантоведческой науки. К сожалению, объем книги (а также, отчасти, нежелание вдаваться в критику) не позволил мне подробно проанализировать  все   значительные концепции. Самая необходимая информация на этот счет дана в примечаниях.

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