Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes

The reason is that mitigating the law has not been balanced

with the corresponding methods of stifling the processes of the

genesis of evil as based upon its comprehension . This pro-

vokes a crisis in the area of societies’ anti-crime protection and

makes it easier for pathocratic circles to utilize terrorism in

order to realize their expansionist goals. Under such conditions,

many people feel that returning to the tradition of legal severity

is the only way to protect society from an excess of evil. Others

believe that such traditional behavior morally cripples us and

opens the door to irrevocable abuses. They therefore subsume

others’ life and health to humanistic values.

In order to emerge from this crisis, we must galvanize all

our efforts in a search for a new road, one which would both be

more humanitarian and would effectively protect defenseless

individuals and societies. Such a possibility exists and can be

implemented, based on an objective comprehension of the

genesis of evil.

In factual essence, the unrealistic tradition of a relationship

between a person’s “crime”, which no other person is in the

position to evaluate objectively, and his “punishment”, which

is rarely effective in reforming him, should be relegated to

history. The science of the causes of evil should strengthen

society’s moral discipline and have a prophylactic effect. Often

merely making a person aware that he was under the influence

of a pathological individual breaks the circle of destructiveness.

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THERAPY OF THE WORLD

An appropriate psychotherapy should therefore be permanently

included in any measures to counteract evil. Unfortunately, if

someone is shooting at us, we must shoot back even better. At

the same time, however, we should bring back the law of for-

giveness, that old law of wise sovereigns. After all, it has pro-

found moral and psychological foundations and is more effec-

tive than punishment in some situations.

The codices of penal law foresee that the perpetrator of a

penal act who, at the time of his transgression, was limited in

his ability to discern the meaning of the act or to direct his own

behavior as a result of mental illness or some other psychologi-

cal deficiency, receives a lesser sentence to the appropriate

degree. If we should therefore consider the responsibility of

pathocrats in the light of such regulations and in light of what

we have already said about the motivations for their behavior,

we must then considerably mitigate the scope of justice within

the frame of existing regulations.

The above-mentioned legal regulations, which are more

modern in Europe than in the U.S.A., are rather outdated eve-

rywhere and insufficiently congruent with bio-psychological

reality. They are a compromise between traditional legal think-

ing and medical humanism. Furthermore, the legislators were

in no position to perceive macrosocial pathological phenomena

that dominate individuals and significantly limit their ability to

discern the meaning of their own behavior. Susceptible indi-

viduals are sucked in surreptitiously, since they are unaware of

the pathological quality of such a phenomenon. The specific

properties of these phenomena cause the selection of attitudes

to be decisively determined by unconscious factors, followed

by pressure from pathocratic rulers, who are none too fastidi-

ous as to their methods, not even with regard to their own ad-

herents. How should the degree of penal mitigation then judge

them fairly?

For instance, if essential psychopathy is virtually 100% pre-

dictive concerning attraction to and inclusion in pathocratic

activity, should a judgment recognize similar mitigation of

punishment? This should also be applied to other hereditary

anomalies to a lesser extent, since they too have proved to be

primary factors in the selection of attitudes.

POLITICAL PONEROLOGY

291

We should not fault anyone for having inherited some psy-

chological anomalies from his parents any more than we fault

someone in the case of physical or physiological anomalies

such as Daltonism. We should also stop blaming people who

succumbed to traumas and diseases, leaving brain tissue dam-

age behind, or those who become the object of inhuman peda-

gogical methods.

In the name of their good and that of society, we should use

force with regard to such people, sometimes including forced

psychotherapy, supervision, prevention, and care. Any concept

of blame or guilt would only make it more difficult to behave

in a way which is not only humanitarian and purposeful, but

more effective as well.

In dealing with a macrosocial phenomenon, particularly one

whose life is longer than an individual’s active life, its perma-

nent influence forces even normal people to adapt to a certain

degree. Are we, whose instincts and intelligence are normal