Red Hammer 1994

“Soon after the START I signing, we began serious war gaming. Within two years we had developed three proven scenarios. Satisfied, we pressed our planners to see if the attack strategies we had developed could actually be formulated into an operations plan. We were well aware of the tendency for war gamers to develop unrealistic scenarios which play well on the computer but fail miserably under the harsh light of day. It was an iterative process, forcing us to modify certain assumptions, but the basic framework remained intact. The result was an unofficial war plan, complete to the identification of specific military units, which could be implemented on short notice. Our intention was to float the plan for comment, but it ended up on the back burner.”

The defense minister nervously tapped his spent cigarette butt on the couch arm. This plan clearly met the requirement laid on him by the council, but the thoroughness, the years in development, would give it an aura of legitimacy that unnerved him. Besides, he had made a major issue of the ridiculously short timeline and the oppressive security requirements. Now he would return in a few weeks with a detailed plan.

“What specifically is called for?”

Turning to a page halfway through the document, the general pointed to a text table featuring bullets outlining the attack timeline.

“The overriding premise must be total surprise. No compromises. This means no visible preparations, steps toward mobilization, or movements of forces. The fewer people involved in the planning and execution the better. We estimated that the plan could be carried out with one hundred and fifty people, two hundred maximum. This would include handpicked planners, missile-launch crews and officers on ballistic-missile submarines. All must be carefully screened and evaluated. Any leaks could be devastating.” The defense minister’s face tightened. “Not permitting even cursory preparations for mobilization could be catastrophic. What if the attack failed? Or the Americans successfully retaliated? Our war-fighting strategy hinges on a carefully planned and implemented mobilization.”

“True, Defense Minister, the plan is not without risk. But success rests on strict operational security. There is no other way.

“The second requirement is to disrupt their intelligence and warning and the chain of command to their nuclear for-ces. This does not necessary mean a decapitation of the leadership. Destroying key communication nodes paralyzes the decision-making process. Targets would include early warning radars, land-based communications sites, satellite links, communications aircraft, and, of course, the Cheyenne Mountain complex. It is the key command center, feeding data to all the others.”

“How about Washington?” inquired the defense minister warily.

“We went back and forth, but finally eliminated targets near the American capitol. Little would be gained. An important facet is to keep the hotline communication channel unobstructed for rapid war termination. It is the command and control links to the American nuclear forces that must be destroyed.”

The defense minister shifted on the couch. “A very interesting exercise, General,” he commented, “but how could anyone have confidence in this plan? You would be gambling with the fate of the nation, a roll of the dice with millions of lives at stake—hardly the sort of action taken deliberately.” He leaned back. “I can’t believe I am taking this seriously.”

“Quite the contrary,” interjected Ryzhkov. “I held the same opinion, but I’ve since been convinced that if such a plan were ever implemented, it would succeed.”

“But the intangibles?” the defense minister scoffed. “World opinion would crucify us. Even our own people, including many in the military, would be repulsed by this action.”

“Not necessarily, Defense Minister. In the world’s eyes, the Americans would be equally to blame. Many consider them the problem. Besides, with America prostrate, who would challenge us?”

The defense minister had difficulty disguising his skepticism. “Tell me, Marshal Ryzhkov, how does this scenario play out?” Ryzhkov’s face contracted in concentration.

“A simultaneous launch of ICBMs and SLBMs would compress the American decision-making timeline to the point of paralysis. Let me explain.” Ryzhkov moved clo-ser. He spun an irresistible web. The defense minister unwittingly played his part. How many times in the past had they daydreamed about delivering a knockout nuclear blow to their implacable enemies?