Russia Against Napoleon

By mid-October Kutuzov and Bennigsen had between them succeeded in humiliating Barclay de Tolly sufficiently to make him resign.²⁰ Logically at this point the whole headquarters of combined First and Second armies should have been dismantled and orders passed straight down from Kutuzov to the corps commanders. Since the army’s overall structure had been decreed by the emperor, however, only he could authorize such a change. Meanwhile Ermolov resented both the fact that Konovnitsyn had been inserted into the chain of command and that his inefficiency created additional bother for himself. The army’s high command was therefore a maze of overlapping jurisdictions poisoned by personal rivalries among its senior officers. Nikolai Raevsky, the commander of Sixth Corps, wrote at the time that he kept as far as possible from headquarters since it was a viper’s nest of intrigue, envy, egoism and calumny.²¹

Postponed for one day, the attack went ahead early in the morning of 18 October. The plan was for Count Vasili Orlov-Denisov’s cavalry to attack out of the forests on the right of the Russian line, crush Murat’s left flank and storm into his rear. On Orlov-Denisov’s left he would be supported by a column of two corps, commanded by General Baggohufvudt. Next to Baggohufvudt would advance another column, made up of Aleksandr Ostermann-Tolstoy’s Fourth Corps. Once these columns had attacked, the two corps commanded by Mikhail Miloradovich would move up to their support from the western (i.e. left) end of the Russian line. Behind Miloradovich stood the Guards and cuirassiers in reserve. The main problem with this plan was that it entailed all these columns marching through the forests at night in order to take up their positions for a dawn attack. In addition, in order to achieve surprise, the columns must make no noise and strike at first light. Overall responsibility for planning and executing the army’s movements lay with Karl von Toll and the quartermaster-general’s staff.²²

Orlov-Denisov’s column made its way successfully through the forests to its jumping-off point in the east. Since most of his men were Cossacks their ability to find their way was to be expected. The infantry columns of Baggohufvudt and Ostermann-Tolstoy were less successful. When dawn came Ostermann’s column was nowhere to be seen and only part of Baggohufvudt’s men were in place. When Karl von Toll arrived on the scene and found the columns in confusion he exploded into one of his rages, with Baggohufvudt and the nearest divisional commander, Eugen of Württemberg, as his targets. Karl Baggohufvudt was so infuriated by the insults being rained down not just on him but also on the emperor’s first cousin that he resigned his command and took himself off to the Fourth Jaegers, of which he was colonel-in-chief, vowing to die at their head.

Although the neighbouring columns were not yet in place, Orlov-Denisov could not delay his attack for fear of being spotted once daylight had arrived and the French had finally woken up. He therefore launched his Cossacks against the enemy’s eastern flank, which disintegrated and fled in all directions. To Orlov-Denisov’s left matters went less well for the Russians. Storming out of the forest with the only two jaeger regiments on the spot, Baggohufvudt was immediately killed by a cannon ball. Although the French were initially thrown into confusion by the attack, Murat rallied them and they showed their usual courage and fighting spirit on the battlefield. Eugen of Württemberg and Toll rearranged their troops for a renewed and more coordinated assault, which in the end pushed back the enemy. Further back in the forest was Bennigsen, to whom Kutuzov had devolved overall command of the operation. He too was doing his best to impose order and coordination on the advancing infantry brigades, but his efforts cut across Eugen’s. Meanwhile the confusion confirmed Kutuzov’s doubts about his army’s ability to manoeuvre. He refused to allow even Miloradovich’s corps, let alone the Guards, to attack, despite the fact that the French were badly outnumbered and would almost certainly have been routed.²³