Russia Against Napoleon

Once Kutuzov’s army began to pursue Napoleon, problems of supply were inevitable. The army was moving away from its bases and into an impoverished war zone. Even in Smolensk province, let alone Belorussia and Lithuania, there was every likelihood that food would be impossible to find and that the army would have to feed itself from its own wagons. It required 850 carts to carry a day’s food and forage for an army of 120,000 men and 40,000 horses. To sustain itself for a long period would therefore require many thousands of carts. Even if they could be found, this would not necessarily solve the problem. The horses and drivers of the supply train had to feed themselves as well. In a vicious circle very familiar to pre-modern generals the army’s supply train could end up by eating all the food it was attempting to deliver. The longer it spent on the march, the likelier this was to happen. Moving thousands of carts along side roads in a Russian autumn was bound to be a very slow business, especially if they were travelling in the rear of a huge artillery train. These realities go a long way to explaining Kutuzov’s predicament in the autumn and winter of 1812.³⁸

When the campaign began the men carried three days’ rations, and seven more days of ‘biscuit’ – in other words the dried black bread which was the staple of Russian regiments on the march – were in the regimental carts. This was what the regulations required and Kutuzov insisted that they were fully complied with. Large extra supplies were in the army’s wagon train to the rear of the marching columns. On 17 October the army’s chief victualling officer reported that he had sufficient biscuit to feed 120,000 men for twenty days – in other words until 6 November – and 20,000 quarters of oats for the horses.³⁹

Well before the start of the autumn campaign Kutuzov had attempted to create a large mobile magazine to support the army’s advance. On 27 September orders had gone out to twelve provincial governors to form mobile magazines and send them to the army immediately, stressing that ‘extreme speed’ was crucial. Each magazine was to consist of 408 two-horse carts packed in equal measure with biscuit and groats for the soldiers and oats for their horses. The provincial nobility was to provide most of the food and the carts, as well as the ‘inspectors’ who were to organize and lead the magazines. The governors went through the inevitable process of summoning the noble marshals. As one of them reported to headquarters, ‘without the full cooperation of the marshals of the nobility nothing effective can be done’.⁴⁰

With few exceptions the marshals did everything possible and the nobles volunteered the food and transport needed but the enemy was time and distance. Napoleon would have had to stay in Moscow for an extra month at least for mobile magazines from far-off Penza, Simbirsk and Saratov to arrive in time for the autumn campaign. In fact, however, the autumn campaign started even before the mobile magazines from less distant provinces could arrive. The first half of the Riazan mobile magazine, for instance, set off on 29 October, the first echelon of the Tambov mobile magazine on 7 November. Even these mobile magazines had a considerable journey to the army. Moreover they soon found themselves marching in its wake, behind its vast artillery train and through areas eaten out by the men and horses which had already passed. Soon the supply train began to eat its own food in order to stop men and horses from starving. Stuck in the rear with the supply train was also much of the winter clothing which Kutuzov had ordered the governors of nearby provinces to requisition for the army.⁴¹

In principle the mobile magazines should have been directed along march-routes which would intersect the advance of Kutuzov’s columns. Kutuzov did actually order the intendant-general of the combined First and Second armies, Vasili Lanskoy, to send all supplies from Tula towards the army’s line of march through the southern districts of Smolensk province. Just possibly if Barclay de Tolly and Georg Kankrin had been masterminding supply operations rather than Kutuzov, Konovnitsyn and Lanskoy the arrangements might have been more efficient but the task was difficult. Until the last week of October no one could know along which route Napoleon would retreat or Kutuzov would pursue him. Mobile magazines wrongly directed could fall into enemy hands. Once the campaign had begun the armies never stopped moving. Together with the distances involved, the pre-modern communications and the total inexperience of the noble inspectors who led the mobile magazines, this made coordination of army and supply column movements very hard.⁴²