Russia Against Napoleon

At one level it is absurd to call Leo Tolstoy the main villain in this misunderstanding. A novelist is not a historian. Tolstoy writes about individuals’ mentalities, values and experiences during and before 1812. But War and Peace has had more influence on popular perceptions of Napoleon’s defeat by Russia than all the history books ever written. By denying any rational direction of events in 1812 by human actors and implying that military professionalism was a German disease Tolstoy feeds rather easily into Western interpretations of 1812 which blame the snow or chance for French defeat. By ending his novel in Vilna in December 1812 he also contributes greatly to the fact that both Russians and foreigners largely forget the huge Russian achievement in 1813–14 even in getting their army across Europe to Paris, let alone defeating Napoleon en route. One problem with this is that marginalizing or misunderstanding as crucial an actor as Russia results in serious errors in interpreting why and how Napoleon’s empire fell. But it is also the case that to understand what happened in 1812 it is crucial to realize that Alexander and Barclay de Tolly always planned for a long war, which they expected to begin with a campaign on Russian soil that would exhaust Napoleon but that would end in a Russian advance into Europe and the mobilization of a new coalition of anti-Napoleonic forces.

One key reason why Russia defeated Napoleon was that its leaders out-thought him. In 1812 Napoleon failed to understand Russian society and politics, or to exploit Russia’s internal weaknesses. In the end he ruined his cause by delaying in Moscow in the naive hope that salvation would come from Alexander, the Russian elites or even a Cossack revolt. By contrast, Alexander well understood the strengths and weaknesses of his enemy and used this insight to full effect. Before the invasion he realized exactly what kind of war Napoleon wanted and needed. The Russians planned and executed the opposite kind of war – a drawn-out defensive campaign and a ‘people’s war’ which would play to their strengths and Napoleon’s weaknesses. In the first year of the war Russian strategy succeeded beyond their expectations. Napoleon’s entire army was virtually destroyed. This owed much to luck and to Napoleon’s mistakes. Events certainly did not precisely follow Alexander’s plans. Had they done so, Napoleon would have been stopped and worn down on the river Dvina. But in war events very seldom do go precisely according to plan, particularly in a defensive campaign which necessarily surrenders the initiative to the enemy. Nevertheless the basic Russian concept of ‘deep retreat’ was sound and worked. It would not have done so without luck and enemy mistakes, but the resolution and moral courage of Mikhail Barclay de Tolly was also crucial, as above all were the fortitude, discipline and skill of the Russian rearguards and their commanders.

It should be no surprise to anyone that the Russian army fought with more skill in 1813–14 than in 1812. Even more than in most activities there is a vast difference between training for war and its reality. Experience is a crucial teacher. Whether one looks at low-level tactics – such as the use of jaegers – or at the competence of staffs, there is no doubt that the army of March 1814 was much more formidable than had been the case two years before. In comparison to the disaster of 1806–7 when Bennigsen’s army starved in East Prussia, the performance of Georg Kankrin in feeding and supplying the Russian troops as they crossed almost the whole of Europe was also outstanding. No one who has read accounts of how the army fought at Kulm, Leipzig or Craonne – to take but three examples – could subscribe to old myths about how the soldiers lacked the patriotic motivation they had felt in 1812. This is not to deny that officers and men may have fought with special desperation at Borodino after weeks of retreat and in the Russian heartland. As in most armies, however, the key to performance on the battlefield was usually loyalty to comrades and to one’s unit. In the Russian case this included messmates in the artel but also the regiment, which for so many of these soldiers was their lifetime home.