Russia Against Napoleon

31 Digby Smith, Napoleon against Russia: A Concise History of 1812, Barnsley, 2004, p. 92. M. I. Bogdanovich, Istoriia otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda, 3 vols., SPB, 1859–60, vol. 2, p. 456.

32 I read all the issues of Voennyi zhurnal for 1810–12. It is impossible to cite them all.

33 The two key works on the origins of the general staff are Geisman, Svita, SVM, and N. Glinoetskii, ‘Russkii general’nyi shtab v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra I’, VS, 17/10, Oct. 1874, pp. 187–250 and 17/11, Nov. 1874, pp. 5–43.

34 Volkonsky’s former subordinate, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, damns him with faint praise: A. I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, Memuary 1814–1815, SPB, 2001, pp. 156–7.

35 Glinoetskii, ‘Russkii general’nyi shtab’, VS, 17/11, Nov. 1874, p. 11.

36 RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Ed. Khr. 1, fos. 215 ff.

37 All these statistics are drawn from S. V. Shvedov, ‘Komplektovanie, chislennost’ i poteri russkoi armii v 1812 godu’, in K 175-letiiu Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 g., Moscow, 1987, pp. 120–39. The older statistics provided in Geisman, Vozniknovenie, SVM, p. 298, are higher. As Adam Czartoryski commented, ‘I have so often seen in Russia 100,000 men on paper represented only by 65,000 effectives’: A. Gielgud (ed.), Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski, 2 vols., London, 1888, vol. 2, p. 221.

38 The basic rules on the structure and wartime deployment of regiments are in PSZ, 31, nos. 24400 and 24526, pp. 420–24 and 553–8.

39 The likeliest reason for this was that the Guards veterans companies, the marine regiments and the many other military units and institutions in Petersburg provided a more than sufficient rear cadre so there was no need to leave the second battalions behind.

40 For Alexander’s view, see SIM, 1, no. 56, Alexander to Essen, 3 Aug. 1812 (OS), pp. 46–7. When he arrived in Riga, General von Steinhel supported Essen’s view: ‘The troops here are reserve battalions, weak in numbers and inferior in combat-readiness to front-line units’: SIM, 13, no. 3, Steinhel to Arakcheev, 7 Sept. 1812 (OS), pp. 205–7.

41 For picking one’s way through the complicated changes in policy and nomenclature as regards recruit depots and reserve formations, the outstanding Entsiklopediia on 1812 is immensely useful.

42 The key document on the distribution of the fourth battalions is a memorandum attached to a letter of Alexander to Wittgenstein dated 3 Aug. 1812 (OS): SIM, 1, no. 58, pp. 47–9.

43 On the Noble Regiment, see M. Gol’mdorf, Materialy dlia istorii byvshego Dvorianskago polka, SPB, 1882: the statistics are from p. 137. On attracting officers, see also A. N. Andronikov and V. P. Fedorov, Prokhozhdenie sluzhby, SVM, 4/1/3, SPB, 1903, pp. 2–9, 100–182.

44 N. Shil’der, Imperator Aleksandr pervyi: Ego zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie, 4 vols., SPB, 1897, vol. 3, pp. 98–102. This will be covered in more detail in Ch. 7. The instructions to Lobanov to form twelve new regiments on the basis of voluntary contributions were enclosed in a letter from Barclay of 10 May 1812 (OS): RGVIA, Fond 125, Opis 1/188a, Delo 15, fos. 2–10. Estimates of costs are contained in a letter from the governor of Voronezh to Balashev on 24 June 1812 (OS): RGVIA, Fond 125, Opis 1/188a, Delo 16, fos. 92–3.

45 MVUA 1812, 1/2, no. 1, pp. 1–6.

46 For Wolzogen’s view, see his memorandum of 13 Oct. 1811 (OS) in MVUA 1812, 5, no. 139, Wolzogen to Barclay, pp. 273–9. For the minister’s own view that an offensive strategy was the better option, see e.g. a memorandum by him of Jan. 1811: MVUA 1812, 7, no. 16 (additional), pp. 187–9.

47 MVUA 1812, 2, no. 56, Plan of Military Operations, Feb. 1811, pp. 83–93.

48 Alexander of Württemberg’s useful memorandum is in MVUA 1812, 10, no. 143, pp. 253–75; for Bagration, see e.g. MVUA 1812, 12, no. 103, Bagration to Barclay, 12 June 1812 (OS), pp. 107–9; for Volkonsky, MVUA 1812, 11, no. 260, 29 April 1812 (OS), pp. 324–33.

49 There are very many documents on the difficulties of feeding the troops but see e.g. a report from Barclay to Alexander of 4 April 1812 (OS) in which he states that food and particularly fodder is a great problem, the roads are impassable, he cannot requisition since a state of war has not yet been proclaimed but has no money to buy food, and is keeping sickness rates down so long as the units are well dispersed; MVUA 1812, 11, no. 41, 4 April 1812 (OS), pp. 54–5.

50 Again, there are very many memorandums on this theme in MVUA but the best summary of the problem is in I. G. Fabritsius, Glavnoe inzhenernoe upravlenie, SVM, 7, SPB, 1902.