49 The key sources on Austrian organization and preparations are the first three volumes of Befreiungskrieg
1813 und 1814 authored by O. Criste (Österreichs Beitritt zur Koalition, Vienna, 1913), Wlaschutz (Österreichs entscheidendes Machtaufgebot, Vienna, 1913) and Glaise von Horstenau. See e.g. Horstenau’s comment in Dresden, p. 78. See also, however, a very interesting conversation with Radetsky recorded in Wilson’s diary: A. Brett-James (ed.), General Wilson’s Journal 1812–1814, London, 1964, 20 Aug. 1813, p. 63.50 See e.g. an indignant protest from Vorontsov to Barclay on hearing that he was being subordinated to Bülow, who had become a lieutenant-general one month after Vorontsov himself. Barclay accepted the protest and subordinated him to Winzengerode. RGVIA, Fond 103, Opis 4/210, Sv. 53, Delo 18, fos. 15–16: Vorontsov to Barclay, 9 July 1813 (OS).
51 See e.g. Barclay’s letter to Sacken of 10 Sept. 1813 (OS), one of many such examples: MVUA
1813, 1, p. 202; Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, pp. 145–6.52 Saint-Cyr, Mémoires
, vol. 4, no. 15, Napoleon to Saint-Cyr, 17 Aug. 1813, pp. 365–8.53 Horstenau, Dresden
, pp. 78–117. Brett-James, Wilson’s Journal, p. 165.54 Horstenau, Dresden
, pp. 103, 106–7, 123–4.55 Hon. George Cathcart, Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in
1812 and 1813, London, 1850, p. 29. Langeron, Mémoires, p. 256.56 Horstenau, Dresden
, p. 159; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, p. 69; Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, p. 127. Saint-Cyr, Mémoires, vol. 4, no. 26, Saint-Cyr to Napoleon, 25 Aug. 1813, pp. 383–4.57 A quick guide to Napoleon’s initial plan is conveyed in a letter to the Duc de Bassano of 24 August: Saint-Cyr, Mémoires
, vol. 4, no. 21, 24 Aug. 1813, pp. 377–8.58 Cathcart, Commentaries
, pp. 231–2. Horstenau, Dresden, p. 270.59 Cathcart, Commentaries
, p. 228. On Constantine’s views, see e.g. RA, 1, 1882, pp. 142–54.60 These points are all made by Horstenau, Dresden
, pp. 257–68, 277–86: since he was the official Austrian historian of the campaign he had no reason to exaggerate the failings of Austrian leadership, so one can assume that his judgements are fair. See also Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 76–8.61 Brett-James, Wilson’s Journal
, 30 August 1813, p. 169.62 All the general histories of the campaign go into detail about the crucial events of 26–30 August on the allied right. Apart from Friederich and Bogdanovich, there is a full description in Geschichte der Kämpfe Österreichs: Befreiungskrieg
1813 und 1814, vol. 4: Maximilian Ehnl, Schlacht bei Kulm, Vienna, 1913. Apart from Eugen’s own memoirs, it is also important to read the memoirs of his chief of staff, General von Helldorff: Zur Geschichte der Schlacht bei Kulm, Berlin, 1856. All subsequent histories draw heavily on the three volumes written between 1844 and 1852 by Colonel Aster of the Saxon army about the autumn 1813 campaign. Nevertheless one must go back to Aster himself because his works contain significant details omitted from the later histories: on the events on the right wing, see H. Aster, Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna, Königstein und Priesten im August 1813 und die Schlacht bei Kulm, Dresden, 1845. For obvious reasons it is far harder to find detailed French coverage of these events: Rousset, Grande Armée, for example, says little on the debacle though he does cite important correspondence of Vandamme. Saint-Cyr also publishes useful documents but like all the other French participants is anxious to exonerate himself from blame. Fezensac puts most of the blame on Vandamme though he is also critical of Saint-Cyr and Napoleon. His is the best-informed account from the French side: Souvenirs militaires, Paris, 1863, pp. 403–29.63 The clearest and most detailed description of the intended march-routes is in Horstenau, Dresden
, pp. 293–6.64 There is a useful discussion of this decision in T. von Bernhardi, Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des kaiserlichen russischen Generals der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll
, 5 vols., Leipzig, 1858, vol. 3, book 6, pp. 175–83.