of the German translation of Telpukhovsky's book,
To slow down the German advance on Leningrad, not only were some regular reserve
troops thrown in, especially along the River Luga, but also freshly improvised
civilians had been mobilised, early in July, to dig three lines of trenches, anti-tank ditches, and other, admittedly rudimentary, defences on the approaches to Leningrad. The
"outer" line of defence was along the River Luga.
As it is now openly admitted, no fortifications of any kind existed in that part of Russia; for even though the Soviet Government had been extremely concerned about the security of Leningrad, and had even embarked on its Winter War of 1939-40 to push the Finnish frontier back, "it had never even occurred to anybody before the war that Leningrad might be threatened from the south or southwest".
[IVOVSS, vol. II, p. 210.]
The Germans pushed on relentlessly, and reached the Luga river long before the Russian defences were complete. Nevertheless, by July 10, a long stretch of the Luga Line had been manned by the so-called Luga operational group, consisting of four regular infantry divisions and three divisions of Leningrad
bridgeheads on the north side of the Luga.
Meanwhile, other German forces were overrunning Estonia on the west side of Lake
Peipus. Breaking through to Kunda on the Gulf of Finland east of Tallinn on August 7, the Germans cut off the Russian forces who had retreated to the Estonian capital. Even before that, other German forces had pushed north to Kingisepp along the east bank of Lake Peipus, and the threat to Leningrad had grown immensely. The Germans had forced the Narva river and were not only advancing on the former Russian capital from the
Narva-Kingisepp area, where the Russians had already suffered terrible losses in heavy fighting, and from the Luga area, but were also advancing to the east of Leningrad, both north and south of Lake Ilmen, with the obvious purpose of isolating Leningrad from the east and joining with the Finns on the east side of Lake Ladoga.
In July, the Finns had already struck out in two directions— across the Karelian Isthmus up to the frontier, and to the east of Lake Ladoga, towards Petrozavodsk, on the banks of Lake Onega.
A particularly harrowing episode was the attempt of the Soviet troops marooned at
Tallinn to escape by sea. For over a month they had tried to stop the Germans capturing Tallinn from the south. A large part of the Soviet Baltic Navy was still at Tallinn, and the greatest possible number of troops were to be evacuated by sea. It was a kind of Dunkirk, but without air cover, all available Russian aircraft being concentrated in and around Leningrad, where the situation was already highly critical, as the Germans had by this time practically cut off Leningrad from the east.
At Tallinn there were 20,000 Russian troops, and these, together with the Baltic Navy, had tied up substantial German forces within a radius of ten to twenty miles for over a month. 25,000 civilians were mobilised to strengthen the defences to the south of the city, though how enthusiastic these Estonians were may be questioned.
The Germans started their all-out attack on Tallinn on August 19, but the Russians,
supported by the guns of the coastal defences and warships, were able to hold their
ground for nearly a week. On August 26, however, the Germans broke into the city, and the Russian Supreme Command ordered the evacuation of Tallinn, all the more so as
Leningrad badly needed what troops and ships could still be rescued. After two more
days of intensive street fighting, the convoy of troop transports and warships sailed from Tallinn harbour. The Germans claimed that "not a single ship" would be able to leave Tallinn; but, according to the Russians, "most" of the ships, including the flag-ship