Russia at war 1941-1945

In his statement to us at Viazma in the middle of September, General Sokolovsky had

made three important points: first, that despite terrible setbacks the Red Army was

gradually "grinding down" the Wehrmacht; secondly that it was very likely that the Germans would make one last desperate attempt, or even "several last desperate

attempts" to capture Moscow, but they would fail in this; and, thirdly, that the Red Army was well-clothed for a winter campaign.

The impression that the Russians were rapidly learning all kinds of lessons, were

dismissing as useless some of the pre-war theories, which were wholly inapplicable to prevailing conditions, and that professional soldiers of the highest order were taking over the command from the Army "politicians" and the "civil war legends" like Budienny and Voroshilov was to be confirmed in the next few weeks. Some brilliant soldiers had

survived the Army Purges of 1937-8, notably Zhukov and Shaposhnikov, and had

continued at their posts during the worst time of the German invasion; Zhukov had

literally saved Leningrad in the nick of time by taking over from Voroshilov when all seemed lost. Apart from him and Shaposhnikov, Timo-shenko—a first-class staff officer who had started his career in the Tsar's army—was almost the only one of the pre-war top brass to prove a man of ability and imagination.

The first months of the war had been a school of the greatest value to the officers of the Red Army, and it was above all those who had distinguished themselves in the operations of June to October 1941 who were to form that brilliant pléiade of generals and marshals the like of whom had not been seen since Napoleon's Grande Armée. In the course of the summer and autumn important changes had been made in the organisation of the air force by General Novikov, and in the use of artillery by General Voronov; both Zhukov and

Konev had played a leading role in holding up the Germans at Smolensk; Rokossovsky,

Vatutin, Cherniakhovsky, Rotmistrov, Boldin, Malinovsky, Fedyuninsky, Govorov,

Meretskov, Yeremenko, Belov, Lelushenko, Bagramian and numerous other men, who

were to become famous during the Battle of Moscow or in other important battles in

1941, were men who had, as it were, won their spurs in the heavy fighting during the first months of the war. Distinction in the field now became Stalin's criterion in making top army appointments. It is, indeed, perfectly true that "the summer and autumn battles had brought on a military purge, as opposed to a political purge of the military. There was a growing restlessness with the incompetent and the inept. The great and signal strength of the Soviet High Command was that it was able to produce that minimum of high calibre commanders capable of steering the Red Army out of total disaster".

[Erickson, op. cit., p. 624.]

Undoubtedly some of the commanders had only a purely nominal Party affiliation, and

some of the new men, such as Rokossovsky, had actually been victims of the Army

Purges of 1937-8, and so could not have had any tender feelings for Stalin.

The Stavka, the General Headquarters of the Soviet High Command was set up on June 23, and a few days later the State Defence Committee (GKO), consisting of Stalin,

Molotov, Voro-shilov, Malenkov and Beria; on July 10 the "Stavka of the High Command" became the "Stavka of the Supreme Command", with Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budienny, Shaposhnikov and General Zhukov, the Chief of Staff, as

members. On July 19 Stalin became Defence Commissar and on August 7 Commander-

in-Chief.

The Commissar system was greatly reinforced; the commissars, as "representatives of the Party and the government in the Red Army" were to watch over the officers' and soldiers'

morale, and share with the commander full responsibility for the unit's conduct in battle.

They were also to report to the Supreme Command any cases of "unworthiness" amongst either officers or political personnel. This was a hangover from the civil war, and, indeed, from the much more recent period when the officer corps was suspected of unreliability.

In practice, in 1941, the commissars proved, in the great majority of cases, to be either men who almost fully supported the officers, or were, at most, a minor technical

nuisance; but inspired by the same lutte à outrance spirit, and, faced daily by pressing military tasks, the old political and personal differences between officer and commissar were now usually less harsh than in the past. Even so, the dual command had its

drawbacks, and, at the time of Stalingrad, the commissars' role was to be drastically modified.

Whether or not there was any serious need for giving the officer a "Party whip", there was certainly even less need for the NKVD's "rear security units" to check panic through the use of machine-gunners ready to keep the Red Army from any unauthorised