Russia at war 1941-1945

that it is in Britain's interest to do without certain things and to give them to Russia... He and Eden are said to be the most whole-hearted pro-Russians in the

Cabinet now. At the little press conference yesterday he was bursting with

exuberance. Slapping his knees he was saying that the Russians were pleased with

Beaverbrook, and the Americans were pleased with Beaverbrook— "Now, aren't

they, Averell?" to which Harriman replied: "Sure, you bet." ... Beaverbrook is praising Stalin up to the skies... I imagine he has been genuinely impressed by

Stalin's practical mind, his organising ability, and his qualities as a national leader...

At the Kremlin banquet last night, cold and sceptical Molotov made an unusually

warm speech.. .

[Alexander Werth, Moscow "41 (London, 1942), pp. 226-7. Beaverbrook's attitude to Russia had manifested itself much earlier as is borne out by the Harry Hopkins Papers on Churchill's famous "pro-Russian" broadcast of June 22: "He conferred that day principally with Beaverbrook and Sir Stafford Cripps... Although one would hardly have expected it of him, Beaverbrook was a vehement supporter of immoderate and unstinted aid to the Soviet Union and was subsequently an ardent, persistent and sometimes (to Churchill) embarrassing proponent of the Second Front. At the urging of these two men, as well as his own inclination, Churchill went on the air that Sunday with one of his most powerful speeches." (Sherwood, op. cit., p. 305.)]

The impression Beaverbrook gave of the Moscow visit not only to the correspondents on the spot, but also to Churchill in his dispatch of October 4—"the effect of this agreement has been an immense strengthening of the morale of Moscow"—and the comments made by the Russians seem wholly at variance with the account given after the war by

Churchill:

Their reception was bleak and discussions not at all friendly. It might almost have been thought that the plight in which the Soviets now found themselves was our fault. (They) gave no information of any kind. They did not even inform them of the basis on which Russian needs of our precious war materials had been estimated. The Mission was given no formal entertainment until almost the last night... It might almost have been that it was we who had come to ask favours.

[Churchill, op. cit., p. 416.]

There is no doubt that at the time the Russians were extremely pleased with the political significance of the conference and the propaganda capital they could make of it and that they were anxiously looking forward to the long term prospect of American help on a

large scale. On the other hand the British deliveries that were immediately available were, of course, a mere drop in the bucket.

[Churchill's message to Stalin of October 6, promised that the convoy, due to arrive at Archangel on October 12, would carry twenty heavy tanks and 193 fighter planes, the

convoy due on October 29 140 heavy tanks, 100 fighter planes (Hurricanes), 200 Bren

carriers, 200 anti-tank rifles and 50 two-pounder guns]

Even if "the reception was bleak"—although Beaverbrook then gave the very opposite impression—it is more than probable that the news from the front had something to do with it. While Beaverbrook and Harriman were still in Moscow, the great German

offensive against Moscow had started, first in the Briansk and three days later in the Viazma sector. Whatever the future value of the Economic Conference was to be, the

Battle of Moscow had to be won by the Russians alone with what was left of their

operational equipment.

While Soviet diplomatic activity was chiefly concerned with the establishment of closer relations with Britain and the USA, the German invasion had created a number of

additional diplomatic problems. Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Italy were now in a state of war with the Soviet Union, and Churchill was reluctant to declare war on Hungary, Rumania and especially on Finland; indeed, the problem of Finland was to lead to some considerable Anglo-Soviet friction.