Russia at war 1941-1945

In planning the gigantic enterprise of 1943 it was not possible for us to lay aside all other duties. Our first Imperial duty was to defend India... To allow the Germans and Japanese to join hands in India or the Middle East involved a measureless

disaster to the allied cause. It ranked in my mind almost as the equal of the

retirement of Soviet Russia behind the Urals, or even of their making a separate

peace with Germany. At this date [spring 1942] I did not deem either of these

contingencies likely, [but] our Indian Empire... might fall an easy prey... Hitler's subjugation of Soviet Russia would be a much longer and, to him, more costly task.

Before it was accomplished the Anglo-American command of the air would have

been established beyond challenge. Even if all else failed this would be finally

decisive...

[ Churchill, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 288.]

Roosevelt was extremely sceptical about "any junction between Japanese and Germans"

and was, like General Marshall, more favourable than Churchill to an attempt to open a Second Front in France in 1942.

That was certainly the impression that Molotov brought back from his visits to

Washington and London in May-June 1942, and the present-day Soviet History makes the most of the fact that Roosevelt twice assured Molotov that the Second Front would be opened in 1942, and that General Marshall told him that the USA had every possibility of opening such a front. According to Hopkins, however, what Roosevelt had twice told

Molotov was that he expected a Second Front to be opened in 1942. Hopkins also records that "Marshall felt that the sentence about the Second Front [which Molotov had drafted for the communiqué] was too strong, and urged that there be no reference to 1942", adding: "I called this particularly to the President's attention but he, nevertheless, wished to have it included".

The public statement issued on June 11 therefore included the sentence:

"In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent task of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942."

Now the fat was in the fire. Although Churchill discreetly omits to mention Roosevelt's responsibility for this statement, and felt forced to subscribe to it on Molotov's return from Washington to London, he insisted on handing to Molotov the now well-known

aide-memoire saying, inter alia:

It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes. We can therefore give no promise in the

matter, but, provided that it appears sound and sensible, we shall not hesitate to put our plans into effect.

[Sherwood, op. cit., p. 582, and Churchill, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 305. Churchill underlines the words "We can therefore give no promise in the matter"]

The plan in question, as we know, concerned "a landing on the Continent in August or September 1942", and Molotov's great hope was that "at least forty German divisions"

would be drawn off from the Russian front.

At the ceremony in London on May 26 at which the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was signed very warm speeches were made by Molotov and Eden, both of whom stressed the great

importance of the alliance, not only during the war, but also after the war. For all that, Churchill's attitude continued to be somewhat reserved. According to both the Russians and Americans, relations between Molotov and Roosevelt were much more friendly than

between Molotov and Churchill.

[Many anecdotes were told both then and later about Molotov's week-end at Chequers.