Russia at war 1941-1945

troops, supported by large numbers of tanks and aircraft, struck a powerful blow at our 9th Army in the Slaviansk and Barvenkovo areas on May 17. Our troops had to

withdraw to the left bank of the Donets, thus exposing the flank of the Soviet shock troops advancing on Kharkov. By cutting the communications of our troops

advancing on Kharkov, the Germans placed these in an extremely difficult position, and they were forced, with very heavy fighting, to withdraw to the east, suffering serious casualties in the process.

[Telpukhovsky, op. cit., p. 119.]

The more recent History is much more explicit about this episode: it says that the advance on Kharkov was persisted in at the demand of Stalin, and despite the protests of Khrushchev, who saw that these troops were walking into a trap. Further, it tells how the Russian tank reserves were thrown in too late to save the situation. Finally, it admits that a large number of Russian troops were encircled, and that in the hard-fought attempts to break out "many brave men" died, including the deputy commander of the South-West Front, Lt. Gen. Kostenko, the commander of the 6th Army, Lt. Gen. Gorodnyansky, the

commander of the 57th Army, Lt. Gen. Podlas and many other high-ranking officers.

Although many of the troops broke out by escaping across the Donets, others continued to fight in the encirclement until May 30.

The offensive against Kharkov which had begun so successfully, thus ended in the

rout of three armies of the South-Western and Southern Front.

[ IVOVSS, vol. 2, p. 415.]

The History also mentions the fact that, as a member of the War Council of the South-Western Front, Khrushchev urged Stalin to stop the advance on Kharkov and to

concentrate the Russian forces on smashing the German counter-offensive. But Stalin

insisted on the Russians continuing their advance on Kharkov—"which," says the History, "complicated the situation still further."

[ IVOVSS, vol. 2, p. 414.]

Whether this is strictly true or not (and one must remember that the History was written after the XXth Congress, and goes out of its way to magnify Khrushchev's role in the war at Stalin's expense), it is interesting to note that this particular episode was dealt with at considerable length in Khrushchev's "Secret Report" at the XXth Congress in February 1956. The main points he made were these:

When an exceptionally serious situation developed in the Kharkov area, we

correctly decided to drop the operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov...

We informed Stalin that the situation demanded changes in the operational plans...

Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion and ordered that the

Kharkov operation be continued, although by this time many of our army units

were themselves threatened with encirclement and extermination...

I telephoned Vassilevsky (the Chief of Staff) and begged him to explain the situation to Comrade Stalin. Vassilevsky replied, however, that Comrade Stalin did not wish to hear any more about this operation... I then telephoned Stalin at his villa.

Malenkov answered the phone. I said I wanted to speak to Stalin personally. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov... I asked again