Russia at war 1941-1945

That many "Ognevs" had been exiled and even shot in the 1937-8 Purge is, needless to say, not even alluded to in Korneichuk's play. Rokossovsky, for one, was well aware of it; and that may be why he (and many other officers) did not care for the play. They felt, moreover, that it produced some awkward discussions among the troops themselves, and caused some disrespectful questions to be asked. Paradoxically, the play was, on the one hand, a Party-versus-Army demonstration, but, on the other, an exaltation of the

professional soldier at the expense of the old civil war hack with his more "revolutionary"

tradition.

The full restoration of the officer's "single command" was contained in the ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 9, which abolished the Institute of the

Political Commissars in the Red Army. The ukase, alluding to the friction that often used to arise inside an army unit between the officer and the commissar, especially during the hard weeks of the retreat, explained that there was now no further need for political commissars in the old sense; they had originally been introduced during the Civil War to keep an eye on the officers, many of whom had belonged to the old Tsarist Army and

"who did not believe in the strength of the Soviet regime and were even alien to it."

Without as much as alluding to the reduced rôle of the commissars under Tukhachevsky, and the "politisation" of the Army after the purges, the abolition of "dual command" in 1940, at Timo-shenko's insistence, and its reintroduction once more at the beginning of the German invasion in 1941, the ukase merely said that, since the Civil War, a large number of officers had been trained under Soviet conditions, and that, during the present war, "an enormous number of new and experienced officers have emerged; they have acquired the greatest experience, have proved their devotion to their country, and have grown in stature both militarily and politically."

On the other hand the commissars and political workers have greatly increased

their military knowledge; some of them have already been given commanding

posts ... while others may be employed as officers right away, or after a certain period of military training... In the circumstances, there is no longer any reason for having political commissars in the Red Army. What is more, the perpetuation of the Institute of Political Commissars may act as an obstacle in achieving the best resultsin the command of the troops; this, in itself, would put the commissars in a false andawkward position. The time has therefore come for establishing complete Single

Command, and for placing upon the officer the sole responsibility for military

decisions..,

Thus dual control was abolished; the commissar was turned into the officer's "deputy in the political field"; he was also an officer, but usually of junior rank and was, above all, in charge of political education, propaganda, welfare, etc. The important thing was that he could no longer interfere with the officer's decisions, least of all with his operational decisions.

Another great practical advantage of this reform, after the terrible losses suffered since June 1941, was the great increase, within a short time, in officer cadres drawn from the ranks of ex-commissars, most of whom had had first-hand experience of the war.

The ukase replaced the "institute" of political commissars and political instructors (the opposite numbers of the n.c.o.'s) by an "institute" of "deputy-commanders in the political field in army units, staffs, sub-units, military schools, and in the central... offices of the People's Commissariat for Defence..."

The Red Star editorial of October 11 pointed out that numerous commissars had had a gallant war record; there had been many cases when an officer was killed or wounded, and the commissar took over his duties. Many such commissars had already been given