Russia at war 1941-1945

1914. It is in the interests of both Germany and Russia to avoid a mutual massacre for the benefit of the Western democracies.

[ IVOVSS, ibid., quoting Soviet Ministry of Defence Archives.]

Schulenburg then proposed to Russia a non-aggression pact, complete with a protocol on the respective spheres of interest. Again the Soviet Government " declined ", and Schulenburg, much discouraged, reported to Berlin that the Soviet Government took

treaty obligations very seriously and expected the same attitude from its co-signatories.

[This does not tally with the German version, which says that Molotov first mentioned a non-aggression pact on August 15. The date is important. It was four days after the

arrival of the Drax Mission about whose "seriousness" the Russians were now very doubtful. See W. R. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London, 1960), p. 521.]

By now the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks had, indeed, reached a deadlock, both on

"numerical reciprocity" and, more immediately, on the Polish issue; and when, on August 20, Hitler sent his famous telegram to Stalin asking him to receive Ribbentrop "on Tuesday, August 22 or, at the latest, on Wednesday, August 23 ", and saying that Ribbentrop would arrive with full powers for signing the non-aggression pact, "as well as the protocol", Stalin agreed.

It should, however, be remembered that, apart from the political soundings undertaken by the Germans in both Berlin and Moscow, there were also the trade negotiations which ran parallel with the political soundings, and had, of course, some bearing on them. Indeed, it was by announcing the Trade Agreement with Germany on August 21 that the Soviet

Government prepared the ground for the much more spectacular and, to many, almost

unbelievable announcement that was to come three days later. But the wording of the

Pravda editorial of August 21 accompanying the announcement of the Trade Agreement was significant enough to anyone who could read between the lines—and, in this case, it did not even require outstanding political acumen to do so.

Shirer is probably quite right in saying that it was on August 19 that Stalin made his choice, unless it was on the 20th, after the receipt of Hitler's personal telegram.

The best conclusion this writer can come to is that, as of August 14, when

Voroshilov demanded "an unequivocal answer" on the question of allowing Soviet troops to meet the Germans in Poland, the Kremlin still had an open mind as to

which side to join... At any rate, Stalin does not seem to have made his final decision until the afternoon of August 19.

[ Shirer, op. cit., p. 535.]

On the 19th, the Soviet press was, on the face of it, still violently anti-Nazi. It made it quite apparent that a German attack on Poland was now almost certainly a matter of days.

Thus, Pravda of August 19 still published a TASS message from Warsaw under the heading: "GERMAN PROVOCATIONS IN DANZIG", and a TASS message from

Berlin, under the heading: "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY":

The Völkischer Beobachter today prominently displayed comments in the Italian press to the effect that the tension between Germany and Poland "can no longer be settled by a mere settlement of the Danzig question". All German papers are trying to present Poland as an "aggressor", and as the creator of "an intolerablesituation". Britain and France are being attacked with special violence. In itseditorial, the Völkischer Beobachter says: "The problem of Danzig and the Corridorare ripe for a German solution." The papers are openly threatening war. "Everyday that's wasted." says the Völkischer Beobachter, "increases the danger of war."