The most famous case of urban resistance was that of the Young Guard in the mining
town of Krasnodon in the Donbas; but this act of collective patriotism and martyrdom was by no means unique, any more than was that of Zoya who was hanged by the
Germans in a village outside Moscow, in December 1941, and became, like the
Krasnodon Heroes, a national symbol. The build-up of national heroes and martyrs was very much of a lottery; many fought and died, and never became famous.
At the height of the partisan movement, in 1943—4, there were at least half-a-million armed partisans in the Soviet Union. How many partisans and how many persons
"associated" with them lost their lives in combat, or as a result of the German punitive expeditions is very hard to say; but in Belorussia alone about a million persons are estimated to have been killed in the course of the partisan war.
[ For further details see John A. Armstrong (ed.)
of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1964.)]
Chapter XII PARADOXES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN
1943—THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI —THE "FREE GERMAN
COMMITTEE"
On October 1943 the foreign ministers of the Big Three—Molotov, Cordell Hull and
Eden—met in Moscow; this meeting was, among other things, intended to prepare the
ground for the "Summit" at Teheran a month later. But during a great part of 1943, before clear decisions had been taken to hold these two conferences, the Soviet attitude to the Western Allies remained puzzling and full of apparent contradictions. This attitude was partly, at any rate, determined by what was happening at the time on the Russian Front.
At the time of Stalingrad, Stalin had been full of praise for the Anglo-American landing in North Africa; in February, with the Germans about to start their Kharkov counter-offensive, he began complaining again of the absence of a Second Front. Then, in March, partly in response to Admiral Standby's complaint about Russian ingratitude, the Soviet press started playing up Western aid, and the breach with the London Poles was followed, as we have seen, by rapturous accounts of the Allied achievements in North Africa. Soon afterwards came the dissolution of the Comintern, a gesture intended to impress Western opinion.
One cannot, however, escape the impression that this great cordiality shown to the Allies had something to do with the situation on the Eastern Front: on the eve of the Nazi
offensive at Kursk, the Soviet public were very anxious, and, for once, it was apparently thought expedient to magnify, rather than minimise, the Western war effort.
But, as we know from the Stalin-Churchill correspondence during that period, relations were in reality far from cordial. Churchill tried to cheer Stalin with stories of 400-bomber raids on Essen (March 13); but, while not denying the value of such raids, Stalin was not satisfied. On March 15 he complained of major operations in North Africa again being postponed, and said that "Husky", the planned landing in Sicily, "can't possibly replace the second front in France."
The Soviet troops [he wrote] fought strenuously all winter. Hitler is taking all
measures to rehabilitate and reinforce his army for the spring and summer. A great blow from the west is essential. There is grave danger in delaying the Second Front in France.
Churchill went on sending him messages about "1,050 tons of bombs we've flung on Berlin" (March 28).
Stalin thanked him for the information and then graciously added (or was he being
heavily ironical?):
Last night with my colleagues I saw
—who allege that Britain is not fighting but merely looks on.
But a few days later he blew up, after Churchill had told him that there would, for the present, be no more Arctic convoys, with the Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Lützow around. "I consider the step as catastrophic," Stalin wrote on April 2. "The Pacific and the Southern
[Iran] routes can't make up for it."
Again Churchill wrote (April 6) of 348 aircraft over Essen; Stalin welcomed the