Russia at war 1941-1945

was convinced the Russians would be there by August 2; and with tremendous

enthusiasm they joined in..."

Rawicz was in a state of great emotion as he spoke about Warsaw and its destruction and there were tears in his eyes as he mentioned his wife and daughter, who were "still there", in that burning inferno. He reckoned that 200,000 people had already been slaughtered.

It was all tragic, and a little mystifying. Had these two men really acted in good faith (I felt that they had) in their attempt to avert the disaster? Were they, as London was later to call them, deserters from the AK cause?

*

According to the History:

At the beginning of September, with the Germans having now turned their main attention to our bridgeheads on the west side of the Vistula, we were able to concentrate

sufficiently large forces which ... finally captured Praga on September 14. Thus, there was a considerable improvement in the Warsaw sector of the front, and there was now a good prospect of giving direct support to the Warsaw Rising. This was the task with

which the 1st Polish Army [under General Beding] was entrusted. On September 15 it

entered Praga, and began to prepare the forcing of the Vistula and the establishment of bridgeheads in Warsaw itself.

After describing this operation, carried out with the help of amphibious vehicles, and supported by Russian artillery and aircraft, the History then goes on to say that between September 16 and 19, six battalions crossed the Vistula, that the Polish soldiers and officers fought heroically, but that they were helpless against the very heavy fortifications from which the Germans were able to prevent any extension of the bridgehead.

Moreover, the insurgents failed to co-ordinate their actions with the Polish forces on the bridgehead. On September 21 German tanks and infantry attacked in strength, splitting up the bridgehead and inflicting very heavy casualties on the Poles. On September 23 the Poles had to evacuate the bridgeheads and return to the east bank of the Vistula, suffering very heavy losses.

Such is the present Russian version of the abortive "Berling operation" undertaken (according to the "London" Poles) on Berling's own initiative and without Russian support. After its failure, Berling was recalled to Moscow "for further training".

Quoting Soviet Ministry of Defence archives, the History then gives a long and impressive list of arms, food and other material dropped on Warsaw by the Soviet air force between September 14 and October 1, the eve of Bör-Komarowski's capitulation.

There were altogether over 2,000 Soviet sorties over Warsaw.

The History also dwells on the very heavy Russian casualties in the fighting in Poland during that period. Thus, between August 1 and September 15 the 1st Belorussian Front lost 166,000 men (killed and wounded) and the 2nd Ukrainian Front (in August only)

122,000 men.

Finally, when the position in Warsaw had become completely hopeless, says the History, the Red Army command proposed to the Warsaw insurgents, to fight their way across the Vistula under Russian artillery and aircraft protection; but only a small number of

Warsaw fighters took advantage of this offer.

In conclusion, the History quotes Gomulka's merciless indictment of the AK leadership in Warsaw who "committed a fearful crime against the Polish people by launching the insurrection without previous co-ordination with the Red Army command."

Such is the present-day Russian—and Gomulka—version of the Warsaw tragedy. It

evades the awkward questions of the Moscow radio appeals at the end of July to the

people of Warsaw to "rise" (though it criticises the Swit broadcasts) and the Russians'

refusal to let supply planes from the West land on Soviet airfields.

[The Swit broadcasts were those of the "pro-London" Poles.]

But the really crucial question is whether the Russians could have forced the Vistula at Warsaw in either August or September; and on this the Russian evidence to the contrary seems impressive, reinforced as it is by the opinion of General Guderian who wrote:

It may be assumed that the Soviet Union had no interest in seeing these (pro-

London) elements strengthened by a successful uprising and by the capture of their capital... But be that as it may, an attempt by the Russians... to cross the Vistula at Deblin on July 25 failed, with the loss of thirty tanks... We Germans had the

impression that it was our defence which halted the enemy rather than a Russian

desire to sabotage the Warsaw uprising.

And then: