Russia at war 1941-1945

"Our demands are minimal. In our talks with Tanner and Paasi-kivi we proposed a mutual assistance pact on the lines of those signed with the other Baltic States. The Finns said they were neutral; so we did not insist. What we are asking for is only a small area of a few dozen kilometres north-west of Leningrad, in return for which we are willing to give them an area twice that size. We are also asking for a naval base at the western end of the Gulf of Finland. We have now a naval base at Baltiski in Estonia on the south side of the gulf; we want a similar base on the north side." Molotov argued that these demands were eminently reasonable, and regretted that the Finns were being difficult.

[From the Finnish point of view these Russian demands did not look as trivial as Molotov tried to suggest, and events were soon to show that the Finns had good grounds for

mistrusting Russia's intentions.]

He then briefly dealt with Japan, saying that between May and mid-September there had been heavy fighting in the Far East. Japan had wanted to annex a part of Mongolia; but if England's guarantee to Poland was a scrap of paper, the Soviet Union's guarantee to the Mongolian People's Republic was not. On September 15 peace had been restored

between Japan and the Soviet Union.

In conclusion he remarked that the United States Government had lifted its embargo on arms to belligerent nations, and this, he said, "aroused legitimate doubts". This complaint fitted, of course, the official line that not Germany, but Britain and France were now the

"aggressors". This argument was illustrated a few days later by another Kukryniksy cartoon in Pravda showing British and French generals and capitalists in top hats queuing up for armaments in front of "Uncle Sam's Bargain Basement".

Molotov's speech of October 31, 1939 marks the end of the first phase of the Soviet-

German "honeymoon". The recovery by the Soviet Union of Western Belorussia and the Western Ukraine— including some areas, such as Lwow, which had never been part of

the old Russian Empire—suggested to many Russians that, from a national point of view, the rapprochement with Nazi Germany could have some distinct advantages. It is true that all these annexations were mixed up with "acute problems of our country's security"

as Molotov had said, and this could primarily refer only to a potential danger from Nazi Germany. Nevertheless there was a widespread feeling in the country that "neutrality"

paid; that as a result of the Soviet-German Pact the Soviet Union had become bigger and, as yet without too much bloodshed, more secure.

Following the partition of Poland, the western frontier of the Soviet Union had been moved several hundred miles further west; the Baltic States had been "neutralised"

through the establishment of Soviet military bases there. There was, of course, that threat to Leningrad left which had now to be dealt with.

The "liberation" of Eastern Poland, with its 700 Russian dead, had been one of the cheapest wars ever fought and gave the pleasant illusion of the Red Army's invincibility.

The Finnish war, with its enormous casualties (48,000 Russian dead alone) was to raise some highly awkward questions about the Red Army's overwhelming power and

efficiency. Politically, the Finnish war could not, as we shall see, have been handled—at least in its initial stages—more ineptly than it was.

Chapter IV FROM THE FINNISH WAR TO THE GERMAN

INVASION OF FRANCE

The Russians considered the Finnish frontier, running only twenty miles north-west of Leningrad, a potential threat to Russia's second largest city. The Russians, as Molotov said in his speech of October 31, were "only" asking that the frontier be pushed back "a few dozen kilometres", while a much larger area was to be given to Finland further north in return for this concession. Moreover, the Russians, anxious to control the Gulf of Finland and so to protect Leningrad and its sea route, had asked for a naval base, i.e. for the port of Hangö on the north side of the Gulf.

[ In 1945, Paasikivi and Kekkonen, both future presidents of Finland, who had favoured accommodation with the Russians, told me that they had considered the Russian

proposals moderate and understandable, and maintained that the war could have been

avoided had their policy prevailed.]

The negotiations continued for two months, until at the end of November there was a

frontier incident, real or imaginary. Despite Finnish denials the Russians claimed that the Finns had shelled the Soviet border killing several Russian soldiers. The Russians

demanded that the Finnish Army withdraw twenty or twenty-five kilometres from the

frontier. The Finnish Government denied that the incident had occurred and refused to comply. On November 29 Molotov sent a note to Irje Koskinen, the Finnish Minister in Moscow, in which he declared: