occasion it was almost equally prominently reported that some of the most famous
Russian singers and musical performers had given a special concert in Bucharest in
honour of King Michael and the Dowager Queen Helen and that, after the concert, the
artistes, as well as many eminent Soviet scientists who were there, were presented to
"Their Majesties".
Among other friendly gestures during that summer was the conferring by Marshal
Zhukov of the Order of Victory on Eisenhower and Montgomery; the compliment was
returned when Montgomery conferred the G.C.B. on Zhukov, the K.C.B. on
Rokossovsky, the O.B.E. on Sokolovsky and Malinin, and so on.
On the other hand, there was a good deal of unpleasantness of one kind or another. The Soviet press showed much indignation over Field-Marshal Alexander's "insolent and insulting" behaviour to the Yugoslavs at Trieste.
[Tito had tried to annex Trieste and Istria, which met with sharp opposition from
Churchill and Truman. Although Alexander was at first friendly to the Yugoslavs, he
later sharply opposed them on Churchill's instructions, and on one occasion even
compared Tito to Hitler and Mussolini, much to Stalin's indignation. (See Churchill, op.
cit., vol. IV, pp. 480-8). Later, in 1948, at the time of the Stalin-Tito quarrel, the Russians made a complete about-turn and accused the Yugoslavs of having behaved provocatively and irresponsibly and of nearly having dragged the Soviet Union into an unwanted war with the Western Allies by trying to grab Trieste.]
There had also been, as already said, some angry recrimination on the part of the
Russians about Churchill's "suspect patronage" of the "Flensburg Government". There were, further, some angry protests over the temporary arrest, in northern Italy, of Nenni and Togliatti, and a good deal of recrimination about British policy in Greece. Much was made, of course, of the leading part played by the communists in both the Italian and the French Resistance, but, for all that, the Russian attitude to the French, Italian and other Western Communist parties remained somewhat vague. Downright revolutionary
activities on their part were not encouraged; instead, both while the war lasted and for two years after, they were urged to "co-operate" with the bourgeois parties—and in France, with de Gaulle in particular—and to make their influence felt both in parliament and in the administration.
[The most striking example of communist "appeasement"
"national unity", and with the defeat of Germany as No. 1 objective. Thorez's move, obviously taken with
Stalin's approval, if not simply on his instructions, annoyed a great part of the communist rank-and-file, and also some leaders like Marty and Tillon (the latter had been highly prominent in the Resistance inside France), both of whom were later to be charged by the communist leadership with irresponsible revolutionary romanticism and
Similarly, Thorez declared that the Liberation Committees that had emanated from the Resistance must not try to "substitute themselves" for the Governments. (See the author's
Only time would show how influential they could become.
(d)
Poland—always Poland!—continued to be the most acute problem between Russia and
the Western Allies in the early summer of 1945. Even before entering Poland proper, that is, in Western Belorussia and Lithuania, the Red Army had met with some armed
resistance and sabotage from the "London" Polish underground, the
assassinated by Poles; the
underground and by the Church.
In January 1945, on instructions from London, the