demanding an "immediate solution" of the question concerning the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. It also demanded the transfer to the Soviet Union of Northern
Bukovina which was ethnically Ukrainian. An additional argument concerning Northern
Bukovina was that "in November 1918 the People's Assembly
Davidescu, the Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow, declared, on the following day, his
government's "readiness" to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government; but the latter demanded a "Clear and precise" answer. This came almost immediately, and on June 28 the Red Army began to move into the two areas.
On June 23 Germany had been informed of the Soviet demands on Rumania, "but had to declare that she was not interested in the question of Bessarabia". As the
"While the Battle of France was going on, it was particularly undesirable for the Germans to complicate their relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Germans feared that, in the event of a Soviet-Rumanian conflict, Rumania might lose her oilwells, while
Germany was extremely anxious that these should remain intact".
For hard-boiled "realism" the Russian conduct in this case was hard to beat. The
(IVOVSS, I, p. 281). Rumania joined the Axis in November 1940.]
*
During the few days separating the occupation of the Baltic States and of Bessarabia-Bukovina, a number of other significant things happened. On June 25 it was announced that diplomatic relations had been established between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Milan Gabrilovic was appointed Ambassador to Moscow and V. A. Plotnikov
Ambassador to Belgrade.
But that was not all. On the following day came a real bombshell of another kind—the
enterprise or office, and there could no longer be any migration of labour. The
offences.
Needless to say, countless "spontaneous" meetings of workers were reported from all over the country, all approving the
Speaking at a plenary session of the Soviet Trade Union Federation on June 25, N. M.
Shveraik said: "We are living in a capitalist encirclement and the war is raging over great areas. It is our good fortune not to be in the war, but we must be prepared for all
emergencies. We must do all we can to be many times stronger than we are; we must in every way and at any moment be ready to face every possible ordeal."
After the fall of France, it was only too clear to everybody that there was only one country from which these "ordeals" could now come. It was certainly not England, and not even Japan. And Shvernik went on: "Comrades, as Comrade Stalin has taught us, the most dangerous thing in the world is to be caught unawares. To be caught unawares
means falling a victim to the unexpected. Today the international situation demands from us that we strengthen the defence of our country and the might of our armed forces day after day."
During that historic week, the coverage of events in the West showed a slight, if only very slight, pro-British bias. Churchill's speeches saying Britain would fight till final victory, were duly reported, and, as early as June 21, there was a first mention in the Russian press of de Gaulle and his refusal to surrender to the Germans. On the other hand, Pétain was reported as calling for the termination of the war between Germany and Britain; and the Soviet press also published the Franco-German armistice terms, and the report of the German High Command on the French campaign: 27,000 Germans killed,
18,000 missing, 111,000 wounded. Prisoners taken: 1,900,000, including five army
commanders.
The fact that German losses were only about half of what had been the Russian losses in the "little" Finnish War cannot have passed unobserved. The secret hope that Germany would have found herself greatly weakened by her war in the West had been dashed to
the ground. Now, for the first time, the Russians heard names bandied about which,
before long, were to acquire so ominous a ring: Rundstedt, Kleist, Guderian.
For all that, the pretence that relations with Germany were good had still to be kept up.