Russia at war 1941-1945

is not offering it any new and closer understanding; there have been no such talks.

2) According to Soviet information, Germany is also unswervingly observing the

conditions of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, just as the USSR is doing.

Therefore, in the opinion of Soviet circles, the rumours of Germany's intention to tear up the Pact and to undertake an attack on the USSR are without any

foundation. As for the transfer to the northern and eastern areas of Germany of

troops during the past weeks, since the completion of their tasks in the Balkans, such troop movements are, one must suppose, prompted by motives which have no

bearing on Soviet-German relations.

3) As is clear from her whole peace policy, the USSR intends to observe the

conditions of the Soviet-German Pact, and any talk of the Soviet Union preparing

for war is manifestly absurd.

4) The summer rallies now taking place among Red Army reservists and the

coming manœuvres have no purpose other than the training of reservists and the

checking of railway communications. As everyone knows, such exercises take place

every year. To represent them as something hostile to Germany is absurd, to say the least.

[ In the recent History Stalin is taken severely to task for this TASS communiqué: "Up to the last moment I. V. Stalin tried to prevent a German attack and tried to influence the German Government. In order to test Germany's intentions and to influence her

government, Stalin caused TASS to publish this communiqué... It reflected Stalin's

incorrect assessment of the political and military atmosphere. Published at a time when war was already on our threshold, the TASS statement misguided Soviet public opinion and weakened the vigilance of the Soviet people and of the Soviet Armed Forces."

(IVOVSS, vol. I, p. 404.)]

The History is no doubt quite right in saying that it was much too late in the day to "test"

Germany's intentions; but, on the other hand it seems deliberately to exaggerate the TASS communique's soporific effect on the Soviet people.

The Russians were sufficiently used to reading between the lines of government

communications not to overlook the innuendo of the phrase: "These troop movements, one must suppose, are prompted by motives which have no bearing on Soviet-German relations." Far from being unduly reassured by this TASS communiqué, a very high proportion of the Russian people spent the next few days anxiously waiting for Berlin

"reactions" to it. According to Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow, thousands of people were glued to their wireless sets listening to news from Berlin. But they listened in vain. The German Government did not respond in any way to the TASS statement, and

did not even publish it. When, on the night of June 21, Molotov asked Schulenburg to call on him, it was too late.

Schulenburg, apparently wholly uninformed of Hitler's plans, was unable to give any

answer to Molotov's anxious questions as to "the reasons for Germany's dissatisfaction"; and not until he returned to the Embassy did he receive Ribbentrop's instructions to go to see Molotov and, "without entering into any discussions with him" to read out to him a cabled document which, framed in Hitler's most vituperative manner, was in fact a

declaration of war.

[As Shirer says, "It was a familiar declaration, strewn with all the shopworn lies and fabrications at which Hitler and Ribbentrop had become so expert... Perhaps ... it

somehow topped all the previous ones for sheer effrontery and deceit" (op. cit., p. 847).]

Sick at heart, the Ambassador drove back to the Kremlin just as dawn was breaking, and read the document to Molotov. According to Schulenburg's account, the Foreign

Commissar listened in silence, and then said bitterly: "This is war. Do you believe that we deserved that?"

PART TWO