Russia at war 1941-1945

The whole defence of the State frontier was based on the assumption that a surprise attack by Germany was out of the question, and that a powerful German offensive

would be preceded by a declaration of war, or by small-scale military operations, after which the Soviet troops could take up their defensive positions... No

operational or tactical army groups had been formed to repel a surprise attack.

[IVOVSS, vol. I, p. 474.]

The History goes on to quote a table showing that in the main invasion areas the Germans had a clear four or five-to-one superiority over the Russians; but, in addition to this numerical superiority, they also enjoyed great qualitative superiority, many of the Soviet soldiers in the frontier areas being fresh conscripts—youngsters without any knowledge or experience.

There was also, as already mentioned, an appalling shortage of modern tanks on the

Russian side, and of properly trained tank crews. The equipment of the frontier troops, says the History, "was not to be completed until the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942".

Even grimmer is the story of how the modern Russian planes in the western areas were destroyed, mostly on the very first day of the invasion.

The fast new planes required longer runways than had existed before; and it so happened that in the summer of 1941 a whole network of new airfields was being built in the

frontier zones. This building of new airfields and the reconstruction of the old ones was in the hands of the NKVD. And here comes, in the History, the suggestion of perhaps deliberate sabotage on the part of Beria's organisation. Taking no notice of the warnings from the military, Beria proceeded to build and rebuild a large number of airfields in the frontier areas simultaneously.

[In reality, there appears to be no "objective" proof that Beria was a traitor or a German agent, but he has always been available when in recent years awkward facts have had to be explained. This footnote should not suggest that the author has ever had any kindly feelings for Beria.]

As a result, our fighter aircraft were concentrated, on June 22, on a very limited number of airfields, which prevented their proper camouflage, manoeuvrability and dispersal. Also, some of the new airfields ... had been built much too close to the frontier, which made them specially vulnerable in the event of a surprise attack. Theabsence of a proper network of airfields on June 22 and the overcrowding of a smallnumber of the older airfields—the location of which was perfectly well known to theenemy—account for the very grave losses our air force suffered during the very firstdays of the war.

[IVOVSS, vol. I, pp. 476-7.]

Everything else at the frontier went wrong on that 22nd of June. The carrying capacity of the railways in the frontier areas—all acquired since 1939—was three or four times lower on the Russian side than on the German side. Also, the building of fortifications along the

"new" borders was only at an initial stage in June 1941. A plan had been drawn up in the summer of 1940 for fortifying this border, but it was a plan stretching over several years.

The fortifications on the "old" (1938) border had been dismantled, and, on the "new"

frontier only a few hundred pillboxes and gun emplacements had been built by the time the war started. Anti-tank ditches and other anti-tank and anti-infantry obstacles had been built to the extent of less than twenty-five per cent of the plan. The Germans were, of course, very well informed about these fortifications, airfields, etc. The History mentions not only numerous German commando raids that had taken place since 1939, but also the more than 500 violations of Soviet airspace by the Luftwaffe, 152 of them since January 1941. To avoid any unpleasantness with Hitler, the frontier troops, according to the History, had been given strict orders not to shoot down any German reconnaissance planes over Soviet territory.