In Chapter 3 («The Barbarians and Barbarian Innovations in the Army: auxilia, mimeri, foederati, buccel-larii»)
the author joins the opinions expressed by D. Hoffman (1969), R. Schulz (1993); R. Scharf (2001), E. P. Glushanin (1991), M. Speidel (1994), O. Schmitt (1994) and J. Haldon (1984), as well as refutes the schemes put forward by F. Aussaresses (1906; 1909). In particular, he states that the foederati as a kind of armed forces must have appeared no earlier than during the reign of Theodosius I (379–395), who seems to have organized two or three tens of such new units numbering 10,000—15,000 soldiers in total and composed mostly of Goths. This deduction looks plausible, indeed, because later on, for instance in the 6th century, there were normally 10–13 tagmata consisting of foederati in the imperial service.Chapters 4 («Just before the Spurt: the Isaurian Zeno and the Reformer Anastasius»), 6 («In chase of the Past 292
Grandeur: the Conqueror Justinian»), 10 («Between the Shahanshah and the Qaghan: Tiberius» Strictness, Maurice» s Economy and Phocas» Nearsightedness»), and 11 («To deal with the Armenians according to the Avar Scheme: Heraclius as a Warrior and Politician») have to do with considering both the events at the fronts and the changes in the army administration.
The crisis situation in the Eastern Roman army is reflected by the noted treatise «Strategikon» usually attributed to the emperor Maurice (582–602). However, the best of the surviving manuscripts points at Urbicius as its author. He may have been the same person as Urbicius, the Eastern Roman general in the rank of the magister militum per Orientem,
nicknamed Barbatus («Bearded Man»), who had been acting at the court of the emperor Anastasius (491–518). The text of this treatise is multilayer, and it obviously contains fragments of earlier writings. The oldest layer is a collection of fragments from several treatises dedicated to warfare matters. Close to them is an anonymous treatise known as «De militari scientia» (or the «Byzantine Anonymous»). The main enemies for Urbicius (see Chapter 5: «Perception of the Enemy: Neighbours of the Empire») are the peoples well known to him as good horsemen or even as exceptionally horsemen (nomads). Such are first of all the Hunno-Bulg-hars (called «Scythians», but they are not the Avars!), then the Persians and finally the Germanic («Blondhaired») peoples. As it may be observed from the text of the «Strategikon», Urbicius was very solicitous about how not to cede these foes in the art of fast maneuvering mounted warfare at a distance, with the use of the bow. True, it is difficult to say for sure when and in which volume within Anastasios» reign so timely a reform was put into practice in the imperial forces.Chapter? («Germanus, Cousin of Justinian I, Procopius of Caesarea, and the Tactical Secret of PseudoMaurice») narrates that further military reforms were realized in the age of Justinian, perhaps following his cousin Germanus» initiative. Their traces can be seen in both the Pseudo-Maurice» s treatise and the works of Procopius of Caesarea. The reforms included a scheme of the army array envisaging individual mobile tactical units (the so-called cursores-defensores
and plagiophylakes-hyperkerastai), as well as a two- or three-line battle order. It seems quite possible that an idea to detach the cursores and defensores came to the Latin-language milieu of the Roman army from the Alans and the Moors. On the other hand, the two- or three-line battle order with the plagiophylakes and hyperkerastai is rather a study innovation that appeared, judging by the Greek denominations of these units, in the midst of the high nobility of the Eastern Roman Empire; at the same time, this novelty may have been worked out by analogy with some achievements within the Western Mediterranean, in Italy.In scholarly literature (Mazzucchi, 1981) there is the opinion that such a tactical scheme to be seen in the «Strategikon» has no support in other sources. Indeed, the contemporary writings do not contain any of the terms in question. However, the fact is that the author of the «Strategikon» was a very cautious person frequently warning his readers against the broad spread of the available information about the tactical schemes and methods employed by the imperial army. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that one cannot find in any other texts direct 294