SS Charlemagne: The 33rd Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS

After the fall of Elsenau on the afternoon of the 25th, Russian tanks hooked round and attacked the rear of the French positions from the north, while Russian infantry blocked the escape route to the west. A group of eighty survivors, without ammunition or supplies, formed up and retreated to the north under the command of Lieutenant Fatin of the 1st/58th. With other stragglers, this constituted a company of 120 men in 3 platoons on the orders respectively of Officer-Cadets Chatrousse and Lapard, and Sergeant-Major Bonnafous. Following a painful march with the Russian tanks on their heels, they succeeded in joining up with a detachment commanded by Captain Obitz, and then Captain Martin. (The fate of this detachment will be dealt with later.)

As the Russians were advancing on Elsenau, SS-Colonel Zimmermann called on the command post of the XVIIIth Mountain Corps at Stegers to discuss the situation with General Hans Hochbaum. It was decided that the Charlemagne would withdraw to Stegers, while the command post of the XVIIIth Mountain Corps would withdraw to Flötenstein. At the end of the conference, General Hochbaum accompanied SS-Colonel Zimmermann to his command post’s garden gate just as the first Russian tank went past and shot up and set on fire SS-Colonel Zimmermann’s staff car. However, that night the corps command post managed to escape under cover of darkness and re-establish itself in Flötenstein as planned.

Next morning SS-Major-General Krukenberg met up with SS-Colonel Zimmermann at the corps command post in Flötenstein. Before departing for Neustettin, where the bulk of the Division was located, Krukenberg gave orders to SS-Colonel Zimmermann and SS-Second-Lieutenant Patzak to go to Greifenberg to arrange the departure of the replacement battalion to fill the gaps in the Charlemagne following these first engagements.

The 1st/58th, which was withdrawing west along the railway line to Bärenhütte, had difficulty maintaining its cohesion under fire from Russian tanks. That morning Captain Berrier’s 2nd/58th arrived complete and intact at Hammerstein, where it was joined by the remainder of the 2nd/57th and 1st/58th coming from Bärenwalde. The 3rd Company of the 58th was able to organise the defence of Bärenhütte, where Captain Raybaud had established the command post of his 1st/58th. This village became a strongpoint defended by four combat teams, two provided by the 2nd/58th under Captain Berrier, one from the 1st/58th under Captain Monneuse, and the last by Captain Roy from the 58th Regiment.

During the disastrous afternoon of the 25th, while the bulk of the enemy forces were putting everything into pushing north and overwhelming Elsenau, disdaining the road from Bärenhütte to Hammerstein, a light Russian reconnaissance vehicle was stopped by the outposts in front of Bärenhütte, the vehicle and a machine gun destroyed and several prisoners taken. The German second-lieutenant serving as liaison officer to the 57th Regiment was hit by two explosive bullets in the arm and was evacuated.

The village being situated outside their main line of advance, the Russians ignored Bärenhütte, their interminable columns moving on Elsenau. By 2000 hours, the whole of the infantry guns and anti-tank guns under Captain Roy had exhausted all their ammunition on these columns, which also became the target of the mortars of the 58th Regiment’s 4th and 8th Companies, provoking a Russian artillery riposte on Bärenhütte.

It was not until 2300 hours on the 25th that the Russians launched the first attack on the village, which they had encircled after nightfall. Majors de Vaugelas and Raybaud meanwhile prepared the methodical disengagement of their commands, which was to take place at midnight. The 58th Regiment’s 5th Company, under Sergeant-Major Eric Walter, was given the task of engaging the enemy during the move and of forming the rearguard thereafter.

As there were no means of evacuating them, the heavy guns were spiked and abandoned, and each man was given a Panzerfaust to carry. At the set hour the disengagement began under the direct orders of Brigadier Puaud along the only route still practicable, but which Russian patrols had tried to control several times during the evening. This was how Lieutenant Labuze, who had been sent on a liaison mission to Hammerstein, fell victim to an enemy patrol while passing through Geglenfelde.

From the beginning the disengagement took place so noisily that the Russians could not have helped noticing but, unaware of the weakness of the opposition, they failed to take advantage and kept a respectable distance, even though they could have inflicted a bloody blow by attacking the column as it withdrew.

The first elements of the Division began retreating to Neustettin at 1900 hours, a town about 18km west of Hammerstein.

26 February 1945