Stalin: A Biography

Lenin went back into hiding and sent furious letters to comrades in the Smolny Institute. This was the former girls’ secondary school in the centre of the capital where the Petrograd Soviet and the central bodies of the various parties — including the Bolsheviks — were based. Lenin was keeping up the pressure for armed action. Kerenski was considering his options and came to the conclusion that drastic action was required before the Bolsheviks moved against him. Tension rose on 18 October when Kamenev breached party discipline by stating the case against insurrection in the radical left-wing newspaper Novaya zhizn (‘New Life’).⁹ While not revealing precisely what the Bolshevik Central Committee had decided, he dropped very heavy hints. Lenin wrote to the Smolny Institute demanding the expulsion of the ‘strike-breakers’ Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party.¹⁰ On 19 October Zinoviev entered the proceedings with a letter to Rabochi put. Its contents were at variance with the position he had so recently espoused. Zinoviev claimed that Lenin had misrepresented his position and that Bolsheviks should ‘close ranks and postpone our disputes until circumstances are more propitious’.¹¹ Quite what was intended by Zinoviev is unclear. Perhaps he wanted to be able to go on arguing the case in the Central Committee (whereas Kamenev had undeniably breached confidentiality and jeopardised the party’s security).

This spat fell into the lap of Stalin as chief editor of Rabochi put. He decided to accept Zinoviev’s conciliatory move and print his letter.¹² But neither Zinoviev nor Stalin explained how Kamenev and Zinoviev as opponents of armed action could work with Lenin, Trotski and those committed to insurrection. On 20 October the Central Committee adjudicated. It was a fiery session and the first occasion when Stalin and Trotski seriously fell out with each other. Trotski was blunt. Stalin, he insisted, had been out of order in publishing Zinoviev’s letter. Sokolnikov, Stalin’s editor of Rabochi put, denied involvement in the editorial decision. Stalin stood exposed as the person responsible.¹³ Kamenev resigned from the Central Committee in despair at the policy of insurrection. Stalin continued to support Lenin’s policy, but the indignities of the debate induced him to present his resignation from the editorial board.¹⁴

He recovered his poise only when his request was rejected. This seemed the end of the matter; nobody knew how deeply he resented any shock to his self-esteem — and Trotski in 1940 was to pay the ultimate personal price. In terms of Bolshevik political strategy it remains unclear why Stalin was indulgent to Kamenev and Zinoviev. He never explained his thinking. But it would be in accord with his usual attitude to regard Kamenev and Zinoviev as allies in the struggle to reduce Trotski’s influence to a minimum. Lenin’s growing penchant for Trotski was a threat to the authority of Central Committee veterans. Another possibility is that Stalin sensed that the opponents of insurrection would ultimately stay with the party. Milyutin quickly moved back into line with official policy. Perhaps Stalin believed that a disunited party could not carry through the necessary armed manoeuvres against the Provisional Government. At any rate it was on his best form that he returned to the Central Committee on 21 October. Stalin, not Trotski, drew up the agenda for the forthcoming Second Congress of Soviets. His scheme marked down Lenin to speak on ‘land, war and power’, Milyutin on workers’ control, Trotski on ‘the current situation’ and Stalin himself on the ‘national question’.¹⁵

At the same Central Committee meeting Stalin was included in the list of ten members deputed to reinforce the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. He was at the centre of political operations.¹⁶ Already he belonged to the Military-Revolutionary Committee. He also had a vibrant influence in the Party Central Committee and, despite the contretemps over Zinoviev, was among its most trusted leaders.

The Provisional Government was the first to act in the contest with the Bolsheviks. On the morning of 24 October, on Kerenski’s orders, troops arrived at the premises of Soldat and Rabochi put, broke some machinery and seized equipment. Stalin was present. He watched as the edition which he had signed into print was seized and an armed guard stationed at the door. He can hardly have been surprised by Kerenski’s measures. Stalin’s anonymous editorial had stated:¹⁷