Although the Germans were content to allow the first two weeks of November to pass quietly, Zhukov was not and he ordered his front-line units to conduct aggressive local counterattacks to hinder the German build-up. A protracted series of skirmishes occurred around the village of Skirminova, east of Volokolamsk, between Rokossovsky’s tank brigades and the German 10.Panzer-Division on 8–12 November. In one skirmish, Katukov’s tankers destroyed a Pz.Bef.Wg. III, killing Oberst Theodor Keyser, commander of Panzer-Regiment 7 from 10.Panzer-Division. However, a counterattack on 14–15 November by Polkovnik Aleksandr A. Kotlyarov’s 58th Tank Division, recently arrived from the Far East, was less successful. Kotlyarov attacked the German 5.Infanterie-Division with over 200 light tanks, mostly BT-7 and T-26, but lost about one-third of them in less than two days of fighting. Zhukov had already executed several senior officers for battlefield failures or alleged cowardice and Kotlyarov apparently feared reporting that German infantry had defeated his tankers and opted to commit suicide instead. Zhukov’s spoiling attacks accomplished very little and prevented Rokossovsky from building up any appreciable reserves. Furthermore, in addition to Kotlyarov’s defeat, the new tank brigades suffered significant losses in these tank skirmishes – including about one-third of the available KV-1 and T-34 tanks. Predictably, the results of Zhukov’s local counterattacks in early November were not worth the loss of troops, equipment and supplies, and only served to set the conditions for one last German tactical success.
The German plan for the second phase of Typhoon was a classic pincer attack that completed ignored terrain, weather and logistics. Hoth and Höpner would crush Rokossovsky’s 16th Army and advance to Yakhroma, north of Moscow. Von Kluge, supported by Kuntzen’s panzers, would break through the Soviet center at Naro-Fominsk, and Guderian would seize Tula and then approach Moscow from the south. Von Bock optimistically hoped for a link-up between the three panzer groups east of Moscow.
However, Heeresgruppe Mitte was only committing thirty-six divisions to the final attack on Moscow, instead of the seventy he employed at the start of Typhoon, since nearly half of Heeresgruppe Mitte was being drawn to defend the flanks from Soviet counterattacks. Nor could von Bock rely upon the Luftwaffe, which had transferred a number of units to the Mediterranean theater and could commit only 300 aircraft to the second stage of Typhoon. Although the
The second phase of Typhoon began on 15 November with local actions by 1.Panzer-Division against the 30th Army around Kalinin, but the offensive proper began when Schaal’s LVI Armeekorps (mot.) seized a crossing over the Lama river on 17 November. The next day, Höpner smashed in Rokossovsky’s front near Volokolamsk and advanced toward Klin with the 2.Panzer-Division. Once again, German armour had made their main effort near the boundary between two Soviet armies; the breakthrough split apart the 16th and 30th armies. By late on 18 November, Rokossovsky’s army was falling back under heavy pressure toward Istra, while Lelyushenko was rushed to Klin to take charge of the crumbling 30th Army from Khomenko, an incompetent NKVD general. Lelyushenko had relatively little infantry to defend Klin, but armour from three different tank brigades and the remnants of the 58th Tank Division enabled him to build a barrier around the town.
The German panzers were operating better now, on the hard frozen ground, and regained a degree of their former mobility. Lelyushenko was able to hold off Hoth’s panzers at Klin for five days, thanks to the presence of a handful of T-34 and KV-1 tanks. However, the 2.Panzer-Division captured Solnechnogorsk on 24 November, which threatened Lelyushenko with encirclement and forced him to withdraw. Stalin was worried about this German advance, which brought their panzers to within striking distance of Moscow, and asked Zhukov if the city would be held. Zhukov replied that it could be, but that it would require 200 more tanks. Stalin replied that there were no more tanks in the RVGK reserve or even his own personal reserve – Zhukov already had everything available.138
By 25 November, the Red Army was running out of space and tanks.