Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

In less than a week, three Soviet armies attacked the German front between Ostashkov and Rzhev and broke the junction of Heeresgruppe Nord and Heeresgruppe Mitte. The 9.Armee’s XXIII Armeekorps was thrown back in disorder and a huge 150km-wide gap torn in the German front line. The Soviet steamroller fanned out, with the 3rd Shock Army advancing toward Kholm, the 4th Shock Army toward Velikiye Luki and the 22nd Army due south toward Yartsevo. This Soviet breakthrough was easily the worst crisis suffered during a winter filled with crises for the Germans, since it threatened the existence of Heeresgruppe Mitte. However, the Stavka had provided each of these three armies with only a single OTB and no cavalry, so their ability to exploit the victory was limited to a walking pace through deep snow. The Germans were not able to completely stop the Soviet avalanche, but they used their rail movement capability to move reinforcements to Kholm and Velikiye Luki, which became fortified strongpoints. To make matters worse for the Germans, Konev’s Kalinin Front achieved a significant breakthrough with its 39th Army that isolated the German XXIII Armeekorps at Olenino and threatened to envelop the entire 9.Armee at Rzhev with the 11th Cavalry Corps.

In contrast to the Northwest and Kalinin fronts, which had limited tank and cavalry forces to exploit their victories, Zhukov ensured that the Stavka provided his Western Front with the lion’s share of available armour, artillery and cavalry. However, Zhukov’s fifteen tank brigades were worn out from two months of continuous combat and in poor shape for a general offensive. The strength of four of the brigades on 1 January indicates that their remaining armoured strength was 10–35 per cent of authorized strength and also that no more than one-quarter of the available tanks were T-34s:

• The 20th Tank Brigade had five operational tanks (one T-34, one T-26, one T-60 and two Valentines)

• The 23rd Tank Brigade had six operational tanks (one T-34 and five Valentines)

• The 32nd Tank Brigade had twelve operational tanks (one KV-1, five T-34, six T-60)

• The 146th Tank Brigade had sixteen operational tanks (two T-34, ten T-60, four Valentines)

After being relatively sober-minded throughout 1941, Zhukov suddenly let Stalin’s vision of imminent German collapse cloud his judgment, and he believed that his Western Front could pull off a large-scale pincer attack toward Vyazma. His forces had already created a gap between 4.Panzerarmee and the 4.Armee near Borovsk and the 4.Armee’s right flank had also been torn apart near Sukhinichi. Zhukov weighted his armour on his right flank, with eight tank brigades supporting the 5th, 16th and 20th Armies, while he formed another pincer on his left with the 43rd, 49th and 50th Armies, which were supported by five tank brigades. From the German point of view, with von Kluge now in charge of Heeresgruppe Mitte, the situation was awful and the only possible solution – as demanded by Hitler – was to dig in and wait for the Red Army to outrun its limited supplies. The handful of remaining German tanks were gathered in central reserve near Vyazma.

Zhukov’s steamroller began on 20 January and simply shoved the German 4.Armee back along a 100km-wide front, recapturing Mozhaisk. Although the German XIII Armeekorps was nearly encircled at Yukhnov, Zhukov failed to trap any German units. His decimated tank brigades lacked the strength to conduct more than local actions and the fact that most of his armour was comprised of T-60 light tanks made it difficult for his forces to reduce a German Stützpunkt equipped with anti-tank guns. On 27 January, Zhukov decided to commit his own mobile group, Belov’s 1st Guard Cavalry Corps, to a deep raid toward Vyazma. Belov’s cavalrymen reached the outskirts of Vyazma but were turned away by a kampfgruppe from 5.Panzer-Division. Likewise, the 11th Cavalry Corps approaching from the north was prevented from cutting the Minsk–Moscow highway and Heeresgruppe Mitte’s main line of communications by a kampfgruppe from 11.Panzer-Division. By 1 February, Zhukov’s forces had been stopped at Gzhatsk and Yukhnov and a surprise German counterattack – led by infantry, not tanks – isolated the 33rd Army on the approaches to Vyazma. Zhukov began to display a tendency to reinforce failure by sacrificing three airborne brigades and more troops in an effort to reenergize his offensive. However, General der Infanterie Gotthard Heinrici, the new commander of 4.Armee, fought a very cagey battle against Zhukov that prevented him from either taking Vyazma or rescuing the 33rd Army, which was eventually crushed. Likewise, Model, who took over 9.Armee, managed to repair the holes in his line, hold onto Rzhev and eventually destroy the Soviet 39th Army.