Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

While the panzer divisions were assembling, von Manstein and his staff hastily developed an operational plan to rescue Paulus’ trapped AOK 6. The basic idea for Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm) was for a two-pronged attack led by Hoth, using both the XXXXVIII and LVII Panzerkorps. Previous experience in armoured operations indicated that a two-pronged offensive had the best chance of maintaining momentum, since the schwerpunkt could be switched between the two spearheads to keep the enemy off balance. Manstein wanted to use the German-held bridgehead across the Don at Nizhniy Chir, only 100km from Stalingrad, as the main jump-off point for XXXXVIII Panzerkorps to mount a relief operation, with LVII Panzerkorps attacking from Kotelnikovo. However, the two-pronged concept did not last long. Vatutin also recognized the importance of Nizhniy Chir and ordered Romanenko’s 5th Tank Army to attack Armee-Abteilung Hollidt on the Chir River on 7 December. Butkov’s 1st Tank Corps (reduced to fifty-two tanks), along with the 3rd Guards Cavalry corps and two rifle divisions, attacked the German screening positions on the Chir; the 336.Infanterie-Division held its ground against Soviet tank attacks but the 7.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division lost two of its battalions, allowing Butkov’s armour to penetrate the German screen and reach Sovkhoz (State Farm) 79. Von Manstein was forced to commit the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps to restore the front and Balck’s 11.Panzer-Division, which was still arriving, counterattacked into Butkov’s flank on 8 December. According to von Mellenthin’s well-known account in Panzerschlachten (1956), Balck knocked out fifty-three Soviet tanks – but there is no mention of German losses.⁸¹ Balck’s troops did find the bodies of 100 German rear-area troops who had been captured at Sovkhoz 79 and murdered by troops from the 157th Tank Brigade. Balck used this incident to raise combat morale in a statement to his troops, reminding that ‘the terrible fate of Sovkhoz 79’ awaited them if they were not victorious.⁸² In any case, Balck prevented Romanenko’s armour from getting across the Chir in strength, but Vatutin kept pressure on Hollidt’s forces and eventually forced the Germans out of Nizhniy Chir, which prevented the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps from joining Wintergewitter.

Unable to use the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps, von Manstein was forced to adapt Wintergewitter to a single prong launched by LVII Panzerkorps from Kotelnikovo. From that position, the distance to Stalingrad was 145km. Although Hitler promised that von Manstein would receive a dozen divisions to conduct Wintergewitter, by 10 December he only had Raus’ 6.Panzer-Division and part of 23.Panzer-Division in place. Although these two formations had a total of 200 tanks, there were no German infantry divisions on hand to support Hoth – just the remnants of two Romanian infantry divisions – which was an ominous sign that the operation was doomed to fail. Von Manstein wanted to wait for more reinforcements, but by this point it was clear that the Luftwaffe airlift was failing and that AOK 6’s situation was becoming critical. Wintergewitter was based on the assumption that AOK 6 would launch a breakout effort once Hoth’s armour approached close to Stalingrad, but by early December Paulus was so short of fuel and ammunition that his armoured units were all but immobilized. Consequently, von Manstein authorized Hoth to commence Wintergewitter on 12 December with just the 6 and part of the 23.Panzer-Divisionen, to be joined by 17.Panzer-Division when it arrived.

North of Kotelnikovo, General-major Nikolai I. Trufanov’s 51st Army deployed a very thin screen of three rifle divisions, three cavalry divisions and two tank brigades (with seventy-seven tanks) in hasty blocking positions across a 150km-wide front. Most of Trufanov’s units were at half-strength and had not constructed prepared defenses. When Hoth attacked with his two panzer divisions on line at 0630 hours on 12 December, they had little difficulty punching through Trufanov’s thinly-spread infantry. Raus’ 6.Panzer-Division overran a rifle division, then pivoted westward to overrun a cavalry division and knocked out ten Soviet tanks for no loss, then boldly advanced toward the Aksay River.⁸³ On their right flank, the 23.Panzer-Division was only able to make a limited attack with Kampfgruppe Illig (III./Pz.Regt 201 and I (SPW)./Pz.Gren.Regt 128), but secured its objectives and captured 250 prisoners and seventeen artillery pieces. Fliegerkorps IV managed to provide some air support, which helped Hoth’s armour in the initial actions, but as he advanced toward Stalingrad his flanks were only protected by unsteady Romanian and Luftwaffe troops.